

# **Global Humanitarian Assistance 2000**

**An Independent Report  
Commissioned by the IASC  
from Development Initiatives  
May 2000**

## Global Humanitarian Assistance 2000

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The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established in June 1992 as a result of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182. Under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the IASC coordinates inter-agency humanitarian assistance in response to complex and major emergencies. The members of the IASC are the Heads, or their designated representatives, of the United Nations Operational Agencies: The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The World Food Programme (WFP), The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), The World Health Organisation (WHO). In addition, there is a standing invitation to The World Bank, The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The non-governmental organisation (NGO) consortia The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), InterAction and The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) also have a permanent invitation to attend.

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It has drawn heavily on existing work on humanitarian assistance by the Center for International Cooperation at New York University, the Humanitarianism and War Project at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies and the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute in the UK. It has also benefited greatly from the comment, analysis and perspective of NGOs and NGO Coalitions concerned with humanitarian assistance.

We hope that the report is an accurate and truthful record of aid for Humanitarian Assistance in the 1990s and of the forces that helped to shape it. The authors take full responsibility for the content of the report, which does not necessarily represent the views of the IASC, OCHA or the Government of the UK. Development Initiatives would be pleased to receive comments and any corrections to errors of fact or interpretation.

It has been a privilege to work with the IASC and the humanitarian community on this report.

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## Foreword

During its last meeting of 1998, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Working Group requested OCHA to undertake a study of trends in humanitarian aid flows over the last decade. Following consultations with a number of IASC member agencies, terms of reference were drawn up, consultants identified and funding for the study secured. Development Initiatives of the UK have now edited the report.

I believe that this work has achieved extremely interesting results, which are developed in the following pages. Clearly, humanitarian funding trends of the last decade have undergone major changes, yielding important lessons for IASC members in the years to come.

This is a first of what is intended to be a series of targeted studies on humanitarian aid flows. Future editions will highlight the contributions made by communities and governments of countries affected by disasters and will include analysis of the humanitarian roles of NGOs, non-OECD donors and the private sector. We hope that these reports will contribute to public understanding of the international financing of global humanitarian assistance and to meeting the needs of people exposed to the human suffering and material destruction caused by disasters and emergencies.

OCHA wishes to extend its appreciation to the Government of the United Kingdom (Department for International Development) whose financial support made this publication possible.

Ernest Chipman  
Chief, Complex and Emergency Response Branch,  
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Geneva  
May 2000

# Summary

## Background

On any day during the last decade, humanitarian organisations were trying to get emergency relief to people in up to 50 places around the globe. More than four million people have been killed in violent conflict since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Thirty countries have been affected by complex humanitarian crises. Natural disasters have caused the deaths of over 150,000 people each year. At any point in the 1990s, more than a hundred million people were living lives blighted by conflict and natural disaster. An average of 35 million people were displaced from their homes. Overwhelmingly, those affected by disaster live in developing countries. Many spend each day of their lives struggling with poverty and insecurity.

Globalised communication and the end of the Cold War have meant that the reality of natural disasters, wars and complex emergencies has been visible to billions of people through the media. All over the world, the public have made personal donations and urged their governments to respond quickly and generously to relieve human suffering.

But during the 1990s the gulf between the wealthy and secure and those suffering from acute need has grown. Rich countries have continued to get richer. Inequality has continued to increase both between and within countries. Despite growing affluence, developed country governments have become progressively meaner in their contributions to official aid. Average per capita wealth in the OECD increased from US\$21,000 to US\$28,000 per year during the 1990s. Of that, just over US\$5 a year was given to Humanitarian Assistance.

Two major factors changed the external environment for humanitarian assistance during the last decade of the 20th Century. The end of the Cold War saw an upsurge in instability and led to a fundamental reappraisal of foreign and security policies. At the same time, the reality of globalisation became apparent to politicians and the public. There has been a growing awareness that environmental threats and humanitarian crises are increasingly transnational. The resurgence of conflict and displacement within Europe reminded OECD donor countries that development is fragile and that even developed countries can be directly affected by acute humanitarian crises.

The 1990s brought unprecedented challenges for agencies concerned with emergency relief and raised questions on the role of humanitarianism. At the start of the decade there was a new optimism that the international community could intervene in crises, protect human rights and ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered to people

in need. But experience in Somalia undermined confidence in the idea of external engagement in complex emergencies. Many governments became reluctant to intervene, especially if this meant a military involvement. Two years later the international community faced the accusation that its reluctance to act in Rwanda had contributed to the subsequent genocide.

These experiences and the hard-hitting evaluations that followed caused donors and aid agencies to fundamentally review their mandates, capacities and management of resources. The decade ended with the Kosovo crisis and the first-ever intervention by NATO outside its boundaries in the name of humanitarianism.

### Financial Trends

Overall the 1990s witnessed a major jump in spending on Humanitarian Assistance. Having virtually doubled from 1990 to reach US\$4.6 billion in 1991, spending rose to a peak of US\$5.7 billion in 1994, reaching 10 percent of ODA for the first and only time. After declining for the following 3 years, in 1998 Humanitarian Assistance increased to US\$4.5 billion, close to the average for the previous seven years.

As a share of GNP, Humanitarian Assistance has dropped from 0.03 percent to 0.02 percent over the decade – twenty cents out of every thousand dollars.

In 1998, one fifth of total Humanitarian Assistance was spent on supporting refugees and asylum seekers in donor countries. In 1997, OECD countries hosted 400,000 asylum seekers and used US\$647 million worth of ODA to subsidise the costs; Low Income Countries received almost ten times the number of refugees and only US\$341.3 million was forthcoming to help support them.

The sources of Humanitarian Assistance remained heavily concentrated. About a third of Humanitarian Assistance has come from one donor (US). The top five donors contributed two thirds of the total. The share of total ODA to Humanitarian Assistance varied between donors from less than 1 percent to more than 25 percent.

The decade has seen the rise of the European Community Humanitarian Office which became the single biggest donor of Humanitarian Assistance in 1994.

Spending through non-governmental channels increased during the 1990s to the point where most donors channeled at least a quarter of their Humanitarian Assistance through NGOs – some very much more.

Voluntary giving by the public has been generous and sustained.

### Control of Humanitarian Assistance shifted to bilateral donors

Through the decade there have been increasingly strong calls for global, integrated and coordinated responses. At the same time, there has been unprecedented fragmentation of responsibility for Humanitarian

Assistance resources, with bilateral donors and ECHO controlling much larger shares of Humanitarian Assistance and with an increase in the earmarking of funds to specific activities.

- At the end of the 1980s, around 45 percent of Humanitarian Assistance was given in multilateral contributions to the UN. Bilateral donors controlled half of the total and 5 percent was controlled by the European Commission. In 1991 Humanitarian Assistance doubled, but the share given in multilateral contributions to the UN fell to a quarter and remained at that level throughout the decade. In the late 1990s, bilateral donors controlled over 60 percent of Humanitarian Assistance with the European Commission making up the difference.
- Because of the increases in Humanitarian Assistance, the volume of the UN multilateral share went up by about 30 percent in real terms over the decade. But European Commission expenditure quintupled and bilateral donors controlled a collective humanitarian budget of nearly US\$3 billion, compared with less than \$1 billion at the start of the decade.

### Global response favours high profile and 'local' humanitarian emergencies

The response to humanitarian need has been heavily skewed in favour of particular countries and regions.

- Funding available for each affected person in the Great Lakes region and in former Yugoslavia has been roughly twice the average for people in need in neighbouring countries.
- For some countries, the international response met less than 10 percent of estimated needs. Eritrea in 1998 received less than US\$2 for every person affected by the emergency; former Yugoslavia received US\$166.

Higher profile situations that were well up the political agenda, and which involved not just a humanitarian response but political, diplomatic and military engagement, got the lion's share of attention and resources. Geo-political and other national interests often drove humanitarian response. Proximity has been a key factor. European donors have been strongly oriented to the crisis in the Balkans; the USA, Canada and Spain were major contributors to relief following Hurricane Mitch. Ethnic minorities in donor countries have put effective pressure on governments and NGOs to respond to crises in their countries of origin.

Over the decade, the proportion of needs met was higher in Africa than in other regions. But spending per capita was very significantly lower in Africa than in Asia, Europe and Latin America.

The already unequal allocation of resources was reinforced by media



attention; coverage of humanitarian situations, particularly where troops are engaged, has been powerful and prolonged. This affected domestic political commitments and public engagement. Over the last decade, the media itself became a humanitarian actor, no longer simply reporting on humanitarian situations but helping to shape them.

Natural disaster assistance increased in response to the number and severity of disasters but it fluctuated widely in reaction to individual emergencies. The response to Hurricane Mitch alone was more than the total response to all natural disasters for the previous five years combined.

Emergency food aid increased from a low of 1.7 million tons in 1989 to nearly five million tons in 1999. Recipients of emergency food aid have been dominated by some of the world's poorest countries, with Sub Saharan Africa accounting for nearly two thirds of all relief food aid over the decade

### **Development Cooperation is less concerned with unstable countries**

Humanitarian assistance takes place in a context of development cooperation. The resources for both come from Official Development Assistance. Political and administrative responsibility is often shared by the same ministers and departments.

Over the decade, many donors adopted more integrated approaches to foreign, security and cooperation policy. There was widespread acknowledgement of the need for 'intelligent' responses – doing relief with development in mind and vice versa, and linking political, economic and humanitarian interventions.

There have been serious efforts to adapt funding systems and institutions in order to deliver the most appropriate humanitarian and development assistance. However, attempts to bridge the 'gap' between relief and development were mostly in the form of small compartmentalised funds rather than increased flexibility.

As well as the decline in total development assistance, the 1990s saw major changes in the aid regime. The emphasis on poverty reduction increased: many donors adopted the International Development Targets, and integrated responses stressing the importance of governance and 'ownership' by developing countries became popular.

In order to achieve results and show progress on the International Development Targets, donor policy has been influenced by the need to spend money in countries where aid can be effective – 'good policy' countries. Such a 'results culture' does not sit comfortably with humanitarian assistance; 'good policy' countries are by definition not countries affected by instability and disasters. Countries affected by disasters often experience severe isolation. Foreign investment declines, commercial links evaporate, diplomatic, academic and tourist links often suffer. This isolation is reinforced by a results-oriented

development assistance policy that specifically excludes many vulnerable countries from long-term development assistance.

The trends of the 1990s revealed the serious risk that focusing on effective aid in good policy countries will further marginalise countries affected by instability and disaster.

### **Humanitarian Assistance underpins support for development cooperation**

There was no evidence of change in attitudes to human suffering or the need for aid during the 1990s. Public support for humanitarian assistance remained robust, founded on a strong moral imperative.

Humanitarian Assistance increased its share of ODA over the decade, from 4 percent at the end of the 1980s to more than 8 percent throughout the second half of the 1990s. The deep-rooted commitment to humanitarian assistance continued to underpin both public and political support for long term poverty reduction and sustainable development.

Public and political engagement with humanitarian situations has been wide ranging involving solidarity groups, NGOs, local authorities and individuals. It was sustained partly by media coverage that ranged from human interest to political, military and economic analysis. The focus of public attention on ‘high profile’ emergencies re-inforced the neglect of people in situations well out of the public eye.

### **Matching expectations with capacity**

Demands placed on Humanitarian Assistance resources increased dramatically during the 1990s. Humanitarian agencies were increasingly expected to resolve situations, not just relieve suffering. Humanitarian response routinely involved political, diplomatic and military interventions. Much discussion over the decade focused on how to define the scope and limits to humanitarian action and the danger of humanitarian action being used as a substitute for political solutions. Politicisation has challenged the humanitarian mandate, making it more difficult for agencies to be neutral and thus to have access to affected populations.

A climate of introspection and self criticism seems to have led to neglect of the achievements of humanitarian action: the lives saved, the people protected, the prevention of epidemics and the foundations for rebuilding lives and communities.

Serious efforts have been made to match expectations with appropriate capacity. However, some fundamental contradictions have emerged:

- The decade has seen ever-stronger calls for a global, coordinated, integrated response to humanitarian need. But over the same period, control over resources has become more fragmented as the share managed by bilateral donors has increased.

- Creating intelligent approaches to linking relief and development is undermined by development cooperation policies that exclude unstable countries from long-term development cooperation relationships.

There is serious concern that these contradictions and the concentration of Humanitarian Assistance on a few, ‘popular’ situations, may increase the isolation of already-vulnerable countries. These issues need to be addressed, if humanitarian agencies are to increase their capacity to protect human rights and respond equitably to human need.

### Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific States	IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability & Performance on Humanitarian Assistance	IGC	International Grains Council
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process	IRC	International Rescue Committee
CEC	Commission of the European Communities	IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
CNN	Cable News Network	MEUR	Million Euros
CRS	DAC Creditor Reporting System	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD)	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)	NIS	Newly Independent States
DG	Directorate General	OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office	ODA	Official Development Assistance
ECTF	European Community Task Force	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ECU	Former currency of the European Union	OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
EPRS	Emergency Preparedness and Response Section	PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
FAC	Food Aid Convention	SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement	UN	United Nations
GNP	Gross National Product	UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
GTC	Grain Trade Convention	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	UNITAF	United Nations Task Force
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank	UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons	UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
		WFP	World Food Programme
		WHO	World Health Organisation

## Measuring Humanitarian Assistance: a note on the data

The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2000 focuses mainly on *official aid flows* – that is money given as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by governments of donor countries who are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and the Commission of the European Communities.

To be counted as Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid has to meet certain conditions. It must be undertaken by the official sector; it must be given to developing countries as defined by the DAC; the promotion of economic development and welfare must be the main objective; it must be given on concessional financial terms – if it is a loan, then the grant element must be at least 25%.

‘Humanitarian Assistance’ is the part of ODA allocated to emergency or humanitarian relief activities, as opposed to long term ‘Development Assistance’. Most donors account for their Humanitarian Assistance separately from their Development Assistance, but their definitions of what can and cannot be included in Humanitarian Assistance vary. However all donors report to the DAC every year on their expenditure on ‘emergency and distress relief’.

There are two main sources of data on aid for Humanitarian Assistance: the OECD DAC Statistics and the OCHA Financial Tracking System on UN Consolidated Appeals.

Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) bring together all of the UN Agencies plus International Organisations and NGOs. Appeals are made for individual countries or for specific situations where Humanitarian Assistance is sought from the international community.

Since 1992, US\$24.5 billion has been spent through the CAPs – around half the total expenditure on Humanitarian Assistance reported through the OECD DAC. For global analysis, this report has relied as much as possible on the OECD DAC data. For more detailed breakdowns by

country, sector or implementing agency it has relied on the OCHA Financial Tracking System.

### Multilateral and Bilateral ODA

The DAC classifies all ODA into one of two categories: Multilateral or Bilateral.

ODA is classified as multilateral if it is given to international institutions whose members are governments and who conduct all or a significant part of their activities in developing countries and if the contributions are pooled and disbursed entirely at the multilateral institution’s discretion. All other ODA is bilateral.

