




GHA REPORT 2012



Global Humanitarian
Assistance

A DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE 

GHA REPORT 2012

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2012.

GHA tries to answer some of the basic questions about the way that the world finances response to crisis and vulnerability. How much is spent on humanitarian assistance? Where does it go? What is it spent on? Who spends it? Our aim is to provide clear, objective evidence on resources, easily accessible on paper and online, so that decisions and policy can be better informed. We believe that better information means better aid.

For a number of years now, we have highlighted the data on resources for people who live on the edge of crisis, in chronic poverty and where violent conflict is common and states are fragile. As the GHA Report 2012 points out, building the resilience of vulnerable populations is an essential part of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is not well served by responses that create a false partition between chronic poverty and vulnerability to crisis.

Since the G20 in Korea in 2010, building resilience has become an increasingly visible policy concern. The GHA Report 2012 includes new data that is of particular relevance to this area. Cash-based programming, for instance, enables people to make their own choices about priorities and whether they invest for the short or longer term. Between 2008 and 2011 humanitarian spending on cash and voucher-based programming ranged between US\$45 million and US\$188 million. Spending on disaster prevention and preparedness and risk reduction, essential for building resilience to crises large and small, remains very low at just 4% of humanitarian aid and less than 1% of development assistance.

The level of unmet humanitarian need in 2011 was the worst for a decade: over a third of the needs identified in the UN consolidated appeals have remained unfunded – leaving a shortfall of US\$3.4 billion. The impact of this is exacerbated by the increasing concentration of humanitarian aid on a smaller number of mega-crises. Historically the top three recipients have absorbed around 30% of total humanitarian aid. In 2010 that jumped to nearly half (49%) and other countries in crisis collectively saw a reduction in their share of total funding.

The good news is that, at 62 million, the number of people affected by crises in 2011 was 12 million fewer than in 2010. Total spending per person in the UN consolidated appeal (CAP) has fallen from US\$98 per person in 2010 to US\$90 in 2011. But these calculations do not tell us enough. Three areas where better data could contribute to better aid are funding according to need, domestic response and aid in the context of other resources. Funding according to need is a principle of good humanitarian donorship, but it cannot be implemented without better data on target populations and more transparent and accessible information on needs. Local and national responses to crisis are vitally important in saving lives and reducing vulnerability. If better data was available on the scale and nature of domestic response, then international humanitarian resources could be used more efficiently to add value. Humanitarian aid is just one of the resources available to respond to crises and build resilience: development assistance, military spending, domestic revenues, remittances, peacekeeping, private investment as well as people's own resources are all part of the picture. Better information on all resources helps more effective allocations. GHA is working to publish more data in these areas in order to contribute to the more effective use of resources for building resilience and reducing poverty for very vulnerable populations.

We hope that you find this report and all the supporting data online helpful. We are always available to answer questions, provide additional information or produce specific graphs and spreadsheets through our phone and online helpdesk. Please visit the GHA website: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org.

We would welcome your feedback and suggestions about data that you would find most useful.



Judith Randel
Executive Director, Development Initiatives


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Large volumes of international humanitarian aid are spent each year in places where people are acutely vulnerable to crises – where high proportions of the population live in absolute poverty, where violent conflict is common and where states are fragile.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, CRED, INCAF, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, SIPRI and World Bank data

In 2010, 53 of the 139 countries receiving international humanitarian aid had higher than average shares of their respective populations living on less than US\$1.25 a day.



39 countries receiving international humanitarian aid had been affected by conflict for five or more years over the previous decade. They collectively received US\$10.7bn in 2010.

45 states categorised as 'fragile' received 88.6% of the total international humanitarian aid.


Just over US\$8bn was spent in 46 countries that had an above average share of their population affected by natural disasters between 2001 and 2010.

Fewer people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2011 than in 2010 – but numbers appear to be rising again in 2012.


Source: UN consolidated appeals process (CAP)

1 person icon = 1 million


2010 74million



2011 62million




2012 61million*



*This includes 10 million people in the Sahel affected by food insecurity and added to the appeal in May/June 2012


Natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan drove sharp increases in both humanitarian needs and financing in 2010.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, UN OCHA FTS data and our own research



Despite large increases in humanitarian financing, the gap between met and unmet needs in UN CAP appeals has widened by 10% over the last five years.


Source: UN OCHA FTS



The funding gap also widened for other appeals in 2011.

- Average level of needs met
- Needs met in 2011

Source: UN OCHA FTS and IFRC



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2010 major natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan had wide-ranging effects on the collective humanitarian response: driving up overall international spending by 23% over the previous year; drawing in new government and private donors; and involving military actors in responses on a huge scale. These crises also shifted historic geographical concentrations of humanitarian spending, exacerbating the gap in unmet financing for a number of other countries.

In 2011 global humanitarian needs were smaller in scale, with the UN's consolidated humanitarian appeal requesting US\$8.9 billion, 21% less in financing, to meet the humanitarian needs of 62 million people, compared with US\$11.3 billion requested to meet the needs of 74 million people in 2010. The overall international humanitarian financing response fell back by 9%, from US\$18.8 billion in 2010 to US\$17.1 billion in 2011. But despite the reduction in needs in the UN's humanitarian appeals, the gap in unmet financing widened to levels not seen in ten years.

Humanitarian crises not only occur in parts of the world where many people are already poor: they deepen poverty and prevent people from escaping from it. Building resilience to shock and disaster risk therefore is not only the concern of affected communities and humanitarians; it is of fundamental importance in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in the elimination of absolute poverty.

THE RESPONSE TO GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN CRISES

The collective international government response to humanitarian crises reached an historic peak in 2010, growing by 10% to reach US\$13 billion. Based on preliminary figures, total international humanitarian aid from governments fell by US\$495 million, or 4%, in 2011. Humanitarian aid from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors increased by US\$1 billion between 2009 and 2010 (9%) and fell by US\$266 million between 2010 and 2011 (2%). Humanitarian aid from governments outside of the OECD DAC group increased by US\$156 million (27%) between 2009 and 2010, then fell by US\$229 million (31%) in 2011.

Private funding has become increasingly responsive to need relative to government sources. Private contributions grew rapidly in 2010, up by 70% (US\$2.4 billion) from 2009 levels and reaching US\$5.8 billion. Initial preliminary estimates for 2011 indicate that levels of private giving have fallen back again but still remain above 2009 levels, at US\$4.6 billion.

The impact of the global economic crisis is only now starting to be felt in development aid budgets. Official development assistance (ODA) from OECD DAC donors fell in absolute terms by US\$4.2 billion (3%) in 2011. Humanitarian aid fell at a slightly lower rate (2%) than development assistance more widely (3%) in 2011, and thus grew as a share of total ODA by 0.1%. In the year following the Pakistan and Haiti 'mega-disasters', when overall humanitarian needs subsided, a reduction of just 2% demonstrated partial resilience in humanitarian spending amongst OECD DAC donors, particularly when viewed against a backdrop of aid budget cuts. The impact of the prospect of more severe cuts in ODA on humanitarian assistance remains to be seen.

While some donors were increasing their contributions to meet rising levels of need in 2010, however, others were reducing theirs, and over a period of several years the donor division of labour has gradually shifted. The top ten countries increasing their humanitarian aid spending between 2008 and 2010 (the United States, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and France) collectively increased their contributions by US\$1.2 billion over the period. The ten donors with the largest humanitarian aid spending reductions between 2008 and 2010 meanwhile (Saudi Arabia, the European Union (EU) institutions, the Netherlands, Italy, Kuwait, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Thailand and Greece) collectively reduced their contributions by US\$1 billion.

The overall rising trend in international humanitarian aid to recipient countries in 2010 masked a number of shifts in the traditional distributions of international humanitarian funding. The US\$3.1 billion of humanitarian funds channelled to Haiti in 2010 was of a completely different order to the volumes typically received – more than double the amount received by the largest recipient in any other year to date. In each year since 2001, approximately one-third of total humanitarian aid has been concentrated among the top three recipient countries. In 2010, however, the share of the leading three recipients jumped to nearly half of the total, with Haiti receiving 25% and Pakistan 17%.

There were some clear 'losers' amidst the overall growth in international humanitarian aid spending in 2010. Among the 15 countries with the greatest reductions in humanitarian funding by volume, five

experienced an improvement in their humanitarian situation; of the remaining ten, all experienced greater difficulties in raising funds within their UN funding appeals than in the previous year, with many noting serious difficulties in raising funds in the first half of the year. In the most striking examples, the proportion of funding needs met in the UN appeals for Nepal and Chad were 33% and 31% lower, respectively, in 2010 than in 2009.

FORCES SHAPING HUMANITARIAN NEED AND THE MIXED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The scale of global humanitarian crises abated in 2011, with 12.5 million fewer people targeted to receive humanitarian assistance in the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP), and a further drop of 10.4 million in the expected numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2012. In 2011 the number of people affected by natural disasters fell to 91 million, substantially lower than the 224 million in 2010 and the lowest figure in ten years.

The structural vulnerabilities of the global economic system that gave rise to the global food crisis of 2008 remain largely unchanged, leading to a second price spike in 2011, with energy prices rising by 143% and food prices by 56% from their lowest points in 2009 to their peaks in 2011. Price volatility remains acute, and the outlook is one of continued high prices.

Unmet humanitarian financing needs rose across the board in 2011, for UN CAP and other appeals alike. The proportion of humanitarian financing needs within the UN CAP appeal that remained unmet in 2011 was greater, at 38%, than in any year since 2001, despite overall reduced requirements. UN appeals outside of the CAP in 2011 were funded to just 37% overall, however, well below the average of 46% for the period 2000–2011. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appeals in 2009 and 2010 had unmet requirements of 17% and 21% respectively, compared with just 11% and 10% in the two preceding years. International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) appeal funding requirements were just 50% met in 2011 against an average of 67% for the period 2006–2011.

In 2010, consolidated appeals – which represent chronic, predictable humanitarian crises – collectively saw an 11% reduction in the share of their appeal requirements met. In 2011 regular consolidated appeals fared slightly better, with a 1% increase in the share of requirements met, but the majority of them were worse funded in 2011 than they were two or three years previously.

INVESTMENTS TO TACKLE VULNERABILITY

Many of the leading recipients of humanitarian assistance are characterised as complex crises, with countries often suffering from conflict and with very limited capacity to deal with disasters. All but one of the top ten recipients between 2001 and 2010 are considered fragile states, and all have been affected by conflict for 5–10 years.

In 2009, 68% of total official humanitarian assistance was received by countries considered long-term recipients, i.e. countries receiving an above-average share of their total ODA in the form of humanitarian aid for a period of 8 or more years during the preceding 15 years.

Building resilience to crises in these places is the most efficient and cost-effective way of preventing suffering and protecting livelihoods, yet relatively small shares of international resources are invested specifically in building resilience. Just 4% of official humanitarian aid (US\$1.5 billion) and 0.7% (US\$4.4 billion) of non-humanitarian ODA was invested in disaster risk reduction between 2006 and 2010.

Conflict-affected states receive the overwhelming majority of international assistance: on average, between 64% and 83% of international humanitarian assistance was channelled to countries in conflict or in post-conflict transition between 2001 and 2010. ODA investments in peace and security sectors grew by 140% overall between 2002 and 2010 – and by 249% within the top 20 recipients.

Aid is a key resource to meet the needs of people vulnerable to and affected by crises. But many other official and private resource flows have a role to play in creating broad-based growth – growth that has the potential to reduce poverty and vulnerability, provided it is equitable and built on investments that engage with and support the poor.



THE STORY

In 2010 the international humanitarian system was tested by crises of enormous scale – not least in Pakistan, where ten years of rain fell in one week, leaving 20 million people affected by widespread flooding.

Traditional responses to humanitarian crises fall under the aegis of ‘emergency response’: material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.); emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes); relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications). But humanitarian aid can also include reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as disaster prevention and preparedness.

CREDIT

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HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO CRISES


The global response to humanitarian crises is the collective output of a complex ecosystem of communities, organisations and national and international governments, each facing a range of choices about how, where, when and how much they contribute to meet humanitarian need.

Each year sees changes in the nature of humanitarian crises and the global context in which they arise. In 2010 major natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan had wide-ranging effects on the collective response: driving up overall international spending by 23% over the previous year; drawing in new government and private donors; and involving military actors in responses on a huge scale. These crises also shifted historic geographical concentrations of humanitarian spending, exacerbating the gap in unmet financing for a number of other countries.

In 2011 global humanitarian needs were smaller in scale, with the UN's consolidated humanitarian appeal requesting US\$8.9 billion, 21% less in financing, to meet the humanitarian needs of 62 million people, compared with US\$11.3 billion requested to meet the needs of 74 million people in 2010. The overall international humanitarian financing response fell back by 9%, from US\$18.8 billion in 2010 to US\$17.1 billion in 2011. But despite the reduction in needs in the UN's humanitarian appeals, the gap in unmet financing widened to levels not seen in ten years.

This chapter quantifies the scale of official and private humanitarian aid contributions and attempts to answer some basic questions about where the money comes from, where it goes and how it gets there.

GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE



1.1 WHERE DOES THE FUNDING COME FROM?

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS

Between 2001 and 2010, government donors provided US\$99 billion in humanitarian aid financing. 95% of this was provided by governments that are members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC). 5% was provided by governments outside the OECD DAC group.

The largest donor throughout this period was the United States, which provided over a third of the total funding from governments. The five largest donors between 2001 and 2010 (the United States, the EU institutions, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden) collectively contributed 69% of the total.

While the contributions of the leading donors – all of whom are OECD DAC members – account for the largest share of government humanitarian aid financing, the division of labour among donors is continually evolving and other governments outside of the traditional OECD DAC group are playing an increasingly prominent role. Notably, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are now major humanitarian aid donors and rank among the top 20, above a number of OECD DAC donor governments.


HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS

Our definition of humanitarian funding from governments includes funding from:

- 24 OECD DAC members – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union institutions – which report to the OECD DAC.
- Other governments that report their humanitarian aid contributions to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS). Because reporting is voluntary, the number of governments reporting varies from year to year. In 2010, 130 government donors reported their humanitarian aid contributions to the FTS, while in 2011 only 84 governments reported. The largest of these 'non-OECD DAC' or 'other government' donors include Saudi Arabia, UAE, Russia, Turkey, China, India, Qatar and South Africa.


See the Data & Guides section for a detailed explanation of how we calculate humanitarian aid contributions from governments.

FIGURE 1: TOP 20 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID, 2001–2010




Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 2: GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID IN 2010



Note: Data for 2011 is an estimate based on partial preliminary data releases; therefore for detailed analysis we use 2010 as the latest available year. 153 governments plus institutions under the EU participated in the international humanitarian response to crises in 2010, contributing US\$13 billion in total. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 3: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENT DONORS, 2001–2011




Note: Data for members of the OECD DAC includes their bilateral humanitarian aid contributions plus core ODA to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme (WFP) up to 2010. Data for 2011 is an estimate based on partial preliminary data releases and estimated core ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. Data for OECD DAC members is based on 2010 constant prices. Data for non-OECD DAC member governments includes all other government humanitarian aid, as captured by the UN OCHA FTS (current prices). Our distinction between these two groups of government donors is driven entirely by the data. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

In response to increased need (see Chapter 2), the collective international government response to humanitarian crises reached a historic peak in 2010, growing by 10% to reach US\$13 billion. Based on preliminary figures, total international humanitarian aid from governments fell by US\$495 million, or 4%, in 2011. This fall was significantly less than the 21% reduction in financing requested through UN humanitarian appeals in the same year.

This pattern corresponds with the 'ratchet effect' on humanitarian funding levels observed around other major humanitarian crises in the past decade, whereby humanitarian funding levels increase sharply in peak crisis

years, but do not fall back to pre-crisis levels in subsequent years. In 2005, for example, the international humanitarian financing response from governments increased by 36% to a then record high of US\$11.4 billion in response to major disasters (the Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami and the South Asia (Kashmir) earthquake) and remained well above pre-2005 levels thereafter, falling by just 12% in 2006. Similarly, in 2008 the international humanitarian response scaled up by 33% to meet increased humanitarian needs – stemming from the global food price crisis, cyclones affecting Myanmar and Bangladesh and the Sichuan earthquake in China – to a new high of US\$12.4 billion, falling back by just 5% in 2009.

FIGURE 4: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM OECD DAC MEMBERS, 2001–2011




Note: Data for 2011 is an estimate based on partial preliminary data releases (constant 2010 prices) and estimated core ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

In response to increased need (see Chapter 2), humanitarian aid from OECD DAC donors increased by US\$1 billion between 2009 and 2010 (9%) and (based on preliminary figures for 2011) fell by US\$266 million between 2010 and 2011 (2%) – substantially less than the fall in financing requested by the UN.

The impact of the global economic crisis is only now starting to be felt in development aid budgets. Despite a 4% fall in gross national income (GNI) across OECD DAC economies in aggregate in

2009, ODA from OECD DAC governments continued to grow in 2009 and 2010. However, while GNI recovered slightly in 2010, growing by 3% and again by 1% in 2011, OECD DAC ODA fell in absolute terms by US\$4.2 billion (3%) in 2011. It also fell by 0.1% as a share of GNI.

FIGURE 5: OECD DAC GOVERNMENT GNI AND ODA GROWTH, 1990–2011




Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Humanitarian aid fell at a slightly lower rate (2%) than development assistance more widely (3%) in 2011, and thus grew as a share of total ODA by 0.1%. In the year following the Pakistan and Haiti 'mega-disasters', when overall humanitarian needs subsided, a reduction of just 2% demonstrates partial resilience in humanitarian spending amongst OECD DAC donors, particularly when viewed against a backdrop of aid budget cuts. The impact of the prospect of more severe cuts in ODA on humanitarian assistance remains to be seen.

Humanitarian aid from governments outside of the OECD DAC group has been more volatile than that of their DAC counterparts. Humanitarian assistance from this group increased


by US\$156 million (27%) between 2009 and 2010, then fell by US\$229 million (31%) in 2011. Trends since 2000 show that contributions from governments outside of the DAC group have fluctuated considerably, with annual variations of up to 222%. An overall upward trend is nevertheless apparent, with sharp increases in years of major emergencies, such as the second Palestinian intifada in 2001, the Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, and the China earthquake and Yemen floods in 2008 (see figure 7).

FIGURE 6: OECD DAC MEMBERS' HUMANITARIAN AID AS A SHARE OF THEIR TOTAL ODA, 2001–2011




Note: The line on this graph shows clear peaks in the humanitarian share of ODA in 2003 (Afghanistan, Iraq), 2005 (Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami and South Asia (Kashmir) earthquake) and 2008 (food insecurity, China earthquake, cyclones in Myanmar and Bangladesh). Data for 2011 is based on partial preliminary data (constant 2010 prices). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

FIGURE 7: HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE OECD DAC GROUP, 2001–2011



Note: The number of donors reporting varies in this period from a minimum of 40 in 2003 to a maximum of 130 in 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 8: ODA AND ODA-LIKE CONCESSIONAL FLOWS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE OECD DAC GROUP, 2006–2010




Note: Includes net disbursements of ODA flows for OECD members which are not members of the DAC group (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey) and other non-OECD governments (Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and UAE), plus data for concessional ODA-like flows for development cooperation, which may not correspond with strict ODA definitions for BRICS governments (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Source: OECD DAC data

We do not yet have an indication of 2011 development assistance flows from governments outside of the OECD DAC but, as a group, they experienced average annual growth rates in their ODA and ODA-like concessional flows for development cooperation of 8% between 2006 and 2010, compared with

debt relief) for OECD DAC members of 6%. Several of the largest donors experienced particularly rapid growth during this period, with China's ODA-like concessional flows increasing by an annual average of 19% between 2006 and 2010, while the ODA flows of both Saudi Arabia and India increased annually by 14%.

