Although military interventions can be high profile, the total humanitarian spending they represent is relatively small. During the decade 2004 to 2013, just 1.2% of humanitarian assistance reported by OECD DAC donors was channelled via military organisations.

Military and defence actors played a significant role in the response to the West African Ebola virus disease outbreak in 2014. Working together with a team of engineers from the Armed Forces of Liberia, the US Department of Defense helped build Ebola treatment units across Liberia, including this one in Tubmanburg. In total the US committed 3,000 troops as well as engineers and military assets to its Ebola response.
How humanitarian assistance gets from the donor to the crisis-affected person matters. Rarely a direct transaction, funding moves from donor to a ‘first recipient’ agency or mechanism and then sometimes through several further levels before it materialises in the form of goods, services or cash for crisis-affected people. The timeliness, cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of response are all affected by these ‘channels of delivery’ choices as well as by the length and nature of the various transaction chains.

Traceability is key to understanding and improving these channels of delivery. However, the data does not allow money to be systematically followed beyond the first recipient. Fully compliant reporting to meet the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard could allow contributions to be traced through the system from the donor down to the activity level.

Current data does reveal that the majority of international humanitarian assistance went in the first instance to UN agencies, and that the largest share of this came from government donors. In 2013, 48% of government funding went to the six major UN agencies involved in humanitarian coordination and response. The World Food Programme (WFP) has received the bulk of funding to UN agencies over the last decade, but the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also received a significant and steadily increasing amount.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are the second-largest group of first recipients and in 2013 they received 20% of government donors’ international humanitarian assistance. Most of this goes, at least in the first instance, to international NGOs (INGOs) – 2014 figures suggest that local and national NGOs directly received 1.2% of that given to all NGOs, two-thirds of the share that they received the previous year. Funding channelled through the affected state and through donors’ defence agencies remains small, though with the recent Ebola and Typhoon Haiyan responses, there is growing attention to their respective roles.

Pooled funds are important mechanisms for rapid response and gap-filling at the global and country levels. In 2014, the UN-managed pooled funds mobilised US$1.1 billion, 4.4% of international humanitarian assistance. Funding, however, tends to be concentrated – 50% went to five countries, and some major donors chose to channel little or no assistance through these funds.
FIGURE 5.1
Humanitarian funding channels, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF data and GHA's unique dataset for private voluntary contributions. Notes: GHA’s first-level recipient data from government donors and EU institutions uses OECD DAC CRS and UN OCHA FTS data. The figures in our calculations for total humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors use data from OECD DAC Tables 1 and 2a, so totals here may differ. “Public sector” refers both to the OECD definition of public sector and the FTS category of funding channelled to the ‘affected government’. OECD DAC CRS codes ‘other’, ‘to be defined’ and ‘Public Private Partnerships’ are merged and expressed as ‘other’ unless otherwise specified. Private funding figures use GHA’s unique dataset on private voluntary contributions for humanitarian assistance. RCRC, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
Channels of delivery

Different donors display different preferences in how they direct their humanitarian assistance. For example, while multilateral organisations (primarily UN agencies) received an estimated 61% of international humanitarian assistance from governments traceable to first-level recipients between 2009 and 2013, this proportion was much higher for contributions from DAC donors (62%) than for other governments (41%). These statistics in turn mask individual donor preferences in different contexts.

While both DAC and other government donors appear to prefer channelling their delivery through multilateral agencies, they vary in how they choose to direct the rest of their assistance.

Around 19% of humanitarian assistance from DAC donors went directly to NGOs over the five-year period, while just 2% of reported allocations from other governments was channelled this way. In contrast, according to GHA’s unique dataset on private voluntary contributions, private donors channel the largest share of their funding by far through NGOs (89%).

International humanitarian assistance is not a direct transaction between donor and recipient. Funding moves through transaction chains of varying lengths and complexity. ‘Following the money’ through these is essential to promote accountability and improve efficiency. Yet while there is significant interest in understanding transaction costs and value for money, it is not currently possible to track humanitarian funding on its journey from donor to the crisis-affected person.

As Figure 5.1 shows, most government funding does specify a first-level recipient. Yet while we know that these initial recipients often then pass funding to second- or third-level recipients or beyond, this is not systematically captured in current reporting systems.

