The accelerating impacts of climate change affect people worldwide, with those already experiencing humanitarian crises often more severely impacted. Changes in the climate and extreme weather events result in food insecurity, livelihood disruptions and economic setbacks. With large gaps in both humanitarian and climate finance, it is imperative that the right assistance reaches the people and places who need it most.

Our interactive chart maps the volumes of climate finance (showing specifically official development assistance) against levels of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change around the world. Ahead of COP 29, we provide the latest data, with a specific focus on climate official development assistance (ODA) to fragile and conflict-affected states, which have limited ability to prepare and respond to climate change impacts.

With this data tool you can explore:

• how much climate ODA a country receives (both as a total and as a share of all ODA)
• how much is for the purpose of mitigation or adaptation (or both)
• how much funding goes to countries experiencing protracted humanitarian crisis (five or more consecutive years of humanitarian crisis)
• how much funding goes to countries experiencing food insecurity.

In addition, there are interactive bubble charts highlighting regional trends in:

• total climate ODA
• climate ODA as a share of all ODA
• climate finance per person
• adaptation and mitigation finance
• climate ODA and food security.

Transparent and accessible data helps highlight gaps and opportunities to those advocating for a more comprehensive response to climate change. For more on climate finance data, tracking, accountability and the triple nexus, check out some of the related links at the bottom of the page.

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• All countries experiencing protracted humanitarian crisis have high or very high climate vulnerability, with the exception of Ukraine, Türkiye, Jordan, Egypt and Latin American countries that are a part of the Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP).
• Data for the latest-available year (2022) shows that those countries receiving the most climate finance are generally not experiencing protracted humanitarian crises.
• Small island developing states (SIDS) receive the largest share of adaptation ODA, whereas countries with large populations but not experiencing protracted crisis (such as Brazil, India and China) receive the largest share of mitigation ODA.

Climate finance comes from both the public and private sectors, including as bilateral and multilateral official development assistance (ODA). It is distributed in the form of grants and loans. In 2009, developed nations pledged to provide a yearly sum of US$100 billion in climate finance to support low- and middle-income countries, a commitment that remains unfulfilled. In 2022, country-allocable climate ODA was, on average, 6.2% of ODA for countries not in protracted crisis. In countries experiencing protracted crises, the average proportion was 6.0%.

Figure 2 uses scaled bubbles to show the amount of total climate finance for each country. Countries to the left-hand side of the chart are less vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while countries on the right hand side are more vulnerable. Protracted crisis countries are shaded dark pink.

Findings: total climate ODA

• The most climate-vulnerable countries received lower amounts of total funding. This was particularly the case in Latin America and the Caribbean.
• Countries in protracted crises are among the most climate vulnerable; however, they receive a smaller volume of climate finance than countries that are less climate vulnerable. They also receive a smaller volume of funding than countries not experiencing protracted crises. For example, Tunisia, which in 2022 had low climate vulnerability and was not experiencing protracted crisis, received US$142.48 million in total climate ODA. In comparison Somalia was highly climate vulnerable and experiencing protracted crises but only received US$17.46 million.

Assessing climate ODA as a proportion of total ODA presents a different picture, and hints at a potential connection between funding volumes, vulnerability levels and precise targeting. If a country with high vulnerability to climate change receives a larger share of ODA as climate finance, this could indicate that funding is better aligned with need.

Figure 3 uses scaled bubbles to show climate ODA as a share of total ODA for each country. Countries to the left-hand side of the chart are less vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while countries on the right-hand side are more vulnerable. Protracted crisis countries are shaded dark pink.

Findings: climate ODA as a share of all ODA

• The average share of climate ODA as a percentage of total ODA is 6.13%. For countries that are not experiencing protracted crisis, this increases to 6.20%. For countries that are experiencing protracted crisis, this decreases to 5.99%. Only 11 of the 44 countries experiencing protracted crisis have an average share of climate ODA that is above the global average: Panama (63.35%), Colombia (27.06%), Brazil (18.21%), Costa Rica (16.99%), Dominican Republic (16.52%), Peru (14.99%), Ecuador (14.42%), Mexico (14.40%), Bangladesh (10.76%), Türkiye (6.61%), and Egypt (6.43%).
• The countries where climate ODA represents the greatest share of total ODA are Panama, Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. None of these have a high or very high vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
• In the countries most vulnerable to climate change, the share of ODA represented by climate ODA is significantly less than the global average for all countries of 6.13%. This includes Chad (1.88%), the Central African Republic (0.64%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.43%), Sudan (0.82%), and Afghanistan (0.27%). All 5 are also currently experiencing protracted crisis.

Calculating the volume of climate finance received as a ‘per capita’ figure provides an additional perspective for assessing the sufficiency of climate finance to a country.