Growth in development assistance flows from governments outside of the OECD DAC group should also be considered in the context of robust economic growth, particularly in China, where average annual growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP) between 2006 and 2010 reached 10% in real terms.

FIGURE 9: GDP GROWTH OF OTHER GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTORS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS, 1990–2010



Note: Includes GDP for Brazil, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and UAE, in current prices. Data for UAE is reported only for 1992–2007 and for Liechtenstein for all years up to 2009; the latest available year has been substituted in years where no current data is available. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data

The overall humanitarian aid financing response from government donors has proved resilient to the global financial and economic crisis, with government donors continuing to respond to rising demand up to 2010. While some donors were increasing their contributions to meet rising levels of need in 2010, however, others were reducing theirs, which over a period of several years has gradually shifted the donor division of labour.

The top ten countries increasing their humanitarian aid spending between 2008 and 2010 (the United States, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia and France) collectively increased their contributions by US\$1.2 billion over the period. The ten donors with the largest humanitarian aid spending reductions between 2008 and 2010 meanwhile (Saudi Arabia, the EU institutions, the Netherlands, Italy, Kuwait, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Thailand and Greece) collectively reduced their contributions by US\$1 billion (see figure 10 overleaf).

In some cases, these reductions reflect a rebalancing of aid spending following exceptional contributions in 2008 in response to the global food crisis – notably, for the EU institutions and Saudi Arabia. But in other countries – including Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands – a longer-term trend of reduced humanitarian spending has emerged.

Spain doubled its share of total contributions from governments, from 2.5% in 2005 to 5% in 2009, but it has also begun to follow a downward trend in its humanitarian spending, beginning in 2010, and saw its share fall back to 3% in 2011 (based on preliminary figures). This reflects revisions in its aid budget more broadly, which fell by almost a third in 2011 as part of its domestic austerity measures.

The United States meanwhile has experienced growth in its already dominant share of the total, contributing 36–37% of the total provided by all governments between 2008 and 2011, compared with a ten-year average of 35%.

Absolute volume is not the only way by which one can measure the significance of humanitarian assistance within donor budgets. The United States, for example, provided the largest overall share of humanitarian aid contributions in 2010, and humanitarian aid is a priority within its aid spending. But in comparison with its national wealth, the United States is not amongst the most generous donors, with humanitarian aid spending equivalent to just 0.03% of GNI in 2010 or just US\$15 per US citizen.

The most generous humanitarian aid donors in 2010 were Sweden (0.15% of GNI) and Luxembourg (0.14% of GNI). OECD DAC EU member states as a group, however, provided humanitarian aid equivalent to just 0.02% of their GNI. In 2010, contributions to the Haiti and Pakistan crises drew in new government donors and the Gambia, which donated US\$1 million to the Haiti response, ranked as the third most generous donor on this measure, giving the equivalent of 0.13% of its GNI as humanitarian aid.

Of the top 30 donors by volume in 2010, the UAE allocated the largest share (28%) of its aid budget towards humanitarian aid, followed by the United States (16%) and Sweden (15%). China allocated the lowest share of its aid-like flows towards humanitarian aid (0.1%), followed by Saudi Arabia (3%) and France (4%).

FIGURE 10: INCREASES AND DECREASES IN HUMANITARIAN AID EXPENDITURE, 2008-2011

DONOR	US\$ MILLION INCREASE/DECREASE				SHARE OF HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS			
	2008	2009	2010	2011*	2008	2009	2010	2011*
Government total	3076	-572	1168	-495				
DAC total	2446	-213	1012	-266	92.4%	95.1%	94.3%	95.9%
Non-DAC total	630	-359	156	-229	7.6%	4.9%	5.7%	4.1%
10 LARGEST INCREASES 2008-2010								
United States	1350	-52	444	-228	36.1%	37.4%	37.4%	37.1%
Japan	166	-6	332	169	2.5%	2.6%	4.9%	6.5%
Canada	73	-24	152	-86	3.4%	3.4%	4.2%	3.7%
Sweden	64	38	76	24	4.6%	5.2%	5.3%	5.7%
Germany	75	-9	66	-59	5.5%	5.7%	5.7%	5.5%
Turkey	-1	-5	56	3	0.1%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%
United Kingdom	140	131	-86	157	7.2%	8.7%	7.2%	8.8%
Norway	-34	-14	55	1	3.5%	3.5%	3.6%	3.8%
Australia	157	45	-11	49	2.9%	3.4%	3.0%	3.5%
France	40	-30	63	-98	3.2%	3.1%	3.3%	2.7%
10 LARGEST DECREASES 2008-2010								
Saudi Arabia	353	-484	174	-173	4.6%	0.7%	2.0%	0.7%
EU institutions	287	-330	114	74	15.1%	13.0%	12.7%	13.8%
Netherlands	65	-95	-27	-121	4.7%	4.1%	3.5%	2.7%
Italy	38	-49	-51	35	3.1%	2.8%	2.2%	2.5%
Kuwait	85	-55	-30	3	0.8%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%
Spain	207	21	-101	-88	4.6%	5.0%	3.8%	3.3%
Ireland	-5	-72	-3	1	1.6%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%
Austria	35	-17	-7	-12	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.4%
Thailand	29	-28	11	-11	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
Greece	5	-4	-7	-7	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%

Note: *Data for 2011 for OECD DAC members is an estimate based on partial preliminary data releases (constant 2010 prices) and estimated core ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data







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NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITHIN THEIR BORDERS

Domestic actors are often among the first to respond to crises, in the most critical first hours and days. The governments of crisis-affected countries moreover have the primary responsibility to take care of victims of disasters on their own soil, and it is only when an affected government does not have the capacity to meet all of the needs arising from a crisis that international actors should be called upon to respond.

In high-income developed countries, governments and domestic civil society typically take the lead in disaster response (see 'Domestic response to disaster in Japan' on page 24).

Many governments in developing countries also play critical roles in providing material assistance, and in ensuring security, law and order and an enabling environment for international assistance. In September 2011, for example, an earthquake measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale hit the India/Nepal border area. The next day, the Indian government deployed 5,000 army personnel, search and rescue teams, a team of army doctors and nine tonnes of relief supplies to the affected area. The government of Nepal earmarked Rs25,000 (around US\$283) to be spent on 'temporary relief' for each affected person and allowed victims access to medical treatment free of charge. Similarly, in Ethiopia, the government

has played a pivotal role in the targeting, management and implementation of the productive social safety nets programme (PSNP) which proved to be the most timely and efficient response in the region during the 2011 Horn of Africa food security crisis (see Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion of Ethiopia's PSNP).

The domestic contributions of communities, organisations and governments in crisis-affected countries are largely invisible in assessments of global response to crises. While some governments have reported the financial cost of some of their domestic responses to crises to the UN OCHA FTS, this represents a tiny fraction of the real investments.

Without a better understanding of the contributions of domestic actors to crisis response, the international humanitarian system is unlikely to be able to improve coordination, complementarity or effective support to domestic crisis response.

The UN humanitarian resolution, Resolution 46/182 of 1991, says: 'Each state has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organisation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory'.

FIGURE 11: REPORTED DOMESTIC FINANCING CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES, 2007–2011




FIGURE 12: FUNDING PER DISASTER-AFFECTED PERSON IN 2011 (US\$)

Japan flooding
US\$486,758

Nicaragua
flooding
US\$33

Sri Lanka
flooding
US\$21

El Salvador
flooding
US\$12

Note: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Sri Lanka figures are based on number of targeted beneficiaries and funding received in UN flash appeals in 2011.
Source: UN OCHA FTS and Ministry of Finance, Japan

DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO DISASTER IN JAPAN


The earthquake and tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on 11 March 2011 and the subsequent damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant caused a disaster which exceeded all contingency plans of the Japanese government. However, in a high-income

country, the well-resourced Japanese government took the lead role in responding to the disaster.

The government approved several extraordinary budgets amounting to US\$198 billion for the national relief and reconstruction response

to the earthquake and tsunami. The total investment from the Japanese government per affected person dwarfed the international contributions received in UN flash appeals for natural disasters in 2011.


FIGURE 13: JAPAN'S NATIONAL FUNDING FOR ITS 2011 EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI RESPONSE (US\$ BILLION)



Source: Development Initiatives based on data from the first and third supplementary budgets of the fiscal year 2011, Ministry of Finance, Japan

PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FOUNDATIONS, COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS TO NGOS, UN AND THE RED CROSS

FIGURE 14: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, 2006–2011




Note: All figures for 2011 are preliminary estimates. Private contribution figures for 2006–2010 are based on our own research of a study set of NGOs, UN agencies and Red Cross organisations; the figure for 2011 is a preliminary projection based on the extrapolation of shares of private funding to MSF in 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data, annual reports and our own research (see Data & Guides section)

Private funding has become increasingly responsive to need relative to government sources. Private contributions grew rapidly in 2010 in the face of urgent need, up by 70% (US\$2.4 billion) from 2009 levels and reaching US\$5.8 billion. The proportion of the total international humanitarian response drawn from private funding has also increased over

recent years, from 17% in 2006 to 31% by 2010. Initial preliminary estimates for 2011 indicate that levels of private giving have fallen back again but still remain above 2009 levels, at US\$4.6 billion.

FIGURE 15: TOTAL PRIVATE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR TYPE, 2006–2010 (US\$ BILLION)



Source: Development Initiatives based on our own research (see Data & Guides section)

More than three-quarters of private giving between 2006 and 2010, an estimated 76%, came from private individuals. Foundations and private corporations accounted for 7% and 8% respectively. A further 9% came from other private donors, the majority of which were national committees of UN organisations, such as UNICEF, and Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies.

There are data limitations in assessing the response of these different sources of private finance to specific emergencies and appeals. For example, large streams of private income, including funds raised by platforms such as the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), are not always included, and some major humanitarian organisations, notably MSF, do not report their private income to UN OCHA's FTS.

PRIVATE GIVING TO MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (MSF)

MSF consistently raises large volumes of private funding to support its humanitarian work, and it increased its private income from US\$613 million in 2006 to US\$1.1 billion in 2011. On average, less than 10% of MSF's funding comes from donor governments and institutions. Moreover, the majority of the organisation's private funds – 86% – are donated by some five million private supporters around the world.

Despite its heavy reliance on private giving, MSF rarely launches specific emergency appeals and funds most humanitarian operations from the regular donations it receives. In fact, when a major humanitarian disaster occurs, spontaneous donations often exceed operational requirements. Only five days after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami, MSF publicly announced a halt in its fundraising as the funding received (US\$137 million) already exceeded

the cost of its planned emergency deployment. This decision proved controversial both among the media and the humanitarian community, who were fearful that it would undercut an unprecedented wave of private giving. However, MSF's decision was perfectly aligned with its needs-driven fundraising strategy, by which it seeks to raise only as much money as it can reasonably spend on the emergency response, taking into account its capacity, the scale of needs and constraints in humanitarian access.

Large-scale emergencies typically trigger spontaneous giving for the crisis at hand and also tend to attract new donors, who then become regular MSF sponsors. MSF estimates that nearly one million new donors supported its response to the Haiti earthquake and cholera outbreak, and the majority of them remain regular supporters two years after the crisis.

FIGURE 16: PRIVATE DONORS TO THE HORN OF AFRICA CRISIS AND JAPAN EARTHQUAKE, 2011

HORN OF AFRICA CRISIS	US\$m	SHARE OF TOTAL PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
Private charities and foundations	69.5	13%
IKEA Foundation	62.0	12%
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	7.2	1%
Jolie-Pitt Foundation	0.3	0%
Private corporations	1.0	0%
Coca-Cola Company	1.0	0%
UNICEF national committees	103.7	20%
UNICEF National Committee, Germany	17.5	3%
UNICEF National Committee, France	14.3	3%
USA Fund for UNICEF	13.9	3%
Others	58.0	11%
Private individuals and organisations	349.5	67%
Total private funding	523.7	

JAPAN EARTHQUAKE	US\$m	SHARE OF TOTAL PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
Private charities and foundations	4.7	0.8%
Starbucks Foundation	1.2	0.2%
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	1.0	0.2%
BP Foundation	1.0	0.2%
General Mills Foundation	0.7	0.1%
General Motors Foundation	0.5	0.1%
Private corporations	41.6	7.2%
Jefferies Group Inc.	5.3	0.9%
Canon Group	3.7	0.6%
Toyota Motor Corporation	3.7	0.6%
GlaxoSmithKline	3.4	0.6%
Abbott Laboratories	3.0	0.5%
UNICEF national committees	0.0	0.0%
Private individuals and organisations	532.2	92.0%
Total private funding	578.4	

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

In spite of these limitations, the FTS provides detailed information on the types of private donors responding to particular crises. The shares of total private funding reported to the FTS coming from private charities and foundations range from as little as 0.8% in the case of the Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011 to as much as 13% in the Horn of Africa crisis. Corporate

giving varies from 0.2% in the case of the Horn of Africa emergency to 8% for the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan. The contributions of UNICEF national committees and private individuals and organisations amounted to an average of 13% and 71% respectively across major humanitarian crises in 2010 and 2011.



THE STORY

The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that hit north-eastern Japan on 11 March 2011 affected 400,000 people and devastated local infrastructure. The Japanese government led the response, while international actors provided additional technical capacity and resources. (In this picture, a member of a British search and rescue team looks for trapped survivors in Ofunato.)

The contributions of communities, civil society and the governments of crisis-affected states are often overlooked in assessments of crisis response.

CREDIT

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1.2 WHERE DOES THE FUNDING GO?

COUNTRY VARIATIONS

In the ten years between 2001 and 2010, 151 countries received US\$86 billion in humanitarian assistance. Funding was concentrated among a relatively small group of recipients, with the top 20 recipients receiving 75% of the total over the period; 25% was received by the three largest recipients alone.

Many of the leading recipients, which accounted for the largest share of humanitarian assistance over an extended period, experienced complex crises affected by both conflict and natural disaster, with a high incidence of long-term, chronic poverty. Eighteen

of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian aid, for example, were affected by conflict for 5 or more years in the 10 years between 2001 and 2010; 14 of them had populations of over a million people affected by natural disasters; and 14 countries are considered long-term recipients of humanitarian aid (see Chapter 3). While the top 20 recipients account for 13% of the world's population, they are home to 21% of the world's population living on less than US\$1.25 a day.

TRACKING FUNDING TO RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

Our calculation of international humanitarian response relies on data from the OECD DAC for contributions from OECD DAC donors, who provided 95% of the total funds from governments between 2001 and 2010. In 2012, the latest available data from the OECD DAC on humanitarian aid flows to recipient country level is available up to 2010. While data on resource flows tracked within the OCHA FTS is available for 2011, these two sources are not directly comparable. Analysis in this section therefore focuses on international humanitarian response up to and including 2010.

We also distinguish humanitarian funding that is allocable to recipient countries. While government donors provided US\$99 billion in humanitarian aid between 2001 and 2010, US\$86 billion was received at recipient country level; the balance was channelled to regional-level programmes and other activities supporting the humanitarian sector that were not attributable to a specific country.

See the Data & Guides section for a detailed explanation of our methodology and calculations.

FIGURE 17: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID, 2001–2010





FIGURE 18: KEY DATA FOR THE TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID, 2001–2010




Note: The number of people living on less than US\$1.25 a day is expressed to the latest available year. Our definition of 'conflict-affected' includes both incidence of conflict and/or the presence of a multilateral peacekeeping operation. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, CRED EM DAT, UNHCR, UNRWA, Uppsala Conflict Data and SIPRI multilateral peacekeeping operations data

In 2010, for the first time in five years, Sudan was overtaken as the largest recipient by Haiti which, in absolute volume terms, received over three times as much. The US\$3.1 billion of humanitarian funds channelled to Haiti in 2010 was of a completely different order to the volumes typically received – more than double the amount received by the largest recipient in any year to date (see reference tables section for volumes of funding to leading recipients from 2001 to 2010).

The volumes of assistance received can be put into perspective when viewed alongside levels of need. Pakistan, for

example, also received a large volume of humanitarian funds in 2010 – US\$2.1 billion – in response to the floods (see Chapter 2). In terms of funding received per affected person targeted in UN appeals, however, funding to Pakistan (US\$115) was substantially lower than Palestine/OPT (US\$319), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (US\$228), the Republic of Congo (US\$139) or Sudan (US\$134). Haiti, by contrast, received three times more funding per targeted beneficiary (US\$1,022) than Palestine/OPT and more than 100 times more per targeted beneficiary than Nepal (US\$9).


FIGURE 19: SHARES OF THE US\$12.5 BILLION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID ALLOCABLE BY COUNTRY IN 2010



International assistance to recipient countries varies not only in volume but also in the type of humanitarian assistance received. This largely reflects the nature of the crisis. Ethiopia, for example, which is characterised by chronic food insecurity, received 80% of its humanitarian aid in the form of emergency food aid between 2006 and 2010, compared with just 3% in Iraq and 10% in Palestine/OPT. Afghanistan, which has experienced severe damage to infrastructure as a consequence of war, received over one-third of its humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2010 in reconstruction relief.


Sources of humanitarian financing also vary considerably between crises and recipient countries. For example, while the overwhelming share of international humanitarian aid overall is provided by OECD DAC donors (90% between 2001 and 2010), Haiti received 37% of its humanitarian aid from private donors between 2006 and 2010. This trend was driven primarily by the US\$1.3 billion in private funding received in response to the 2010 earthquake.

FIGURE 20: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID PER BENEFICIARY TARGETED IN UN CAP APPEALS IN 2010 (US\$ PER PERSON)



Note: Target beneficiary numbers are the highest beneficiary number stated in each country-level consolidated or flash appeal in 2010.
Source: Development Initiatives based on UN CAP appeals, OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 21: HUMANITARIAN AID BY EXPENDITURE TYPE TO THE LEADING RECIPIENTS, 2006–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data


Pakistan received just 72% of its humanitarian aid from OECD DAC donors between 2006 and 2010, with 17% (US\$576 million) provided by other governments, of which US\$435 million was contributed in 2010 alone. Major non-OECD DAC government donors

to Pakistan included the UAE (US\$182 million), Saudi Arabia (US\$231 million) and Turkey (US\$54 million).

Lebanon also received a relatively large share (13%) of its humanitarian aid from other governments between 2006

and 2010. This trend was influenced by contributions of US\$136 million from 30 non-OECD DAC governments in 2006, with major contributions from Middle Eastern governments, including US\$65 million from Saudi Arabia and US\$25 million from the UAE.