To address this gap, IATI (see Chapter 9) aims to provide a common reporting standard that will allow the coding of funding and spending relating to specific activities. If such information was systematically and comprehensively reported, it would be possible to trace disbursements from donor to final implemented programmes and resources delivered. Geo-coding at the activity-reporting level would also allow the delivery of assistance to be mapped geographically. As shown in the GHA Report 2014, tracking tools such as d-portal already allow development funding to be traced in this way.

An estimated 21% (US$0.8 billion) of humanitarian assistance from other government donors between 2009 and 2013 was channelled directly to the public sector in recipient countries, compared with just 8% for OECD DAC donors.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data, and GHA’s unique dataset on private voluntary contributions.
Note: Channels of delivery data for private funding is based on GHA’s own calculations and further analysis is available in Chapter 3.
The largest share of international humanitarian assistance is channelled, at least in the first instance, through UN agencies – and this share is growing. In 2013, nearly half (48% or US$7.3 billion) of international humanitarian assistance from government donors went via the six UN agencies with a key role in humanitarian coordination and response: WFP, UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This was a slight rise from their 45% share (US$5.7 billion) in 2012 – and significantly higher than their 16% share in 2004. These UN agencies can act as both appealing agencies and grant-makers, and both coordinators and implementers – roles often taken on by the same agency within the same emergency.

UN agencies receive funding in a number of ways, through: regular core funding from government donors; other contributions from governments; institutional and private donations; and pooled funds. A small proportion for UN OCHA, UNHCR and UNRWA also comes from the general UN budget. In the case of FAO, a proportion also comes from assessed contributions from member states.2

Overall, voluntary contributions from government donors provide the majority of funding to these six UN agencies, predominantly donors from the OECD DAC group – who provided 96% of their funding in 2013 (US$7.0 billion) – through both core contributions and other allocations. The largest DAC donor to these UN agencies in 2013 was the US with US$3.1 billion (accounting for 55% of all DAC donor contributions). The next largest donor, the UK, contributed a quarter of that at US$716 million (13%), while Japan gave US$476 million (8.4%).

Most of the funding from DAC donors to these UN agencies is for specific responses rather than core funding. In 2013 19% was for core funding – a stark reversal from the decade before, when core funding represented 85%. However, some of the difference may be explained by improved reporting of other allocations over the decade.

Donors outside the DAC group provided 4.2% of the total from governments to these six UN agencies in 2013 – US$305 million. In 2013 by far the largest of these donors was Kuwait, which contributed US$224 million, followed by Russia with US$31.3 million and Saudi Arabia with US$18.9 million. However, the shares and volumes of funding from this group of donors may change significantly in 2014, given the allocations to WFP from Saudi Arabia that year (see Chapter 3).

Of the UN agencies, WFP and UNHCR receive the largest share of direct humanitarian assistance from governments – 47% to WFP and 27% to UNHCR over the past ten years. Over this period, WFP has received US$23.8 billion of international humanitarian assistance, almost equivalent to that received by UNHCR, UNRWA and UNICEF combined. Funding to WFP has grown at the highest rate but with significant volatility – this is perhaps explained by the nature of food crises, including the 2008 global food price crisis which prompted a peak in WFP funding. Conversely, funding to UNHCR, the second-largest UN agency recipient, has increased steadily from US$471 million in 2004 (31% of total funds disbursed via the six agencies) to US$2.3 billion (31%) in 2013, mirroring the year-on-year growth in the numbers of people displaced (see Chapter 1).
FIGURE 5.3
International humanitarian assistance from governments to six UN agencies, 2003–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UNSCEB) data.

Notes: The calculation for the top chart is composed of core and non-core humanitarian assistance given by governments to UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, UNICEF, FAO and UN OCHA. In the bottom charts no figures are available on core humanitarian contributions for FAO and UN OCHA from the DAC governments for 2003 and 2008.
Pooled funds can counter-balance bilateral donor preferences, fill funding gaps at a global and country level and respond to changing needs. They can also provide a trusted channel in contexts where donors lack capacity to manage direct grants. The UN-managed humanitarian pooled funds – the global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the country-based emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHFs) – received US$1.1 billion in 2014, 4.4% of the total humanitarian response that year. This is the second consecutive annual increase in their volume and decrease in their share, from US$987 million (5.6% share) in 2012.

