In 2023, humanitarian response requirements were the highest on record. As of August 2024, the UN estimates that 311 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.[1] This compares to the 168 million people in need less than five years ago.[2][3] Most of the people are in contexts that have had ongoing responses from the international humanitarian community for years. Recent escalations or deteriorating conditions that put further strain on the system have come in contexts that have had response plans for a number of years, such as Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan or Ukraine.
At the same time, funding to the humanitarian sector stalled in 2023. Some donors have cut their humanitarian contributions, and private funding has come back down from the 2022 peak when it was buoyed by financing for the Ukraine response. Few government donors commit beyond 10% of the 0.7% official development assistance (ODA) target to humanitarian assistance. There are also signs that funding for international humanitarian assistance will reduce further in 2024, forcing humanitarian actors to make tough choices. Indeed, Development Initiatives’ (DI’s) projections show that total humanitarian funding, including that to interagency plans, is set to drop in 2024.
The path ahead for the humanitarian sector is not one of unprecedented growth, as it has been in recent years. Funding shortfalls, high humanitarian needs, difficulties in humanitarian access, and the protractedness of crises pose significant difficulties. The future is more uncertain.
Total international humanitarian assistance, 2019–2023; projection for 2024
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Source: Development Initiatives (DI) based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and our unique dataset for private contributions. Projection produced by DI.
Notes: Figures for 2023 are preliminary. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous Global Humanitarian Assistance reports due to updated deflators and data. Data is in constant 2022 prices. The 2024 projection is based on how much funding has been received at the time of writing compared to the same point in previous years (see our ‘Methodology and definitions’, Chapter 5).
Total international humanitarian assistance declined slightly in 2023 although the sector is still receiving historically high amounts of funding. The Ukraine crisis boosted humanitarian financing volumes in 2022, and while the rate of increase in humanitarian funding was not sustained, the sector received a similar amount of funding in 2023.[4][5]
The outlook for the future remains uncertain. With key donors making cuts to their humanitarian budgets, and organisations across the sector reacting to the financial ‘crunch’ by reducing their budgets, funding levels for 2024 are projected to drop further. The central estimate of our 2024 projection is lower than the amount received in the previous two years. If realised, this would be the biggest reduction in total international humanitarian assistance on record.
Unlike previous years when resources increased from both public and private sources, 2023 is a more complicated picture. Government funding increased, though with large variability across donors (see the next sub-section).
Funding from private donors declined significantly in 2023 following a short-lived increase driven by donations for the Ukraine response and has now reverted to a similar range as that seen before 2022.
Humanitarian assistance in 2024 seems set to fall by the biggest drop on record according to a projection produced by DI.
20 largest public donors of humanitarian assistance in 2023, and change from 2022
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Source: DI based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.
Notes: 2023 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2022 prices. The total donor funding label reflects funding in 2023 and the percentage change compared to 2022 (excluding any estimated contribution through EU institutions). ‘Public donors’ refers to governments and EU institutions. Contributions of current and former EU member states to EU institutions international humanitarian assistance shown separately. Percentage change excludes EU contributions. *Türkiye is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely spent on hosting Syrian refugees in Türkiye, and so not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance from other donors in this figure. 2022 figures differ from the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2023 due to final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a different year for constant prices.
In 2023, only 12 of the top 20 donors increased their humanitarian funding and 8 shrunk their humanitarian portfolios. To compare with the previous year, 15 of the top 20 donors increased their international humanitarian assistance in 2022. This could indicate that the tide is starting to turn: while not all donors are decreasing spending, it could be indicative of future trends.
However, despite the decrease in funding from some of the top 10 donors of humanitarian assistance, overall public international humanitarian assistance increased in 2023, largely due to the data suggesting an increase from the US.
The donor base continued to narrow in 2023, with only a small number of donors accounting for the vast majority of funding.
In 2023, the EU established a voluntary target for humanitarian funding of 0.07% of GNI, and encouraged Member States to “continue efforts to close the humanitarian funding gap … and ensure that an appropriate share, for example 10%, of their ODA is devoted to humanitarian action, on the basis of existing humanitarian needs.”[15][16]
Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2014–2023; projection for 2024
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Source: DI based on UN OCHA FTS, data extracted 19 July 2024 – 2024 funding requirements data updated on 2 October 2024; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), data extracted 5 August 2024; and Syria 3RP financial dashboard data, data extracted 5 August 2024.