Donors often choose to spend their bilateral ODA through multilateral agencies. This is sometimes referred to as ‘multi-bi’. Because multilateral agencies are not able to spend this money at their own discretion it is not included in the multilateral category. Thus multilateral ODA does not equal all funds spent by multilateral agencies. It equals only the funds over which multilateral agencies have control over where and how money can be spent.

### Total Humanitarian Assistance

Total Humanitarian Assistance has been calculated from OECD DAC data as follows:

- Total bilateral ODA for emergency and distress relief including emergency food aid reported to the DAC by all donors plus the European Commission.

Plus

- Total multilateral contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA

Plus

- Multilateral contributions to WFP in proportion to the share of WFP’s operational expenditure allocated to relief.

Most expenditure on Humanitarian Assistance through other multilateral agencies such as UNICEF or UNDP is from the bilateral ODA category.

# 1

## Trends in Funding Humanitarian Assistance

In the last ten years, the people of thirty countries have been affected by complex humanitarian emergencies. Over three hundred natural disasters have been reported, affecting people in 108 countries and killing 150,000 people a year.<sup>1</sup> More than four million people have been killed in violent conflict since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.

At any point in the 1990s, an average of 35 million people were displaced, forced to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Overwhelmingly, those affected by disaster live in developing countries and many spend each day of their lives struggling with poverty and insecurity.


Technological advance and the end of the Cold War have meant that natural disasters, wars and complex emergencies have been visible to billions of people through television, radio, newspapers and websites.

Over the past decade, the rich countries have got richer and inequality has increased both between and within countries.<sup>2</sup> What has happened to the global effort to respond to humanitarian need? In this chapter we explore how much money has been given by governments and international agencies over the past ten years; how well the funding has matched the need; what share of wealth and development cooperation are given to Humanitarian Assistance and which countries are the most generous.

### How much Humanitarian Assistance does the world give?

Overall, the 1990s have witnessed a major jump in spending on Humanitarian Assistance. Post-Cold War instability coupled with an increase in natural disasters and environmental hazards resulted in spending almost doubling in 1991 to reach US\$4.6 billion. It continued to rise

**Figure 1.1 Total ODA to Humanitarian Assistance 1988–1998**



Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Table 1.


through the early 1990s, peaking in 1994 at US\$5.7 billion and exceeding 10 percent of total ODA for the first and only time.

From 1995 there were three years of decline. In 1998 an increase of around US\$500 million brought funding from OECD governments for Humanitarian Assistance to around US\$4.5 billion<sup>3</sup> – a sharp increase from the 1997 figure.

Figure 1.1. shows Official Development Assistance (ODA) spent on Humanitarian Assistance in developing countries as reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). But these figures do not show the whole picture.

In addition, DAC donors have given around US\$500 million in emergency assistance to countries of central and eastern Europe.

**Figure 1.2 Humanitarian Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe**



A large number of countries outside the DAC also give Humanitarian Assistance. In 1999, OCHA reported a total of 27 non-DAC countries that gave a total of US\$17 million. The largest non-DAC donors have been China, Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the Russian Federation, India, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and Pakistan.

Reliable figures for global voluntary giving from the public for humanitarian causes are not available but there is no doubt that the sums involved are considerable. The Spanish public donated US\$150 million to NGOs and institutions working in response to Hurricane Mitch<sup>4</sup> alone.


Probably the biggest single, undocumented response to humanitarian need comes from the communities and countries affected. One measure is the number of refugees who are given asylum. In 1998, three quarters of the 13.5 million refugees and asylum seekers needing protection were living in developing countries. A total of around 10 million people were thus being supported in countries with an average per capita income of less than US\$8 a day – most of them in countries where the average income is less than US\$2 a day.

### Increases in Humanitarian Assistance tend to be sustained

Over the last quarter century, trends in ODA for humanitarian emergencies show a distinctive pattern: periodic increases in humanitarian aid tend to be followed by a plateau and then another rise. Funding does not fall back to its 'pre-plateau' level.


In real terms bilateral aid for humanitarian emergencies remained broadly stable for much of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. From 1973 to 1985, emergency spending averaged around US\$500 million a year. In the mid-1980s, driven by the need to respond to famine in Sudan and Ethiopia, Humanitarian Assistance doubled. Emergency funding remained at around its new level of some US\$1 billion a year until 1991, when it doubled again and increased year on year until 1994. Even at its low point in 1997, bilateral funding for Humanitarian Assistance was more than twice its average for the late 1980s and four times the average for the previous decade in real terms.

**Figure 1.3 Long-term Trends in Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance**



Source: OECD DAC Statistics

**Figure 1.4 Long term Trends in Total ODA**




Source: OECD DAC Statistics

This is in contrast to the pattern for ODA as a whole, which showed a slow increase through the 1970s and 1980s before dropping to its levels of previous decades. In 1997, ODA dropped to the same level of funding as 1981 in real terms. Even the increase in 1998 – largely fuelled by response to the economic crisis in Asia – only put spending back to its 1984 level.

In the face of these drastic cuts in total ODA in the 1990s, Humanitarian Assistance has been relatively protected. It has increased its share of the declining ODA budget, growing from around 4 percent at the end of the 1980s to more than 8 percent for all of the second half of the 1990s.

Not all of this growth represents an increased commitment to humanitarian issues – it also includes substantial spending on domestic support for refugees who have sought asylum in donor countries.

**Figure 1.5** Humanitarian Assistance as a share of total ODA



Source: OECD DAC Statistics

### Refugee spending in donor countries raises controversy

Rules for what can and cannot be included in ODA figures are set by the donor group in the OECD, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). These rules are important, since the ODA measure is used to judge donors' performance against the long-standing commitment to spend 0.7 percent of GNP on aid.


Since 1992 donors have been allowed to include in their Official Development Assistance figures, money spent on refugees and asylum seekers living in the donor country during their first year of residence. Seventeen out of 21 donors have done so at least once, and 12 do so on a regular basis.

The sums spent are significant – in 1998 amounting to just under a billion dollars – or more than a third of bilateral Humanitarian Assistance.

The inclusion of these costs has been controversial. Many NGOs have criticised the transfer of funds from the already small allocations



**Figure 1.6 Use of Humanitarian ODA to pay for refugee costs in the donor country**




Source: OECD DAC Statistics

for international development and poverty reduction to support expenses formerly met by other government departments. The methods of calculation have also been controversial in a number of countries.<sup>5</sup>

The trend in asylum applications does not match the trend in spending ODA on domestic provision for asylum seekers. It reflects more the decisions of individual donors to include their spending as part of their ODA. The USA did not report any spending on refugees in the US as part of its ODA until 1997 and only reported substantially in 1998, when US\$387 million out of its total expenditure of US\$898 (43 percent) million was shown to be spent at home.

There is also a marked difference in the way that countries treat this spending. The UK, which in 1998 received 46,020 asylum seekers, did not use any of its ODA to fund their costs. Of the 12 donors who did use international aid to support refugees at home in 1998, the costs

**Figure 1.7 Numbers of asylum applications**




Source: US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1999

charged per asylum seeker ranged from US\$231 to more than US\$16,000.<sup>6</sup>

This funding of domestic costs in OECD countries from international development assistance also highlights the fundamental inequity in the system, since most refugees are hosted by poor countries. In 1997, 3.7 million refugees were received in countries with an annual per capita income of less than two dollars a day. The total bilateral ODA they received for emergency assistance was US\$341.3 million. In the same year, OECD countries hosted 400,000 asylum seekers and used US\$647 million worth of ODA to subsidise the costs. Thus OECD donor countries were spending twice as much money to support one tenth of the number of refugees from the already slim resources for ODA.

**Figure 1.8** Volume of ODA spent on refugees in selected donor countries



### How does spending match need?

Spending has to be seen in the context of humanitarian need. To make sense, it has to be linked to the need it is trying to meet and the resources it has at its disposal.

The number of major armed conflicts has been going down through the decade – with fewer armed conflicts in 1998 than ten years previously.<sup>7</sup>


Overwhelmingly, these conflicts are characterised as internal, rather than wars between nation states. According to data reported by the IFRC and by UNHCR, the number of internally displaced people has been fallen from about 24 million in 1992 to 18 million in 1998 and the number of refugees from 18 million to 11.5 million over the period. While it is obviously very difficult to get accurate numbers, there seems little doubt about the overall trends.

In natural disasters however, the trend has been towards an increasing number of natural disasters and an increasing cost, especially in


**Table 1.1** Incidence of major armed conflicts worldwide during the 1990s

Year	Number of Major Armed Conflicts	Number of Locations
1993	33	28
1994	31	27
1995	30	25
1996	27	24
1997	25	24
1998	27	26

Source: SIPRI Annual Report 1999

**Figure 1.9** Trends in numbers of refugees and Internally Displaced People by region

Source: UNHCR Statistics and IFRC, World Disasters Report 1999

**Figure 1.10** Overall trends in numbers of refugees and displacements

Source: UNHCR Statistics, IFRC, World Disasters Report 1999

economic terms. The insurance company, Munich Re, reports that economic losses from natural disasters have risen from US\$69 million in the 1960s to more than US\$500 million in the 1990s.<sup>8</sup> The same report suggests that 187000 lives were lost between 1990 and 1999 as a direct result of natural disasters – excluding famine and drought. IFRC report that natural disasters kill over 150,000 people each year and disrupt the lives of 129 million others.

Spending per affected person in complex humanitarian emergencies is difficult to assess but analysis of the responses to UN Consolidated Appeals shows that there has been little change. Spending per head increased between 1994 and 1996, but fell in the following three years. In 1999 spending per head was very slightly higher than it was in 1994.

### Can donors afford to support Humanitarian Assistance?


Humanitarian Assistance given per capita has remained pretty steady since 1999. Each person living in the world's main donor countries has contributed roughly US\$5<sup>9</sup> a year to help people affected by disaster or conflict.

However, over the same period, income has grown dramatically in OECD countries. Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in 1991 was US\$21,457 for the OECD. In 1998 it was US\$27,789. Thus, in the face of a 30 percent increase in average income, donor country populations gave slightly less to humanitarian emergencies in 1998 than they did in 1991. As a share of GNP, Humanitarian Assistance has dropped from 0.03 percent in 1991 to 0.02 percent in 1998 – just 20 cents out of every thousand dollars.

### Which countries give Humanitarian Assistance?

There are marked differences between donors in terms of the volume and proportion of ODA that they spend on Humanitarian Assistance.

**Figure 1.11** Humanitarian Assistance per capita in OECD countries



Source: OECD DAC Statistics

Ninety percent of bilateral Humanitarian Assistance comes from ten donors.

The United States is by far the largest donor of Humanitarian Assistance, accounting for more than 30 percent of the bilateral total in 1998. At nearly US\$900 million, it gave as almost as much as the four next largest donors put together.

The top five donors – USA, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom account for 64 percent of the total.


The next group of five – Germany, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and Denmark – account for a further 25 percent. The remaining donors together contribute around US\$320 million dollars – just 11 percent of the total.

There have been some marked changes over the decade in the volumes of Humanitarian Assistance from individual donors. The most striking cases are Germany, Italy and Austria, the countries closest to the Balkans.

German bilateral Humanitarian Assistance reached a peak of US\$677 million in 1992 – exceeding the United States' contribution of US\$581 million and accounting for a fifth of the global total. Its share of bilateral ODA rose to 13 percent compared with just 1 percent in 1990. By the end of the decade Germany's expenditure on Humanitarian Assistance had been falling steadily since 1993, reaching US\$174m in 1998. Austria has shown similar pattern – doubling in 1991, increasing by a further 50 percent in 1992 and maintaining levels of more than US\$100m a year for four years. From its peak of US\$147m in 1992, it fell to US\$34m in 1998.


Some of the world's largest donors of ODA are among the most modest contributors to global Humanitarian Assistance. Over the past seven years, Japan – the largest aid donor for most of the 1990s – gave between 0.18 percent and 1.45 percent of its bilateral ODA to

**Figure 1.12** Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance by donor, in real terms



Source: OECD DAC Statistics


**Figure 1.13** Fluctuations in Humanitarian Assistance from Germany, Italy and Austria



Humanitarian Assistance. France – another very large aid donor – gave between 0.4 and 2.1 percent. However, countries which allocate little of their bilateral ODA to Humanitarian Assistance, may contribute in other ways – sometimes outside of ODA through peacekeeping and sometimes through contributions to multilateral agencies. Japan for instance has been a very significant contributor to UNHCR: in 1999, the Government of Japan contributed US\$115 million – second only to the USA – and private donors from Japan a further US\$4 million.

In Norway and Sweden, the situation is quite different. The average annual share of bilateral ODA to Humanitarian Assistance from Norway is 19 percent and in one year it allocated a quarter of its ODA to Humanitarian Assistance. Sweden gave an even higher proportion, with an average of 21 percent and a high of 24 percent. Norway and Sweden are also strong contributors to UN agencies, increasing the strength of their humanitarian contribution.

**Figure 1.14** Humanitarian Assistance as a share of Bilateral ODA



### Notes

1. Natural disaster data taken from OCHA Financial Tracking on Natural Disasters and Munich Re, and IFRC.
2. See UNDP Human Development Report 1998 p29
3. See note on statistics on ppxx for a detailed commentary on the problems of identifying a reliable total figure for Humanitarian Assistance. For comparative purposes, for this report, the total has been calculated from total bilateral ODA for Emergency and Distress Relief as reported by donors to the DAC in DAC Table 1; plus ODA from the Commission of the European Union for Emergency and Distress Relief. These figures include emergency food aid as reported to the DAC and in DAC Table 1. These figures will include funds spent through multilateral agencies for specific situations. Multilateral core funding which is not allocated to a specific situation is recorded by the DAC, but not disaggregated, so emergency aid is not shown as a separate line within the multilateral allocations. For comparative purposes therefore, these figures include the total multilateral contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA. The multilateral contribution to WFP has been included in proportion to WFP's own calculation of the share of WFP total income allocation to relief.
4. Fanjul, G., 'Spain' in Randel, J. , German, T and Ewing, D., (eds), 'The Reality of Aid 2000', Earthscan London November 1999
5. See Sundman, F. and Rekola, J., in 'Finland' in ICVA/Eurostep, 'The Reality of Aid 1996' Earthscan, London, 1996
6. All data on asylum seeker and refugee numbers taken from United States Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1999, Immigration and Refugee Services of America 1999, Washington DC, 1999
7. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [www.sipri.org/](http://www.sipri.org/)
8. Topics 2000 – Natural Catastrophes the Current Position. Munich Re Group, Munchen, December 1999 pp123 and
9. OECD Population 819.02 million in 1997.

# 2

## Trends in Allocations


### Is Humanitarian Assistance allocated on the basis of need?

In 1992 the first set of UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) was launched – the start of an effort to coordinate and manage the global humanitarian response. Six appeals were launched that year, raising a total income of US\$2.1 billion.