The CERF accounted for 45% (US$480 million) of this pooled funding in 2014, consistent with its five-year average. Managed by UN OCHA, it directly disburses only to UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (who then often sub-grants to others) in both rapid-response (see Chapter 7) and underfunded emergency settings. In 2014 it allocated funds to crisis responses in 45 countries.

The CHFs and ERFs operate in 19 countries, are open to local and national NGOs as well as multilateral agencies, and aim to support both existing UN-coordinated appeal priorities and new or escalating urgent needs. Varying in size in different countries – from US$137 million in South Sudan to just US$50,000 in Uganda – these country-based pooled funds together received US$593 million in 2014.

Humanitarian pooled funding is concentrated in a small number of countries, of which the five largest received 50% of all such funding in 2014. In 2014 South Sudan received 22% of this (mostly from the CHF) – at US$190 million this was a tenth of all humanitarian assistance to the country that year. South Sudan has been described as a test case for pooled funding and has been in the top two recipients of pooled funds every year since its independence. Sudan, the DRC, Ethiopia and Somalia have been among the ten largest recipients of pooled funds every year between 2010 and 2014. There were however three new additions to the ten largest recipients in 2014: Iraq, Afghanistan and oPt. None of the countries covered by the Syria appeals appear in the top ten in 2014.

Many of the largest bilateral humanitarian donors were also among the largest donors to pooled funds, with some notable exceptions. The UK was the largest pooled funds contributor in 2014, giving US$288 million. Together, the UK, Sweden and Norway provided 52% (US$2.6 billion) of total funding to pooled funds between 2010 and 2014, and have consistently been the three biggest donors over that period. In contrast, the US and Japan tend to channel relatively little humanitarian assistance via pooled funds, contributing respectively 0.4% and 0.2% of the total to humanitarian pooled funds in 2014.

There is increasing attention on pooled funds in discussions on improving the sufficiency and efficiency of humanitarian funding. New guidance on country-based pooled funds has been issued, and discussions continue on how to make them more accessible to national and local NGOs (see page 5). At the global level, the idea of a ‘Super-CERF’ has been suggested – reserved for major crises (see chapter 4) and funded from assessed contributions from UN member states.
FIGURE 5.5

Ten largest recipients of pooled funds, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and CERF data.
Notes: Pooled funds are expressed as a percentage of humanitarian assistance reported to UN OCHA FTS only.

FIGURE 5.6

Ten largest government contributors to humanitarian pooled funds, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF and OECD DAC data.
Recovery and development pooled funds

In many countries, humanitarian pooled funds are just one of many multi-donor funding mechanisms, with remits ranging from preparedness and early recovery to peacebuilding and stabilisation. These other mechanisms could play an important role in financing preparedness and sustainable recovery as part of a broader resilience approach, complementing and aligning with humanitarian pooled funds. A recent study on development and climate adaptation pooled funds noted, for example, that “financing chronic vulnerabilities largely through humanitarian assistance over the long term, without linkages or synergies with other sources of finance is unlikely to address the root causes of vulnerabilities and reduce the pressure on humanitarian assistance.”

Recovery- and development-orientated pooled funds include UN multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), national MDTFs and stand-alone joint programmes, and can attract a mix of humanitarian and development funding. However, for the largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2014, expenditure by these pooled funds was generally significantly lower than that by humanitarian pooled funds. For example, in Somalia, US$54.9 million was received through the CERF and CHF in 2014, compared to only US$3.8 million received through MDTFs and Joint Programmes that same year. None of the ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2014 received funding from trust funds administered by the World Bank in 2014.

There are examples of spending through development-orientated pooled funds slowing down in countries as a crisis escalates and humanitarian funding increases. For example, expenditure through the Iraq United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Trust Fund was US$12.7 million in 2013 compared to just US$5.7 million in 2014. At the same time, the CERF allocated US$10.0 million to Iraq in 2013 (2.1% of all CERF funding in 2013), increasing to US$25.5 million in 2014 (5.6% of all CERF funding in 2014). While this scaling down of development funds in times of acute crisis can to some extent be expected, there is significant rationale and scope for development pooled funds to remain engaged in many crisis-affected countries. This is particularly the case in protracted and largely predictable emergencies. Pooled funds can be a means of channelling support to address vulnerabilities and build resilience in fragile states where other development modalities may be difficult.