FIGURE 22: DONOR SHARES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE 20 LARGEST RECIPIENTS, 2006–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

SHIFTING TRENDS

FIGURE 23: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID BY REGION, 2001–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

The overall rising trend in international humanitarian aid to recipient countries in 2010 masked a number of shifts in the traditional distributions of international humanitarian funding. The regional distribution of humanitarian aid also shifted in 2010. Africa's share of the

total fell from 55% to 34% (a reduction in volume of US\$1.3 billion), and the Middle East's share fell from 20% to 10% (a reduction in volume of US\$846 million). The share of the Americas, meanwhile, grew from 4% in 2009 to 26% in 2010 (an increase in volume of US\$3 billion).


In each year since 2001, approximately one-third of total humanitarian aid has been concentrated among the top three recipient countries. In 2010, however, the share of the leading three recipients jumped to nearly half of the total, with Haiti receiving 25% and Pakistan 17%.

FIGURE 24: CONCENTRATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITHIN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 2001-2010

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Top 3 recipients	31.7%	28.7%	36.1%	36.8%	32.2%	30.1%	30.7%	30.1%	31.0%	48.5%
Next 10 recipients	26.4%	29.1%	31.7%	31.7%	39.0%	42.2%	36.5%	38.0%	42.9%	30.2%
All other recipients	42.8%	42.1%	32.2%	31.5%	28.8%	27.7%	32.8%	31.9%	26.1%	21.4%

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 25: SHIFTING VOLUMES OF HUMANITARIAN AID AMONGST THE LEADING RECIPIENTS AND THE REST, 2001–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

Not only did humanitarian aid become more concentrated in just two countries in 2010, but all other recipients collectively saw a reduction both in their shares of the total and in the absolute volumes they received.

There were some clear 'losers' amidst the overall growth in international humanitarian aid spending in 2010. Among the 15 countries with the greatest reductions in humanitarian funding by volume, 5 experienced an improvement in their humanitarian situation (Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Georgia, Ethiopia and Myanmar). Among the remaining ten, some experienced an improvement

in their humanitarian situation, but all experienced greater difficulties in raising funds within their UN funding appeals than in the previous year, with many noting serious difficulties in raising funds in the first half of the year. In the most striking examples, the proportion of funding needs met in the UN appeals for Nepal and Chad were 33% and 31% lower, respectively, in 2010 than in 2009.


FIGURE 26: THE 10 LARGEST CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID FLOWS, 2009–2010

2009–2010 US\$m INCREASE		2009–2010 US\$m DECREASE		EXPLANATION
↑	Haiti	2,921		Over three million people (30% of the population) affected by the 7.0 magnitude earthquake on 12 January 2010. UN issued a flash appeal requesting US\$1.5 billion.
↓			Sudan	Gradual shift towards reconstruction and development funding, but humanitarian situation remained serious with deterioration in South Sudan. The percentage of humanitarian funding needs met in the UN appeal fell by 5% in 2010.
↑	Pakistan	1,498		Major flooding affected more than 20 million people. The UN launched the largest ever flash appeal requesting US\$2 billion.
↓			Palestine/ OPT	Funding needs in UN appeal were revised downwards by US\$61 million at the mid-year point following poor funding response. Funding requirements met fell by 24% in 2010.
↑	Niger	181		UN estimated over 7 million people, 46% of the population, were affected by moderate to severe food insecurity following harvest failure in late 2009. A coup d'état early in the year allowed greater humanitarian access and scale-up of response.
↓			Somalia	While the crisis remained serious with 3.2 million people in need of assistance, UN appeal requirements – already 19% lower than 2009 – were revised downwards by US\$93 million owing to shrinking humanitarian access and poor funding response in the first half of the year.
↑	Kyrgyz Republic	70		Violent clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the country's south led to 400 deaths and displacement of 375,000 people.
↓			Iraq	Acute humanitarian needs subsided in 2010, but UN appeal for Iraq (non-CAP) was just 38% funded and the regional response appeal for Iraqi refugees just 29% funded. UN reported this had 'profound' effects on ability to deliver assistance.
↑	Chile	69		An 8.8 magnitude earthquake affected 1.8 million people.
↓			Zimbabwe	Humanitarian situation improved after cholera outbreak and food insecurity in 2009 and formation of Inclusive Government in 2009 led to greater economic stability.
↑	Guatemala	37		Tropical Storm Agatha struck Guatemala and the Pacaya volcano left nearly 400,000 people in need of humanitarian assistance.
↓			Indonesia	Had received increased funding in 2009 due to an earthquake and aftershocks. No UN funding appeal was made in 2010.
↑	Jordan	35		Jordan continued to host refugees from Iraq and Palestine/OPT.
↓			DRC	Humanitarian crisis remained widespread plus 190,000 newly displaced in Equator province. Percentage of funding needs in UN appeal met fell by 2% in 2010.
↑	Yemen	28		Insecurity, displacement and food insecurity left an estimated 2.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.
↓			Kenya	Percentage of funding needs in UN appeal met fell by 18% in 2010.

2009-2010		US\$m INCREASE	EXPLANATION	2009-2010		US\$m DECREASE	EXPLANATION	
↑	Papua New Guinea	23	An estimated 20,000 people in remote parts of East Sepik Province, northwestern Papua New Guinea, affected by flooding.		Georgia	-90	Improvements in the humanitarian situation following 2008 conflict.	↓
↑	Timor-Leste	18	Continued recovery needs and chronic poverty.		Uganda	-70	Improvements in the humanitarian situation with many IDPs returning home. But despite much lower funding requirements in the UN appeal, the appeal was the worst funded it had been in six years at the mid-year point.	↓
↑	Thailand	17	Estimated 4.2 million people affected by flooding.		Ethiopia	-60	Reduction in people in need of food assistance following better than expected harvest in early 2010.	↓
↑	Mali	13	Increased food insecurity with more than 250,000 people food insecure in 2010.		Syria	-55	1.3 million affected by drought in 2010. Funding requirements for UN (non-CAP) appeal revised downwards by 18% following poor funding response.	↓
↑	Solomon Islands	13	A magnitude 7.2 earthquake generated a tsunami, damaging or destroying approximately 100 to 200 homes and affecting an estimated 500 people.		Myanmar	-52	Improvement in the humanitarian situation following cyclone Nargis in 2008, although people affected by floods, landslides and cyclone Giri in 2010.	↓
↑	Samoa	13	Earthquake and associated tsunami in December 2009 left approximately 1000 individuals displaced.		Nepal	-48	Gradual improvement in humanitarian situation and shift towards transition activities following signing of peace agreement in 2006. However, funding requirements met in Nepal's UN appeal (non-CAP) fell by 33% in 2010.	↓
↑	Iran	12	Earthquakes in July and December.		Chad	-44	In addition to existing needs of 1.2 million people, 1.6 million were newly affected by drought and food insecurity in 2010. Percentage of funding needs in UN appeal met fell by 31% in 2010.	↓

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN funding appeal documents

FIGURE 27: OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN AID FROM OECD DAC MEMBERS BY ACTIVITY TYPE, 2006–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Trends in the form of humanitarian assistance have been relatively constant, with 50–60% of OECD DAC humanitarian aid spent on emergency relief, including provision of emergency health care, shelter, water and sanitation. Response has been driven by the nature of need, illustrated by the sharp increase in the proportion of assistance delivered as emergency food aid in 2008 following the global food crisis. However, proportions subsequently fell back to pre-2008 levels in 2010 (25%).

Despite considerable rhetoric, spending on disaster preparedness and prevention has not reached above 4% of the total humanitarian spending by OECD DAC members in any of the five years between 2006 and 2010. While levels have risen slightly over the period, this may be a function of improved donor reporting as much as shifting donor priorities (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of government funding for disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction).



THE STORY

Political unrest in the Middle East exemplifies the complex consequences of crises in a globally connected world. Civil conflict and NATO military intervention in Libya affected not only the Libyan population but also prompted the flight of tens of thousands of migrant workers into neighbouring countries. Armed combatants fled from Libya into Mali, creating unrest that contributed to a military coup in early 2012. The interruption in oil production and export contributed to rising energy and consequently food prices.

CREDIT

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1.3 HOW DOES THE FUNDING GET THERE?

Humanitarian funding follows a variety of pathways, sometimes passing through multiple transactions between donors, funds and delivery agencies en route to crisis-affected populations.

Donors face a range of choices when deciding how best to spend their humanitarian funding envelopes to best meet the needs of people in crisis, while also respecting their own commitments to principles and policies. They may provide unearmarked funding to multilateral organisations – typically UN agencies – to spend as they determine fit, or they may provide tightly earmarked bilateral funds to multilateral agencies stipulating where and on what type of activities the funds must be spent. They may choose to contribute to pooled humanitarian funds, which have been established to promote more timely and needs-based allocations of funding and are managed by the UN system. Donors may also choose to directly fund international NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or NGOs in crisis-affected countries. Less frequently, donors may provide funds directly to an affected government or they may implement their funds directly themselves, often, for example, through their own military forces.

In practice, donors' humanitarian budgets are spread widely across the spectrum of possible channels. However, beyond this first level of transactions, where funds pass from donors to their first recipients, we know relatively little about the routes and subsequent levels of transactions through which humanitarian funds pass to reach affected populations (see infographic on page 42). Without better information on the flow throughout the system to the point of delivery to aid recipients, there

is little scope to assess the efficiency of the system or to meaningfully hold the chain of delivery of assistance to account. However, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) has the potential to provide transaction-level data in real time that would fill in many of these current information blanks.

DATA AND THE INTERNATIONAL AID TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE


Tracking the humanitarian dollar through the system is currently hindered by the lack of information on what has been delivered to whom and the absence of a feedback loop that enables the people affected by crises to say what they have received, and when. Without this feedback or aggregated data on what commodities and services have been delivered, the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian response is hard to measure.

Transparency was a key issue at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, Korea in late 2011, where donors signed up to implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of aid information, based on the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and OECD DAC statistical reporting standards. Forty-two organisations have now published data on their aid projects in line with the IATI standard. These include bilateral and multilateral aid organisations, an implementing organisation (the United Nations Office for Project Services – UNOPS), philanthropic foundations and

27 NGOs and INGOs. So far, organisations have been focusing on publishing information on their development aid; however, the IATI standard applies to all resource flows and as donors implement their Busan commitment to publish to a common standard by 2015, it will be applied to many more humanitarian actors. IATI's consultation with developing country stakeholders has indicated a demand for better information on humanitarian assistance and also on South–South and triangular cooperation flows.

Focusing on humanitarian actors will encourage IATI to consider further how detailed information can be published in as timely a manner as possible to meet the operational data requirements of humanitarian stakeholders. UNOPs became the first publisher to share its sub-national geographic information in the IATI open data format, and as the number of organisations providing this type of information increases, this could support humanitarian efforts to ensure that assistance reaches the communities most in need of it.

HUMANITARIAN FUNDING CHANNELS



FUNDING TO FIRST-LEVEL RECIPIENTS

First-level recipients receive humanitarian funding directly from the donor source (this being a DAC government, other government or private donor). First-level recipients can be the public sector, including institutions of donor and local governments; multilateral organisations, ranging from UN agencies to the World Bank and other supranational institutions; international, donor country-based and local NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs); the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; and any other type of humanitarian organisation that can channel donor financing. In turn, these first-level recipients can choose to pass the funding received on to another organisation to implement, thus moving beyond the first-level recipient choice controlled by the donor.

OECD DAC members provided the largest share of funding to first-level recipients (83%) in 2010, 9% more than their share of overall humanitarian assistance; however, this was nearly 10% less than in the previous year. Private donors increased their share of the total from 2% in 2009 to 12% in 2010, driven

mainly by the huge mobilisation of public and private sector giving for the Haiti emergency. Other government donors contributed 5%, a slight increase of 0.7% from 2009 levels.

During the period 2006–2010, multilateral organisations received, on average, just over half of all funding traceable to first-level recipient organisations (54%). Over the same period, NGOs and CSOs received an average of 17% of the funding, rising to 21% in 2010. Representation by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement also increased over the period, from just 4% in 2006 to 10% in 2010. Finally, public sector institutions received on average 14% of the international humanitarian financing between 2006–2010.

FIGURE 28: FIRST-LEVEL RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID, 2006–2010





FIGURE 29: FIRST-LEVEL RECIPIENTS AS A SHARE OF DONORS' HUMANITARIAN FINANCING, 2006–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

Different donors favour different first-level recipient organisations when it comes to deciding how to channel their humanitarian financing. OECD DAC member countries concentrated 55% of all their funding through multilateral organisations, with 17% to NGOs, 13% to the public sector, 7% to the Red Cross and 8% to other channels during the 2006–2010 period. This average hides variations amongst individual donors: the United States, for example, channelled on average over 60% of its funding through multilateral organisations, while Switzerland dedicated less than one-third. Conversely, a quarter of all Switzerland's funding was channelled through the Red Cross, compared with just 3.5% from the United States. France channelled the bulk of its humanitarian funding (80%) through the EU, compared with only 26% by the UK. Finally, EU institutions spent 65% of the funding through only two channels: multilateral organisations (37%) and the public sector (28%).

Governments outside the DAC group split their financing among the public sector and multilateral organisations evenly, at 37% and 40% respectively on average. Furthermore, they were four times more likely to fund a Red Cross/Red Crescent organisation than an NGO. The UAE channelled, on average, 40% of its funding through the UAE Red Crescent Society, while Brazil channelled over half of its humanitarian money through governmental institutions in recipient countries.

Private donors favoured multilateral organisations, mainly UNICEF, to channel 46% of their funding. Another 34% and 14% respectively were allocated to NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent, while the public sector received a scanty 0.3% of all private funding.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN CRISIS-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

The contributions of CSOs in crisis-affected countries, including local NGOs, faith-based organisations and local Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, is extremely difficult to quantify, although their contributions are considered vital. In many crises, these organisations often play a critical role, responding before the international community arrives, accessing populations that international actors may not be able to reach and continuing to support communities as they recover from crisis, after the international response has waned.

Domestic actors often struggle to access international funding, and it is currently not possible to track comprehensively the volumes of funds passed on through the international system to such actors. Many donor governments cannot, by policy, or do not, by preference, fund domestic NGOs directly. Domestic NGOs, therefore, receive relatively small volumes of international humanitarian aid contributions directly from donor governments. However, since 2006, country-level humanitarian pooled funds have enabled domestic NGOs to access funding directly, with the total funds channelled through emergency response

funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHF) growing ten-fold, from US\$1.7 million in 2007 to US\$17.8 million in 2011. In 2011, contributions from donors and pooled funds increased by 77% and 263% respectively. The largest increase was in Somalia where domestic NGOs, which play a major role in crisis response, accessing insecure areas that international actors cannot, received US\$10.9 million via pooled humanitarian funds, and US\$6.7 million from government donors.

Access to international humanitarian response funds for domestic NGOs is often mediated by UN agencies and international NGOs, who pass on a proportion of their donor and private funding to national NGOs to implement humanitarian programmes. This final step in the journey of humanitarian funds is largely untraceable within the OECD DAC and OCHA FTS data, making it extremely difficult to fully account for funds and to assess the extent to which donors and international organisations are working in partnership with local actors.


We also know very little about the volumes of resources raised domestically by these organisations. As an indication,

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT LOCAL ACTORS

‘Principle 8: Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.’

based on a survey of 42 local Red Cross society annual financial reports, an estimated 10% of their total collective budgets of US\$251 million between 2007 and 2010 was raised from domestic sources. The Japanese Red Cross National Society raised US\$483 million from private sources within the country – of this, US\$122 million alone came from private donations from Japanese citizens.

FIGURE 30: HUMANITARIAN AID TO NATIONAL NGOS IN CRISIS-AFFECTED COUNTRIES FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND POOLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDS, 2007–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

POOLED FUNDS

Pooled humanitarian funds were created to facilitate more timely and efficient funding for crises, proportionate with needs and in line with priorities identified by UN humanitarian coordinators.

Since the inception of pooled humanitarian funds, increasing volumes of financing have been channelled via these mechanisms, from US\$583 million in 2006 to US\$900 million in 2011. In 2011, 5% of total international humanitarian aid financing from governments and private donors was channelled via pooled funds.

Pooled humanitarian funds provide a conduit for donors who have little experience or capacity to allocate and administer pooled funds to channel funds towards priority humanitarian needs. In 2010 a record 161 donors, including governments, private individuals, corporations and foundations,

contributed to the CERF, 56 donors to ERFs and 16 to CHFs. However, over the lifetime of the funds to date, the leading ten donors have provided 90% of the total funds received.


The CERF has received the largest share (52%) of the total channelled via pooled funds, followed by country-level CHFs (37%) and ERFs (11%).

In a number of recipient countries, primarily those with the largest CHFs and ERFs, a significant proportion of humanitarian funds is received via pooled funds. The DRC and Sudan, in particular, benefit from substantial pooled mechanisms, which constituted 46% and 15% respectively of their total humanitarian funds between 2006 and 2010.

POOLED HUMANITARIAN FUNDS


- The UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allows donors (including governments, private corporations, individuals, trusts and foundations) to pool their financing on a global level to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to people affected by humanitarian crises.
- Common humanitarian funds (CHF) are managed and funds are allocated according to the needs and priorities identified at recipient country level. CHF typically allocate funds to projects within a UN humanitarian workplan or action plan.
- Emergency response funds (ERFs) are also managed at country level and exist in countries that may not have a UN humanitarian workplan and may not regularly participate in the UN appeals process. ERFs are able to finance small-scale projects, allowing national NGOs to access funds directly.

FIGURE 31: TOP 10 DONOR CONTRIBUTORS TO HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS, 2006–2011




Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

FIGURE 32: TOTAL FUNDING TO POOLED FUNDS, 2006–2011




Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

FIGURE 33: SHARES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID RECEIVED VIA HUMANITARIAN POOLED FUNDS, 2006–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

FIGURE 34: CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTRY-LEVEL COMMON HUMANITARIAN FUNDS



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 35: CONTRIBUTIONS TO EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNDS, 2006–2011 (US\$ MILLION)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	TOTAL
Afghanistan					6.3	4.8	11.1
CAR		5.8	6.2				12.0
Colombia				1.4	2.1	2.4	5.9
Ethiopia	15.7	16.4	68.2	45.6	16.7	43.4	206.0
Haiti			5.5		81.9	0.5	87.8
Indonesia	0.5	0.3	1.5	3.0		2.3	7.6
Iraq		2.1	6.1	15.6	4.9		28.7
Kenya				2.6		3.7	6.3
Nepal			0.1				0.1
Pakistan					36.6	0.9	37.6
Palestine/OPT		5.4	2.5	7.5	3.2	3.8	22.4
Somalia	5.1	13.0	12.5	13.4	8.9		52.8
Uganda				0.3	0.6		0.9
Yemen					2.6	5.7	8.3
Zimbabwe		1.3	3.4	3.9	0.7	0.9	10.1
Total	21.3	44.3	105.9	93.3	164.5	68.5	497.7

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 36: TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND, 2006–2011 (US\$ MILLION)

RECIPIENT COUNTRY	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1	DRC 38.0	DRC 52.5	DRC 41.1	Somalia 60.5	Pakistan 51.8	Somalia 53.0
2	Sudan 35.5	Bangladesh 26.7	Ethiopia 31.5	DRC 30.4	Haiti 36.6	Ethiopia 46.5
3	Afghanistan 32.3	Sudan 25.5	Myanmar 28.4	Zimbabwe 26.8	Niger 35.0	Pakistan 32.4
4	Kenya 27.2	Somalia 15.7	Kenya 26.0	Kenya 26.3	DRC 29.1	South Sudan 22.8
5	Somalia 16.6	Uganda 13.0	Pakistan 18.7	Sudan 25.8	Sudan 23.9	Kenya 22.7
6	Sri Lanka 10.0	Ethiopia 12.4	Afghanistan 18.2	Sri Lanka 23.5	Chad 22.8	Chad 22.6
7	Ethiopia 10.0	Mozambique 12.2	Haiti 16.0	DPRK 19.0	Kenya 20.0	Sudan 18.3
8	Chad 9.4	Zimbabwe 12.0	Sudan 16.0	Ethiopia 15.6	Ethiopia 16.7	Côte d'Ivoire 16.3
9	Eritrea 5.9	DPRK 11.1	Nepal 12.6	Philippines 11.9	Sri Lanka 15.7	Sri Lanka 16.1
10	Côte d'Ivoire 5.8	Sri Lanka 10.9	Sri Lanka 12.5	Niger 11.7	Yemen 14.5	Niger 15.7
% of total	73.5%	54.7%	51.6%	63.3%	64.1%	62.5%
Total top 10	190.7	192.0	221.2	251.7	266.2	266.3
Total recipients	259.3	350.9	428.8	397.4	415.2	426.2

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN CERF data

Four CHF were operational in 2011, in Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Somalia and Sudan. Following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the Sudan CHF, the oldest and largest of the funds, was separated at the beginning of 2012 into two separate funds for Sudan and South Sudan.