Although only a part of global Humanitarian Assistance is allocated through the appeals, they do give a good indication of where human need has been greatest during the decade – and where resources have been sent in response. Agencies that participated in the CAPs estimated the funding needs country by country. Roughly 50 percent of the worldwide funding needed was for Africa between 1993 and 1997. In 1999 Africa's share of requests fell to 37 percent. At the start of the decade, the Newly Independent States and Middle East generated between 12 percent and 17 percent of all requests for funding. In the last three years of the decade, their funding needs as reflected by requests fell to less than 2 percent of the total.


The most marked change was in Europe, as needs in former Yugoslavia came to dominate the humanitarian agenda. Up until 1996, requests for aid in response to crises in Asia (primarily Afghanistan and Korea), Europe and Latin America accounted for at most one third of total humanitarian funding requests. In 1997 and 1998, as financial collapse swept Asia and war broke apart Yugoslavia, half of all humanitarian aid requested was for those regions. In 1999, that proportion rose to 62 percent.

**Figure 2.1** Volume of Consolidated Appeals requests, by region (US\$)




Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data



**Figure 2.2** Share of Consolidated Appeals requests, by region

It is notoriously difficult to get an accurate picture of the number of people affected by a disaster. It involves making judgments about whether people have been sufficiently severely affected to be included in the figures. Affected people will not just be in one country but include refugees who have fled to other places. In all disasters the prevailing chaos makes information gathering difficult and unreliable. In the context of the CAP, OCHA compiles figures of 'target beneficiaries'. This information, supplemented where necessary with information on numbers of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees, gives an indication of where the levels of need have been greatest over the decade.

While the number of people reportedly in need of humanitarian assistance in Africa has fallen in the latter half of the decade, it was still just under 50 percent of the total in 1999. The very marked shift in funds away from Africa and towards Europe does not appear to be justified by the numbers of people affected by disasters.


**Figure 2.3** Distribution of people affected by disasters by region

### Neglected emergencies increasingly marginalised

Of course the costs of responding to a disaster differ from place to place – if supplies have to be airlifted costs will be much greater than if they can be distributed by road. The levels of local support and assistance will also affect the need and nature of the international response. Having said that, it is clear that the global donor response to emergencies is heavily skewed towards situations that have a higher profile. These areas of the world receive more money per head and a higher proportion of the requests that are made for funding are met. This situation is made even more unequal by the fact that it is not only humanitarian assistance that is concentrated on these emergencies; it is also political and diplomatic action; conflict prevention and peace-keeping and military inputs. Thus the already neglected emergencies are even more marginalised.

Throughout the 1990s, funding per affected person in the Great Lakes and in former Yugoslavia was roughly twice the regional average.

**Figure 2.4** Funding per affected person in the Great Lakes and former Yugoslavia and neighbouring countries




Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

Just as the Great Lakes and former Yugoslavia dominated the headlines and the political agenda for their regions, so they dominated the contributions (see Figure 2.4). While funds requested for each emergency depend on different factors – needs assessment, local conditions, access, transport – it is notable that funds requested for these regions also far outstripped requests for their less popular neighbours, as Figure 2.5, below, shows. While the average request for Africa was between US\$50 and US\$90 per affected person, for the Great Lakes it was never lower than US\$150 and peaked at US\$235 per person. Similarly, in former Yugoslavia, while the regional average was under US\$120, the requested funding per head ranged from US\$150 to US\$300.

The scale of the difference in response to different countries cannot

**Figure 2.5** Requests for funding per affected person in the Great Lakes and former Yugoslavia and neighbouring countries




Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

be attributed solely to varying costs of assistance. Funds requested are not simply an assessment of need – they are also an assessment of what funding is reasonably likely to be available. A spiral effect is the result: increased attention, leads to increased donor interest and increased commitment, leads to more optimistic estimates of what funding may be available, leads to higher estimates of ‘need’, leads to increased funding etc. Some countries suffer from a downward spiral of global concern. Low levels of funding lead to reduced aid agency expectation and, in turn, low levels of requests for funding and reduced attention.

The situation is similar in terms of response to natural disasters; the effect of one disaster can be very marked. The most dramatic example of the decade was the international response to Hurricane Mitch in 1998 – which exceeded the total committed to natural disasters by all donors for the previous five years.

At the other end of the scale are the forgotten emergencies. In

**Figure 2.6** International response to selected natural disasters (US\$ millions)




Source: OCHA Natural Disasters Financial Tracking System

Figure 2.7 below, only those situations that have been the subject of a Consolidated Appeal are examined. There are others – often localised and chronic – which scarcely make their way onto the international agenda at all.

This leads to a profoundly unequal response between countries; for example, Eritrea and Ethiopia received virtually nothing from the Consolidated Appeal in 1998 while Sudan received more than requested.

**Figure 2.7 Humanitarian Assistance per head via UN Consolidated Appeals in 1998**




Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

**Table 2.1 The neglected emergencies**

Country	Year	Number of people affected	Funding requested per head in US dollars	Funding received per head in US dollars	Percentage of Needs Covered
Ethiopia	1998	188000	11	0	0
Eritrea	1998	275000	33	1.4	4.3
Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)	1997	650000	27	2	7.9
Uganda	1999	585000	14	2	12
Afghanistan	1999	2000000	56	23	33
Afghanistan	1998	3623800	43	15	33
Liberia	1997	2500000	12	4	36
Tanzania	1999	322000	30	11	37
Afghanistan	1997	3872000	34	14	42
Chechnya	1997	140000	85	41	48
Liberia	1998	1400000	44	21	48


Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

**Figure 2.8** Percentage of needs covered by region

Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

Overall, a higher percentage of needs were met in Africa than in other regions. The fluctuations tended to be sharpest in the Newly Independent States partly because there were fewer countries for which Consolidated Appeals were launched and a poor response to one can skew the figures. In 1998, for instance, the appeal for Tajikistan raised only 30 percent of the funds needed and it was the only appeal in the region.

The concentration of donor resources does not just affect Humanitarian Assistance funds. General aid flows are also influenced as are NGO funding patterns. MSF Holland for instance spent around half of their assistance in Africa over the past decade.

**Figure 2.9** Médecins sans Frontières Holland expenditure 1990–99, by region

Source: MSF Holland


### What activities is Humanitarian Assistance spent on?

There is no consistent system for categorising spending on humanitarian assistance. There are two main sources – the OCHA Consolidated

Appeals information and the OECD DAC information on aid commitments.

Under the Consolidated Appeals reporting, agencies classify their requests into sectors such as education or health. These sectors can and do include many different items and different classifications are used in different years. Analysing the trends on sectors is further complicated by the use of categories of beneficiary such as children or refugees as well as sectors of activity in the same tables. Donors report some spending commitments to the DAC on areas such as human rights, demobilisation and reintegration – the number of donors reporting has been increasing over recent years, but coverage is still not complete. Precise or comprehensive analysis is therefore impossible but there is some evidence of broad trends in spending priorities.

**Figure 2.10 Food Related Humanitarian Assistance**




Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

Firstly, food and nutrition activity takes the lion's share of spending. In only two of the last ten years has food-related spending fallen below 50 percent of the total. When spending on agricultural production, income generation and food security is added in, expenditure has mostly been over 60 percent of the total.


Spending in several sectors has decreased sharply over the years. Shelter and other basic infrastructural materials, transport and logistics have virtually disappeared from the allocation of resources shown in the Consolidated Appeals. ECHO however spent 14 percent of its budget on transport in 1998 and the Kosovo crisis has demanded increased spending on shelter. As Figure 2.11 shows, spending on water and sanitation has also declined.

Other areas of expenditure have increased. Spending on re-integration, repatriation, demobilisation and resettlement quadrupled in 1996 and continued to increase for the next two years to reach nearly 30 percent of non-food humanitarian assistance in the CAPs in 1998.

**Figure 2.11** Spending on Transport, Logistics, Shelter and Water

Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data


Spending on health related activity has also increased over the past seven years, averaging around 15 percent of non-food humanitarian expenditure in the last three years of the decade. Around 10 percent of spending under the CAPs goes to coordination, capacity building and management.

**Figure 2.12** Trends in Spending on Reintegration, Coordination and Health

Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal Data

In 1998 for the first time, the CAP included a classification on preparedness. Contributions to preparedness totaled US\$3.4 million in 1998 and US\$3.55m in 1999 – less than 0.4 percent of the total.


Donors have been reporting funds that are committed to humanitarian assistance, but outside the definition of ‘emergency and distress relief’ to the DAC. The levels of spending on almost all the categories have increased over the decade. These include Reconstruction relief (US\$146m in 1998), Post Conflict peace building (US\$108m in 1998), Human Rights (US\$127m), Flood Prevention and Control (US\$78m at its highpoint in 1993) and Demobilisation (US\$5m in 1998).

**Figure 2.13** Commitments to 'new' humanitarian sectors

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

### Natural disasters

In each year of the 1990s around 40–45 natural disasters have been reported to OCHA.

**Figure 2.14** Numbers of Natural Disasters

Source: OCHA, Natural Disasters Financial Tracking System

Funding however has fluctuated much more sharply because the overall level of funding is very strongly influenced by responses to individual disasters.

The world's biggest response to a natural disaster was to Hurricane Mitch.<sup>1</sup> The volume of international assistance not only exceeded that of any other natural disaster during the 1990s, it was the equivalent of the combined contributions made by *all* donors to *all* natural disasters during the previous five years. (see Figure 2.15).


However, although the number of deaths attributed to Hurricane Mitch is high, the death toll pales in significance compared to other



**Table 2.2 Funding for Individual Natural Disasters**

Year	Largest International Response to a Natural Disaster in a Given Year		Total Contributions to Natural Disasters
1998	Hurricane Mitch	US\$662 million	US\$1,130 million
1997	Montserrat Volcano	US\$82 million	US\$303 million
1996	China Floods	US\$22 million	US\$84 million
1995	North Korea Floods	US\$32 million	US\$105 million
1994	China Floods	US\$58 million	US\$113 million
1993	India Earthquake	US\$16 million	US\$78 million
1992	Egypt Earthquake	US\$194 million	US\$257 million

Source: 'Contributions for Natural Disasters' (various years), OCHA. Figures exclude contributions-in-kind and services

**Figure 2.15 Funding for Natural Disasters**

Source: OCHA, Natural Disasters Financial Tracking System

**Table 2.3 Latin American Natural Disasters**

1906	Valparaiso earthquake kills 20,000
1939	Chilean earthquake kills 28,000
1949	Ecuadorian earthquake kills 6,000
1963	Hurricane Flora kills 6,000 in the Caribbean
1970	Earthquake in Northern Peru kills 66,000
1985	Nevado de Ruiz volcano kills 25,000 in Colombia
1985	Mexican Earthquake kills 9,500 people
1998	Hurricane Mitch leaves 9,000 dead in Central America
1999	Venezuela flash floods kill 30,000 (est.)

Source: OCHA, Natural Disasters Financial Tracking System OCHA

recent natural disasters. A 1991 cyclone and flood in Bangladesh killed an estimated 125,000 people. The death toll from Orissa's 1999 cyclone exceeded 30,000, and floods in Venezuela the same year claimed an estimated 30,000 lives.

### Notes

1. This report draws on a number of documents, including evaluations of the humanitarian response conducted by the Pan American Health Organization and WHO (February 1999, Santo Domingo) and CIDA (Universalia, May 1999). It also draws on the report of the Joint (OCHA/UNDP/UNICEF/PAHO/WHO) Disaster response Recovery Mission to Central America (February 1999) and reports of the Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America.
2. Civil Coordinator for the Emergency and Reconstruction, Social Audit for the Emergency and Reconstruction, CIET International, Managua, April 1999
3. Details from various NGO reports and press releases; 'Mitch appeal tops £5m in three days', BBC Online Network, 14 November 1998
4. 'Consultative Group Meeting for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America', Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, Dec. 10–11, 1998
5. *ibid.*
6. Consultative Group Meeting for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, 'Summary Report of the Proceedings', Stockholm, 25–28 May 1998
7. 'Stockholm Declaration' 28 May, 1998
8. Green, Eric, 'Stepped-Up Relief Seen for Devastated Areas of Caribbean Basin', Washington File, US State Department, 8 December 1999

### Box 2.1 The Response to Hurricane Mitch

A disaster of Mitch's magnitude would have placed the emergency services of any country under severe stress. Several factors combined to make the situation worse in Central America. First, widespread poverty made the situation much more severe – water supplies and sanitation were already inadequate before the emergency, and became much worse after the storm. Many of those most severely affected lived in bad housing on hillsides and in other vulnerable locations. Widespread deforestation and farming on marginal lands exacerbated flooding and erosion. Because the region was emerging from a period of prolonged civil unrest, relations between some governments and civil society organisations were weak, and there were problems of donor confidence in government structures.

Most evaluations of the response were carried out from a donor perspective. One, however, was undertaken by a Nicaraguan civil society coordinating group, which surveyed more than 10,000 homes throughout the country in February 1999.<sup>2</sup> The evaluation found that two out of three people surveyed had received assistance of some kind. Sixteen per cent received help within three days of the storm, 28 per cent within eight days, and 56 per cent after eight days. About half the respondents said that aid distribution was 'orderly', and 42 per cent said it was 'even handed' or fair. While these numbers may have left considerable room for improvement, they are significantly better than average under such circumstances.

#### Humanitarian Assistance

The immediate international response to the disaster was enormous, timely and focused on those in greatest need. Much of it came from countries in the region, including Mexico and Cuba.

The public response through Northern NGOs was large and generous. Médecins sans Frontières sent medical teams, drugs and equipment, and helped repair water and sanitation systems. In the first days of the emergency, World Vision pledged US\$5 million and shipped medicine, clothing, shoes, blankets, tinned food, powdered milk, soap, tools and agricultural implements. Working with its local branches, the Red Cross distributed food, clothing, soap, tools, chlorine and blankets. Red Cross teams worked to rescue survivors in the villages wiped out by mudslides at the foot of the Casitas volcano.


Canadian Churches and NGOs raised an estimated US\$26 million, and in Britain, a joint NGO appeal raised £5 million within three days.<sup>3</sup>

By far the largest response came from the United States, which mobilised more than US\$300 million, along with 5,000 military and civilian personnel. Most large American NGOs devoted significant resources to the emergency effort, and American private sector firms also contributed. Chiquita Brands International provided lump-sum bonuses, interest-free loans and other assistance, including US\$3 million in food, supplies and freight. Caterpillar provided generator sets, and UPS airlifted 200 tons of supplies. Many bilateral and multilateral agencies on the ground were able to divert financial and material resources that were already on hand. WFP, for example, quickly moved food stocks from a number of locations.

#### Reconstruction

Six weeks after the hurricane, a 'Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America' was inaugurated at a meeting convened in Washington by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The purpose of the meeting was to encourage an approach to reconstruction that would 'transform the region and overcome its former burden of poverty and inequality'.<sup>4</sup> The President of the IDB, Enrique Iglesias, said that support was required for immediate reconstruction needs, but it was also needed to sustain recent advances in democracy and peace. 'Let us turn the

Figure 2.16 Donor Response to Hurricane Mitch



Source: OCHA, Natural Disasters Financial Tracking System

tragedy of Hurricane Mitch into a springboard for a great virtue, the virtue of demonstrating international solidarity'.<sup>5</sup>

Delegates to the meeting pledged support of US\$6.3 billion, including funds already approved for emergency assistance, for rehabilitation, longer-term development and debt relief. The IDB said that it expected to allocate about US\$3 billion in financing and debt relief. The Paris Club countries offered an immediate moratorium on the payment of bilateral debts, to Honduras (three years), and to Nicaragua (two years). The World Bank announced a Central American Emergency Trust which received pledges of US\$100 million to help Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala with multilateral debt servicing, and in the six months after the disaster, the World Bank approved in record time new loans totaling more than US\$338 million to support the reconstruction process.