A number of Joint Programmes illustrate the potential of humanitarian and development partners working together and combining resources in certain contexts. The UNDP/UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative Joint Programme for Refugees and their Host Communities in Eastern Sudan is an example of this: financial and technical support aims to encourage communities in refugee camps in Eastern Sudan to transition into self-sufficient settlements. Host populations also receive assistance through the programme and local government authorities have joint ownership of the project to create an enabling environment for overall improvement of sustainable livelihoods and economic development.
### FIGURE 5.7

Ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance 2014, by pooled-funding mechanism type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CERF</th>
<th>CHF</th>
<th>ERF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>US$2,180m</td>
<td>US$12.3m</td>
<td>US$53.4m</td>
<td>US$53.4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>US$1,889m</td>
<td>US$25.5m</td>
<td>US$137m</td>
<td>US$137m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>US$1,400m</td>
<td>US$1.9m</td>
<td>US$5.5m</td>
<td>US$5.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>US$1,062m</td>
<td>US$5.2m</td>
<td>US$25.5m</td>
<td>US$25.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>US$957m</td>
<td>US$10.8m</td>
<td>US$138m</td>
<td>US$138m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>US$912m</td>
<td>US$7.1m</td>
<td>US$138m</td>
<td>US$138m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>US$880m</td>
<td>US$10.8m</td>
<td>US$138m</td>
<td>US$138m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>US$862m</td>
<td>US$21.3m</td>
<td>US$33.5m</td>
<td>US$33.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>US$666m</td>
<td>US$43.0m</td>
<td>US$41.3m</td>
<td>US$41.3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>US$627m</td>
<td>US$43.0m</td>
<td>US$41.3m</td>
<td>US$41.3m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**
- CERF
- CHF
- ERF

**CERF, CHF and ERF funding as proportion of total humanitarian assistance**
- Syria: 0.6%
- South Sudan: 0.5%
- Lebanon: 0.2%
- Other pooled funds:
  - Syria Recovery Trust Fund (German Development Bank KfW as Trustee)
  - South Sudan Recovery Fund
  - UNDG Iraq Trust Fund
  - Lebanon Recovery Fund
  - Peacebuilding Fund
  - Jordan Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
  - Darfur Peace and Stability Fund

**Notes:**
- Data in constant 2013 prices, except for expenditure from ‘other pooled funds’.
- Several ‘other pooled funds’ with expenditure of less than US$10,000 in 2014 or zero/negative expenditure have been excluded.
- 2014 disbursement data for the Syria Recovery Trust Fund is not available.
- 2014 disbursement data is available for the Palestinian Partnership for Infrastructure Multi-Donor Trust Fund (World Bank), but allocations of US$57 million made since July 2012.
- Expenditure for pooled funds reporting to the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office are subject to change pending finalisation of year-end expenditures for 2014.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF, UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, World Bank and UNDP data.
Funding channelled through NGOs

NGOs access humanitarian funding both directly from donors and indirectly through UN agencies and other NGOs. In 2014 they directly received 18% of the total funding reported to UN OCHA’s FTS. It is likely that they received significantly more indirectly, as sub-grants from international agencies, but the data does not reveal how much this amounted to (see page 67).

As requirements and funding grew from 2013 to 2014, so did the amount directly received by NGOs – from US$2.9 billion to US$4.0 billion. The number of NGOs directly receiving humanitarian assistance grew from 400 in 2012 to 483 in 2014, and the majority (70%) of those directly receiving funds in 2014 were INGOs. Funding was somewhat concentrated, with the ten largest international NGO recipients accounting for 36% of all funding to NGOs that year.

Local and national NGOs have long been recognised as crucial in effective and appropriate humanitarian response and resilience. They can often respond more quickly and stay longer than international actors, flexing between development and humanitarian action. They can also draw on local knowledge, access populations which are out of reach to international actors, and play a role in holding national and international actors to account. ‘Localisation’ has been a recurring theme in the World Humanitarian Summit consultations, including calls for the role of national and local NGOs to be better supported.