The overall increase in funds received by the CHFs in 2011 was a result of a sharp increase in contributions to the CHFs for Somalia and Sudan, with both countries experiencing an increased burden of humanitarian needs associated with insecurity and drought.

Funding to ERFs, by contrast, fell in 2011, following a peak in 2010 driven by contributions to the ERFs in Haiti and Pakistan. Contributions to the ERF for Ethiopia more than doubled in 2011 in response to increased humanitarian needs arising from the food security crisis.

The ERFs in CAR and Somalia were converted to CHFs in 2008 and 2010 respectively. The ERF for Uganda was closed in 2011. New ERFs for Pakistan and Yemen were created in 2010.

The CERF received US\$467 million in funding for humanitarian crises in 2011, providing an important injection of funds to crises both through its rapid response window, which allocated 66% of the total funds in 2011, and to under-funded emergencies, which received 34% of funds.

THE MILITARY


Military actors have a long history of providing support in times of emergency – both at home and abroad. However, the frequency and scale of foreign military involvement in humanitarian action have increased in the past decade, driven by both capacity needs and logistical expediency.

Natural disasters have increased in frequency and severity and, in some circumstances civilian agencies simply do not have adequate capacity to respond to humanitarian needs on a large scale, especially where infrastructure is badly

damaged. Both domestic and foreign militaries have played a significant role in responding to large-scale disasters, including the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and, more recently, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 – when 34 foreign militaries are thought to have deployed troops, assets and supplies in the response.

Foreign military actors have also found themselves increasingly present in areas of humanitarian need in the past decade, due to the expansion in multilateral

FIGURE 37: HUMANITARIAN AID CHANNELLED VIA DONOR DEFENCE AGENCIES REPORTED TO THE OECD DAC, 2006–2010



Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

peacekeeping operations, as well as the major foreign military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The OECD DAC criteria for ODA allows 'additional costs incurred for the use of the donor's military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services' to be counted towards a government's ODA contributions. A proportion of military humanitarian activity is therefore captured within DAC statistics.

The United States channels the largest volumes of funds via its defence apparatus. The volume of these contributions increased dramatically in 2010, reflecting the US Government's major contributions of military assets and personnel to the relief effort following the earthquake in Haiti.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) acts both as an implementing agency in humanitarian crises and as a donor. A large proportion of the US Government's


military humanitarian aid does not, however, involve activities directly implemented by the DoD; a large portion of the funds reported to the OECD DAC is in fact funds channelled via the US DoD to third party implementing partners to carry out project activities, in particular through the US Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).

FIGURE 38: RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID CHANNELLED VIA MILITARY ACTORS, 2006-2010 (US\$ MILLION)

	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		TOTAL 2006-2010
Pakistan	86.4	Afghanistan	54.0	Afghanistan	108.8	Afghanistan	69.6	Haiti	380.8	Haiti	380.8
Afghanistan	19.7	Iraq	47.1	Iraq	41.2	Chad	18.4	Afghanistan	22.9	Afghanistan	275.1
Lebanon	13.3	Lebanon	20.1	Chad	27.3	Iraq	11.0	Iraq	18.7	Iraq	125.9
Iraq	7.9	America, regional	6.1	Myanmar	12.9	Georgia	9.1	Pakistan	14.8	Pakistan	104.6
Indonesia	7.3	Sudan	1.6	America, regional	8.8	Myanmar	2.6	Indonesia	4.4	Chad	46.9
America, regional	5.8	Chad	1.2	Lebanon	7.0	Kosovo	2.6	Chile	1.1	Lebanon	42.1
Timor-Leste	3.6	Pakistan	1.0	China	2.1	Lebanon	1.6	Kosovo	0.4	America, regional	21.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2.5	Ethiopia	0.8	Pakistan	1.9	China	0.9	Guatemala	0.1	Myanmar	15.5
DRC	1.9	South of Sahara, regional	0.7	Georgia	1.7	Bolivia	0.9	Chad	0.04	Indonesia	12.2
Guatemala	0.2	Serbia	0.6	Europe, regional	0.6	America, regional	0.5			Georgia	10.8

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

FIGURE 39: HUMANITARIAN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MILITARY ACTORS REPORTED TO UN OCHA FTS, 2007–2011



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 40: RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID CHANNELLED VIA MILITARY ACTORS REPORTED TO UN OCHA FTS, 2007–2011 (US\$ MILLION)

2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		TOTAL 2007–2011	
Afghanistan	6.0	Georgia	21.0	Indonesia	4.3	Haiti	506.4	Japan	94.2	Haiti	509.0
Dominican Rep.	1.8	Haiti	2.6	Afghanistan	3.8	Pakistan	70.0	Libya	3.8	Japan	94.2
Nicaragua	1.0	Myanmar	1.4	Pakistan	3.0	Afghanistan	10.0	Pakistan	0.6	Pakistan	73.6
Peru	0.6	China	1.3	Philippines	0.8	Chile	6.1	Tajikistan	0.1	Georgia	21.0
		Bolivia	0.1	El Salvador	0.6	DRC	0.8	Honduras	0.1	Afghanistan	19.8
				Jordan	0.3	Guatemala	0.8			Chile	6.1
						Kyrgyzstan	0.2			Indonesia	4.3
						Region	0.1			Libya	3.8
						China	0.1			Dominican Rep.	1.8
										China	1.4

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Military humanitarian contributions that are not ODA-eligible may be tracked within the OCHA FTS data, though many of the contributions reported are descriptions of in-kind relief goods and services. The United States is the largest donor reflected in the FTS data but the contributions of a greater diversity of donors, including many donors outside of the OECD DAC grouping, are also visible in the data. In addition to major contributions from the United States in 2010, France, Nicaragua, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Suriname, Uruguay,

Jordan, Italy and Jamaica all reported military humanitarian contributions to the Haiti earthquake response, while Egypt, Indonesia and Russia reported contributions to the Pakistan flooding response.

In 2011, the largest contribution of military humanitarian assistance was to Japan, with contributions totalling US\$89.6 million from the US DoD and US\$4.6 million from China.



THE STORY

Multiple crises in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan have led to the forced displacement of millions of people. Pakistan hosted 1.7 million refugees and 453,000 internally displaced people in 2011.

Many of the leading recipients of humanitarian aid are affected by multiple, overlapping crises. Pakistan is home to 35.2 million people living in absolute poverty. It experiences domestic and regional conflict and has endured large-scale flooding for two consecutive years.

CREDIT

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FORCES SHAPING HUMANITARIAN NEED

AND THE MIXED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The scale of global humanitarian crises abated in 2011, with 12.5 million fewer people targeted to receive humanitarian assistance in the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP), and a further drop of 10.4 million in the expected numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance at the beginning of 2012.

Irrespective of this most recent downward trend in people affected by crises, however, major structural global crisis risks – including high food prices and market volatility and the increasing threat of weather-related hazards – mean that large numbers of people, particularly the poor and those in fragile states, are acutely vulnerable to crises.

The international response to humanitarian crises has been mixed. Despite lower finance requests than in previous years, the gap between needs and funding widened in 2011, with the UN CAP appeal reporting the lowest proportion of funding requirements met in a decade. Timeliness and inequitable responses between crises are also of continued concern.

This chapter considers recent trends in drivers of humanitarian crises and reflects on the international response to meeting those financing needs.


DRIVERS OF VULNERABILITY AND CRISIS

The primary drivers of humanitarian crises are typically natural disasters and/or conflict, intersecting with people's vulnerability to, and ability to cope with, the impact of such events.

In 2011 the number of people affected by natural disasters fell to 91 million, substantially lower than the 224 million in 2010 and the lowest figure in 10 years. The number of people affected in low-income countries in 2011 was the lowest in 5 years, at 11 million. Similarly, in lower middle-income countries, 18 million people were affected in 2011, the lowest number in 8 years and half that of 2010.


The estimated cost of damages associated with these natural disasters, however, rose substantially to US\$290 billion in 2011, up from US\$127 billion in 2010. The majority of these damages, some US\$210 billion, were incurred in Japan, where around 400,000 people were affected by the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, illustrating the huge financial cost of natural disasters in a high-income OECD country.

FIGURE 1: PEOPLE AFFECTED BY NATURAL DISASTERS, 2000–2011



Note: Income groups are attributed using World Bank classification, April 2012. Source: Development Initiatives based on Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) EM-DAT

FIGURE 2: TRENDS IN THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENT CONFLICT, 2001–2010




Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (datasets UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946–2010; UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.3-2011, 1989–2010; UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.3-2011, 1989–2010)

Data for 2011 may yet reverse this trend, with new conflicts in Libya and Syria and increased levels of violence in a number of countries, including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen. However, the number of incidents of violent conflict (violent incidents which result in at least 25 deaths) was in relatively steady decline between 2002 and 2010 – with the exception of 2008. There have been notable reductions in the incidence of one-sided attacks on civilians, from 46 events in 2002 to 18 in 2010.

The major proximate causes of humanitarian crises may have eased in 2011, but global forces contributing to vulnerability, particularly for the poorest people, remain very much present.

FIGURE 3: CHANGES IN COMMODITY PRICES, 1990–2012



Note: Food and energy price indices here show variation from 2005, when the index value is set at US\$100. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank Global Economic Monitor data

The structural vulnerabilities of the global economic system that gave rise to the global food crisis of 2008 remain largely unchanged, leading to a second price spike in 2011, with energy prices rising by 143% and food prices by 56% from their lowest points in 2009 to their peaks in 2011. Price volatility remains acute, and the outlook is one of continued high prices. Food production remains sensitive to weather and to agricultural and energy policies, including continued investment in biofuels in preference to food production in many countries. Political unrest in the Middle East, particularly in Libya in 2011, has disrupted oil production. Volatility in energy markets also has an impact on food prices, with production dependent on fertiliser, and distribution and processing dependent on fuel. For countries dependent on food imports, this combination of high prices and volatility leaves poor populations, who spend large proportions of their household income on food, extremely vulnerable to shocks of both an idiosyncratic and co-variant nature.

Disasters related to increasingly unpredictable weather patterns and extreme weather events are predicted to occur with increasing frequency. The 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa cannot be definitively attributed to climate change, although affected communities report that drought now occurs at shorter intervals, reducing their opportunities to recover. What the Horn of Africa crisis demonstrates very clearly, however, is that where there is weak governance, or where groups of vulnerable people, such as pastoralists, are marginalised from the support mechanisms of the state, and where people depend on livelihoods that are acutely sensitive to the weather, weather-related hazards can have devastating consequences. Given that these hazards are increasingly likely, dealing with these vulnerabilities is essential.

ASSESSING THE SCALE OF THE CRISIS

Members of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group have made a clear commitment to fund on a proportionate basis and in accordance with assessed needs. This ambition is constrained, however, by the limited availability of objective and comparable evidence about humanitarian needs. This inevitably has consequences for the decisions ultimately made about how resources are directed. Without robust and comparable evidence, people living in crisis cannot be assured a proportionate share of the available global humanitarian funds and providers of assistance cannot be effectively held to account.

There has been much greater attention to this problem in recent years, and improvements in the evidence base are beginning to filter into the UN CAP, which remains the primary global assessment of humanitarian needs and funding allocation guidance tool for donors.

In 2011 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Needs Assessment Taskforce produced and field-tested new 'Operational Guidance for Coordinated

Assessments in Humanitarian Crises', a policy document which establishes roles and responsibilities for actors in coordinated assessments. It also published the 'Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) Manual', designed to promote the collection of more reliable and timely data on humanitarian needs in the early stages of crises. In addition, global clusters have agreed a set of key humanitarian indicators against which the scale and severity of crises can be monitored on an ongoing and comparable basis.

In 2012 several UN consolidated appeals include humanitarian 'dashboards', which provide summary analysis of humanitarian needs, coverage and gaps. Many of these dashboards incorporate the basic outcome-level indicators agreed by the IASC in 2011 – crude mortality rate, under-5 mortality rate, morbidity rate, under-5 global acute malnutrition and under-5 severe acute malnutrition – which enable comparisons of humanitarian needs across crises and over time. Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Yemen, the Philippines and Afghanistan carried out multi-cluster assessments

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP (GHD)

The GHD initiative is an informal donor forum that aims to promote a set of agreed principles and good practices, including:

- **Principle 5:** While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
- **Principle 6:** Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
- **Principle 11:** Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
- **Principle 14:** Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formation of common humanitarian action plans (CHAPs) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and coordination in complex emergencies.

GHD members in 2012 include (OECD DAC members are highlighted): **Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.**

COLOMBIA'S HUMANITARIAN SITUATION RISK INDEX (HSRI)

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Universidad Santo Tomás in Colombia began working together in 2006 and have created a country-level humanitarian risk index to assist decision makers in rationalising a wide range of complex information, in a context where access to affected areas is often restricted, to better prioritise and coordinate humanitarian response.

Colombia is a relatively data-rich country, with information on economic and social conditions collected by the government. The index combines this information from municipality level with information on conflict and response capacity to assess vulnerability and threat as well as the likely impact of crises.

As with other composite risk indices – for example, the EC Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) Global Needs Assessment index and OCHA's Global Focus Model – the HSRI cannot provide real-time information on the evolution of crises or provide numbers of affected people for response planning purposes, and so must be complemented by up-to-date situation analysis from people on the ground. However, the HSRI has proved valuable in achieving consensus on priority areas for early action and resource allocation and is a core tool used in allocating funding within the Colombia Emergency Response Fund and the country's Common Humanitarian Framework to select beneficiaries.

The HSRI has proved extremely successful in predicting likely mass displacement and indicating where the greatest number of affected people are likely to be. Following a survey of available methodologies, the Government of Colombia opted to build upon HSRI to create a Victimization Risk Index, with the goal of estimating areas with risk differentiated by type of harm suffered. This tool was designed to inform government restitution processes under the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law and will include the construction of an information system designed to systematise the process of calculating the index and producing online maps.

www.colombiassh.org/irsh

FOREWARNED IS NOT ALWAYS FOREARMED

THE FINANCING RESPONSE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA FOOD CRISIS IN KENYA AND SOMALIA IN 2011

The food crisis in the Horn of Africa was anticipated well in advance of it reaching crisis proportions. As early as August 2010, USAID's Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) issued warnings that the effects of La Niña could have significant food security implications in East Africa. The failure of two consecutive rainy seasons (October–December 2010 and March–May 2011) brought that prediction to pass, giving rise to a dangerous combination of very low crop yields, high livestock mortality rates, diminished opportunities for work, falling livestock prices and rising staple food and fuel prices.

Despite clear warnings of a building crisis, initial UN consolidated appeal requirements for Somalia for 2011 were relatively modest at just US\$530 million. These failed to anticipate the scale of the unfolding crisis. The donor response to the humanitarian appeals was slow and disappointing in the first half of 2011, hampering the ability of agencies to scale up programmes that could have prevented or mitigated some of the effects of the crisis on people's lives and livelihoods. Just 38% of revised requirements for the appeal for Kenya and 28% of revised funding requirements for Somalia had been met by June 2011, weeks before famine was officially declared in parts of Somalia.

In July 2011, funding requirements were revised upwards for both Kenya and Somalia, and were subsequently revised upwards again for Somalia in August. Funding for both appeals began to rapidly increase after the official declaration of famine.


that informed their 2012 CAP appeals, and many countries now compile their appeals using the Online Project System (OPS) which maps projects by geographic location and numbers of beneficiaries targeted. This allows coordinators to better track gaps and duplication. Innovations involving humanitarian actors at recipient country level are also improving the evidence base, enabling more strategic matching of humanitarian funding to needs (see above box on Colombia's HSRI).

Improvements in the evidence base on the scale and severity of humanitarian needs are beginning to bear fruit, yet disproportionate and late responses to humanitarian crises suggest that there are other substantial barriers to funding according to needs, aside from insufficient information.

Many donors continue to use a narrow definition of humanitarian needs that prioritises acute humanitarian needs (where a clear triggering event means that humanitarian thresholds are rapidly breached) above chronic needs (where

crises are protracted and humanitarian indicators are often at or around crisis threshold levels) and above the risk of crisis. When crises with chronic needs or mounting risk and vulnerability are forced to compete with those with more acute needs, the latter will often receive funding priority (see discussion in Chapter 1 on 'winners' and 'losers' in 2010 and the discussion below on trends in financing for chronic crises within the UN CAP). In addition, the prevailing institutional and conceptual divide between humanitarian and development programming and funding streams leaves no clear responsibility for addressing underlying vulnerability to crises. This combination of factors permits preventable crises to escalate into situations of acute need, as evidenced very clearly in 2011 by the slow donor response to clear, early evidence of a building crisis in the Horn of Africa.

FIGURE 4: FUNDING TO UN CONSOLIDATED APPEALS FOR KENYA AND SOMALIA, 2011



RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS – FUNDING APPEALS

Evaluating the response to global humanitarian crises is reliant on measuring the extent to which humanitarian needs expressed in public requests or appeals for funding have been met. In reality, these appeals are only a partial representation of the total global needs. In the case of the UN humanitarian appeal, only crises considered high-priority are included, and not all needs within a crisis are targeted within an appeal. For example, according to UN OCHA FTS, there were 35 natural disasters that involved international humanitarian responses in 2011 but, of those, only 5 were subject to an appeal or to a specific financial tracking initiative. Nevertheless, funding appeals remain the most comprehensive and widely referenced source of information on humanitarian funding requirements. In order to consider a more comprehensive picture of funding requirements, the UN CAP appeal may be considered alongside UN appeals outside of the CAP and appeals from other major humanitarian organisations not participating in the UN appeals, such as the International Federation of the

THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS

Coordinated by the United Nations, the consolidated appeals process (CAP) is undertaken in a country or region to raise funds for humanitarian action as well as to plan, implement and monitor activities. Two different kinds of appeal are generated by the CAP: consolidated appeals and flash appeals.

Consolidated appeals include projected activities for the following year, often in conflict and post-conflict situations where needs are relatively predictable. These country and regional consolidated appeals are amalgamated by the UN, with the launch of the humanitarian appeal each November.