A report of a progress meeting in Stockholm in May 1999, concluded that: 'Hurricane Mitch clearly demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the poorest segments of the population who suffered the most from Mitch's devastation. At the same time, the poor, in cultivating steep hillsides and living in flood plains, contributed to the severity of flooding and mudslides.'<sup>6</sup> The meeting agreed that action was required 'to strengthen sustainable environmental practices, particularly conservation measures in agriculture, forestry and land use. 'Early warning systems and community organisations for disaster response are required to mitigate the impact of future disasters.' Considerable emphasis was also placed on issues of transparency, accountability and the building of democratic processes and institutions.

A 'Stockholm Declaration' reiterated an international desire to assist in rebuilding – not the same – 'but a better Central America', with a commitment by the affected countries themselves 'to continue to consolidate peace and democracy in their countries, and to seek higher levels of equitable growth'.<sup>7</sup> By the end of the meeting, donor indications of support amounted to approximately US\$9 billion over the following four to five years. Much of this represented concessional financing, debt relief and a redirection of existing projects.

More than a year after the storm, however, many of the pledges made by donors had not been realised and a certain amount of cynicism had begun to develop.

### Conclusions

In terms of lives lost and overall damage, Hurricane Mitch was one of the worst natural disasters of the century in the Western hemisphere. Three issues in the humanitarian response stand out over others:

- national governments in the region were largely unprepared, and the most heroic local efforts were undertaken at municipal and village level;
- the very generous international response was out of proportion to natural disasters elsewhere. It has been suggested that some of it might have been motivated by the wish to forestall increased northward migration;
- after decades of calls for better coordination, its absence following Mitch suggests that the problem is not so much one of capacity as will.

There was a clear recognition by NGOs and donor agencies that the disaster had been made worse by extreme poverty, and attempts were made in the following months to create better coordination mechanisms, and to ensure that there was adequate follow-up for reconstruction and for a 'transformation' of the development process, which would emphasise equity, transparency, democratic institution-building and sustainable environmental and human development.

In December 1999, the Director of the Latin America and Caribbean Office in the US Department of Commerce, Walter Bastien, said that the initial emergency effort by NGOs, governments, multilateral organisations had been 'phenomenal'. But he regretted that the second phase of the recovery effort – reconstruction – 'was slow in coming'. Despite the pledges of December 1998 and later in Stockholm, donors had delayed their contributions, insisting that 'mechanisms needed to be put in place' to receive financial assistance. Another problem mentioned by Bastien was the issue of transparency: donors wanted to be sure, he said, that money was being spent on its intended use and not for unrelated activities.<sup>8</sup> Recipients might have fairly asked the same question: according to a Nicaraguan NGO, US\$16 million of Spain's promised US\$30 million for reconstruction was allocated to the widening of a highway in the southeastern part of the country – where Mitch had done no damage to roads.

# 4

## The Politics of Humanitarian Assistance

### The Context of Humanitarian Response

Public and political reaction to humanitarian situations is strongly influenced by the context in which they are perceived. The changed external environment since the end of the Cold War has shaped both the perceptions of humanitarian need and the nature of an appropriate response.

Given the available funds and the capacity of people (politicians and the public) to focus only on a very limited number of issues at a time, it is inevitable that in effect, emergencies are 'competing' for attention.

Which crisis captures the attention of the public and politicians depends to some degree on scale and urgency, but to a very considerable extent on a complex interaction between media, UN, governments, NGOs and the public.

### The globalisation of crisis . . .

The reality of globalisation has become apparent to politicians and the public. The resurgence of conflict and displacement within Europe has reminded OECD donor countries that development is fragile and that even developed countries can be directly affected by acute humanitarian crises. There is a growing awareness that environmental threats and humanitarian crises are transnational. In a globalised world, problems and people are not confined within national borders.

### and reappraisal of foreign and security policy

Since 1989 and the upsurge in instability in the first half of the nineties, there has been a fundamental reappraisal of foreign and security policies. At a political level, governments have been trying to take a more integrated approach to increasingly inter-related problems. Policy thinking is attempting to make the link between security, foreign affairs, environment, trade, development cooperation, humanitarian interventions and human rights considerations. Humanitarian assistance is no longer seen as an activity which can take place outside the normal boundaries of international relations; it is part and parcel of a more complex and political response to crisis.

From the perspective of the public, humanitarian crises have become more immediate and more visible – thanks to the globalised news coverage. But they are also more complex – with a strong political dimension to what was previously seen in terms of simple human need.

Human rights have also been elevated as an issue. Always a fundamental concern for the UN and a campaigning issue for NGOs, the

promotion and protection of human rights are now seen as mainstream issues for many governments.

Even the doctrine of national sovereignty has been reappraised by an international community newly focused on the need to respond to humanitarian need and protect human rights. Humanitarian issues have now become 'heavyweight' preoccupations at the highest levels of government.

### Matching aid to new conditions and new players

Governments and aid agencies have been trying to match the architecture of assistance to this changed environment. As many crises are seen to have a strong political dimension, the provision of relief now routinely accompanies political and sometimes military efforts to protect human rights and find peaceful solutions to conflict. The definition of what is covered by humanitarian action has, therefore, stretched way beyond the provision of basic needs such as food and shelter, into democratisation, peacebuilding, and the promotion of civil society.

Administratively, the new environment means that ministries responsible for humanitarian assistance now have to work more closely with ministries responsible for foreign policy and defence. On the ground, aid workers, diplomats and soldiers are routinely working side by side – and in some circumstances undertaking very similar roles.

Attitudes to humanitarian assistance are affected by the fact that there are many more people and organisations involved. But while there is no dispute about the importance of an integrated approach to complex emergencies, in practice vertical divisions within government, and within many aid agencies, mean that the humanitarian response to crisis is often not as coherent as it could be. There are still bridges to be built between the different actors whose expertise is now needed in so many emergencies.

As Kofi Annan has pointed out

*'...in national governments as well as international agencies, departments that are responsible for security policy tend to have little knowledge of development and governance policies, while those responsible for the latter rarely think of them in security terms'.<sup>1</sup>*

One of the strongest indications of political significance of humanitarian issues is the bias in response towards high profile emergencies and the continuing marginalisation of countries that are strategically unimportant to the donors. As humanitarian assistance has become more strongly drawn into the mainstream of politics, it appears to have become more difficult to create political and public interest in such countries. This politicisation of the allocation of humanitarian funds is one downside of the closer integration of humanitarian and foreign policy.

Public attitudes can sometimes be a check on this skewing of responses to countries nearer the top of the political agenda but can also reinforce existing biases. Public response is very sensitive to media coverage and other interventions which give a high profile to a humanitarian situation – particularly the involvement of troops.

### More is expected of humanitarian interventions while less is put into development cooperation

One of the major ironies of the post-Cold War era is that, at a time when political and environmental instability has brought humanitarian need and the work of aid agencies into the political mainstream, the overall availability of aid funds has declined sharply.

Prior to the 1990s, humanitarian agencies tended to be judged by whether they could respond to immediate needs in a reasonable time. But expectations have changed radically over the decade. Now they are expected to bring hostile communities together and find lasting solutions to intractable problems.

Politicians have acknowledged the links between poverty and conflict. The need to invest in sustainable development to avoid future environmental disaster is routinely asserted. And yet, having peaked at US\$63 billion in 1992, ODA in real terms fell through to decade to reach US\$53 billion in 1998 and not even the optimistic see any basis on which to predict a reversal of this trend.

Two major factors seem to have caused the decline in aid. The first was a strong desire in OECD countries to reduce budget deficits by cutting government spending. The second was governments' unwillingness to give political priority (and therefore funds) to aid and development cooperation.

Governments may argue that, in fact, overall resources devoted to humanitarian interventions did rise over the 1990s. Military budgets have made an increasing contribution to addressing humanitarian crises and, clearly, more diplomatic resources have been expended to promote political solutions. It is also true that humanitarian aid spending rose sharply in the early 1990s, from around US\$2 billion to a peak of US\$5.7 billion in 1994. Even after falling back quite sharply, humanitarian aid in 1998 remained at US\$4.5 billion – much higher than during the Cold War era.

The key point is that provision for all the extra humanitarian activity has been found from within declining aid budgets – in spite of all the talk about the need to invest in building stable, sustainable societies in order to avoid crisis.

A crucial issue, therefore, is why, at a time of increased need and when humanitarian crises have achieved unprecedented attention, donor governments are reducing the overall funds that aid agencies have available to address the issues that are universally considered important: human rights, governance, equity and poverty. Is it that

governments are simply reflecting a public sentiment? The answer is a resounding ‘No!’.

### Public support remains strong

*‘There is no evidence anywhere in DAC member countries of compassion fatigue’.*<sup>2</sup>

*‘Most people in the north favour aid to victims of disasters and refugees’*<sup>3</sup>

*‘Support for aid is strongest around short-term humanitarian issues’.*<sup>4</sup>

There is no doubt that the humanitarian instincts of the public remain very strong, both in OECD donor countries and in other countries, especially those whose near neighbours are affected by disaster.

Whether tested by opinion polls on attitudes to helping people in need, or by voluntary giving to NGOs, humanitarianism runs deep.

- An analysis of opinion surveys published by UNDP in 1998 showed an average of 80 percent support for foreign aid across 21 countries – a rise of 2 percent in support for aid compared with just over a decade earlier.<sup>5</sup>
- Oxfam UK’s income rose by 27 percent to almost £124.3 million in 1998/99. Oxfam’s annual report noted the ‘tragic irony that dreadful wars and natural disasters have led to Oxfam announcing a record fundraising year’, with major emergencies in south Sudan, Bangladesh, Central America, and Kosovo resulting in Oxfam spending more overseas on emergencies than on development work.

### Humanitarian Assistance underpins support for development cooperation

One of the most striking conclusions from the last decade is that humanitarian assistance, far from diverting attention and money from efforts to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development, actually underpins both public and political support for development assistance.

Much of the overall international relief and development endeavour has its roots in the relief of suffering and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict. Oxfam had its origins in the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief which sought to relieve suffering in Greece after the Second World War. At governmental level

*‘the way for aid to less developed countries was paved by wartime and immediate post war programmes for relief and reconstruction . . . A series of international relief efforts of successively broader scope – the Red Cross, Belgian Relief, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the World Bank and the Marshall Plan – and the institutionalisation of international concern with economic matters in universal membership organisations, culminating with the UN Economic and Social Council,*



*also show steady growth in international concern for economic problems of foreign countries . . . Such humanitarian concern often combined addressing concrete and immediate problems with the advocacy of more permanent, structural solutions'.<sup>6</sup>*

Despite this shared genesis, traditionally there has been a gulf between relief and development: people involved in overseas aid have wanted to focus as much as possible on aid for development, rather than relief. There has been a strong feeling that the latter, while sometimes inevitable, was a 'sticking plaster' – whereas the best use of aid was to invest in long-term measures to help communities and countries address the underlying causes of poverty and build sustainable development. This wish to invest as much as possible in the long-term elimination of poverty resulted in a perception that spending on relief diverted money away from the goal of sustainable poverty elimination: that relief and development were in competition.

But the experience of the 1990s has caused people to reassess thinking on the relationship between relief and development. And alongside a new awareness that approaches to crises and long-term development need to be more closely integrated, one of the main lessons of the decade is that support for humanitarian action underpins the whole of the wider development endeavour.

It has long been clear that one of the main reasons the public give money to support overseas aid is that they want to help people in acute need. In Canada for example, a 1998 poll showed humanitarian concerns as the main reason for supporting aid: five times as many people cited emergencies as the reason to support aid than economic benefits to Canada.<sup>7</sup>

The experience of NGOs illustrates two ways in which public support for relief helps sustain long-term development efforts.


Many NGO fundraisers point to the fact that after a major disaster, when voluntary donations for the crisis subside, NGO incomes tend to settle back to a level significantly higher than they were before the crisis. So disasters tend to ratchet up the overall level of giving.

In the area of awareness too, NGO experience shows that public interest in a crisis can often be translated into a sustained commitment to working for development. In the UK, Band Aid generated massive public concern and response to famine in Ethiopia and was the origin of the NGO Charity Projects and Comic Relief – which through television plays a crucial and very positive role in informing and forming public attitudes to development.

While it is not possible to say definitively that the aid cuts of the 1990s would have been worse if it were not for a series of very visible humanitarian crises, there is anecdotal evidence that suggests that this is the case. ODA as a whole has been falling during the nineties while humanitarian assistance has been increasing. A priori there is a case

that there has been a diversion of aid funds away from some of the world's poorest countries in order to assist the victims of conflicts of high political importance to OECD countries.<sup>8</sup> What evidence there is suggests an altogether different interpretation. In Germany for instance humanitarian assistance rose very sharply in the mid nineties on top of increasing ODA. In the UK in 1984 a two percent cut in real terms had been proposed for 1985/6 because some additional support which had been provided to Gibraltar and the Falklands had come to an end. In an environment of strong approval for cuts in public expenditure, forty government party MPs abstained by sitting in their seats when the vote was taken. This reflected the overwhelming public concern to respond to the Ethiopian famine and was described by an aid official as 'an important turning point, when the government recognised that aid was actually cared about'.


**Figure 4.1** German spending on development and Humanitarian Assistance



Source: OECD DAC Statistics Table 1

Development assistance budgets are often a very painless area for governments to make cuts in public spending. The DAC notes that aid budgets 'have fallen significantly faster than other government expenditures, so that the share of ODA in total government spending dropped from 0.8 percent to 0.6 percent' over the period 1993 to 1998.<sup>9</sup>

Individual NGO reports show that the downward trend in official aid has not been matched by a decline in voluntary giving. In fact, the reverse is true – suggesting that it is not the public who has experienced aid fatigue. Rather it seems it is politicians, who are either weary of the aid effort themselves, or more cynically, have an interest in talking up aid fatigue in order to make aid budgets a softer target for cuts. The fact that humanitarian assistance has grown in a decade of unprecedented aid cuts suggests that it can command stronger commitment, and so is more difficult to cut, than longer term assistance.

**Figure 4.2 Humanitarian Assistance as a Share of Total ODA**

Source: OECD DAC statistics

### Public concern to make a direct contribution to reducing suffering

It is clear that the public wants money to be spent as directly as possible on the relief of acute suffering. Public support is strongest for aid allocations to emergency aid, and to basic needs such as food, clean water and primary health care.<sup>10</sup>

The reasons why emergency spending has traditionally met with a generous public response are easy to understand. Emergency situations, and especially natural disasters, can be presented in a way that makes it easy for people to engage:

- immediate and clear needs
- the chance for people to do something personal that will make a difference
- the possibility of quick and visible results
- no necessity for sustained involvement

So an interesting issue is whether the change in the nature of many emergencies during the 1990s has had a negative impact on public support.