Global humanitarian assistance reported to the UN OCHA FTS over the period. Their share of total funding has halved from 0.4% in 2012 to 0.2% in 2014, and their share of the total given to NGOs has almost halved – from 2.3% to 1.2%. The volume of international humanitarian assistance they received has also declined from a peak of US$58.0 million in 2011 to US$46.6 million in 2014.

The number of local and national NGOs receiving this funding has also dropped – only 16 local NGOs and 80 national NGOs were recorded as having received funding in 2014 in UN OCHA FTS, down from 22 and 95 respectively in 2013. At the same time, the number of INGOs receiving funding grew – from 300 in 2013 to 339 in 2014.

ERFs are designed to be accessible to NGOs, and indeed the majority of ERF funding has been channelled through them. Over the past five years, 57% of US$297 million total ERF funding of US$524 million has been channelled through NGOs. National and local NGOs have directly accessed US$39.2 million of this, representing 7.5% of all ERF funding and 13% of ERF funding channelled through NGOs.

The RCRC Movement channelled a greater share of its funding to NGOs – 70% in 2014 compared with 62% from ERFs. However, the sums involved were smaller – US$7.3 million total funding from the RCRC compared with US$90.3 million from the ERFs. The RCRC also channelled a significantly greater proportion of its NGO funding to local and national organisations – 21% in 2014 alone.

International humanitarian financing, however, remains oriented to international humanitarian agencies and NGOs, with only a small proportion of reported funding being channelled directly to local and national NGOs. Between 2010 and 2014, local and national NGOs combined received US$243 million – 1.6% of the total given directly to NGOs and 0.3% of the total assistance reported to the UN OCHA FTS over the period. Their share of total funding has halved from 0.4% in 2012 to 0.2% in 2014, and their share of the total given to NGOs has almost halved – from 2.3% to 1.2%. The volume of international humanitarian assistance they received has also declined from a peak of US$58.0 million in 2011 to US$46.6 million in 2014.

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FIGURE 5.8A
International humanitarian assistance to NGOs by type, 2014

US$3.4bn
85%

US$43.7m
1.1%

US$24.1m
0.6%

US$40.9m
1.0%

US$5.7m
0.1%

US$485m
12%

Total US$4.0bn

International NGOs

Southern international NGOs

Affected national NGOs

National NGOs

Local NGOs

Undefined

Total US$55.7m

FIGURE 5.8B
ERF funding channelled through NGOs by type, 2014

US$40.4m
72%

US$2.5m
4.5%

US$0m
0%

US$10.0m
18%

US$2.2m
3.9%

US$0.6m
1.1%

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: Values are those committed/contributed (constant 2013 prices). Scaled by percentage. For NGO coding methodology, see Data & Guides.
Very little international humanitarian assistance is normally channelled via the authorities of the affected state. The Good Humanitarian Donorship principles call on donors to “strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and coordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.” Nonetheless, for a combination of practical, political and historical reasons, particularly in conflict settings, the bulk of international humanitarian assistance is channelled through international agencies.

Recently, in the wake of the Philippines and Ebola crises and in the search for solutions to protracted refugee situations in the Middle East, there is a renewed focus on national partnership in non-conflict settings. This is reflected in the language of the UN-coordinated appeals, most notably that of the Syria Refugee and Resilience Plan (see Chapter 7). National capacity is also a recurring theme in the World Humanitarian Summit discussions. However, the proportion of international humanitarian assistance provided to government authorities of affected states remains low. In 2014 just 3.1% of assistance reported to the FTS was channelled through the affected state – a small proportion but a significant rise from the previous two years.

With funding via the state in active conflict settings often at odds with humanitarian principles, peaks in the volume and proportion of this type of funding have clearly been prompted by rapid-onset disasters – in 2005 by the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake, in 2010 by the Pakistan floods and Haiti earthquakes and in 2014 by the Ebola virus disease outbreak. Pakistan, Jordan, Haiti and Sierra Leone have been the four largest recipients of direct funding to affected states since 2010.