Flash appeals are a rapid strategic and fundraising tool based on

immediately identified needs, and may be issued following sudden-onset disasters such as earthquakes or cyclones. Flash appeals are added to the overall UN humanitarian appeal as new crises occur.

The funding requirements of the entire UN CAP appeal – including both consolidated and flash appeals – are revised and updated at the mid-year point.

The UN also coordinates appeals outside of the UN CAP for countries and crises whose fundraising needs are considered to be of a lower priority, or where the government of the crisis-affected state elects for an appeal not to be included in the UN CAP.

FIGURE 5: UN CAP REQUIREMENTS, FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS, 2000–2011



Note: Numbers may vary due to rounding. Source: UN OCHA FTS data


Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

In 2011, the international response to humanitarian crises within the UN humanitarian appeal fell further short of meeting global humanitarian needs than it had for more than a decade. Humanitarian funding requirements expressed in the UN humanitarian appeal fell to US\$8.9 billion in 2011, following an historic high in requirements in 2010 driven by the huge flash appeals for Haiti and Pakistan (with requirements of US\$1.5 billion and US\$1.9 billion respectively – see Chapter 1). But the proportion of humanitarian financing needs within the UN appeal that remained unmet in 2011 was greater, at 38%, than in any year since 2001, despite overall reduced requirements.

Outside the UN CAP process, UN OCHA FTS tracks humanitarian funding to a series of non-CAP appeals. These are mainly joint UN and national government appeals for crises which do not undergo


the same coordination and consolidation as the CAP appeal. The boundaries between what makes a CAP and a non-CAP appeal, however, are quite flexible. Sometimes non-CAP appeals become CAP appeals (for instance, the initial Pakistan Floods flash appeal and the Mongolia Dzud appeals in 2010), bringing further attention to bear on their levels of funding. From a donor point of view, this means that a considerable proportion of the financial effort of some donors goes largely unnoticed, despite being aligned with the core humanitarian principle of funding on the basis of need and whenever and wherever needs arise. Even more importantly, such nomenclature is hardly relevant for affected populations, who have the same expectations as people living in countries that are a priority for the UN CAP.

FIGURE 6: UN APPEALS NEEDS MET AND UNMET AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVISED REQUIREMENTS, 2000–2011



Source: UN OCHA FTS

FIGURE 7: NON-CAP APPEAL REQUIREMENTS, FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS, 2000–2011




Source: UN OCHA FTS

Non-CAP appeals tend to be considerably more modest in requirements than the CAP: between 2000 and 2011 the average CAP appeal sought US\$262 million, compared with just US\$132 million on average requested by a non-CAP appeal. However, there were two significant exceptions: in 2006, US\$2 billion, or 94% of all funding requirements for non-CAP appeals, was sought for the Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan (Afghanistan TAPA) appeal. Similarly, in 2010, a single appeal – the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan – represented 40% of the requirements, amounting to US\$661 million.

Non-CAP appeal funding trends also tend to be much more volatile than those of the UN CAP. Non-CAP appeals are also more poorly funded. On average, CAP appeals have seen 66% of their needs met in the period 2000–2011, compared with only 46% in the case of non-CAP appeals. Non-CAP appeals in 2011 were funded to just 37% overall, however, well below the average.

FIGURE 8: NON-CAP APPEAL NEEDS MET AND UNMET AS A PERCENTAGE OF APPEAL REQUIREMENTS, 2000–2011




Source: UN OCHA FTS

The IFRC and the ICRC have their own appeal systems, which are not aligned with or integrated in the UN CAP. The ICRC manages one of the single largest humanitarian budgets in the sector, regularly exceeding US\$1 billion in funding, the bulk of which goes towards


its annual emergency appeal. The ICRC's humanitarian work focuses on conflict and protracted crises. Appeals in 2009 and 2010 had unmet requirements of 17% and 21% respectively, compared with just 11% and 10% in the two preceding years.

FIGURE 9: FUNDING TO ICRC EMERGENCY APPEALS AGAINST REQUIREMENTS, 2006–2010



Note: Numbers may vary due to rounding. Source: Development Initiatives based on ICRC annual financial reports

FIGURE 10: FUNDING TO IFRC EMERGENCY APPEALS AGAINST REQUIREMENTS, 2006–2011



Note: Numbers may vary due to rounding. Source: Development Initiatives based on IFRC financial data

The humanitarian work of the IFRC is focused on responding to natural disasters; therefore funding requirements are much more volatile in relation to the peaks in humanitarian needs associated with natural disaster events. Exceptionally high IFRC emergency appeal requirements in 2008 were prompted by China's Sichuan earthquake, Myanmar's Cyclone Nargis and a food security crisis in the Horn of Africa. In 2010, requirements were propelled by the Haiti and Chile earthquakes and the Pakistan floods. The average level of funding requirements met between 2006 through to 2011 was 67%. The level of funding needs met in 2011, however, was the lowest in the 2006–2011 period, at just 50%.

Unmet humanitarian financing needs rose across the board in 2011, for UN CAP and other appeals alike. However, there are some indications that private funding may have proved more resilient and more responsive to needs, with private funding to Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), for instance, staying close to 2010 levels in 2011 (see box on page 26 in Chapter 1). Donations from private individuals actually rose by 4% and only funding from private charities and corporations experienced a significant decrease (around 40%) from the heights of the Haiti response in 2010. The predominance of private giving from individuals almost cancelled the slump in private financing from institutions.

PROPORTIONALITY IN FINANCING RESPONSES TO CRISES

At the same time as the overall funding gap widened, funding to individual crisis appeals within the UN consolidated appeal was distributed disproportionately, with a number of crises faring worse than others. Moreover, many of the countries in protracted crisis, which are regular participants in the UN appeals process, have experienced a sustained downward trend in the shares of their appeal requirements met over the past five years.

Every year there is wide variation between the best- and worst-funded appeals. In 2011 Somalia was the best-funded with 89% of needs met, although funds were late to arrive (see figure 4 on page 62), followed by the flash appeal for Libya, which was 82% funded. The worst-

funded appeal, the flash appeal for flood response in Nicaragua, was just 30% funded against requirements.

In 2010, consolidated appeals – which represent chronic, predictable humanitarian crises – collectively saw an 11% reduction in the share of their appeal requirements met. In 2011 regular consolidated appeals fared slightly better, with a 1% increase in the share of requirements met, but the majority of them were worse funded in 2011 than they were two or three years previously.

FIGURE 11: SHARES OF NEEDS MET IN THE BEST- AND WORST-FUNDED UN CAP APPEALS, 2000–2011





FIGURE 12: SHARES OF APPEAL REQUIREMENTS MET IN REGULAR CONSOLIDATED APPEALS, 2007-2011



Source: UN OCHA FTS

FUNDING ACCORDING TO NEEDS IN PAKISTAN

The international financing response to humanitarian needs associated with major flooding in Pakistan across two consecutive years has been inconsistent, with quite different levels of response to needs in 2010, when the disaster was high-profile, and in 2011, when the crisis received little media attention.


Pakistan was still recovering from the effects of the 2010 floods when new floods began in mid-August 2011. In the following months over five million people were affected, mostly in the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan, both of which were also severely affected the previous year.

An estimated 35% of the communities affected in 2011 were also affected the previous year, meaning that more than a million people had barely recovered or were still trying to recover from the impact of the previous year's flooding when the most recent floods hit.

The 2011 UN consolidated appeal was relatively modest compared with that of 2010, seeking just US\$66 per person compared with the US\$97 per person requested the previous year. However, a far lower proportion of those reduced funding needs were met in 2011.



FIGURE 13: FUNDING TO THE UN APPEALS FOR PAKISTAN 2010-11 AND 2011-12



	2010	2011
Total number of people affected	20.6 million affected	9.2 million affected
	18 million in need	5.2 million in need
Number of deaths	1,985	520
Homes damaged/destroyed	1.7 million	0.8 million



THE STORY

Millions of people live in situations of extreme vulnerability yet investments to build resilience remain small in scale and disconnected. Spending on disaster prevention and preparedness was just 4% of total official humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2010. Humanitarian aid alone cannot address these situations of fragility.

These trees in Sindh, Pakistan, became cocooned in the webs of spiders climbing to escape the rising water following the floods in 2010.

CREDIT

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Development

INVESTMENTS TO TACKLE VULNERABILITY

Year after year, a large share of international humanitarian aid is spent in places that are not necessarily the most exposed to severe hazards, but which are home to the people who are most vulnerable to hazards in general. These are often places where large proportions of the population live in absolute poverty, where violent conflict is common and where states are fragile. Building resilience to crises in these places is the most efficient and cost-effective way of preventing suffering and protecting livelihoods, yet relatively small shares of international resources are invested specifically in building resilience: just 4% of official humanitarian aid (US\$1.5 billion) and 0.7% (US\$4.4 billion) of non-humanitarian official development assistance (ODA) was invested in disaster risk reduction between 2006 and 2010.

Humanitarian crises not only occur in parts of the world where many people are already poor, they deepen poverty and prevent people from escaping from it. The food price spike of 2010–2011, for example, is estimated to have pushed 49 million people in low- and middle-income countries into poverty in the short term. Drought and conflict in the Horn of Africa in 2011 reduced more than 600,000 people to living in refugee camps in Kenya and left more than four million people in Somalia unable to sustain themselves without humanitarian aid in 2012. Building resilience to shock and disaster risk therefore is not only the concern of affected communities and humanitarians; it is of fundamental importance in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in the elimination of absolute poverty.

In this chapter we consider whether the current emphasis and scale of investments are both adequate and effectively targeted to improve the resilience of communities at risk of crisis. We also look at ODA investments, including humanitarian aid, in context with other international and domestic resources.

RESOURCE FLOWS TO CRISIS-AFFECTED STATES IN 2010

Humanitarian aid is just one of several types of resource that might flow into a crisis-affected state. Each type of resource has a particular role to play in creating broad-based growth and reducing poverty and vulnerability.

Sources: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, IMF, SIPRI and UNCTAD data

Notes: Government revenues are expressed net of ODA grants



POVERTY, VULNERABILITY AND CRISIS

There is a strong correlation between countries that are major recipients of humanitarian aid over extended periods of time and conflict, state fragility and a lack of progress in poverty reduction. The numbers of people living in absolute poverty have decreased dramatically in the past 20 years, and the world is on track to meet MDG target 1(a) to halve

the number of people whose income is less than US\$1.25 a day between 1990 and 2015. Yet progress in poverty reduction has been uneven, with many of the most vulnerable countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, still lagging far behind.

FIGURE 1: PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION LIVING ON LESS THAN US\$1.25 A DAY



Note: Levels of colour indicate levels of poverty. Source: World Bank staff calculations from PovcalNet database

While the top 20 recipients of ODA account for 13% of the world's population, they are home to 21% of the world's population living on less than US\$1.25 a day. The top recipients also include some of the countries that are making the least progress against the MDGs (including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan).

The overwhelming majority of those affected by natural disasters each year live in middle-income countries. In the ten-year period from 2002 to 2011, 81% of people affected by natural disasters lived in China, India and Bangladesh. Yet because middle-income countries typically have greater capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters, they seldom receive large shares of international humanitarian aid. Many of the leading recipients of humanitarian assistance are affected by natural disasters – of the top ten recipients, seven have had more than three million people affected by natural disasters between 2001 and 2010, but these are characterised as complex crises, with countries often suffering from conflict and with very limited capacity to deal with disasters. All but one of the top ten recipients between 2001 and 2010 are considered fragile states, and all have been affected by conflict for 5–10 years. Conflict-affected states receive the

overwhelming majority of international assistance: on average, between 64% and 83% of international humanitarian assistance was channelled to countries in conflict or in post-conflict transition between 2001 and 2010 (see figure 3).

Humanitarian assistance is also habitually spent in the same countries over extended periods of time. In 2009, 68% of total official humanitarian assistance was received by countries considered long-term recipients, i.e. countries receiving an above average share of their total ODA in the form of humanitarian aid for a period of 8 or more years during the preceding 15 years. Of the 26 countries that fit the criteria as long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance, 19 were affected by conflict during the period 2001–2010; of those, 16 experienced violence and/or hosted a multilateral peacekeeping mission for 7 or more of those 11 years (see figure 4).


As poverty reduction proceeds elsewhere towards achieving the MDG targets, these situations where most humanitarian aid is spent year after year will be left further behind unless the root causes of and vulnerability to these complex crises are tackled.

FIGURE 2: VULNERABILITY INDICATORS IN THE TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID

	% OF POPULATION LIVING BELOW US\$1.25 A DAY	PROGRESS AGAINST MDGS, 2011 (RANK OUT OF 133)	FRAGILE STATE	CONFLICT-AFFECTED (NUMBER OF YEARS 2001 AND 2010)	LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE RECIPIENT
Sudan	19.8%	90	Yes	10	Long-term
Palestine/OPT	0.04%	100	Yes	10	Long-term
Afghanistan	No data	126	Yes	10	Long-term
Ethiopia	39.0%	29	Yes	10	Long-term
Iraq	2.8%	130	Yes	9	Long-term
Pakistan	21.0%	49	Yes	7	Medium-term
Haiti	61.7%	115	Yes	7	Medium-term
DRC	87.7%	133	Yes	10	Long-term
Somalia	No data	133	Yes	10	Long-term
Indonesia	18.1%	29	No	6	Medium-term


Sources: Development Initiatives based on World Bank, Center for Global Development MDG progress index 2011, OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) list of fragile states 2011, OECD DAC data and Development Initiatives research

FIGURE 3: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID RECEIVED BY CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES, 2001–2010



Notes: See Data & Guides section for our definition of conflict-affected states. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program


FIGURE 4: LONG-, MEDIUM- AND SHORT-TERM RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID, 2001–2010



Note: Countries classified as long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance are those receiving an above average (10.4%) share of their ODA as humanitarian assistance for eight or more years between 1996 and 2010. Medium-term recipients of humanitarian assistance are those that have received more than 10.4% of their ODA as humanitarian assistance for between four and eight years over this period. The sudden increase in the volume of funds received by medium-term recipients reflects the huge increase in funds received by Haiti and Pakistan in 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

SOCIAL PROTECTION AND CASH TRANSFERS

FIGURE 5: HUMANITARIAN EXPENDITURE ON CASH-BASED PROGRAMMING



Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Social safety-nets provide opportunities to respond to humanitarian needs in a timely and cost-effective fashion, to build resilience or, at the very least, to help prevent deterioration of livelihoods in times of crisis.

The humanitarian community has increasingly incorporated elements of social protection programming into its crisis response as an alternative to commodity distributions, with a range of modalities including provision of cash, vouchers and cash-for-work.

The number of donors funding cash transfer programmes in humanitarian emergencies increased from 6 in 2006 to 21 in 2011, peaking at 41 donors in 2010 in response to the emergencies in Haiti and Pakistan.

Palestine/OPT received a total of US\$334.7 million in humanitarian cash transfer financing between 2006 and 2011, making it the largest recipient over the five-year period. Pakistan was the second largest, receiving US\$66.7 million, the majority of which (US\$60.3 million) was received in 2010 (see figure 7).

Cash-based humanitarian programming has a number of major benefits, including stimulating local markets and providing recipients with greater choice. In some cases it might also help people to build productive assets and provide them with resources to protect and rebuild their livelihoods.

In order to function effectively at scale, however, social protection requires the collective expertise and efforts of governments, development actors and humanitarian actors.

FIGURE 6: TOP 10 DONORS TO HUMANITARIAN CASH-BASED PROGRAMMES (US\$ MILLION)

	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
1	UNRWA	52.9	ECHO	4.6	US	30.0	EU institutions	41.8	US	97.7	US	31.4
2	ECHO	7.4	US	0.5	ECHO	8.7	US	39.6	ECHO	16.8	ECHO	21.4
3	Japan	6.8	Norway	0.5	Austria	1.6	UK	10.6	UNRWA	8.7	Canada	11.3
4	Spain	2.1			France	1.5	Qatar Charity	10.0	ERF	8.2	Netherlands	4.8
5	Belgium	1.3			Norway	1.2	Kuwait	6.5	Canada	7.0	CHF	4.7
6	Norway	0.5			CERF	1.0	France	5.2	Australia	5.6	Sweden	4.0
7					Italy	0.5	Canada	4.8	Sweden	4.8	Belgium	3.9
8					Spain	0.4	Netherlands	4.5	Fondation de France	3.3	OPEC*	2.0
9					Luxembourg	0.1	Belgium	4.2	Belgium	3.1	ERF	1.8
10							Switzerland	3.9	Brazil	3.0	Ireland	1.6

Note: *OPEC Fund for International Development. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 7: LEADING RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN CASH-BASED PROGRAMMES (US\$ MILLION)

	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
1	Palestine/OPT	70.2	Burundi	4.2	Afghanistan	49.7	Palestine/OPT	139.8	Palestine/OPT	60.5	Palestine/OPT	55.6
2	Afghanistan	4.0	Uganda	1.0	Palestine/OPT	8.6	Afghanistan	3.1	Pakistan	60.3	Somalia	12.7
3	Burundi	0.7	Pakistan	0.5	Burundi	3.1	Kenya	2.3	Haiti	52.8	Pakistan	5.4
4					Somalia	2.3	Zimbabwe	1.3	Sudan	2.5	Kenya	4.2
5					Haiti	0.1	Sudan	1.3	Sri Lanka	2.5	Afghanistan	3.0
6					Honduras	0.1	Pakistan	1.1	Niger	1.8	Côte d'Ivoire	2.9
7					Sri Lanka	0.02	Somalia	0.7	Zimbabwe	1.4	Yemen	1.6
8							Indonesia	0.6	Somalia	0.8	Sri Lanka	1.5
9							Burundi	0.4	Burundi	0.7	Chad	1.0
10							Egypt	0.2	Ethiopia	0.1	Philippines	1.0

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

ETHIOPIA'S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NETS PROGRAMME (PSNP)

The largest social safety nets programme in Africa, the Ethiopia PSNP, demonstrated a variety of comparative advantages over traditional humanitarian responses to food insecurity during the 2011 Horn of Africa food crisis.

The Ethiopia PSNP was created in 2005 out of a desire to find sustainable alternatives to the annual provision of large amounts of humanitarian food aid, and regularly provides predictable cash and/or food transfers to 7–8 million rural and food-insecure households for six months of every year to bridge a period of predictable food needs. The PSNP, together with other components of the government's food security programme, aims to enable households to build their assets and to increase income over a five-year period so that they can ultimately 'graduate' out of chronic food insecurity. The PSNP also aims to build community assets, including a restored natural resource base, in order to address the underlying causes of food insecurity, rather than simply addressing the symptoms.

The PSNP has inbuilt mechanisms to scale up and respond to increased acute food needs through a contingency budget and risk financing mechanism

(RFM). In August 2011, as the extent of the growing food crisis became apparent, the Ethiopian government triggered the RFM for the first time. This allowed the PSNP to extend the duration of support to 6.5 million regular recipients and to offer support for three months to an additional 3.1 million people in PSNP areas, bridging the food gap until the November 2011 harvest.