### Politicisation has not reduced public response

Many crises are now intensely political as well as humanitarian. Whereas environmental disasters have often been seen as ‘natural’, uncomplicated ‘acts of God’ – simply in terms of need – an increasing number of post-Cold War emergencies now carry with them the idea that someone can be blamed for bringing about unnecessary human suffering.

Media coverage of conflict and avoidable environmental degradation have helped to politicise humanitarian crises but the evidence of NGO

appeals does not suggest that this politicisation has had any negative effect on public attitudes.

Even in the cases of complex political emergencies, where many of the needs demand sustained efforts that cannot be summarised simply or captured by the camera, it is possible to harness public compassion in a way that helps to tackle the human impact of a crisis.

The decline of the Balkans into conflict and the ongoing instability in Rwanda are man-made catastrophes, and such solutions as may exist are complex, long-term and certainly on a scale that makes the contribution of any individual look small. And yet the response of ordinary people in the OECD and neighbouring countries to human suffering in Kosovo and in Rwanda has been enormous. This suggests that public attitudes towards humanitarian crises are not determined simply by questions such as how straightforward or complex is the need or by immediate threats to stability. In virtually every survey of public attitudes, the moral imperative comes out as the dominant issue: *'the strongest predictor by far of support for aid was agreement with the statement 'we have a moral duty to help'*.<sup>11</sup>

### The need to make a difference

The determinant of public attitudes is whether people can identify with the need and feel they can make a difference.

NGO appeals often focus on this idea, with fundraisers presenting images with which people can easily identify – 'US\$5 buys a bucket and US\$500 buys a tent'. Of course, few donors will actually think that their particular donation will be allocated to that specific item – but the subliminal message is – 'if you personally don't help, someone is going to suffer because they will not have a tent for shelter or a bucket for water!'

### Identifying with people in need

A second key factor shaping responses is whether people can identify personally with those affected. In the area of long-term development, the success of sponsorship in fundraising terms amply demonstrates how people can identify with a problem through an individual. The same phenomenon can work in the context of emergencies, where a journalist or NGO uses an individual case to illustrate the human impact of a crisis. The case of Irma Hajim a young child from Sarajevo whose plight and subsequent care in the UK brought the Bosnian war back to the headlines is just one illustration of the fact that personal commitment and empathy are critical to public sentiment.

*'The importance of the personal is not limited to individual giving. Governments are influenced too. If a refugee tide, a natural disaster or sudden hostilities can be characterised by specific victims – by individuals whose human stories can stop busy citizens halfway around the world*

*dead in their tracks – public opinion might respond strongly enough to move the officials who write the checks*<sup>12</sup>

### Direct Aid Phenomenon

During the 1990s there have been many direct aid initiatives. Communities have driven lorries full of donated goods to people in countries directly affected. Supermarkets have encouraged customers to buy an extra tin of baked beans and put it in a bin for victims of particular crises. In Sweden there have been many examples of the public wanting to provide direct assistance to near-by Baltic countries.

In some countries, this depth of local involvement has been harnessed. In Italy the involvement of people and organisations with towns and cities in Bosnia was linked up with government efforts through the Tavolo de Coordinamento. This resulted in initiatives based on links between people, social relations and local institutions. It has been widely praised, not least for its sustainability. This assessment contrasts with the dismissive attitudes towards direct aid initiatives taken by many ‘professional’ aid agencies who are concerned about the potential pitfalls of such ‘amateur’ efforts. While many of their concerns have been proven justified, the importance and value of direct aid initiatives in stimulating public and political commitment to humanitarian assistance should not be underestimated.

### The role of solidarity groups

Many donor countries have large numbers of solidarity and linking groups that maintain connections between communities in different countries. During emergencies, these groups often act as a catalyst, raising awareness and mobilising resources for partners overseas. The response of many countries to Hurricane Mitch was partly the result of pressure from groups of people in donor countries who had ongoing links with central America – many of which were formed when the crisis facing countries in the region was perceived to be political, rather than meteorological.

The twinning of communities in Europe, the Balkans and the NIS has also been important. Assistance given in the context of widespread links between local government, schools, industries, cultural and sporting groups can help to maintain a sense of normality and security and to rebuild the social fabric. Such links are not dependent on the emergency for their existence and thus provide opportunities for a sustained engagement.<sup>13</sup>

### The role of ethnic minorities

It is clear that in recent years, minority ethnic groups in donor countries have often been very effective in raising the profile of emergencies and triggering enough public and political awareness to ensure that funds are made available.

The Canadian International Development Agency provided almost as much assistance to victims of the Taiwan earthquake as it did to the Orissa cyclone – not because of objective need, but because of public pressure from Chinese Canadians (and an absence of pressure from Indian Canadians). In the Netherlands NGOs and government were under strong and effective pressure from the Turkish community to respond to the earthquake in 1999 – such pressure easily outweighs pre-determined rules and criteria for what degree of assistance should be given.

### The role of individuals and small groups in focusing attention

George Harrison and Ravi Shankar in Bangladesh almost 30 years ago, and Bob Geldof in the mid-1980s are very obvious examples of how individuals can act as catalysts – raising awareness and mobilising public opinion. Individuals and small groups play a critical role in engaging public or political interest. But there are many less prominent examples where the personal testimony of journalists, aid workers or politicians or where the impact of a particular report or series of images have appeared to encapsulate a crisis and trigger a response.

## The bias to high profile and 'local' situations

### Political factors

In the 1990s there has been a substantial shift in where humanitarian assistance is spent, as Europe and Central Asia have joined more traditional recipients of aid in Africa and Asia. There are also marked differences between the level of response to different emergencies – some can command almost 100 percent of whatever funds are requested and spending of \$200 or \$300 per head; others are lucky to get a third of what they need and spending per capita will be a tenth or less of that in more popular emergencies.

The plight of the Kurds following the Gulf War and the humanitarian crises on the very borders of the European Union following the implosion of former Yugoslavia, were linked to top priorities for OECD countries. But it is hard to argue that the needs of affected populations were any greater than those of countries that saw a much less determined and generous response from OECD donors. Increasingly, strategic, security, foreign policy and economic concerns help set the humanitarian assistance agenda and humanitarian assistance becomes part, but only part, of a strategic response.

The United Nations and the Red Cross are obliged to respond to every humanitarian crisis. Governments, NGOs and the media are in a different situation – whilst they may try to respond to many situations, they are not expected to respond universally. While the UN and Red Cross are accorded a special status in line with their global remit, in terms of public attention, the obligation to try to mobilise help for

every crisis has a downside, which is that the currency of appeal becomes debased. The public sees humanitarian emergencies as demanding a special effort to respond quickly and generously. As every fund-raiser knows, you cannot have a 'special' appeal all of the time.

While many bilateral aid agencies and international NGOs may be working in several emergency situations at any one time, it may be easier for them to raise awareness of particular crises. They can be more selective about their involvement – limiting their response to the resources they can raise and timing their appeals in line with how they judge the public will respond.

Of course, this selective approach to emergency appeals has from time to time led to criticism of NGOs, with some commentators suggesting that NGO involvement and appeals were sometimes led by fundraising opportunity, rather than need. While on occasion this may have been true, the more realistic assessment seems to be that NGOs want to maximise the resources raised from the public for emergencies. However unpalatable it may be, if international attention is focused on Country A and an NGO issues an appeal for Country B, it is likely to get a much lower response than if it had put the same effort into appealing for Country A. If human need and the opportunity to be effective are the same in both places, there is a utilitarian argument that it makes sense to appeal for the place where you are likely to get the best response.

### Proximity

In 1992, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali argued that a degree of racism could explain the disparity in response between different emergencies – namely those in Bosnia and Somalia. Certainly the interest of individual donors in Kosovo for a time completely outstripped the pace of giving for almost all the emergencies in Africa combined, causing some people to ask whether generosity towards Kosovo from Northern donors, was based on the fact that they had more in common with the people there. By the end of the 1990s, such fears began to look misplaced, with Rwanda again illustrating the massive public response to emergencies in Africa and Asia that has been evident for the past three decades. A recent example reinforces the point. Despite the presence of many cameras, many humanitarian agencies and great need, the 1999–2000 Chechen war sparked no Kosovo-type public response.

A simpler explanation accounts for some of the skewing towards different countries and regions: proximity. The responses to Hurricane Mitch were strongest from the USA and Canada and from Spain. Australia, New Zealand and Japan respond to emergencies in Asia and the Pacific – and as the use of Australian troops in East Timor shows, not only with humanitarian assistance. In 1999, ECHO funding for Former Yugoslavia and Kosovo was four times the funding for all 70

African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries.<sup>14</sup> From 1990 to 1994 Germany, Austria and Italy saw major increases in their humanitarian assistance in order to respond to need in the Balkans.

This bias is perfectly understandable: politicians and the general public will have personal links which create a strong sense of obligation. People are more familiar with the countries concerned because they have been there on holiday or have business or educational links so it is easier to identify with the people affected and aid is often given using these links.

### The role and responsibility of global media

Kofi Annan sees media attention as part of the problem of the skewed responses to humanitarian need.

*'The crisis in Kosovo, for example, received saturation coverage. The more protracted and deadly war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the resumption of Angola's savage civil war, received very little. Other wars went almost entirely unreported. Partly for that reason, responses to appeals for humanitarian and security assistance have been similarly skewed'*<sup>15</sup>

As communications globalise, an item covered by a few key news sources can increasingly command international attention. With this potential, comes the danger that the concern of the public and politicians may be mobilised on the basis of a very selective and unbalanced perspective on what constitutes important news.

More and more, what the public sees depends on a strictly limited number of journalists and broadcasters, whose choices really can become a matter of life and death. This places heavy responsibility on the media. It also illustrates how, during the last decade, the media has itself become a humanitarian actor, no longer simply reporting on, but helping to shape, humanitarian situations.

### Some humanitarian crises not influenced by the media

The instances in which humanitarian crises have captured the attention of the general public tend to remain in the memory. But whilst most of the money used by aid agencies is spent in the name of the public, it is clearly not the case that public attention is the only force driving humanitarian action. Humanitarian action also takes place in situations that receive little or no public scrutiny and continues for long after the cameras have left. Sweden for instance has a specific policy of funding 'non CNN emergencies' such as Sierra Leone. This can create conflicts with political priorities and demands for action fuelled by media attention, but the relative political independence of Sida as an agency give it the muscle to pursue neglected countries.

While media attention can be a catalyst for generating public and political action, the nature as well as the extent of the coverage affects the response. Humanitarian situations which are portrayed as being



**Box 4.1 The CNN factor**

The so-called 'CNN factor' has during the 1990s increased the distinction between 'loud emergencies', such as Kosovo and Hurricane Mitch, and the 'quiet emergencies' in Congo and Angola.

This 'CNN factor' provides humanitarian agencies with opportunities as well as problems. Opportunity arises when an emergency is well-covered, drawing in both political as well as donor interest. There is no doubt among humanitarian NGOs that media coverage overwhelmingly shapes public response to an emergency, regardless of the resources that organisations put into fundraising. Thus the 1998 victims of Hurricane Mitch received much greater attention and assistance than victims of the 1999 Orissa cyclone.

Arguably, television is currently the most important communications technology where disasters are concerned. Most people in industrialised countries receive their international information and understanding from television. But the media's attention span – and that of the public – has shortened. Context is often absent as the camera rushes from one 'media event' to the next. And what becomes news often seems serendipitous.

NGOs trying to raise awareness of, and assistance for, the victims of Angola's 25-year war have come up against the 'If it is not on television, it isn't happening' syndrome. Once the cameras left Somalia, there was a rapid drop-off of interest. In the case of Sierra Leone, where the impact of fighting in 1999 and before was arguably as bad, if not worse than Kosovo, there has almost complete lack of interest.

Official donor agencies can help to bridge the gap, providing assistance directly and – through NGOs – to emergencies that are more protracted or that fail to attract the media spotlight. But even they are susceptible to the fallout from media attention.

largely in the political or diplomatic domain have a different impact on the public. US NGOs report that the early coverage of the conflict in former Yugoslavia focused on the diplomatic attempts to find a solution. The message the public received was that a 'humanitarian' response would be inappropriate. As soon as US troops were involved that changed totally.

The involvement of troops generates very substantial coverage in local, regional and national media – much of it based on soldiers' work in meeting basic humanitarian needs and protecting human rights – formerly the domain of the NGOs. This type of coverage generates strong public interest and identification with the crisis and is one of the elements which results in increasing concentration on countries which are already receiving substantial humanitarian support.

**Factors and actors in attention and interest**

*'There is no answer, no over-riding logic to explain where, or why, the reporters roving gaze will stop. Even less understandable is when, or why, a preoccupied public will pause to take note'.<sup>16</sup>*

While the growing power of the media must bring with it heavier

responsibility, clearly many factors, including a big element of chance, play a role in capturing public and political attention.

In summary, the factors that help to determine whether a crisis will get coverage are:

- How severe is the crisis and how clear is the need?
- How much awareness is there of the place that is affected?
- Is it politically, historically or culturally significant – is it close to G7 or OECD countries?
- What other news stories are current?
- How much effort are NGOs putting into generating media and political attention?
- Are there other major crises taking place, competing for attention?

In individual donor countries, whether an affected country is close by, was a former colony or is somewhere people go on holiday will make a significant difference. Whether there are people on the spot with whom a domestic public can readily identify (a medic, aid workers, military personnel, a prominent politician or journalist) will also contribute.

While in some situations it is clear that one agency or even an individual provides the critical spark for wider engagement, in many crises it is not possible to identify a prime mover. Rather the external perceptions are shaped by a complex interaction between the different humanitarian players. Journalists for example, may only cover a story because they happen to be on hand – or they may cover it because something newsworthy is happening close by – or because they have been persuaded by an NGO or UN agency that there is a story that deserves prominence.

Similarly, whereas general public humanitarianism seems quite inelastic – polls show that support for the principle of helping people in need is as strong as ever – public interest and generosity towards particular emergencies is both elastic and unpredictable.

### Remembering the good

Talking about ‘success’ is difficult in the context of work with people whose lives, families and livelihoods may have been ruined. The donor public used to be rewarded for their generosity by images of people trying to help. But now that humanitarian agencies are expected to achieve so much more in often impossible situations, coverage tends to be far more controversial. This reflects the self-criticism and introspection that has characterised many humanitarian agencies in the second half of the decade.

There is a risk associated with the higher expectations placed on humanitarian agencies. What was formerly seen as a ‘simple’ humanitarian mandate has become problematic and controversial. While the exhortation to ‘do no harm’ may make sense to aid agencies, it is unlikely to motivate the public or politicians.