These totals however mask differences between donors. While many major donors might refrain from providing humanitarian assistance via the affected state government due to commitments to financial governance and humanitarian principles, other donors may be impelled to do so by commitments to South–South solidarity and state sovereignty. Donors outside the OECD DAC group show a greater preference for providing bilateral support to affected governments than do their DAC counterparts. These donors provided 6.5% of the total reported humanitarian assistance to the FTS from 2010 to 2014, but they provided 50% of all funding channelled to affected governments over the period. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and China were all among the five largest donors providing direct bilateral support to affected governments. Given that not all funding from donors outside the OECD DAC group is likely to be reported to the UN OCHA FTS, the figures may in fact be higher. As these figures include only international humanitarian assistance, they also do not show the degree to which all government donors choose to channel other forms of development cooperation to the affected state to support crisis prevention, recovery and long-term solutions (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).

### International humanitarian assistance channelled to affected-state governments, 2005–2014

![Figure 5.9: International humanitarian assistance channelled to affected-state governments, 2005–2014](chart)

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: Funding channelled through the affected state includes only those funds channelled through the domestic government in the affected country. Data on ‘Public sector’ in Figure 5.1 refers to funds that may have been channelled through the donor-government public sector, the recipient-government public sector, or in some cases a third-party-government public sector.
Military channels

Military actors have played significant roles in the recent responses to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa and to Typhoon Haiyan. In the case of the Ebola response, the US committed 3,000 troops as well as engineers and military assets as part of its 'Operation United Assistance', while the UK deployed 750 troops and assets including a naval ship and helicopters. Other states, including the Netherlands and China, also provided military assistance. Although such interventions are high profile, the total expenditure they represent is relatively small as, in keeping with international guidelines, the military should deliver international humanitarian assistance only in exceptional circumstances.

Between 2004 and 2013, 1.2% of humanitarian assistance reported by DAC donors was channelled via military organisations. From a 2008 peak of 2.6% (US$294 million), this proportion reached a low of 0.4% (US$47.5 million) in 2013, the lowest since 2004. Afghanistan received 6.4% of its humanitarian assistance from DAC donors via the military over the decade. Since 2009, however, the volume of Afghanistan’s humanitarian assistance channelled via the military has been in decline and other countries, including Haiti, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have received higher volumes in certain single years.

### FIGURE 5.10

Humanitarian assistance from donor defence agencies, 2004–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US$ millions</th>
<th>% of total OECD DAC bilateral humanitarian assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data.

Notes: Total OECD DAC bilateral humanitarian assistance refers to the sum of humanitarian-related ODA disbursements reported by all DAC members. Humanitarian assistance from donor defence agencies refers to those humanitarian-related ODA disbursements reported by defence agencies or ministries of DAC member governments. Bubble size represents volume of disbursements.
However, these figures may not represent the full picture – only projects that are well described in reporting to the DAC are captured. This may explain why funding via the military to the Philippines appeared to decline from US$0.8 million in 2011 to US$0.7 million in 2013 rather than increase the year of Typhoon Haiyan.

International humanitarian assistance channelled via the military may come from different donor ministries or departments. International humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC members that came specifically from donors’ defence agencies, rather than their development or foreign affairs agencies, has represented a small proportion of total humanitarian assistance from DAC donors – an average of 2.5%. This proportion has declined from 6.5% in 2004 to 0.5% in 2013, momentarily spiking in 2010 in response to the Haiti earthquake.

The proportion of international humanitarian assistance channelled through the military by DAC donors reached a low of 0.4% in 2013, the lowest since 2004.

**DATA POVERTY: MILITARY CHANNELS**

This data represents funding only from DAC donors as similar data is not available for other countries. Data on DAC donor defence agency spending is limited to the 11 of the 29 DAC donor countries whose defence agencies report to the DAC. Reporting of humanitarian assistance from donor defence agencies and that channelled through the military has tended to be poor over the last decade, with data relating to 21% of assistance channelled via military organisations failing to specify the recipient country. However, reporting does appear to have improved in the last year – while in 2012 67% was unspecified, in 2013 this fell to 1.0% – primarily because the US tended not to specify its recipients but has substantially decreased the sums that it reports.

While the US has long been the largest DAC reporter of humanitarian spending via its military (accounting for 77% in the past decade), in 2013 humanitarian assistance specifically from the US Department of Defence fell by 76%. The cause of this fall is unknown, as the US does not specify recipient countries in its reporting. In the same year, the Canadian Armed Forces’ response to Typhoon Haiyan drove a 50-fold increase among other DAC members, with Canada accounting for 99% of all donor defence agency spending from DAC members outside the US that year.