In contrast, in non-PSNP areas, where traditional humanitarian actors including UN agencies and NGOs were responsible for meeting emergency food needs, the lags between identifying and assessing the crisis, mobilising funding and responding to humanitarian needs were much longer. The typical lead-time between identifying and responding to food security crises in Ethiopia can be up to eight months, whereas when the PSNP RFM is activated, the response time can be reduced to two months. Moreover, not all the funding required for the humanitarian food aid response was forthcoming, and agencies had to distribute half-rations in some distribution rounds.

As an established programme with predictable requirements, the PSNP can benefit from the best deals when



procuring commodities; it also uses established distribution networks, and is therefore more cost-effective. The PSNP response to the crisis cost an estimated US\$53 per beneficiary compared with US\$169 per beneficiary targeted through the UN- and NGO-managed pipeline (based on our own calculations). More importantly, in addition to cost savings, because there is a system already in place which monitors the situation and has invested in structures to assist with a fast and smooth delivery of assistance, the PSNP is more responsive to early indications of crisis. It is therefore more efficient in ameliorating humanitarian crisis and is transformative in the medium term, lifting households out of chronic food insecurity.

INVESTMENTS IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) involves making investments to build resilience, in order to make the poorest people less vulnerable to shocks. In addition to saving lives and livelihoods, there is growing evidence that such investments are cost-effective in avoiding or reducing the costs of responding to crises.

Volumes of ODA funds invested in DRR are very difficult to track and assess, but nevertheless are well below the targets recommended at the third session of the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2009, where participants recommended that the equivalent of 10% of humanitarian funding and 10% of post-disaster reconstruction funding should be allocated towards DRR work, as well as at least 1% of all development funding.

The amount of humanitarian funding spent explicitly on disaster prevention and preparedness (DPP) increased from US\$56 million in 2006 to a high of US\$501 million in 2009 – falling slightly to US\$492 million in 2010. But the overall share of humanitarian aid spent on DPP by all donors reporting to the OECD DAC – including our assessment of spending on partial DPP activities – is well below the 10% target, at just 4% between 2006 and 2010.

Individual donors vary widely in their commitments to investing their humanitarian expenditure in DPP. Over the 2006–2010 period overall, Japan and Korea spent more than 10% of their total official humanitarian aid on DPP activities, while the United States and the Netherlands spent less than 2%.


It is not currently possible to separate funding for post-disaster reconstruction, but overall ODA investments in DRR were 0.7% of total development spending for the period 2006–2010, against an already very modest target of 1%.

Given that humanitarian aid is predominately still characterised by short-term funding horizons and programming cycles, and is often by mandate and habit less directly engaged with national governments (who bear the primary responsibility for protecting and assisting vulnerable citizens), the targets recommended at the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction place a perplexing emphasis on the humanitarian community. The responsibility for addressing vulnerability cannot rest primarily on the shoulders of humanitarian actors alone. Rather, it is a shared responsibility between the governments whose citizens are vulnerable to crisis and international actors working to reduce vulnerability

COMMITMENTS AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GLOBAL PLATFORM FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, 2009

- The UN Secretary-General called for a target to halve the losses of lives from disasters by 2015, when the term of the Hyogo Framework for Action ends.
- 10% of humanitarian relief funds to go to DRR work.
- 10% as a target share of post-disaster reconstruction and recovery projects and national preparedness and response plans.
- At least 1% of all national development funding and all development assistance funding to be allocated to risk reduction measures, with due regard for quality of impact.

FIGURE 8: HUMANITARIAN DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS SPENDING BY ALL DONORS, 2006–2010



Note: See Data & Guides section for a detailed explanation of our assessment of DRR expenditure. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

and respond to crises on both sides of the humanitarian and development divide.

The ways in which governments, development actors and humanitarian actors work – and the ways they work together – need to change in order to better anticipate, respond to and recover

from shocks. Responses will require greater flexibility in financing and programming approaches, ensuring that development investments in situations of persistent vulnerability include the building of capacity and resilience to risk as a fundamental objective.


FIGURE 9: GOVERNMENT DONOR HUMANITARIAN EXPENDITURE ON DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS, 2006–2010 (US\$ MILLION)

	BILATERAL SPENDING ON DPP/DRR		IMPUTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO DPP/DRR SPENDING VIA MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS			TOTAL HUMANITARIAN DPP/DRR SPENDING	TOTAL HUMANITARIAN DPP/DRR SPENDING AS % OF TOTAL OFFICIAL HUMANITARIAN AID
	DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS	PARTIAL DPP/DRR HUMANITARIAN SPENDING	DPP/DRR SPENDING VIA THE EU	DPP/DRR SPENDING VIA WORLD BANK	DPP/DRR SPENDING VIA WFP		
Australia	85.0	20.9		14.8	0.9	121.6	7.5%
Austria	2.2	0.6	8.8	10.6	0.2	22.3	6.5%
Belgium	24.7		15.4	13.0	0.1	53.1	5.6%
Canada	39.7	88.3	0.0	31.1	2.2	161.2	7.4%
Denmark	15.1	0.5	7.8	8.1	3.7	35.0	2.6%
Finland	5.7	2.8	5.8	4.4	0.7	19.4	2.7%
France	0.8		73.6	45.6	0.3	120.3	6.0%
Germany	53.9	26.4	79.6	75.1	0.6	235.6	6.7%
Greece	0.4		7.3	2.3		10.0	4.2%
Ireland	23.4	11.4	4.2	4.0	1.1	44.0	5.6%
Italy	9.7	0.5	48.3	19.5	1.6	79.6	4.7%
Japan	187.3			117.2	1.0	305.5	18.3%
Korea	10.2	0.7		5.0	0.01	16.0	14.0%
Luxembourg	4.4		1.1	1.1	0.2	6.8	2.6%
Netherlands	4.3	0.02	17.0	10.0	4.7	36.0	1.4%
New Zealand	7.2	0.1		1.0	0.4	8.7	5.1%
Norway	52.3	14.6		11.9	2.9	81.7	3.7%
Portugal	0.01	0.4	4.8	1.5	0.01	6.8	5.5%
Spain	68.7	1.1	30.5	22.3	1.6	124.2	5.2%
Sweden	53.8	0.1	10.1	22.4	6.4	92.7	3.2%
Switzerland	2.4	9.3		18.8	0.2	30.7	2.8%
United Kingdom	93.5	64.3	54.5	80.0	0.4	292.7	6.2%
United States	212.8	15.9		89.0		317.7	1.6%

Note: See Data & Guides section for a detailed explanation of our methodology for imputing shares of DRR expenditure via multilateral organisations.
Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

INVESTMENTS IN GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY


FIGURE 10: GROWTH IN SPENDING ON GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY, PEACE-BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 2002–2010



Source: OECD DAC data

Conflict and state fragility are common to many of the leading recipients of humanitarian aid. Donor governments have given increased priority to activities aimed at building the capacity of states to govern and supporting peace and security within their ODA spending. Investments in peace and security sectors grew by 140% overall between 2002 and 2010 – and by 249% within the top 20 recipients. The top 20 recipients of humanitarian aid over the ten years received on average just over a third of all donor ODA expenditure on the governance, peace and security sectors between 2006 and 2010.

FIGURE 11: EXPENDITURE ON MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS



Note: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Source: Development Initiatives based on SIPRI data

In addition to aid spending towards peace and security, governments invest public funds in multilateral peacekeeping operations. Expenditure on UN peacekeeping operations more than doubled from US\$2.6 billion in 2000 to US\$6 billion in the peak year 2009, before falling back to US\$5.6 billion in 2010. Expenditure on non-UN-convened peacekeeping missions has experienced dramatic growth, with expenditure on African Union (AU) missions increasing 25-fold between 2003 (US\$78 million) and 2010 (US\$2 billion) and spending

on European Union (EU) missions increasing 36-fold, between 2001 (US\$52 million) and 2010 (US\$1.9 billion). If full details of the cost of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operations were publicly available, it is likely that they would eclipse the cost of UN peacekeeping missions.

USING AID TO ADD VALUE IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER RESOURCES


Aid is a key resource to meet the needs of people vulnerable to and affected by crises. But many other official and private resource flows have a role to play in creating broad-based growth – growth that has the potential to reduce poverty and vulnerability provided it is equitable and built on investments that engage with and support the poor.

Remittances, for example, are a vital resource, connecting households directly with the global economy and potentially channelling money directly into the hands of poor people. Remittance flows may be counter-cyclical against economic shocks, with migrants increasing remittances in times of crisis, and therefore may be particularly

important as a household strategy to ensure social protection in countries affected by regular crises and with poorly functioning public service infrastructure, such as Somalia.

Private sector investment has a fundamental role to play in long-term sustainable economic development. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key element in international economic integration, growth and development, with the potential to directly contribute to the reduction of poverty and vulnerability through job creation and the generation of domestic tax revenues.

FIGURE 12: PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL RESOURCE FLOWS IN THE TOP 10 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID IN 2010



Note: There is currently no remittance data available for Afghanistan, Chad, DRC and Somalia and no data on government revenues for Palestine/OPT and Somalia. Government revenues are expressed net of ODA grants. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UNCTAD, SIPRI, IMF and World Bank data

RISKS OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT

Private sector investment can also have negative impacts, and the effects of FDI flows depend on the characteristics of the investments being made, as well as conditions within the recipient country. Private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa currently exhibits some troubling characteristics.

Profit remittances from sub-Saharan Africa totalled US\$32.1 billion in 2010, equivalent to 80% of FDI inflows or 9% of FDI stocks. The region saw a disproportionately high increase in profit remittance outflows during the global economic crisis, with profit remittances almost doubling between 2006 and 2008, from US\$23.9 billion to US\$47.1 billion. Profit remittances have fallen below their peak 2008 values, but remain significantly higher than in other regions.

In 2009 and 2010, FDI inflows to sub-Saharan Africa created on average just 119 jobs per one million people, compared with 315 direct jobs per one million people worldwide. The majority of FDI flows to the region go towards investments in two sectors: coal, oil and natural gas; and metals. Extractive industries in sub-Saharan Africa create relatively few jobs, however. Despite accounting for 47% of total FDI to the region over 2006–2011, the coal, oil and natural gas sector accounted for

only 7% of total jobs created by FDI (Development Initiatives based on planned investment data from Financial Times fDi Intelligence).

Investments are also highly concentrated in a few countries, as well as a few sectors: three countries (South Africa, Angola and Nigeria) accounted for 55% of inflows to sub-Saharan Africa over 2010.

Illicit financial outflows from sub-Saharan Africa were estimated at US\$33.3 billion in 2008 (Global Financial Integrity estimates), which, when combined with the (legal) outflow of profit remittances on FDI, means that outflows related to FDI from the region probably exceed inflows. The primary motivation for illicit outflows is to avoid paying tax, and there is therefore a significant loss of tax revenue for the governments of countries from which the illicit flows leave.

In the pursuit of economic growth and profits, governments and the private sector in both developed and developing countries will need to ensure coherent policies, including transparency, ethical investment standards and effective legislative and revenue collection capabilities, if they are to harness the potential of the private sector to increase resilience and reduce vulnerability.

FIGURE 13: PROFIT REMITTANCES AS A PROPORTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS BY REGION

	2001–2005 AVERAGE	2006–2010 AVERAGE
South Asia	59.3%	45.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa	59.9%	83.5%
Europe and Central Asia	4.3%	12.9%
Latin America and Caribbean	41.4%	67.8%
East Asia and Pacific	32.3%	38.6%
Middle East and North Africa	9.5%	9.9%



THE STORY


These children are playing with the leftover pieces of a bomb in Alashu, a village located some 15 kilometres north of Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur. Roughly half the village's population has fled to camps for displaced people as the area has become the scene of heavy fighting between government and rebel forces.

Sudan has received US\$9.7 billion in international humanitarian aid over the past decade. In 2010, for the first time in five years, it was overtaken as the largest recipient by Haiti. 2011 saw the creation of a newly independent Republic of South Sudan, and 2009 and 2010 marked the start of a gradual shift towards reconstruction and development funding in Sudan. But the country's complex protracted humanitarian crises remain largely unchanged.

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DATA & GUIDES



KEY DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY

HUMANITARIAN AID

'Humanitarian aid' is the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. The characteristics that mark it out from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid are:

- it is intended to be governed by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
- it is intended to be 'short-term' in nature and provide for activities in the 'immediate aftermath' of a disaster. In practice it is often difficult to say where 'during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies' ends and other types of assistance begin, especially in situations of prolonged vulnerability.

Traditional responses to humanitarian crises, and the easiest to categorise as such, are those that fall under the aegis of 'emergency response':

- material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.)
- emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplementary feeding programmes)
- relief coordination, protection and support services (coordination, logistics and communications).

Humanitarian aid can also include reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (repairing pre-existing infrastructure as opposed to longer-term activities designed to improve the level of infrastructure) and disaster prevention and preparedness (disaster risk reduction, early warning systems, contingency stocks and planning). Under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reporting criteria, humanitarian aid has very clear cut-off points – for example, 'disaster preparedness' excludes longer-term work such as prevention of floods or conflicts.

Humanitarian aid is given by governments, individuals, NGOs, multilateral organisations, domestic organisations and private companies. Some differentiate their humanitarian assistance from development or other foreign assistance, but they draw the line in different places and according to different criteria. We report what others themselves report as 'humanitarian' but try to consistently label and source this.

GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The term 'global humanitarian assistance' is used within the context of the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme to mean:

- the international humanitarian response (i.e. humanitarian aid from governments and private contributions)
- domestic response (that provided by governments in response to crises inside their own countries)
- other types of assistance that go to people in humanitarian crises that fall outside those captured in the data on 'international' or 'domestic' humanitarian response (e.g. peacekeeping and other official development assistance (ODA) activities such as governance and security).

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID

International humanitarian aid (sometimes referred to in this report as 'international humanitarian response') is used to describe the contributions of:

- international governments
- individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations.

HUMANITARIAN AID FROM GOVERNMENTS

Our definition of government funding for humanitarian crises comprises:

- the humanitarian aid expenditure of the 24 OECD DAC members – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European institutions – as reported to the OECD DAC as part of an annual obligation to report on ODA flows
- expenditure by ‘other governments’ as captured by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

Our labelling of ‘governments’ is driven by the way in which they report their expenditure (see ‘Data sources’ section below). ‘Other governments’ are sometimes referred to as ‘non-DAC donors’, ‘non-traditional donors’, ‘emerging donors’ or ‘South-South development partners’.

Note: for OECD DAC donors, we make an adjustment to the DAC-reported humanitarian aid figure so that it takes account of each donor’s multilateral (core and totally unearmarked) ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP – see ‘total official humanitarian aid’ below.

PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS

Private contributions are those from individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations.

In our ‘Where does the funding come from?’ section in Chapter 1, the private contributions are those raised by humanitarian organisations, including NGOs, UN agencies and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Data for the period 2006–2010 was collated directly from the sample of organisations and complemented by figures from annual reports. The study set for this period included five UN agencies (UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO and UNICEF), 62 NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and seven Red Cross national societies (Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Data for 2011 was extrapolated from the 2010 figure, using a coefficient of increase/decrease based on private contributions reported to the FTS.

In the ‘Where does the funding go?’ and ‘How does the funding get there?’ sections of Chapter 1, the data is taken from UN OCHA’s FTS (a disaggregation of NGO, foundations and private sector corporations in FTS, plus contributions from private individuals and organisations).

TOTAL ‘OFFICIAL’ HUMANITARIAN AID

Total ‘official’ humanitarian aid is a sub-set of ODA. In this report, we use it when making comparisons with other development assistance. It takes account of humanitarian expenditure through NGOs, multilateral UN agencies and funds, public-private partnerships and public sector agencies – and, in order to take account of multilateral ODA contributions to UN agencies with almost uniquely humanitarian mandates, we make the following calculation:

- humanitarian aid as reported in DAC1 Official and Private Flows, item ‘Memo: Humanitarian Aid’ (net disbursements)
- total ODA disbursements to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP, as recipients, reported in DAC2a ODA Disbursements (we do not include all ODA to WFP but apply a percentage in order to take into account the fact that WFP also has a ‘developmental’ mandate).

Note: all of our humanitarian aid categories include money spent through humanitarian financing mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-level pooled funds. Where necessary, we impute amounts spent through the CERF in specific countries back to the donor (for example, if Norway contributed 10% of CERF funding in 2010 and the CERF allocated US\$10 million to Afghanistan, US\$1 million would be added on to Norway’s other humanitarian expenditure on projects in Afghanistan).

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (DRR)

The use of the term ‘disaster risk reduction’ in this report is taken from UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) terminology: ‘systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters’. Investments in DRR can be tracked using the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), though this is not easy. Each funding transaction reported to the OECD DAC CRS is allocated a five-digit purpose code, which identifies the specific sectors or areas of the recipient’s economic or social development that the transfer is intended to foster. However, there is no specific DRR code within the CRS database, so a forensic method has been used to pull out relevant investments.

A purpose code for one element of DRR has existed since 2004: this falls within humanitarian aid under ‘disaster prevention and preparedness’ (DPP), and data reported under the DPP code (74010) can be easily identified. All funding reported to the flooding prevention/control purpose code (41050) is also included in the final estimate of DRR.

Accounting for DRR measures that are sub-components of development and humanitarian projects that are not coded 74010 or 41050 is more challenging. To identify these, we search through short and long project descriptions referencing 30 key terms selected from

recent literature on DRR and the websites of key DRR-focused organisations (e.g. UNISDR). After each term search, the project descriptions are scanned and those not related to DRR removed (for example, results for 'prevention' include projects with a DRR focus such as flood prevention, but also HIV/Aids prevention, which are excluded).

When assessing individual donor contributions to financing DPP, we have imputed their shares of multilateral ODA contributed to multilateral organisations (WFP, the World Bank and the EU institutions) which were subsequently spent by those organisations on DPP activities.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)

ODA is a grant or loan from an 'official' source to a developing country (defined by the OECD) or multilateral agency (defined by the OECD) for the promotion of economic development and welfare. It is reported by members of the DAC, along with several other government donors and institutions, according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty-reducing development assistance (for sectors such as governance and security, growth, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation). In this report we express our total ODA figures net of debt relief unless expressly stated otherwise.

ODA AND ODA-LIKE FLOWS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT DONORS

Some donors outside of the OECD DAC group voluntarily report their ODA flows to the OECD DAC, which are recorded in 'Table 33'. This includes ODA reported by members of the OECD who are not DAC members (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey) and other government donors outside of the OECD (Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates).

The OECD DAC has reported data on 'ODA-like flows' from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) who do not report to the DAC, based on their own research in 'Table 33a'. These flows may not fully conform to the ODA definition and are considered by the DAC to be concessional flows for development cooperation; figures are derived from official government sources.

GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ODA

This is a sub-set of the social services and infrastructure sector grouping of aid activities – within sector-allocable ODA – that is sub-divided into two further discrete groups of activities.

- The first grouping, the governance and civil society set of activities, is primarily concerned with building the capacity of recipient country governments – in areas including public sector policy, finance management, legislatures and judiciaries – as well as a range of thematic activities including support to elections, democratic participation, media and free flow of information, human rights and women's equality. In 2010 anti-corruption and support to legislatures and political parties were added to the list of activities in this grouping.
- The second grouping is concerned with conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security and includes activities supporting security system management and reform, removal of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, demobilisation of child soldiers, reintegration of demobilised military personnel, small arms and light weapons control, civilian peace-building and some elements of bilateral support for multilateral peacekeeping operations (excluding the direct contributions to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) budget).

OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS (OOFs)

Other official flows are official sector transactions reported by governments to the OECD DAC that do not meet the ODA criteria, in that their primary purpose is not development-motivated, or when their grant element is below the 25% threshold that would make them eligible to be recorded as ODA. Transactions classified as OOFs include export- and investment-related transactions, rescheduling of OOF loans, and other bilateral securities and claims.

OTHER DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS

DOMESTIC RESPONSE

This includes the actions taken in response to humanitarian crises, to transfer resources to those most affected within an affected country, by domestic institutions (both informal and formal) and individuals either living there or temporarily resident elsewhere.

CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

A set of conflict-affected states was identified for each of the years between 1999 and 2010 using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)'s database to determine the incidence of active conflict in a given year. This incorporated both cases where state actors were involved and those where no state actor was involved, but where more than 25 battle deaths resulted. Where a multilateral peacekeeping mission has been present (excluding purely civilian missions) with no recurrence of violence for up to seven consecutive years, a country is deemed to be post-conflict.

FRAGILE STATES

Fragile states are characterised by widespread extreme poverty, are the most off-track in relation to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and are commonly caught in or are emerging from, violence or conflict.

Exact definitions of fragile states vary by donor and institution but often reference a lack of government capacity to provide basic public goods (including security and basic services) and in some cases a lack of willingness to provide them.

Debates in this area increasingly recognise the heterogeneity of fragile states and varying degrees of fragility. They acknowledge that conditions of fragility do not neatly map onto nation states and may be confined to sub-national pockets or may cross national borders.

The list of 45 fragile states used in this report is taken from the OECD's International Network on Fragility and Conflict (INCAF) 2011 list.

LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COUNTRIES (LTHACS)

Long-term humanitarian assistance countries are defined as those receiving a greater than average (10.4%) proportion of ODA excluding debt relief in the form of humanitarian assistance for more than eight years between 1996 and 2010. A total of 25 countries are classified as receiving long-term humanitarian assistance, and in 2010 they received US\$4.9 billion of the US\$10.4 billion from all donors reporting to the DAC.

DATA SOURCES

OECD DAC

- OECD DAC data allows us to say how much humanitarian aid donors reporting to the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) give, where they spend it, who they spend it through and how it relates to their other ODA.
- Aggregate information is published in OECD DAC Stat tables.
- Detailed, project-level reporting is published in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
- The data in this report was downloaded on 18 April 2012. Data for 2011 is preliminary and partial – full final data for the year (which will include data on recipient countries in 2011 and provide a breakdown of activities, as well as enabling us to publish a non-estimated humanitarian aid figure for DAC donors) will not be published until December 2012.
- We make a distinction between ‘DAC countries’ and ‘DAC donors’ – where the latter includes the European institutions.

UN OCHA FTS

- We use UN OCHA FTS data to report on humanitarian expenditure of governments that do not report to the OECD DAC and to analyse expenditure relating to the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP). We have also used it in the ‘Where does the funding go?’ and ‘How does the funding get there?’ sections of the report to analyse private contributions and money spent through NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or a UN agency.
- As well as being the custodian of data relating to UN CAP appeals, UN OCHA FTS receives data from donor governments and recipient agencies and also gathers information on specific pledges carried in the media or on donor websites, or quoted in pledging conferences.
- Data for 2000–2011 was downloaded on 23 March 2012.

Note: UN OCHA FTS and OECD DAC data are not comparable.

UN CERF WEBSITE

Our data on the CERF is taken from the UN CERF website.

CRED EM-DAT DISASTER DATABASE

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) is a leading repository of information on the impact of disasters. One of CRED’s core data projects is the EM-DAT disaster database, which contains data on the impact of 16,000 mass disaster events dating back to 1900. Data is sourced from UN agencies, NGOs, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. We use this data to generate analysis of the incidence and impact of natural disasters in developing countries.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL (SIPRI)

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. SIPRI manages publicly accessible databases on:

- multilateral peace keeping operations – UN and non-UN peace operations since 2000, including location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of personnel, costs and fatalities
- military expenditure of 172 countries since 1988, allowing comparison of countries’ military spending: in local currency, at current prices; in US dollars, at constant prices and exchange rates; and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)
- transfers of major conventional arms since 1950
- arms embargoes implemented by international organisations or groups of nations since 1998.

We use this data to track international expenditure on multilateral peacekeeping operations.

THE UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM (UCDP)

UCDP has been recording data on ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. Its definition of armed conflict – ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’ – is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. It has been operating an online database on armed conflicts and organised violence since 2004.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

We downloaded data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database in April 2012 and used its gross national income (GNI) for non-DAC donors to measure economic performance. Regional Outlooks have been used mainly to analyse government revenues (excluding grants); when this information was missing, calculations have been made (subtracting ODA flows from general government revenues data downloaded from the IMF WEO, to avoid double-counting grants).

WORLD BANK

The World Bank data catalogue includes different datasets such as inflows and outflows of remittances. The Global Economic Monitor (GEM) provides prices and indices relating to food, energy and other commodities – fundamental in understanding fluctuations and trends.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD)

UNCTAD is the United Nations’ body focusing on trade. Its online database provides statistics on trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI).

Further details and guides to our methodology and classifications can be found in the Data & Guides section of our website: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org>

FINANCIAL TIMES FDI MARKETS

FDI Markets is an online database tracking cross border green-field investments covering all sectors and countries worldwide. It provides real-time monitoring of investment projects, capital investment and job creation and is able to track and profile companies investing overseas. The data is collected primarily through different publicly available sources:

- Financial Times newswires and other information sources
- Nearly 9,000 media sources
- Project data received from over 1,000 industry organisations and investment agencies
- Data purchased from market research and publication companies.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CAP	Consolidated appeals process
CAR	Central African Republic
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common humanitarian fund – a country-level pooled fund mechanism
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (DAC)
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DoD	Department of Defense
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly European Community Humanitarian Aid Department)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERF	Emergency response fund – a country-level pooled funding mechanism
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FTS	Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance (the programme)
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GNI	Gross national income
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
LTHAC	Long-term humanitarian assistance countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WFP	World Food Programme

REFERENCE TABLES

FIGURE 1: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS (CAP) APPEALS, 2000-2011

UN CAP APPEAL SUMMARY	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Revised requirements (US\$ billion)	1.9	2.6	4.4	5.2	3.4	6.0	5.2	5.1	7.1	9.8	11.3	8.9
Funding (US\$ billion)	1.1	1.4	3.0	4.0	2.2	4.0	3.5	3.7	5.1	6.9	7.3	5.5
Unmet need (US\$ billion)	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.2	2.0	1.7	1.4	2.0	2.8	4.0	3.4
% needs met	59.2%	55.4%	67.5%	75.8%	64.3%	67.2%	66.5%	72.2%	71.7%	71.2%	63.0%	62.3%
Number of appeals in year	14	18	24	27	31	25	24	30	23	23	19	21
Average requirements per appeal (US\$ billion)	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.19	0.11	0.24	0.22	0.17	0.31	0.42	0.59	0.42
Average funding per appeal (US\$ billion)	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.16	0.14	0.12	0.22	0.30	0.38	0.26
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Revised requirement (US\$ billion)	1.9	2.6	4.4	5.2	3.0	3.8	4.9	4.8	6.3	9.5	7.7	8.1
Funding (US\$ billion)	1.1	1.4	3.0	3.9	2.0	2.3	3.2	3.5	4.5	6.8	4.7	5.1
Unmet need (US\$ billion)	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.2	0.9	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.8	2.7	3.0	3.1
% needs met	59.2%	55.4%	67.5%	76.0%	68.0%	59.3%	65.3%	73.3%	71.9%	71.8%	61.0%	62.3%
Number of consolidated appeals in year	14	18	24	25	22	15	17	15	13	15	15	15
Average requirements per appeal (US\$ billion)	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.13	0.25	0.29	0.32	0.48	0.63	0.51	0.54
Average funding per appeal (US\$ billion)	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.16	0.09	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.35	0.45	0.31	0.34
FLASH APPEALS	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Revised requirement (US\$ billion)	0	0	0	0.03	0.5	2.2	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.3	3.6	0.8
Funding (US\$ billion)	0	0	0	0.02	0.2	1.8	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.1	2.6	0.5
Unmet need (US\$ billion)	0	0	0	0.02	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.3
% needs met	0	0	0	50.7%	39.8%	81.0%	85.3%	57.2%	70.8%	51.6%	71.8%	62.8%
Number of flash appeals in year	0	0	0	2	9	10	7	15	10	8	4	6
Average requirements per appeal (US\$ billion)			0.02	0.05	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.89	0.13
Average funding per appeal (US\$ billion)			0.01	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.64	0.08

Source: UN OCHA FTS

FIGURE 2: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID, 2001-2010 (US\$ MILLION)

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011*	5 YEARS 2006-2010	10 YEARS 2001-2010
Palestine/OPT 1,010	Afghanistan 976	Iraq 1,298	Iraq 1,084	Sudan 1,403	Sudan 1,387	Sudan 1,358	Sudan 1,469	Sudan 1,436	Haiti 3,065	Somalia 1,140	Sudan 6,560	Sudan 9,735
Afghanistan 560	Palestine/OPT 473	Ethiopia 810	Sudan 965	Indonesia 896	Palestine/ OPT 578	Palestine/ OPT 598	Ethiopia 891	Palestine/OPT 1,103	Pakistan 2,065	Sudan 858	Pakistan 3,547	Palestine/OPT 6,488
Serbia 307	Angola 279	Afghanistan 497	Palestine/ OPT 657	Pakistan 748	Lebanon 525	DRC 415	Afghanistan 878	Ethiopia 699	Sudan 909	Ethiopia 762	Haiti 3,542	Afghanistan 5,605
Ethiopia 215	Sudan 265	Palestine/ OPT 466	Ethiopia 449	Iraq 712	Indonesia 524	Iraq 371	Palestine/ OPT 631	Afghanistan 647	Ethiopia 639	Afghanistan 687	Palestine/OPT 3,528	Ethiopia 5,256
DRC 186	DRC 261	Sudan 366	Afghanistan 438	Ethiopia 668	Pakistan 464	Lebanon 329	Somalia 606	Somalia 577	Palestine/ OPT 618	Kenya 550	Ethiopia 2,879	Iraq 5,246
Sudan 176	Ethiopia 235	Angola 319	DRC 285	Sri Lanka 555	DRC 420	Afghanistan 326	DRC 529	DRC 574	Afghanistan 605	Pakistan 460	Afghanistan 2,812	Pakistan 4,565
Iraq 173	Sierra Leone 178	DRC 258	Angola 219	Palestine/OPT 353	Iraq 416	Ethiopia 303	Myanmar 484	Pakistan 567	DRC 456	Haiti 459	DRC 2,394	Haiti 3,708
India 158	States Ex- Yugoslavia 151	Eritrea 179	Liberia 176	Afghanistan 322	Afghanistan 357	Bangladesh 287	Bangladesh 382	Iraq 478	Kenya 290	DRC 431	Somalia 2,018	DRC 3,690
Bosnia- Herzegovina 156	Iraq 147	Burundi 151	Uganda 166	DRC 306	Ethiopia 347	Somalia 275	Zimbabwe 339	Kenya 404	Chad 278	Palestine/OPT 405	Iraq 1,831	Somalia 2,744
Angola 149	DPRK 147	Uganda 147	Burundi 164	Zimbabwe 214	Somalia 321	Pakistan 251	China 315	Zimbabwe 400	Somalia 239	Chad 335	Kenya 1,448	Indonesia 2,434
Sierra Leone 142	Somalia 133	Somalia 140	Somalia 158	Somalia 195	Kenya 254	Indonesia 237	Kenya 307	Chad 322	Niger 231	Yemen 264	Lebanon 1,301	Kenya 1,887
States Ex- Yugoslavia 135	Jordan 124	Jordan 136	Iran 139	Eritrea 191	Uganda 229	Uganda 227	Chad 249	Indonesia 269	Sri Lanka 205	Zimbabwe 190	Indonesia 1,280	Sri Lanka 1,814
Jordan 126	Serbia 111	Sierra Leone 130	Serbia 136	Uganda 182	Sri Lanka 164	Sri Lanka 212	Sri Lanka 246	Sri Lanka 248	Zimbabwe 199	Sri Lanka 163	Zimbabwe 1,218	Lebanon 1,749
Mozambique 124	Tanzania 109	Serbia 129	DPRK 134	Burundi 170	Burundi 152	Kenya 194	Uganda 238	Syria 176	Iraq 185	Niger 161	Chad 1,148	Zimbabwe 1,688
Tanzania 115	Burundi 104	Tanzania 124	Eritrea 124	Liberia 146	Liberia 149	Chad 188	Haiti 212	Myanmar 154	Jordan 170	Cote d'Ivoire 150	Sri Lanka 1,075	Uganda 1,565
Somalia 101	Kenya 95	DPRK 120	Jordan 110	India 131	Zimbabwe 117	Zimbabwe 164	Pakistan 201	Uganda 152	Lebanon 122	Liberia 149	Uganda 929	Chad 1,407
DPRK 100	Lebanon 91	Liberia 106	Chad 105	Chad 128	Chad 111	Colombia 110	Lebanon 189	Haiti 144	Syria 120	Iraq 109	Myanmar 831	Jordan 1,266
Kenya 90	Eritrea 87	Zimbabwe 93	Bangladesh 96	Angola 120	Jordan 107	Jordan 109	Jordan 140	Georgia 141	Indonesia 113	Libya 94	Jordan 661	Angola 1,188
Lebanon 87	Zimbabwe 86	Lebanon 82	Lebanon 91	Jordan 109	Colombia 102	Burundi 108	Indonesia 138	Lebanon 136	Yemen 111	Central African Rep. 78	Bangladesh 630	Burundi 1,159
El Salvador 85	Uganda 81	Kenya 77	Kenya 91	Niger 108	Niger 77	Liberia 107	Yemen 138	Jordan 135	Myanmar 102	Myanmar 78	Burundi 491	Myanmar 995

Source: OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data. *2011 data is based on contributions reported through UN OCHA FTS and is provided for illustrative purposes only

FIGURE 3: TOP 30 DONORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID, 2001-2010 (US\$ MILLION)

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011*	5 YEARS 2006-2010	10 YEARS 2001-2010
United States 2,002	United States 2,025	United States 3,350	United States 2,847	United States 3,765	United States 3,249	United States 3,128	United States 4,478	United States 4,426	United States 4,871	United States 4,642	United States 20,152	United States 34,140
EU institutions 1,129	EU institutions 1,018	EU institutions 1,058	EU institutions 1,362	EU institutions 1,627	EU institutions 1,766	EU institutions 1,587	EU institutions 1,875	EU institutions 1,544	EU institutions 1,658	EU institutions 1,732	EU institutions 8,430	EU institutions 14,624
Saudi Arabia 657	United Kingdom 725	United Kingdom 863	Japan 955	Japan 924	United Kingdom 1,058	United Kingdom 757	United Kingdom 898	United Kingdom 898	United Kingdom 943	United Kingdom 1,100	United Kingdom 4,684	United Kingdom 8,474
United Kingdom 571	Germany 551	Germany 478	United Kingdom 781	United Kingdom 850	Germany 774	Germany 612	Germany 688	Germany 678	Germany 744	Japan 812	Germany 3,497	Germany 6,334
Germany 548	Netherlands 374	Norway 396	Germany 525	Germany 735	Netherlands 619	Netherlands 516	Netherlands 581	Sweden 614	Sweden 690	Sweden 715	Sweden 2,930	Sweden 4,951
Sweden 449	Japan 371	Sweden 389	Netherlands 417	Netherlands 614	Sweden 537	Sweden 512	Sweden 576	Spain 596	Japan 642	Germany 685	Netherlands 2,661	Netherlands 4,773
Netherlands 403	Norway 362	Netherlands 305	France 338	Norway 541	France 430	Norway 463	Spain 575	Netherlands 486	Canada 550	Norway 472	Spain 2,382	Japan 4,442
Norway 347	Sweden 359	Japan 288	Sweden 328	Sweden 496	Norway 421	Spain 368	Saudi Arabia 566	Norway 415	Spain 496	Canada 464	Norway 2,198	Norway 4,156
Italy 293	Italy 340	France 265	Norway 312	France 366	Spain 347	France 361	Norway 429	Australia 401	Norway 470	Australia 439	Canada 2,049	France 3,534
France 287	France 279	Italy 263	Italy 312	Italy 340	Italy 333	Canada 349	Canada 422	Canada 398	Netherlands 459	Spain 408	France 1,998	Spain 3,357
Japan 234	Australia 274	Canada 240	Canada 225	Australia 310	Canada 329	Italy 345	France 401	France 371	France 435	Netherlands 338	Italy 1,679	Italy 3,226
Switzerland 231	Switzerland 233	Australia 222	Switzerland 221	Denmark 297	Denmark 287	Denmark 249	Italy 383	UAE 353	Australia 390	France 337	Japan 1,670	Canada 3,215
Canada 220	Canada 214	Switzerland 216	Spain 206	Spain 286	Australia 278	Switzerland 230	Australia 356	Italy 334	Italy 283	Italy 318	Australia 1,622	Australia 2,794
Australia 178	Denmark 142	Spain 196	Australia 187	Switzerland 268	Japan 251	Saudi Arabia 212	Japan 316	Japan 310	Denmark 259	Denmark 272	Denmark 1,290	Switzerland 2,252
Denmark 169	Spain 128	Denmark 160	Denmark 144	Canada 268	Switzerland 247	Ireland 208	Denmark 269	Denmark 226	Saudi Arabia 256	Belgium 268	Saudi Arabia 1,247	Denmark 2,202