The public engagement in humanitarianism is robust and founded in a strong moral imperative. It will not be knocked aside easily. But political commitment can be undermined by messages which focus only on complexity and difficulty. It is important to remember the achievements of humanitarianism: the lives saved, the people protected, the prevention of epidemics, the foundations for the rebuilding of communities.

### Notes

1. Annan, Kofi Facing the Humanitarian Challenge, Towards a Culture of Prevention, United Nations, NY September 1999 quoted in Stoddard, A., 'Background Paper on Issues in Humanitarian Aid', CIC-Ford Foundation Learning Initiative. Draft November 1999.
2. Public Attitudes & International Development Cooperation, Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich, North South Centre of the Council of Europe and the OECD Development Centre, OECD Paris, 1998.
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7. ROA 2000 p 270.
8. 'In recent years, there's been a growth in spending on humanitarian aid and a reduction of what's available for spending on development'. UK Secretary of State Clare Short speaking at the Dispatches from disasters Conference, London, 27/5/1998. 'Funds for this [emergency relief] appear to be coming at the expense of longer-term development assistance'. Relief aid & development Assistance in Zimbabwe, IFPRI, Washington DC, October 1998.
9. Development Cooperation Report 1998, DAC Paris 1999, p 93.
10. For an annual analysis of opinion polls and surveys on public attitudes in OECD/DAC countries see The Reality of Aid various years (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996/7, 1997/8, 1998/9, 2000), Earthscan, London.
11. Lumsdaine, Op. Cit., p43
12. Mort Rosenblum, in 'Public support for International Development' Edited by Foy and Helmich, OECD Paris, 1996.
13. See OECD DAC Aid Review of Italy (Aid Review Series no 16, 1996) for a very interesting analysis of the Italian public's involvement in reconstruction.
14. ACP countries are those which have been party to the Lomé Convention between themselves and the European Union.
15. Annan, Kofi, Facing the Humanitarian Challenge, Towards a Culture of Prevention, United Nations, NY September 1999
16. Mort Rosenblum, in Public support for International Development Edited by Foy and Helmich, OECD Paris, 1996.

# 6

## Trends in Emergency Food Aid

### Emergency Food Aid Increases its Share


Far-reaching changes have occurred over the past decade in Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided in the form of food aid.

There has been a dramatic increase in food aid for emergency relief from a low of 1.7 million tons in 1989 to an all-time high of five million tons in 1992. This figure was nearly matched in 1999 when emergency food aid reached 4.7 million tons – around a third of the total and a 57 percent increase on 1998.


Emergency food aid in 1999 accounted for between a third and a half of the total, compared with just over an eighth at the beginning of the decade.

From 1993 to 1997 there was a steady decline in the provision of aid as food. In 1998, total food aid deliveries increased for the first time in five years – although at eight million tons, they were still less than half of the 1993 peak of 17.4 million tons (see Figure 6.2) – and in 1999 global food aid deliveries increased by 75 percent over the previous year. The 1993 peak was boosted by large flows of food aid to Russia, to help ameliorate the political and economic turmoil and to offset reported problems in bringing the Russian harvest to market. It was also inflated by large flows of food to southern Africa, to alleviate expected widespread drought as a result of the El Nino phenomenon. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, food aid flows fluctuated between 12 million and 15 million tons annually, whereas in 1996–98 food aid declined to between seven and eight million tons, rising to over 14 million tons in 1999.

**Figure 6.1** Volume of Emergency Food Aid<sup>1</sup>



Source: WFP, Food Aid Monitor, May 1999 and INTERFAIS April 2000

**Figure 6.2 Total Food Aid Trends**

Source: WFP, Food Aid Monitor, May 1999

The growth in food aid between 1998 and 1999 was mainly accounted for by programme food aid to Russia. However, the overall growth in the quantity of food aid meant that deliveries of both emergency and programme food aid to priority countries increased. Low Income Food Deficit Countries, Least Developed Countries and targeted beneficiaries received increased quantities of food in 1999.

US food aid amounted to 9.2 million tons. Much of this was financed through President Clinton's initiative to support US farmers by purchasing five million tons of US wheat, which was then made available as food aid (although shipments of other commodities, such as maize, soybeans and rice also increased).

Much of the decline in food aid during the 1990s was a result of the steep fall in *programme food aid* – food aid provided bilaterally (i.e. government-to-government) for sale in developing countries, the funds being used either as general budgetary support or to finance specific development projects. Programme food aid previously accounted for some two-thirds of all food aid, but since 1994 the level of programme food aid has fallen sharply, so that in 1998 it accounted for only 30 percent of all food aid – an increase over the 1997 low of 20 percent.

*Targeted food aid* – relief and development food aid provided direct to specific beneficiary groups – declined less precipitately over the middle of the decade. The trend for targeted development food aid has been generally downward since 1994, although it showed a slight increase in at the end of the nineties.

### Future Levels of Food Aid

There are a number of reasons for the decline in food aid which took place in the mid nineties:

- The large agricultural surpluses that fueled much of the food aid in

the 1980s and early 1990s receded. The recent re-emergence of surpluses in Europe and the US<sup>2</sup> is probably an anomaly, and best guesses are that it is unlikely to continue;

- The increasing criticism of food aid, particularly non-relief food aid, became accepted by many donors. For example, the UK government took the position at the recent FAC negotiations that food aid should only be provided for relief purposes. However, following a review of the best uses of food aid for development, WFP's Executive Board have set a clear policy for using food aid to enable people to participate in the development process
- Food aid used to be additional to planned development assistance expenditure as it was given in kind. It has now become incorporated into donors' aid budgets and competes directly with other types of aid, such as financial assistance or the provision of technical expertise. The new FAC refers to the quantity of food provided as well as the quality of food aid interventions – thus donors can offset against their FAC obligations the extra costs involved in providing targeted food transfers compared to the relatively cheaper but untargeted programme food aid. This is likely to result in a decline in the tonnage provided, although the food aid is more likely to have a greater benefit to poor people.

The Food Aid Convention (FAC), administered by the International Grains Council<sup>3</sup>, sets minimum obligations for the major providers of food aid, and sets a floor to food aid flows (see box). Between the mid-1970s and early 1990s food aid shipments were well above the FAC annual commitment level of 7.4 million tons. In 1995 the US and Canada unilaterally reduced their FAC commitments – in the case of the US by more than 40 percent, from 4.5 million tons to 2.5 million tons. The negotiations for the 1999 FAC were geared to trying to prevent a further decline in food aid commitments, as well as trying to ensure that more food aid was used for targeted interventions. As a result, the new FAC, approved by donors in June 1999 for an initial period of three years, has been reduced from 5.35 million tons to 4.895 million tons (plus a pledge by the EU of 130 million ECU in cash, equivalent to approximately 588,000 tons of wheat, including transportation costs<sup>4</sup>).

### Allocations to poorer countries

Along with the reduction in food aid levels the 1990s has seen significant re-targeting of food aid from richer to poorer recipient countries. The poorest countries (Least Developed Countries – LLDCs) and poor countries that depend on food imports (Low-Income, Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs), which include most LLDCs) have seen a substantial improvement in the proportion of total food aid that they receive. For the last few years LLDCs have received nearly half of all food aid,

**Box 6.1 The Food Aid Convention**

The new FAC focuses more on food security than on food aid itself. Some of its main features are:

- Quality food aid to be made available to developing countries with the greatest needs on a predictable basis, irrespective of fluctuations in world food prices and supplies. Particular importance is attached to ensuring that food aid is directed to the most vulnerable groups.
- Greater emphasis on monitoring and evaluating the impact and effectiveness of members' food aid operations, and commitment to supporting the efforts of recipient countries to develop and implement food security strategies.
- Priority to Least Developed and Low Income Countries. Other countries will receive food aid during emergencies or when food aid operations are targeted at vulnerable groups.
- The list of food aid products which may be supplied against the FAC commitment has been broadened beyond cereals and pulses, to include edible oil, skimmed milk powder, sugar, seeds and components of the traditional diet of vulnerable groups or of supplementary feeding programmes.
- Food aid commitments to be expressed either in tonnage, in value or in a combination of both. The cost of transporting and delivering food aid beyond the FOB stage will, where possible, be borne by the donors,
- All food aid to Least Developed Countries will be in the form of grants; grant food aid will account for at least 80% of each member's contribution. Members will not tie the provision of their FAC food aid to commercial imports of goods or services.
- To promote local agricultural development, donors are urged to use their cash contributions for triangular transactions (purchases from developing countries for use in other developing countries) or local purchases (purchases in a developing country for use in the same developing country).

while nearly 90 percent of food aid has been delivered to LIFDCs – Russia, Former Yugoslavia and North Korea have been major non-LLDC/LIFDC recipients.

However, in terms of the proportion of their food imports coming from food aid, there has been a significant decline. Whereas in the mid-1980s food aid accounted for more than one fifth of the food imports of LIFDCs, it is now less than 10 percent. In other words, poor countries have to use commercial sources for more of their imported food needs; this, moreover at a time when international food prices have been well above average.

The proportion of relief food aid going to LLDCs has shown a fairly steady decline over the decade, from a high of more than three-quarters in 1989 to just over half in 1998. However, the increase in global deliveries in 1998 and 1999 resulted in an increase in the volume distributed to LLDCs, although their share of total deliveries has been less than in previous years. The trend is also a reflection of the shift of much relief food from the traditional recipients in Africa and Asia to new recipients in Europe, as well as major new recipients in Asia – especially Indonesia – due to the economic crisis. The proportion of

relief food aid going to LIFDCs dipped in the course of the decade, before climbing back to 1989 levels.

### The Uses of Relief Food Aid

The background to the increased quantities of relief food aid provided by donors during the 1990s is far from straightforward.


WFP's INTERFAIS statistics define relief food aid as food that is distributed freely to the recipients (i.e. they have neither to pay for it – programme food aid – nor to engage in any specific activity in exchange for it – project food aid). Food aid provided as 'relief' is for people in a broad range of situations that have disrupted their lives – not just for high profile emergencies. For example, of the five million tons of relief food aid provided in 1992, 261,000 tons (five percent) was for Russia. Many donors were nervous of the social and economic unrest that followed the break-up of the USSR, and were under pressure to be seen to take some action. The situation among Russia's poor was never analogous to emergency situations as most of us visualize them. Russia's problems in gathering and distributing the harvest resulted largely from its weak marketing and transportation infrastructure. The provision of large quantities of food aid only served to further strain an already creaking system.

Much food aid provided as relief in fact addresses chronic rather than temporary food deficits. For example, Ethiopia has consistently been a major recipient of relief food aid (Figure 6.4) although the danger of starvation (as opposed to daily hunger) largely receded during the 1990s.

### Recipients of Relief Food Aid


The recipients of emergency food aid during the decade from 1989 to 1998 were dominated by some of the world's poorest countries. Fifteen

**Figure 6.3 Selected Recipients of Emergency Food Aid**



Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999



**Figure 6.4 Long Term Recipients of Emergency Food Aid**

Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999

countries – twelve of them Low Income Countries – received three quarters of emergency food aid and by far the largest recipient was Ethiopia. Bangladesh also shows up as a major recipient, although it experienced only sporadic, albeit major, emergencies compared to Ethiopia (and Sudan, Angola and Somalia) which was in a more-or-less continuous state of emergency during the period.

The figure also reflects emergency events in the early 1990s. Malawi's position as the fourth major recipient of relief food aid relates to the presence of large numbers of refugees from Mozambique, as well as occasional drought relief, in the early 1990s. Yet now, Malawi requires very little relief food aid.


Some countries (for example, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan) have consistently been major recipients of relief food aid. Others (such as Chile, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands) have received relief food aid only when they have suffered sudden and short-duration natural calamities. In a few cases countries that were large recipients of relief food aid at the start of the decade (such as Lebanon, Thailand and Malawi) no longer required it by the end of the decade. Some countries that required no relief food aid at the beginning of the decade had become significant recipients by the end – North Korea is the classic examples, receiving nothing up to 1995, but vast quantities since then.

Unfortunately food aid data are not disaggregated according to the cause of the disaster for which relief is supplied but in many cases the cause is obvious. Relief food for Bosnia and ex-Yugoslavia, for Iraq and for Liberia was a direct consequence of conflict. In due course, relief food flows will similarly show up for Kosovo.

Sub-Saharan Africa has consistently been the largest recipient region (Figure 6.5), usually accounting for more than half of all relief food aid. Europe and the CIS countries<sup>5</sup> have become significant recipients

since the break-up of the USSR and Eastern Europe. By contrast, the Caribbean and Latin America region receives hardly any relief food aid, a reflection of the peaceful solutions finally found for many of the political problems that plagued the region in the 1980s, as well as generally stronger economic performance. (In this regard, the devastation caused by Hurricane George and Hurricane Mitch, and the corresponding requirements for large levels of relief food aid in 1998 and, especially, 1999, may be seen as an anomaly).

**Figure 6.5 Regional Distribution of Food Aid**




Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999

### Food aid concentrated on small number of donors

Figure 6.6 shows the major donors of relief food aid for the decade. Together they account for around three-quarters of the total.

The US has consistently been the largest single donor of relief food aid, followed by the European Commission. The US has consistently provided approximately 40 percent of all relief food aid. In 1999, the European Commission provided 14 percent of total emergency food aid and the EU Member States a further 13 percent. The Commission and Member States together therefore were contributing 27 percent of emergency food aid compared with 62 percent from the United States.

Other consistent donors of significant levels of relief food aid are (in decreasing order) Canada, Germany, Japan (since 1991), Australia, Netherlands (since 1991), Sweden and France. The UK, Switzerland and Italy significantly increased their donations of relief food aid in the course of the decade. Other countries were consistent donors of smaller amounts, such as Denmark, Belgium, Norway and Spain. Some of the countries that became newly independent in the course of the decade quickly became modest donors of relief food aid. Developing countries have also become donors, although again of small amounts. In some cases (for example Uganda, Sudan and Pakistan), countries were both donors and recipients. Gulf States have joined the donor group over the decade, although more sporadically than other countries.

**Figure 6.6 Major Food Aid Donors**

Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999

A number of donors provide relief food to a limited number of countries. Nearly all relief food from South Korea, for example, was for North Korea. Donors from the Islamic world have tended to donate to fellow Muslims. UK and France have tended to favour countries with colonial links.

In some cases geography is the determining factor. Thus Australia and New Zealand are the main donors to South Pacific countries requiring relief food assistance. Geo-political concerns often dominate donors' decisions of the provision of relief food aid. Thus the US is a major donor to North Korea, largely for political reasons. The European Union has been a major donor to Russia (as has the US) and Eastern Europe. An interesting feature has been the growth in donations from private sources, both companies and, increasingly, individuals.

Data on donations from UN agencies reflect food provided from the agencies' own funds (for example WFP's cash resources) as distinct from food channeled by donors through the UN agencies.<sup>6</sup> In 1989, under a new Memorandum of Understanding, WFP took over from UNHCR the provision of most food aid to refugees, although UNHCR still provides food for small refugee operations of fewer than 5,000 people, as well as the provision of fresh foods, mainly vegetables, to meet nutritional requirements. Relief food provided by UNICEF is mainly blended food for supplementary feeding programmes for infants and pregnant women.