Over the last two decades, the amount of climate finance allocated per person exhibits significant disparities (particularly between countries that are and are not experiencing protracted crisis). In 2022, the average climate ODA per person globally was US$21.32. In ODA-eligible countries not facing protracted crises this average climate ODA rose to US$29.28 per person. In contrast, countries that are experiencing protracted crises received only US$3.05 per person.

Figure 4 uses scaled bubbles to show the amount of per-person climate ODA for each country. Countries to the left-hand side of the chart are less vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while countries on the right-hand side are more vulnerable. Protracted crisis countries are shaded dark pink.

Findings: climate finance per person

• Per-person climate finance demonstrates a different relationship to climate vulnerability than total volumes. The small island developing states (SIDS) – including those in Oceania – receive higher per-person climate finance than any group of countries, which is in keeping their prioritisation under the UNFCCC system.
• Outside of the SIDS, the countries with the largest climate finance per person are Georgia (US$24.87), Montenegro (US$21.81), Moldova (US$19.43), Serbia (US$19.07) and Armenia (US$18.02) – none of which are currently experiencing protracted crises. All of the above also have low vulnerability to climate.
• Countries experiencing protracted crises, particularly those with high vulnerability to climate, receive much less climate finance per person. The most climate-vulnerable countries are Eritrea (US$0.15), Guinea-Bissau (US$1.18), Sierra Leone (US$1.41), Madagascar (US$1.02), and Zimbabwe (US$1.03) . Of these, none are currently experiencing protracted crises.

Adaptation ODA plays a pivotal role in limiting the effects of climate-induced disasters by equipping communities with the resources needed to withstand these shocks. This encompasses a range of strategies, including ecosystem-based adaptations, innovative financing mechanisms and investments in resilience-building. Mitigation ODA focuses specifically on emissions reductions.

While the UNFCCC recognises the equal importance of adaptation and mitigation efforts, the funding disparity in 2022 was stark, with US$9.0 billion allocated for mitigation and only US$1.8 billion for adaptation.

A share of adaptation ODA greater than the global average may suggest its prioritisation. However, it is important to note that current adaptation finance is estimated to fall at least 5–10 times short of what is needed to prepare low-income countries for accelerating climate impacts. It is also crucial to scrutinise the capacity of specific projects funded by this climate finance to effectively address need.

Figure 5 uses scaled bubbles to show the amount of adaptation ODA for each country. Countries to the left-hand side of the chart are less vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while countries on the right-hand side are more vulnerable. Protracted crisis countries are shaded dark pink.

Findings: adaptation as a share of ODA

• In 2022, country-allocable adaptation ODA was 1.49% per country. For countries experiencing protracted crisis, the average proportion was 1.14%.
• Adaptation finance as a share of ODA was highest in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, especially Dominican Republic (13.88%), Comoros (12.20%), Bolivia (8.59%), St. Lucia (6.58%), and Jamaica (6.03%). Of these countries, only Comoros is categorised as having very high climate vulnerability.
• In some countries, the volumes of adaptation finance represented as a share of ODA are very small. For example, the share in Yemen was 0.003% (of US$3.7 billion total ODA) and in Congo it was 0.03% (of US$729 million total ODA), both of which have very high vulnerability to climate.
• The countries with very high levels of climate vulnerability and experiencing protracted crisis are mostly located in Africa. The average share of ODA that adaptation finance represented in these countries in 2022 is 0.84%.

Adaptation and mitigation finance are equally vital components to tackling the climate crisis. Finance targets should be aligned with nationally determined priorities for both mitigation and adaptation. While longer term benefits are possible with mitigation projects (such as energy transitions), adaptation projects to alleviate impacts from both sudden- and slow-onset events (like droughts, flooding or sea-level rise) are critical to preserving development gains. In general, most countries receive more mitigation than adaptation.

Figure 6 shows the portion of total climate ODA represented by mitigation, dual purpose (both mitigation and adaptation) and adaptation ODA to the countries experiencing protracted crisis. These are ordered with those countries most vulnerable to climate change impacts at the top.

Findings: adaptation and mitigation in protracted crisis countries

• The average share of total climate ODA represented by adaptation in protracted crisis countries is 42.76%, and the average share of total climate ODA represented by mitigation is 44.77% (9.47% is dual purpose: both mitigation and adaptation). For protracted crisis countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (such as Chad, Somalia, South Sudan and Haiti), adaptation finance is often greater than mitigation finance. However, determining the appropriate allocations for mitigation and adaptation finance requires a comprehensive understanding of a country’s priorities and the contextual factors influencing funding decisions.