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011*	5 YEARS 2006-2010	10 YEARS 2001-2010
Spain 158	Belgium 92	Belgium 92	Belgium 125	Belgium 145	Belgium 171	Australia 198	Belgium 206	Switzerland 192	Belgium 227	Switzerland 242	Switzerland 1,083	Saudi Arabia 2,138
Belgium 96	Finland 85	Finland 84	UAE 101	Finland 132	Saudi Arabia 131	Belgium 159	Ireland 203	Belgium 191	Switzerland 211	Finland 159	Belgium 954	Belgium 1,505
Finland 81	Ireland 48	Saudi Arabia 58	Finland 78	Saudi Arabia 112	Finland 131	Japan 150	Switzerland 202	Finland 143	Finland 167	Ireland 129	Ireland 791	Finland 1,178
Ireland 55	Greece 35	Ireland 53	Ireland 63	UAE 100	Ireland 120	Finland 144	Finland 133	Ireland 131	Ireland 128	UAE 89	Finland 718	Ireland 1,107
Luxembourg 33	Luxembourg 30	Austria 32	Austria 41	Ireland 98	Austria 64	Austria 54	UAE 110	Saudi Arabia 82	UAE 114	China 87	UAE 665	UAE 869
Greece 33	Saudi Arabia 29	Greece 32	Portugal 39	Turkey 79	Greece 56	Greece 46	Kuwait 96	Austria 72	Austria 65	Saudi Arabia 83	Austria 344	Austria 545
Austria 32	Austria 25	Luxembourg 30	Greece 39	Austria 71	Luxembourg 53	UAE 45	Austria 89	Luxembourg 52	Turkey 61	Luxembourg 70	Luxembourg 247	Greece 431
Portugal 22	South Africa 20	Kuwait 28	Luxembourg 38	China 66	UAE 44	New Zealand 42	Greece 51	Greece 47	Luxembourg 54	Turkey 64	Greece 239	Luxembourg 414
Korea 18	Russia 18	New Zealand 17	Saudi Arabia 35	New Zealand 65	New Zealand 32	Luxembourg 42	Luxembourg 46	Kuwait 40	Russia 40	Austria 53	Kuwait 182	New Zealand 298
New Zealand 8	Portugal 18	Russia 17	New Zealand 24	Greece 53	Portugal 30	Portugal 21	Russia 44	Russia 32	Greece 39	New Zealand 33	New Zealand 170	Portugal 257
Qatar 1	New Zealand 13	Portugal 16	Russia 17	Qatar 46	Kuwait 24	Korea 17	New Zealand 34	New Zealand 32	China 38	Greece 32	Russia 140	Kuwait 237
China 1	India 7	Qatar 15	Korea 16	Portugal 38	Korea 24	Turkey 11	Thailand 29	Portugal 23	India 37	Korea 29	Portugal 124	Russia 213
Russia 1	Korea 6	India 13	Kuwait 11	Luxembourg 36	Russia 20	Kuwait 11	Korea 27	Korea 22	New Zealand 31	Brazil 29	Korea 114	Turkey 192
South Africa 0	Algeria 5	South Africa 9	Turkey 10	Korea 28	South Africa 16	China 7	Portugal 25	India 14	Brazil 29	Russia 26	Turkey 98	Korea 187
Hungary 0	Turkey 4	Korea 5	South Africa 5	Kyrgyzstan 27	Turkey 11	Czech Republic 3	Kazakhstan 10	Qatar 13	Kazakhstan 25	Portugal 23	India 58	China 126

Note: Data for members of the OECD DAC, 2001-2010, includes core ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP (and to EU institutions where applicable). It is expressed in constant 2010 prices. Data for other donors is taken from UN OCHA FTS and is in current prices. All figures include contributions through the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and pooled funding mechanisms. *Data for 2011 is preliminary. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 4: TOP 20 RECIPIENTS OF TOTAL ODA, (US\$ MILLION, CONSTANT 2010 PRICES)

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	5 YEARS 2006-2010	10 YEARS 2001-2010
India 2,526	Pakistan 2,705	Iraq 2,828	Iraq 5,245	Iraq 9,049	Iraq 5,964	Afghanistan 5,067	Afghanistan 4,850	Afghanistan 6,330	Afghanistan 6,369	Afghanistan 25,868	Afghanistan 36,411
Pakistan 2,513	India 2,442	Vietnam 2,284	Afghanistan 2,694	Afghanistan 3,205	Afghanistan 3,252	Iraq 4,563	Iraq 3,299	Ethiopia 3,841	Ethiopia 3,518	Iraq 18,827	Iraq 36,333
China 2,241	China 2,110	Tanzania 2,110	Vietnam 2,174	Indonesia 2,433	Pakistan 2,425	Vietnam 2,729	Ethiopia 3,231	Vietnam 3,803	Pakistan 2,999	Ethiopia 15,164	Vietnam 24,893
Serbia 2,159	Afghanistan 1,902	Afghanistan 2,038	China 2,000	Vietnam 2,227	Sudan 2,246	Ethiopia 2,555	Vietnam 2,580	Tanzania 2,957	Tanzania 2,957	Vietnam 14,177	Ethiopia 24,767
Vietnam 2,149	Vietnam 1,884	Ethiopia 1,998	Ethiopia 1,969	Ethiopia 2,128	Vietnam 2,132	Pakistan 2,311	Sudan 2,523	Iraq 2,838	Vietnam 2,932	Tanzania 12,326	Pakistan 21,292
Indonesia 1,979	Ethiopia 1,834	China 1,719	Tanzania 1,919	China 2,127	Ethiopia 2,020	Tanzania 2,211	Palestine/OPT 2,390	Palestine/OPT 2,829	Haiti 2,916	Pakistan 12,049	Tanzania 20,853
Ethiopia 1,673	Mozambique 1,763	Bangladesh 1,657	Pakistan 1,610	India 2,065	Tanzania 1,951	Sudan 2,163	Tanzania 2,251	Pakistan 2,804	India 2,806	Sudan 11,362	India 18,949
Palestine/OPT 1,559	Indonesia 1,640	Jordan 1,566	Bangladesh 1,606	Sudan 2,060	Mozambique 1,628	Mozambique 1,798	India 2,112	India 2,530	Palestine/OPT 2,517	Palestine/OPT 11,034	Palestine/OPT 17,951
Egypt 1,482	DRC 1,549	Indonesia 1,491	Egypt 1,573	Pakistan 1,878	Uganda 1,627	Palestine/OPT 1,767	Bangladesh 2,007	Sudan 2,384	Iraq 2,164	India 10,288	Mozambique 16,682
Bangladesh 1,404	Egypt 1,510	Serbia 1,437	Mozambique 1,461	Tanzania 1,686	Palestine/OPT 1,531	Uganda 1,753	Mozambique 1,916	DRC 2,219	Sudan 2,046	Mozambique 9,311	China 16,496
Tanzania 1,348	Tanzania 1,463	Mozambique 1,352	Uganda 1,407	Mozambique 1,487	India 1,483	China 1,605	Uganda 1,591	Mozambique 2,018	Nigeria 2,044	Uganda 8,488	Sudan 16,124
Mozambique 1,308	Palestine/OPT 1,458	Palestine/OPT 1,347	Palestine/OPT 1,376	Bangladesh 1,482	China 1,478	Bangladesh 1,503	DRC 1,575	Uganda 1,794	DRC 2,027	DRC 8,267	Uganda 14,777
Uganda 1,252	States Ex-Yugoslavia 1,134	Uganda 1,261	Serbia 1,335	DRC 1,439	Indonesia 1,376	India 1,356	Egypt 1,532	Kenya 1,788	Mozambique 1,951	Bangladesh 7,484	Bangladesh 14,741
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1,015	Bangladesh 1,108	Ghana 1,160	Ghana 1,222	Sri Lanka 1,356	DRC 1,316	Kenya 1,321	Pakistan 1,510	Nigeria 1,671	Uganda 1,723	Kenya 7,048	Indonesia 13,718
Ghana 974	Zambia 1,105	Bolivia 1,158	DRC 1,212	Uganda 1,351	Bangladesh 1,315	Morocco 1,250	China 1,456	Ghana 1,582	Ghana 1,690	Ghana 6,942	DRC 13,609
Bolivia 967	Uganda 1,018	Egypt 1,036	Sudan 1,162	Ghana 1,215	Ghana 1,244	Nigeria 1,181	Morocco 1,401	Turkey 1,328	Kenya 1,627	Nigeria 6,629	Ghana 12,394
Honduras 939	Serbia 996	Colombia 967	Morocco 961	Palestine/OPT 1,177	Morocco 1,243	Ghana 1,170	Kenya 1,331	Zambia 1,261	Bangladesh 1,413	China 6,301	Egypt 11,217
Nicaragua 840	Bolivia 887	Philippines 921	Bolivia 911	Serbia 1,003	Colombia 1,095	DRC 1,129	Ghana 1,256	Bangladesh 1,247	Indonesia 1,390	Haiti 6,222	Serbia 10,971
Philippines 814	Ghana 881	Sri Lanka 865	Zambia 903	Egypt 960	Serbia 994	Lebanon 993	Indonesia 1,206	China 1,117	Mali 1,086	Indonesia 5,977	Kenya 10,498
Zambia 799	Bosnia-Herzegovina 846	South Africa 832	Madagascar 877	Zambia 938	Kenya 980	Egypt 983	Nigeria 1,194	Haiti 1,111	Burkina Faso 1,058	Morocco 5,786	Morocco 9,632

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

FIGURE 5: TOP 20 DONORS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA), (US\$ MILLION, CONSTANT 2010 PRICES)

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011*	5 YEARS 2006-2010	10 YEARS 2001-2010
United States 13,853	United States 15,383	United States 17,502	United States 22,396	United States 26,454	United States 23,488	United States 22,656	United States 26,801	United States 28,984	United States 30,326	United States 29,082	United States 132,255	United States 227,843
Japan 11,687	Japan 11,432	Japan 9,876	EU institutions 10,197	EU institutions 10,793	EU institutions 11,453	EU institutions 11,654	EU institutions 12,189	EU institutions 12,724	United Kingdom 12,889	Germany 13,317	EU institutions 60,676	EU institutions 110,190
EU institutions 10,345	EU institutions 8,763	EU institutions 9,416	Japan 10,020	Japan 10,303	Japan 10,123	Germany 9,390	Germany 10,670	Germany 11,476	Germany 12,852	United Kingdom 12,780	Germany 52,937	Japan 102,018
Germany 7,844	Germany 7,005	United Kingdom 5,994	France 7,945	France 7,728	Germany 8,549	France 8,428	United Kingdom 9,770	United Kingdom 11,427	EU institutions 12,657	EU institutions 11,854	United Kingdom 50,508	Germany 89,952
France 6,496	France 6,678	Germany 6,915	Germany 7,898	Germany 7,354	United Kingdom 7,983	United Kingdom 8,286	France 9,241	Japan 10,746	France 11,438	France 11,065	Japan 48,699	France 82,668
United Kingdom 5,640	United Kingdom 5,433	United Kingdom 6,951	United Kingdom 7,002	United Kingdom 7,983	France 7,920	Japan 7,920	Japan 9,069	France 10,736	Japan 10,842	Japan 9,802	France 47,826	United Kingdom 82,474
Netherlands 5,390	Netherlands 4,812	Netherlands 4,800	Netherlands 4,651	Netherlands 5,428	Netherlands 5,692	Netherlands 5,813	Netherlands 6,364	Spain 6,196	Netherlands 5,858	Netherlands 5,836	Netherlands 29,877	Netherlands 54,958
Denmark 2,946	Saudi Arabia 3,630	Norway 3,329	Canada 3,669	Canada 4,325	Sweden 4,107	Spain 4,874	Spain 6,021	Netherlands 6,150	Spain 5,610	Canada 4,926	Spain 26,398	Canada 40,303
Italy 2,895	Canada 3,251	Canada 3,122	Norway 3,254	Italy 3,976	Canada 4,088	Canada 4,455	Canada 4,902	Sweden 4,870	Canada 5,151	Sweden 4,848	Canada 23,102	Spain 39,968
Canada 2,835	Norway 3,218	Saudi Arabia 3,064	Sweden 3,090	Sweden 3,823	Spain 3,698	Sweden 4,270	Saudi Arabia 4,880	Norway 4,506	Norway 4,563	Norway 4,178	Sweden 22,312	Sweden 37,912
Norway 2,803	Sweden 3,126	Sweden 2,840	Italy 2,783	Norway 3,656	Norway 3,513	Norway 3,938	Sweden 4,533	Canada 4,506	Sweden 4,533	Australia 4,034	Norway 20,292	Norway 36,552
Sweden 2,721	Spain 2,803	Spain 2,612	Spain 2,731	Spain 2,822	Australia 2,602	Italy 3,457	Norway 3,772	Australia 3,411	Australia 3,819	Spain 3,970	Australia 15,858	Italy 30,138
Spain 2,602	Italy 2,778	Italy 2,453	Denmark 2,489	Denmark 2,497	Denmark 2,474	Australia 2,894	Italy 3,736	Saudi Arabia 3,163	Saudi Arabia 3,480	Italy 3,445	Saudi Arabia 15,376	Australia 27,258
Australia 2,143	Denmark 2,694	Denmark 2,419	Australia 2,296	Australia 2,436	Italy 2,312	Denmark 2,545	Australia 3,132	Italy 2,982	Denmark 2,824	Denmark 2,802	Italy 15,254	Denmark 26,199
Switzerland 1,611	Australia 2,253	Australia 2,270	Saudi Arabia 2,033	Switzerland 1,986	Saudi Arabia 2,256	UAE 2,499	Denmark 2,583	Denmark 2,729	Italy 2,767	Switzerland 2,539	Denmark 13,155	Saudi Arabia 25,587
Belgium 1,449	Switzerland 1,530	Switzerland 1,761	Switzerland 1,970	Belgium 1,751	Switzerland 1,959	Switzerland 1,915	Belgium 2,161	Belgium 2,426	Belgium 2,452	Belgium 2,481	Belgium 10,629	Switzerland 19,279
UAE 742	Belgium 1,500	Belgium 1,487	Belgium 1,509	Saudi Arabia 1,172	Belgium 1,793	Belgium 1,797	Switzerland 2,044	Switzerland 2,234	Switzerland 2,270	Turkey 1,337	Switzerland 10,420	Belgium 18,325
Austria 665	UAE 818	UAE 1,187	Finland 760	Finland 868	Ireland 998	Saudi Arabia 1,598	UAE 1,241	Finland 1,232	Finland 1,333	Finland 1,275	UAE 5,865	UAE 9,762
Finland 631	Finland 706	Finland 716	Austria 690	Turkey 782	Finland 946	Ireland 1,055	Ireland 1,141	Austria 1,047	Korea 1,171	Korea 1,242	Finland 5,593	Finland 9,274
Portugal 452	Ireland 582	Austria 616	Ireland 640	Austria 775	UAE 872	Finland 991	Finland 1,091	Ireland 933	Austria 1,053	Austria 995	Ireland 5,023	Austria 8,066

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC. *Data for 2011 is preliminary

FIGURE 6: THE 30 LARGEST GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTORS OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN 2010

BIGGEST DONORS IN 2010 (US\$m)			MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2010 (% GNI)		MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2010 (US\$ PER CITIZEN)		MOST PRIORITY TO HUMANITARIAN AID WITHIN OVERALL AID PROGRAMMES IN 2010 (% ODA)	
1	United States	4,871	Sweden	0.15%	Luxembourg	109	UAE	27.6%
2	EU institutions	1,658	Luxembourg	0.14%	Norway	97	United States	16.1%
3	United Kingdom	943	Gambia	0.13%	Sweden	74	Sweden	15.2%
4	Germany	744	Norway	0.11%	Denmark	47	Ireland	14.3%
5	Sweden	690	Denmark	0.08%	Finland	31	Luxembourg	13.3%
6	Japan	642	Ireland	0.07%	Ireland	28	EU Institutions	13.1%
7	Canada	550	Finland	0.07%	Switzerland	28	Finland	12.5%
8	Spain	496	Saudi Arabia	0.06%	Netherlands	28	Canada	10.7%
9	Norway	470	Netherlands	0.06%	UAE	24	Norway	10.3%
10	Netherlands	459	Belgium	0.05%	Monaco	23	Italy	10.2%
11	France	435	Guyana	0.05%	Belgium	21	Australia	10.2%
12	Australia	390	United Kingdom	0.04%	Liechtenstein	19	Switzerland	9.3%
13	Italy	283	UAE	0.04%	Australia	18	Belgium	9.3%
14	Denmark	259	Switzerland	0.04%	Canada	16	Denmark	9.2%
15	Saudi Arabia	256	Spain	0.04%	United States	15	New Zealand	9.0%
16	Belgium	227	Canada	0.04%	United Kingdom	15	Spain	8.8%
17	Switzerland	211	United States	0.03%	Spain	11	Brazil	8.0%
18	Finland	167	Australia	0.03%	Saudi Arabia	10	Netherlands	7.8%
19	Ireland	128	New Zealand	0.02%	Germany	9	Greece	7.8%
20	UAE	114	Germany	0.02%	Austria	8	Estonia	7.5%
21	Austria	65	DRC	0.02%	New Zealand	7	United Kingdom	7.3%
22	Turkey	61	Timor-Leste	0.02%	France	7	Austria	6.2%
23	Luxembourg	54	Kazakhstan	0.02%	Bahrain	6	Japan	5.9%
24	Russian Federation	40	Equatorial Guinea	0.02%	Japan	5	Germany	5.8%
25	Greece	39	Austria	0.02%	Italy	5	Kuwait	5.0%
26	China	38	France	0.02%	Greece	4	Russian Federation	4.1%
27	India	37	Saint Lucia	0.02%	British Virgin Islands (United Kingdom)	3	France	3.8%
28	New Zealand	31	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.01%	Kuwait	3	Portugal	3.8%
29	Brazil	29	Italy	0.01%	Andorra	3	Saudi Arabia	2.6%
30	Kazakhstan	25	Grenada	0.01%	San Marino	3	Liechtenstein	2.5%

Notes: GNI data for OECD DAC members is based on data collected by the OECD DAC (in constant 2010 prices); GNI data for donors who are not members of the OECD DAC is based on World Bank data (current prices). ODA for donors who are not members of the OECD is inclusive of debt relief, and for China and Brazil is based on data for ODA-like concessional flows collected by the OECD DAC; data for Brazil is based on the latest available year, 2009.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)

FIGURE 7: HUMANITARIAN AID TO CRISIS-AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN CONTEXT WITH OTHER OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FLOWS IN 2010 (US\$ MILLION)

RECIPIENT	DOMESTIC FLOWS		OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL FLOWS				PRIVATE FLOWS	
	GOVERNMENT REVENUES (EXCLUDING GRANTS)	MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING	OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS	NON-HUMANITARIAN ODA	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	REMITTANCES	FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT	
Sudan	12,406	2,746	86	1,135	909	3,178	1600	
Palestine/OPT	no data	14	19	1,899	618	1,307	115	
Afghanistan	3,356	770	88	5,779	605	no data	76	
Ethiopia	5,530	-	174	2,882	639	387	184	
Iraq	68,729	193	-	1,965	185	no data	1,426	
Pakistan	35,830	-	732	1,539	2,065	9,407	2,016	
Haiti	1,811	612	-	1,315	3,065	1,499	150	
DRC	4,180	1,390	13	1,568	456	no data	2,939	
Somalia	no data	160	-	258	239	no data	112	
Indonesia	129,117	-	5,389	1,276	113	7,139	13,304	
Kenya	10,397	-	109	1,340	290	1,758	133	
Sri Lanka	11,319	-	231	377	205	3,612	478	
Lebanon	11,279	519	101	325	122	8,177	4,955	
Zimbabwe	2,224	-	2	532	199	no data	105	
Uganda	3,386	-	105	1,641	82	773	848	
Chad	2,607	215	44	214	278	no data	781	
Jordan	7,989	-	478	784	170	3,789	1,704	
Angola	29,033	-	68	228	1	82	9,942	
Burundi	814	-	-	565	61	3	14	
Myanmar	5,068	-	2	251	102	154	756	

Note: A small proportion of international humanitarian aid is from private sources. Remittance data for Angola is based on 2008 values. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, IMF, SIPRI and UNCTAD data

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GHA Report 2012 uses the latest data to present the most comprehensive assessment of the international humanitarian financing response. The report considers how this response has measured up to the scale of global humanitarian crises and reflects on the timeliness, proportionality, and phasing of investments. Chapters on humanitarian funding (the donors, recipients and channels of delivery), the forces which shape humanitarian need, and the investments needed to tackle vulnerability, reveal the complexity of humanitarian response. In a world where crisis seems increasingly likely to be the norm, building resilience to shock and disaster risk is key. Transparent and reliable information, as provided by GHA Report 2012, is essential for all those working to address humanitarian crisis and vulnerability.



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