### The role of NGOs


A significant feature of the decade has been the increasing prominence of NGOs as donors, using their own resources to provide relief food aid (Figure 6.7). The decade has seen not only an overall increase in the amount of relief food aid provided by NGOs, but also in the number of

NGOs providing relief food aid. Some NGOs, such as CFB, Caritas, the Red Cross and Oxfam, have been consistent donors. Others, such as the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, CARE and MFM, have been more sporadic, but also significant, donors.

NGOs have also become important as channels of relief food aid (Figure 6.8). Increasingly donors are turning to NGOs to distribute their food aid to beneficiaries, as well as to implement food-aided activities. On the evidence of the past decade, it seems likely that this role of NGOs will increase. The reason for the sharp increase in 1997 is the provision of large amounts of food to North Korea by the Canadian Food Grains Bank and by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies via the South Korean Red Cross.


NGOs play an additional, and perhaps even more significant, role – that of agitator. OXFAM, for example, has consistently urged donors (mainly the UK and the EU) to meet ‘unnoticed’ needs.

**Figure 6.7 Food Aid from NGOs**




Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999

**Figure 6.8 Channels for Emergency Food Aid Deliveries**



Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999

**Figure 6.9 Food Aid from Top Ten NGOs and Intergovernmental Organisations**

Source: WFP/INTERFAIS, October 1999

### Notes

- Note: Relief Food Aid is targeted and freely distributed to victims of natural or manmade disasters. Emergency food aid is not necessarily funded from donors' emergency budgets.
- In 1998, US production of staple cereals increased and prices plummeted, by 22 percent for wheat and soybeans and by 18 percent for maize. Hence President Clinton's intervention in the form of farm disaster assistance.
- The International Grains Council is an intergovernmental forum for cooperation on wheat and coarse grains matters (but not for rice), financed by annual contributions from its member states, which are proportionate to their votes and thus relate to their shares of the world grains trade. The functions of the IGC include review of the implementation of the Grain Trade Conventions (GTC) and the Food Aid Convention (FAC). The GTC seeks to further international cooperation in all aspects of the grains trade, to promote expansion, openness and fairness in the grains sector, to contribute to grain market stability and to enhance world food security. The IGC normally reaches its decisions by consensus and each member is designated as an importer or an exporter on the basis of its average trade in grains. Signatory to the Grains Trade Convention is the criteria for membership to the IGC. As of October 1999, membership of the IGC comprised nine exporting countries and 22 importing countries. An annual IGC Grains Conferences provides a high level forum where senior private sector representatives and government policy makers can discuss topical issues affecting the global grains industry.
- Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (1999): Food Outlook, No. 4, September 1999
- These include the Central Asian republics, included under Europe in Figure 6.4 for the sake of consistency.
- UN agencies' own funds include any unallocable funds – for instance interest on savings that cannot be attributed to a particular donor.

# A

## Appendix A: Reference tables

**Table A.1 Total Humanitarian Assistance 1988–1998 (Millions of US Dollars, Real Terms)**

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total Multilateral ODA for Humanitarian Assistance spent through UN Agencies	777.09	882.26	854.12	1,092.08	1,343.72	1,265.83	1,340.68	1,193.48	1,158.80	960.99	1,212.66
Total Bilateral ODA for Emergency and Distress Relief	876.66	968.89	1,119.11	2,527.68	2,573.53	3,452.11	3,615.96	2,892.20	2,531.42	2,163.03	2,825.74
Total Multilateral ODA for Humanitarian Assistance spent through the EC	78.65	0.00	150.55	1,001.71	334.03	441.15	710.88	531.11	697.62	784.36	498.60
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1,732.40</b>	<b>1,851.15</b>	<b>2,123.78</b>	<b>4,621.47</b>	<b>4,251.28</b>	<b>5,159.09</b>	<b>5,667.52</b>	<b>4,616.79</b>	<b>4,387.84</b>	<b>3,908.38</b>	<b>4,537.00</b>
Percentage of total WFP expenditure to developmental activities	73.42%	65.94%	65.63%	45.41%	35.11%	31.51%	26.29%	35.70%	27.45%	32.11%	21.74%
Percentage of total WFP expenditure to relief activities	26.58%	34.06%	34.37%	54.59%	64.89%	68.49%	73.71%	64.30%	72.55%	67.89%	78.26%

Sources: OECD DAC Statistics Table 1 and Table 2a; WFP Annexes to the Annual Report of the Executive Director

**Notes:**

Bilateral ODA includes emergency food aid after 1995. Prior to that emergency food aid was included in the totals for developmental food aid. Multilateral ODA spent through UN agencies is calculated as follows: Total multilateral ODA to UNHCR and UNRWA – both agencies with an exclusively humanitarian mandate plus multilateral ODA spent through WFP in proportion to WFP's own calculation of its expenditure on humanitarian and developmental assistance. Most spending by other UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNICEF and WHO, for humanitarian assistance will be included in the bilateral spending on emergency and distress relief.

The basis of the share of WFP multilateral expenditure on Humanitarian Assistance is given in the bottom two rows of the table.

**Table A.2 Multilateral ODA through selected UN Agencies (Millions of US Dollars, Real Terms)**

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
UNHCR	365.5	400.0	410.4	456.2	632.1	500.1	537.1	509.9	599.3	427.7	561.6
WFP development plus relief	882.9	864.5	736.4	774.4	792.8	851.3	795.4	762.7	519.9	551.2	600.7
UNDP	1,126.3	1,106.1	1,156.3	1,072.8	1,050.5	957.9	958.1	820.0	825.4	776.2	771.3
UNICEF	439.7	384.7	468.2	367.7	450.5	386.8	385.8	328.2	352.2	364.6	376.6
UNRWA	176.9	187.8	190.6	213.2	197.2	182.7	217.2	193.1	182.3	159.1	180.9

Sources: OECD DAC Statistics Table 1 and Table 2a; WFP Annexes to the Annual Report of the Executive Director

**Table A.3 Numbers of Refugees and Internally Displaced People in Africa, Asia and Europe**

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Africa	22,787,360	23,333,830	22,482,190	15,876,940	12,846,500	11,071,570	12,040,860
Asia	10,279,980	7,287,250	7,406,240	6,634,650	8,278,930	7,783,960	7,391,730
Europe	4,649,090	5,444,200	7,071,540	7,180,980	7,900,890	6,635,770	5,936,830

Source: UNHCR Statistics for refugee numbers; IFRC, World Disasters Report 1999 and previous years

**Table A.4 Total Numbers of Refugees and Internally Displaced People 1992–1998**

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total IDPs	23,684,000	24,490,000	26,423,000	20,400,000	19,705,000	17,437,500	18,026,000
Total Refugees	18,170,210	16,401,440	14,488,740	13,236,130	13,198,950	11,975,630	11,491,710

Source: UNHCR Statistics for refugee numbers; IFRC, World Disasters Report 1999

**Table A.5 Official Aid Contributions to Emergency Relief in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 1995–1998 (Millions of US Dollars, Cash Terms)**

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Developing Countries	41.20	54.46	54.93	33.39
Countries in Transition	40.38	16.58	81.18	152.74

Source: OECD DAC Statistics Table 2a

**Table A.6 Long Term Trends in Bilateral ODA to Emergency and Distress Relief and Total ODA 1969–1998 (Millions of US Dollars)**

	Bilateral ODA to Emergency and Distress Relief		Total ODA	
	Expenditure in Cash Terms	Expenditure in Real Terms	Total in Cash Terms	Total in Real Terms
1969	3.38	21.35	6,888.90	33,603.27
1970	6.94	40.82	6,712.88	31,060.54
1971	80.14	334.70	7,283.62	31,735.05
1972	128.11	518.85	8,843.89	34,475.55
1973	115.23	390.73	8,702.93	30,388.41
1974	113.36	350.88	11,179.76	34,996.31
1975	160.61	424.09	13,253.98	36,418.66
1976	138.47	348.41	13,248.16	35,103.09
1977	167.38	387.55	14,955.65	36,432.55
1978	225.21	468.28	19,147.66	40,618.70
1979	288.25	534.53	21,840.80	41,568.97
1980	353.23	603.82	26,195.05	45,974.02
1981	319.97	554.39	24,603.95	44,315.79
1982	252.83	439.29	27,036.98	49,513.97
1983	278.17	485.94	26,770.46	49,388.03
1984	293.07	534.38	28,130.38	52,868.26
1985	601.64	1,054.56	28,755.47	53,160.92
1986	654.03	980.64	35,836.01	54,204.83
1987	686.69	895.23	40,605.72	53,480.35
1988	721.86	876.66	47,062.99	57,673.79
1989	809.16	968.89	45,734.78	56,497.49
1990	1,058.21	1,119.11	54,489.55	60,575.19
1991	2,417.62	2,527.68	58,553.94	62,768.48
1992	2,586.25	2,573.53	62,710.63	63,237.22
1993	3,250.02	3,452.11	56,485.81	58,155.98
1994	3,468.17	3,615.96	59,151.86	58,286.02
1995	3,062.29	2,892.20	58,926.48	52,520.45
1996	2,692.23	2,531.42	55,438.23	51,431.45
1997	2,163.03	2,163.03	48,324.24	48,324.24
1998	2,070.63	2,825.74	51,888.32	52,979.15

Source: OECD DAC Statistics Table 1

**Table A.7** Numbers of Applications for Asylum to Selected OECD Countries

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Germany	438,200	322,600	127,200	127,900	149,200	151,700
United States	104,000	144,200	146,500	154,500	128,200	84,800
Netherlands	20,300	35,400	52,600	29,300	22,900	34,400
United Kingdom	32,300	28,000	42,200	55,000	27,900	32,500
Canada	37,700	21,100	22,000	25,800	25,600	24,300
France	28,900	27,600	26,000	20,200	17,200	21,000
Belgium	17,800	26,900	14,300	11,400	12,200	11,800
Sweden	84,000	37,600	18,600	9,000	5,800	9,700
Austria	16,200	4,400	5,100	5,900	7,000	6,700
Denmark	13,900	14,300	6,700	5,100	5,900	5,100

Source: US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1998, Immigration and Refugee Services of America 1998, Washington DC

**Table A.8** ODA spent on support for refugees in OECD donor countries 1992–1998 (Millions of US Dollars)

Donor	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Australia	–	–	–	–	0.01	–	–
Austria	115.96	113.37	122.42	109.40	85.23	34.38	29.44
Belgium	–	–	–	–	–	0.32	–
Canada	–	183.69	153.16	111.46	120.04	112.10	104.65
Denmark	104.85	77.14	78.62	71.38	54.15	94.56	91.78
Finland	42.69	11.16	5.90	7.35	11.21	10.34	7.93
France	–	–	–	–	–	56.90	80.29
Germany	624.02	497.68	352.99	381.03	173.37	114.70	58.85
Ireland	–	–	0.90	2.08	4.38	2.24	1.57
Italy	–	52.34	0.50	–	1.94	–	–
Luxembourg	–	4.34	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	109.61	169.54	75.32	–	70.58	73.68	72.43
Norway	–	–	68.02	9.47	9.42	12.00	33.16
Spain	–	0.33	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	–	–	105.63	114.25	114.06	100.20	97.90
Switzerland	–	–	–	–	–	–	9.54
United States	–	–	–	–	–	36.00	387.14
TOTAL	997.13	1,109.59	963.46	806.42	644.39	647.42	974.68

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Table 1

**Table A.9** Funding Contributions and Requests for Funding per Affected Person in the Great Lakes and Former Yugoslavia and their Surrounding Regions (US Dollars)

	1994	1995	1995	1997	1998	1999
<b>Funding per Head</b>						
Great Lakes/Rwanda	144	188	203	162	64	100
Regional Average	44	61	72	34	55	41
Former Yugoslavia	179	151	173	161	166	207
Regional Average	81	114	173	62	65	71
<b>Requests per Head</b>						
Great Lakes/Rwanda	151	181	235	182	154	150
Regional Average	53	76	99	53	83	58
Former Yugoslavia	169	146	253	231	300	265
Regional Average	90	122	253	94	121	98

Source: OCHA CAPs Financial Tracking System



**Table A.10 Consolidated Appeals: Volumes and Shares of Requests for Funding and Income by Region (Millions of US Dollars)**

	1993		1994		1995		1996		1997		1998		1999	
	Volume	Share of total	Volume	Share of total	Volume	Share of total	Volume	Share of total	Volume	Share of total	Volume	Share of total	Volume	Share of total
<b>Requests</b>	2,083	52.80%	1,318	47.44%	1,360	57.92%	1,238	52.30%	739	48.94%	1,071	49.54%	802	33.68%
Africa														
NIS and Middle East	607	15.39%	476	17.13%	349	14.86%	286	12.08%	0.01	0.00%	35	1.62%	46	1.93%
Asia, Europe and Latin America	1,255	31.81%	984	35.42%	639	27.21%	843	35.61%	771	51.06%	1,056	48.84%	1,533	64.38%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3,945</b>		<b>2,778</b>		<b>2,348</b>		<b>2,367</b>		<b>1,510.01</b>		<b>2,162</b>		<b>2,381</b>	
<b>Income</b>														
Africa	1,253	49.55%	1,104	49.73%	1,083	57.39%	898	54.06%	471	46.82%	711	54.69%	632	35.21%
NIS and Middle East	186	7.35%	200	9.01%	207	10.97%	180	10.84%	6	0.60%	10	0.77%	35	1.95%
Asia, Europe and Latin America	1,090	43.10%	916	41.26%	597	31.64%	583	35.10%	529	52.58%	579	44.54%	1,128	62.84%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,529</b>		<b>2,220</b>		<b>1,887</b>		<b>1,661</b>		<b>1,006</b>		<b>1,300</b>		<b>1,795</b>	

Source: OCHA Consolidated Appeal data

**Table A.11 Humanitarian Spending through Consolidated Appeals by Channel Type, 1992–1999 (Millions of US Dollars)**

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>Donor Type</b>								
Government to Government	858.2	712.0	373.2	207.5	265.4	196.0	178.4	124.7
Multilateral	878.1	1,659.5	1,850.3	1,703.6	1,815.6	1,314.2	1,400.7	1,355.7
ICRC/IFRC	274.1	361.9	529.4	559.3	461.0	375.7	324.2	229.0
NGOs/Private Org.	516.5	738.0	838.2	1,010.9	733.5	559.7	740.1	288.5
Unspecified	427.0	366.7	19.8	33.7	88.4	16.3	16.4	114.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,953.9</b>	<b>3,838.1</b>	<b>3,610.9</b>	<b>3,515.0</b>	<b>3,364.1</b>	<b>2,461.8</b>	<b>2,659.8</b>	<b>2,112.4</b>
<b>Shares of Total</b>								
Government to Government	29.05%	18.55%	10.34%	5.90%	7.89%	7.96%	6.71%	5.91%
Multilateral	29.73%	43.24%	51.24%	48.47%	53.97%	53.38%	52.66%	64.18%
ICRC/IFRC	9.28%	9.43%	14.66%	15.91%	13.70%	15.26%	12.19%	10.84%
NGOs/Private Org.	17.49%	19.23%	23.21%	28.76%	21.80%	22.73%	27.83%	13.66%
Unspecified	14.45%	9.55%	0.55%	0.96%	2.63%	0.66%	0.62%	5.42%