Climate change is producing more frequent and more intense periods of drought, forest fires and flooding, all of which have a direct impact on harvests and food cultivation. Globally, the number of people experiencing food insecurity is growing. About 80% of those experiencing food insecurity are experiencing protracted crises. Adaptation finance is a critical part of building resilience to food insecurity, funding changes in agriculture and preparing communities for climate impacts like droughts and floods.

Figure 7 uses scaled bubbles to show the amount of adaptation ODA for each country with a food insecurity gap in 2022. Countries to the left-hand side of the chart are less vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while countries on the right-hand side are more vulnerable. Countries higher up the chart have a more severe food insecurity gap. Protracted crisis countries are shaded dark pink.

Findings: adaptation and mitigation finance

• Countries experiencing the most severe food insecurity gaps also have the highest vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Of the 10 countries with the most severe food insecurity, 9 are also experiencing protracted crisis.
• Countries with the highest climate vulnerability and the most severe levels of food insecurity receive more adaptation finance than those with lower levels of climate vulnerability.
• In 2022, countries with less severe food insecurity gap scores – Benin (1%) and Senegal (2%) – received more adaptation finance (US$38.2, US$55.59 and US$2.23 millions, respectively). Pakistan (19%) and Lebanon (14%) had high food insecurity gap scores, but received significantly less adaptation finance in 2022 (US$20.81 million and US$6.81 million respectively).
• In 2022, there was no clear pattern between the severity of the food insecurity gap and adaptation finance. South Sudan, which had the highest food insecurity (food insecurity gap score 29%) and Yemen (food insecurity gap score 28%) – received just over US$27.89 million and US$0.12 million in adaptation finance respectively.

These charts present insights into the climate finance landscape, highlighting the countries and regions that receive the most finance, and where gaps remain. Action is needed to ensure improved responses to people’s needs, improved quantity and quality of climate financing and improved transparency and reporting.

Accelerating climate impacts can create new (or worsen existing) humanitarian crises. In the context of the existing humanitarian finance gap, it is critical that resources are targeted and channelled effectively across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. Climate finance is a critical component of resilience-building, yet not enough of it reaches the places that need it the most, due in part to the challenges particular to fragile and conflict-affected states. Places facing prolonged conflict and socioeconomic fragility need more and better finance that is informed by local priorities and rapidly deployed to address climate losses and damages.

Climate finance

This data includes all ODA disbursements reported to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and marked with a relevant Rio marker by DAC members, multilateral organisations and other government donors that voluntarily report to the OECD DAC. The two Rio markers can be used to report the relevance of any ODA funding in terms of:

• Mitigation, where a project contributes to stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere by promoting efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas emissions or enhance greenhouse gas sequestration
• Adaptation, where a project seeks to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to current and/or expected impacts of climate change.

We include ODA marked as principal only for both markers.

Protracted crisis

Our definition of protracted crisis countries includes countries with five or more consecutive years of UN-coordinated appeals, as of the year of analysis. The types of appeals and response plans used to determine this classification are outlined in ‘UN-coordinated appeals’.

We have chosen this approach to give an indication of the countries that have consistently, for a number of years, experienced humanitarian needs at a scale that requires an international humanitarian response. Those needs can be limited to specific geographical regions or populations (such as forcibly displaced people).

Food insecurity

Acute food insecurity classification data is from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification / Cadre Harmonisé (IPC/CH), supplemented by UNOCHA’s Humanitarian Programming Cycle (HPC). From IPC/CH, we classify people living in ‘crisis’, i.e. Phase 3 or higher, as being acutely food insecure. From UNOCHA HPC, we classify those in need of humanitarian assistance under the food security sector as being acutely food insecure. Acute food insecurity numbers and phases are as reported or projected by the data year’s most comprehensive IPC/CH survey or UNOCHA HPC appeal year.

Country-level food insecurity phases are calculated based on IPC/CH’s methodology of the highest phase experienced by at least 20% of the population. For countries with only UNOCHA HPC data, we estimate whether the country-level phase is either above or below equivalent Phase 3 (3-, 3+) based on the number of people in need under the food security sector.

For a trend comparison at a country level, we use data from before the Covid-19 pandemic (2017/18/19), against the most recent data year available (2022/23). Data for 2023 is preliminary, relying on partial data, projections from IPC/CH and forward-looking estimates from UNOCHA. These estimates are subject to change, both at a country level and in terms of which countries are assessed.

Food insecurity severity is calculated based on an adapted Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT; α=1) index that weights higher phases of food insecurity to produce a comparable index of severity.

This initial version of the interactive was a collaborative effort, including writing from Erica Mason and Thea Wright, analysis by Guilherme Monteiro and Dan Walton, technical development by Thatcher Kaliisa, and editorial guidance from Simon Murphy.