Notes: Data is in current prices. 2024 data is preliminary in terms of total requirements as of October 2024. Figures for the breakdown of funding to date in 2024 are not visualised because the funding data is partial and continuously changing at the time of writing. The 2024 projection is based on how much funding has been received so far in 2024 compared to the same point in previous years. The percentage of requirements met in 2020 includes all funding, for Covid-19 and other responses, against all requirements that year.
Over the past decade, the funding needed for humanitarian plans has grown significantly. Although funding towards these plans has also grown, it has struggled to keep pace with accelerating humanitarian needs. Interagency humanitarian plans were only 45% funded in 2023. This is the lowest percentage on record and has prompted interagency response plans in 2024 to narrow their focus and prioritise the use of more limited resources. According to our projection, funding is set to fall further in 2024.
People affected do not live in an abstract world of ‘percentage of the funding requirement met’. International humanitarian assistance had its largest ever funding gap in real terms in 2023, meaning millions of people who needed assistance did not receive it.
The amount of funding required in 2024 has declined from a record high in 2023, but this reduction is not solely due to a decrease in humanitarian needs.
DI’s projection for 2024 shows that interagency plans are set to receive even less than they did in 2023.
Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2014–2024
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Source: DI based on UN OCHA FTS, UNHCR and Syria 3RP financial dashboard data.
Notes: Data is in current prices. 2024 data is preliminary in terms of total requirements as of October 2024. Protracted crises are defined as appeals which have had UN-coordinated interagency plans for at least five consecutive years, excluding COVID-19 response plans. Acknowledgement: chart is adapted from Humanitarian Funding Forecast (Lilly D and Pearson M), 2022. Why does the humanitarian system need so much money? Available at: https://humanitarianfundingforecast.org/stories-humanitarian-growth
A significant driver of the recent growth in funding required is that to protracted crises. DI defines protracted crises as contexts that have had UN-coordinated country response plans or regional response plans for at least five consecutive years.
In 2014, most funding required was for contexts that were not protracted. However, in 2024, the vast majority of funding required and provided was for protracted crisis responses, here defined as contexts with five or more years of consecutive UN-coordinated interagency plans.
The protracted nature of crisis requires a forward-looking approach to interagency coordination and planning. It should also spur increased links across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus to address the underlying drivers of crises. Multi-year funding and multi-year planning have never been more suited as ways to respond efficiently and effectively to humanitarian crisis, given that most continue year after year.
Public reporting on multi-year humanitarian funding outside these global aggregate figures from self-reports continues to be poor. This means that it is still not possible to identify which protracted crises or implementing organisations are receiving multi-year funding from Grand Bargain donors.
International humanitarian assistance has grown significantly over the last decade. Our analysis shows that it was as recently as 2012 that total ‘public’ international humanitarian assistance was under US$13.2 billion. The rise to nearly US$36.1 billion in 2023 is quite spectacular when seen in this context.
But the future is more uncertain. Humanitarian needs are far higher than they were a decade ago, and the acceleration of funding required outpaces the funding received. The humanitarian sphere now faces significant challenges that could slow this unprecedented growth.
Firstly, total humanitarian funding dipped in 2023 and is projected to do the same in 2024. Humanitarian organisations are reporting financial squeezes and staffing cuts. Humanitarian financing is below the level at the same point in 2023, and this feeds into a more sombre outlook. The key question is whether the signs in the data and reports across the sector are a temporary dip in the long-term trajectory of growth, or usher in a humanitarian recession.
Secondly, reductions in financing from a number of donors together with increased funding from the US have narrowed the donor base further. In turn, this has increased the system’s dependence on a shrinking number of key donors. This raises questions about the resilience of the humanitarian system in the face of unknown future political conditions.
Thirdly, interagency appeals now suffer from a US$31.5 billion funding gap. Despite donor funding continuing to increase, it is not keeping up with the demands of humanitarians. This means the humanitarian sector has a choice: do less (and prioritise between needs), reduce costs (and find efficiencies in the system) or find more money (from existing or new donors). These choices are difficult, and individual organisations and the wider system are finding ways to navigate a path through them.
However, beyond these short-term options is the reality that the humanitarian sector now operates as a large global safety net for people affected by crisis over the medium to long term. In 2024, 91% of appeal requirements are for protracted crises. And while the large funding gap is in part due to financing, it is as much due to a lack of political solutions. The inability of actors to tackle the root causes of conflict and complex emergencies means that humanitarian needs persist year after year, and as a result, the system keeps demanding more and more funding.