Note: This information is comprehensive to the extent that decisions have been reported to OCHA by the Donor

Source: OCHA Data

**Table A.12 Percentage of CAP Requirements Met by Region 1996–1999**

	1996	1997	1998	1999
Africa	70.50	63.76	66.40	58.80
NIS	62.64	48.74	29.80	56.10
Asia, Europe and Latin America	69.14	67.21	54.20	67.20
<b>Total</b>	<b>69.06</b>	<b>64.03</b>	<b>53.90</b>	<b>64.00</b>

Source: OCHA CAPs Financial Tracking System

**Table A.13 Bilateral ODA to Emergency and Distress Relief by Donor 1971–1998 (Millions of US Dollars, Real Terms)**

	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	UK	USA
1971	6.55	0	1.89	12.28	2.53	0	0	0	0	0	44.24	0	30.81	0	11.04	0	0	34.29	0	48.41	142.66
1972	0	0	0.9	55.15	11.91	2.09	9.63	66.58	0	0	62.36	0	2.27	3.87	34.4	0	0	119.61	55.02	54.99	40.07
1973	0.35	0	10.47	12.42	11.97	3.23	0	35.42	0	0	35.29	0	10.69	2.98	13.95	0	0	34.3	33.88	11.95	173.83
1974	0.47	0	2.31	1.09	11.93	2.9	0	20.31	0.42	0	23.33	0	35.08	2.3	24.74	0	0	18.79	42.36	11.14	153.71
1975	15.37	1.04	4.49	3.03	17.2	3.34	14.09	30.04	0.4	0	2.72	0	24.67	2.96	22.58	0	0	11.96	28.5	11.11	230.59
1976	1.39	0.8	3.38	2.98	14.81	1.64	31.56	6.8	0.75	0	0	0	26.38	0.53	15.71	0	0	19.58	27.99	8.79	185.32
1977	1.98	0.16	6.43	6.89	18.72	0.27	7.36	14.18	0.51	0.62	8.98	0	15.61	0.49	22.19	0	0	39.57	28.37	5.86	209.36
1978	1.74	0.56	7.87	7.11	26.45	1.23	4.79	21.8	1.31	0.32	15.8	0	24.68	0.55	21.8	0	0	40.84	22.44	14.66	254.33
1979	8.23	1.68	9.12	6.99	21.64	3.19	0	62.65	2.37	6.77	11.68	0	38.65	1.22	26.33	0	0	57.63	25.81	8.15	242.42
1980	11.72	1.82	10.04	22.65	27.72	4.1	0	50.69	1.37	15.82	14.13	0	31.26	0.38	29.19	0	0	56.72	20.89	9.41	295.91
1981	5.54	1.3	4.38	18.32	19.53	5.47	40.4	32.34	1.03	41.27	23.89	0	29.15	0.48	30.3	0	0	58.52	20.28	4.14	218.05
1982	11.99	4.43	1.42	28.21	32.72	7.85	0	33.46	0.64	13.95	6.64	0	26.71	1.71	37.85	0	0	128.4	27.21	6.14	69.96
1983	13.11	0	3.1	29.67	33.88	6.39	0	37.3	1.03	21.98	8.25	0	27.66	1.97	27.19	0	0	103.39	24.38	7.88	138.76
1984	14.64	5.07	2.14	53.7	29.12	4.53	0	44.86	2.48	47.52	6.53	0	45.7	0.44	19.57	0	0	112.86	35.36	24.63	85.23
1985	14.55	7.8	4.43	73.05	0	8.96	0	41.84	2.54	195.98	15.11	0	47.03	2.11	35.84	0	0	151.03	43.73	90.91	319.65
1986	9.64	5.06	3.55	34.24	0	13.67	0	37.27	1.55	294.99	2.83	0	38.35	0.38	33.21	0	0	147.37	42.03	49.3	267.2
1987	25.08	8.01	1.66	31.87	0	30.26	0	38.01	1.34	160.16	2.88	0.52	36.46	1.85	25.69	0	0	168	84.5	33.1	245.84
1988	9.46	18.31	2.31	59.78	0	20.26	0	46.6	1.46	175.14	10.16	1.91	41.27	0.76	48.5	0	0	126.14	51.06	43.25	220.29
1989	7.49	30.78	2.15	29.22	0	31.6	0	41.66	1.62	100.66	23.59	2.64	31.4	0	58.68	0	1.43	238.94	63	42.87	261.16
1990	13.06	49.56	5.1	43.06	114.38	58.74	0	51.14	2.2	100.99	32.67	4.12	68.67	4.78	90.12	0	4.77	116.97	51.59	43.78	263.41
1991	13.81	104.73	6.29	76.65	56.3	88.63	0	464.92	3.08	425.8	22.88	11.24	118.48	1.92	79.75	0.13	7.65	161.96	72.81	127.4	683.25
1992	32.3	146.81	13.18	73.91	103.17	58.59	25.33	677.2	2.06	121.65	15.44	7.1	196.02	6.87	85.56	0.11	5.38	291.17	70.34	60.06	581.28
1993	30.9	127.98	19.69	270.12	81.05	25.76	127.76	558.06	5.64	369.71	36.43	8.92	312.03	6.45	125.15	9.06	7.72	307.13	70.16	225.14	727.25
1994	27.35	125.71	13.72	235.88	79.89	29.33	120.55	381.8	9.04	113.11	25.73	4.92	297.81	3.13	199.13	3.9	5.09	358.09	77.37	302.58	1201.83
1995	37.25	97.94	13.39	166.87	63.05	19.5	120.83	368.88	8.21	90.68	46.09	5.94	298.94	1.89	176.39	3.19	17.51	257.76	79.42	199.67	818.8
1996	31.19	81.19	21.08	172.86	48.42	34.99	85.24	256.9	15.84	89.85	64.74	8.03	301.08	3.71	186.38	5.04	11.4	238.83	69.22	209.52	595.91
1997	31.91	37.15	37.15	159.15	94.56	28.61	70.74	204.86	11.2	50.25	73.66	8.13	278.89	5.98	192.08	0.43	17.97	233.81	122.18	164.32	340
1998	77.96	34.23	19.66	161.88	91.79	26.23	89.24	174.16	8.74	21.33	133.63	10.37	297.06	5.54	227.72	0.66	26.6	218.53	129.78	180.23	888.8

Source: OECD DAC Statistics Table 1

**Table A.14** Distribution of funding through Consolidated Appeals to selected agencies 1994–1999 (Millions of US Dollars)

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Income Only					
WFP	1,049.4	904.0	766.9	436.8	659.9
UNHCR	640.8	608.9	594.2	345.2	352.1
UNDP	4.3	4.7	19.0	26.5	63.9
UNICEF	158.0	183.0	124.9	87.4	98.8
FAO	14.3	28.8	18.0	6.1	10.0
NGOs	11.6	8.7	16.1	16.2	18.5
WHO	38.5	34.4	17.8	16.2	5.8
OCHA	6.0	27.8	49.2	45.8	32.9
IOM	7.4	11.6	22.0	16.5	13.6
Other	30.6	11.1	33.3	9.1	45.3
Total Excluding Other	1,930.3	1,811.9	1,628.0	996.7	1,255.6
Total	1,960.9	1,823.0	1,661.3	1,005.8	1,300.9

Source: OCHA CAPs FTS

**Table A.15** Volume and Percentage of ECHO Budget Spent through UN Agencies, International Organisations and NGOs (Euro/ECU Millions)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Percentage Spent through EU NGOs	27.0	45.8	33.6	44.0	40.9	45.9	46.1	48.0	59.7	63.6
Percentage Spent through UN Agencies	10.4	24.3	37	31.7	31.9	23.5	31.9	31.0	18.5	19.8
Percentage Spent through International Organisations	13.1	17.4	11.1	10.8	9.6	11.3	9.4	11.6	10.5	7.4
Percentage spent Directly by the Commission	39.9	1.1	3.4	9.2	15.4	14.6	10.0	6.4	6.6	3.1
Total ECHO Budget	114.3	195.3	368.0	604.8	764.1	694.1	656.7	441.6	517.7	820.0
Volume through NGOs	30.9	89.4	123.6	266.1	312.5	318.6	302.7	212.0	309.1	521.5
Volume through UN	11.9	47.5	136.2	191.7	243.7	163.1	209.5	136.9	95.8	162.4

Source: ECHO Statistics

**Table A.16** ECHO Humanitarian Aid Expenditure by Region (Euro/ECU Millions)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Former Yugoslavia	63.32	35.25	33.9	28.48	23.00	23.78	57.31
ACP Countries	16.51	42.41	30.6	42.34	43.00	27.68	16.41
C. I. S.	8.48	11.90	19.86	8.14	7.00	7.63	7.07
Eastern Europe	0.13	0.35	0.42	0.25	2.00	2.70	0.22
Asia	3.68	3.38	5.7	8.11	12.00	12.08	11.47
Iraq	3.55	2.94	3.59	4.49	4.00	2.70	0.25
N. Africa/Middle East	0.20	0.46	0.72	3.18	4.00	6.18	2.59
Latin America	2.02	2.81	3.95	2.90	5.00	6.24	6.26

Note: The 1999 figure for Asia takes account of 30 MEUR for Turkey

Source: ECHO Statistics

**Table A.17** Analysis of Spending of Humanitarian Assistance through UN and EC Multilateral Channels and Bilateral Channels 1988–1998 (Millions of US Dollars, Real Terms)

	Growth Rates				Share of Humanitarian Assistance Spent through Bilateral, EC and UN agencies		
	Bilateral ODA for Humanitarian Assistance	Multilateral ODA for Humanitarian Assistance through the EC	Multilateral ODA for Humanitarian Assistance through UN Agencies	Total Humanitarian Assistance Growth rate	Bilateral share	EC Share	UN Share
1988	0	0	0	0	50.60%	4.54%	44.86%
1989	10.52%	0.00%	13.53%	6.85%	52.34%	0.00%	47.66%
1990	15.50%	0.00%	3.19%	14.73%	52.69%	7.09%	40.22%
1991	125.87%	0.00%	27.86%	117.61%	54.69%	21.68%	23.63%
1992	1.81%	-66.65%	23.04%	-8.01%	60.54%	7.86%	31.61%
1993	34.14%	32.07%	-5.80%	21.35%	66.91%	8.55%	24.54%
1994	4.75%	61.14%	5.91%	9.86%	63.80%	12.54%	23.66%
1995	-20.02%	-25.29%	-10.98%	-18.54%	62.65%	11.50%	25.85%
1996	-12.47%	31.35%	-2.91%	-4.96%	57.69%	15.90%	26.41%
1997	-14.55%	12.43%	-17.07%	-10.93%	55.34%	20.07%	24.59%
1998	30.64%	36.43%	26.19%	16.08%	62.28%	10.99%	26.73%

Source: OECD DAC Statistics tables 1, 2a and WFP Annual Reports, Various Years

**Table A.18** Allocations of UN Share of EC Humanitarian Aid to Specific Agencies

	Special Ops. (i)	UNHCR	WFP	UNICEF	WHO	UNDP	FAO	UNDHA/OCHA	UNRWA	IDNDR	PAHO	UNDRO	UNHCS
1991	7.50%	45.80%	34.10%	11.63%	0.00%	0.39%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.58%	0.00%	0.00%
1992	0.00%	63.70%	29.16%	3.35%	3.11%	0.38%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.22%	0.08%	0.00%
1993	0.38%	46.35%	37.59%	7.18%	4.88%	0.00%	0.47%	0.00%	3.15%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
1994	0.25%	73.67%	19.66%	4.95%	0.22%	0.00%	0.00%	0.16%	0.19%	0.00%	0.91%	0.00%	0.00%
1995	0.40%	70.07%	22.47%	5.06%	0.00%	0.40%	0.36%	0.40%	0.18%	0.00%	0.67%	0.00%	0.00%
1996	0.00%	68.44%	23.24%	4.66%	1.81%	0.00%	0.00%	0.47%	0.84%	0.00%	0.09%	0.00%	0.44%
1997	0.00%	52.85%	37.15%	6.38%	1.84%	0.00%	0.39%	0.03%	0.87%	0.00%	0.13%	0.00%	0.36%
1998	0.00%	57.94%	26.07%	12.57%	0.92%	0.92%	0.00%	0.00%	0.16%	0.00%	1.41%	0.00%	0.00%
1999	0.00%	59.39%	22.29%	11.81%	4.48%	0.97%	0.41%	0.31%	0.31%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

(i) Includes the International Organization for Migration

Source: ECHO quarterly Statistics

**Table A.19** Emergency Food Aid by Recipient Region (Thousands of Tons)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total
Sub-Saharan Africa	902.6	1,548.6	2,391.3	3,678.8	2,997.1	3,013.9	2,012.8	1,657.1	1,346.0	1,641.7	21189.9
Asia and Pacific	512.3	291.4	510.0	606.6	515.1	388.1	555.1	309.2	1,118.8	943.4	5,750.0
Europe	0.0	12.7	38.8	462.8	526.0	880.5	746.4	588.2	694.9	410.2	4,360.6
North Africa	49.9	19.2	74.0	13.9	12.3	19.8	18.4	27.1	42.0	14.4	291.0
Latin America	66.7	56.1	29.5	12.5	33.1	27.5	37.3	11.8	19.6	36.2	330.3
Middle East	61.2	113.6	319.7	235.3	193.3	175.0	181.5	147.7	104.9	71.3	1,603.5
Total	1,592.7	2,041.5	3,363.3	5,010.0	4,276.9	4,504.8	3,551.4	2,741.0	3,326.3	3,117.2	

Note: For the sake of consistency, Europe includes Central Asian republics

Source: WFP Interfaix

**Table A.20 Top Ten Recipients of European Community Humanitarian Assistance 1992–1999  
(Millions of Euro/ECU)**

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
ACP Countries	0	0	0	9.47	0	0	0	55.4
Fmr. Yugoslavia	277.1	395.1	269.4	234.7	187.0	259.1	123.1	448.5
Sudan	4.0	10.4	26.5	21.4	13.4	23.0	34.0	13.5
Rwanda/Great Lakes	2.7	11.0	27.5	82.0	205.4	13.0	76.7	0
Iraq	5.0	21.5	22.5	24.9	29.5	2.8	14.0	2.0
Afghanistan	2.0	2.8	12.3	12.7	41.1	8.1	19.8	5.8
Angola	7.5	7.00	24.0	17.0	14.0	19.0	0	10.0
Tajikistan	0	0	9.8	16.1	14.2	14.9	16.8	16.0
Somalia	40.0	12.3	8.3	6.0	5.0	7.0	4.0	3.3
Former USSR	3.6	51.3	0	1.3	0.5	0	0	24.3

Source: ECHO Statistics

# B

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See the following websites for data on Humanitarian Assistance:

Reliefweb at [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

DAC Statistics at [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)