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Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus

Lessons from Bangladesh report
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Executive summary

This country report on Bangladesh contributes to a multi-country study focusing on the role of development actors\(^1\) in addressing people’s long-term needs in crisis contexts and supporting operationalisation of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus. This is also pertinent to the Covid-19 response, involving both immediate lifesaving assistance and longer term support for health systems.\(^2\)

This study is part of Development Initiatives’ programme of work on the nexus and aligns with objectives of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Group 5 on Humanitarian Financing. It builds on 2019 research on donor approaches to the nexus\(^3\) and the IASC’s research on financing the nexus,\(^4\) which identified a gap in understanding how development actors address longer term development needs of vulnerable people and structural causes of crises. Other focus countries are Cameroon\(^5\) and Somalia,\(^6\) and the study will conclude with a synthesis report with key findings and lessons across countries and recommendations for development actors engaging in crisis contexts. This research will build the evidence base for how development actors work in crisis contexts, informing national and global development policy and decision-making. Development Initiatives, with support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Norwegian Refugee Council under the umbrella of IASC Results Group 5, will engage with development actors on its findings.

Using the example of Bangladesh, this report aims to improve understanding of how development assistance currently targets crisis-affected people and addresses the structural causes of crisis. It explores how development actors support the delivery of joined-up responses in Bangladesh by working alongside and in collaboration with humanitarian actors at the strategic, practical and institutional levels. It identifies examples of good practice, learnings and recommendations for how development assistance can better prevent and respond to crisis situations and support the delivery of the HDP nexus agenda, both within Bangladesh and potentially elsewhere. One of the limitations of this research in covering a range of issues and actors is the trade-off with the degree of depth we were able to look into specific areas. It is therefore not intended to be a comprehensive or exhaustive review, and various observations that would benefit from further research are highlighted in the report.
Crisis context

Bangladesh has experienced sustained and strong economic growth in recent decades, which translated into the final recommendation by the UN Committee for Development Policy to graduate the country from least developed country status. In 2020, the country faced three types of crises: recurrent natural hazards, the protracted Rohingya refugee crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Cyclones, floods and landslides have repeatedly threatened development progress for decades. Government-led efforts on disaster management and response, with support from international development and humanitarian actors, have increased the countries’ resilience to climate-related shocks. The large influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in 2017 triggered a localised crisis in Cox’s Bazar district. As the crisis grows more protracted, refugees continue to rely on significant volumes of humanitarian assistance with longer term needs unmet. The government maintains a strong stance on the repatriation of the refugees, which impedes long-term planning of the refugee response. The possibility of repatriation remains uncertain following the military coup in Myanmar in early 2021. Development actors have scaled up their activities in the district from 2018 onwards. The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic in Bangladesh reduced economic growth and increased poverty, despite large-scale mitigation measures from the government and multilateral development banks (MDBs). It also added another dimension of need to existing humanitarian crises from natural hazards and forced displacement, while hindering the provision of assistance.

Strategy and partnerships

The government’s national development plans make little reference to the Rohingya refugee crisis, but they do emphasise the importance of disaster management. The majority of official development assistance (ODA) received in recent years was in the form of concessional loans. The leadership of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief on disaster preparedness, response and recovery is supported by development donors, NGOs and UN agencies alike. Local and national NGOs have longstanding experience in building community resilience and reducing disaster risk in Bangladesh. For them, accessing international development funding remains challenging with little transparency on funding received indirectly, though efforts are ongoing to shed more light on this. While the UN has made progress in Bangladesh in formalising international collaboration across the nexus on disaster management, this process is mostly led by humanitarian actors. In the context of the Rohingya refugee crisis, it is challenging for humanitarian and development actors to comprehensively address long-term needs for refugee and host communities in the absence of a multi-year strategy, which is politically not viable with the government. MDBs have broadened the response to address some development needs, even though the government still broadly opposes longer term policy changes that are perceived to disincentivise repatriation. The UN in Bangladesh, with technical leadership by UNDP, and the World Bank are supporting the Government of Bangladesh to formulate the District Development and Growth Plan (DDGP) for Cox’s Bazar, which has the potential to fill the strategic gap for development assistance in the district. Bilateral development donors have also deepened their partnerships with the local government in the district following the influx of Rohingya refugees. The engagement of international actors with local and national NGOs in the district is mostly framed in humanitarian terms, with little funding available for development needs. The private sector
in the district also requires greater support from both development donors and implementers. The response strategy for Covid-19 is nationally led by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. In Cox’s Bazar district, the humanitarian community, coordinated by the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG), has supported the Government’s Covid-19 prevention and response efforts. Humanitarian agencies in the district have consequently expanded their relief to host communities in the district. The UN’s national socioeconomic response strategy to Covid-19 emphasises the need to simultaneously plan and implement across the HDP nexus, but it is too early to assess its success in that regard.

**Recommendations**

Bilateral donors, MDBs and UN agencies should use their diplomatic representations with the Government of Bangladesh in a concerted effort to overcome political obstacles to achieving sustainable solutions to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Especially now, as safe and dignified repatriation has become more uncertain in light of the military coup in Myanmar in early 2021, there is an increasing need to implement a coordinated medium-term approach to the crisis response. It will be critical to build the evidence base on the potential socioeconomic benefits to the district that a longer term approach would bring to allow for an informed discussion with the government. The same set of international actors should also continue to deepen their engagement with the local government in Cox’s Bazar district for it to better cope with the localised refugee crisis. Part of this is wider buy-in for the DDGP (once fully formulated) so it can provide a coherent framework that guides local, national and international development efforts in the district. Development actors further need to increase their engagement with local civil society in crisis-affected regions. This could be through targeted support measures for the private sector in Cox’s Bazar district or disaster-affected parts of the country and through pooled funds for longer term assistance that target local and national NGOs.

**Coordination, prioritisation and planning**

There is a number of coordination bodies in Bangladesh; for humanitarian assistance they vary by type of crisis and for development assistance by sector. There is not yet a designated forum to bring together development and humanitarian actors at the national level. At the district level in Cox’s Bazar, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC), under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, is responsible for management and oversight of the Rohingya refugee response. The Senior Coordinator of the ISCG Secretariat in Cox’s Bazar district ensures the overall coordination of the Rohingya refugee response, including liaison with the RRRC, District Deputy Commissioner and government authorities. The Rohingya refugee response can only include a limited range of development activities in a primarily humanitarian plan. The hope is that the DDGP will eventually be able to fill this coordination gap for wider development assistance in Cox’s Bazar district, however the ongoing planning process has been delayed, faces varying expectations and the final scope of the plan is not yet decided. The government has a strong role in coordinating disaster management at the national and local level. For international actors, separate coordination mechanisms exist for development and humanitarian activities related to natural hazards. Their distinct
functions are perceived to be justified, even though there is greater scope to transfer humanitarian expertise on risk assessments into development planning.

**Recommendations**

International actors in Bangladesh should increase the coherence of existing coordination structures for humanitarian and development assistance by incorporating disaster risk monitoring into broader development planning. This would involve an exchange of information that goes beyond the existing interaction between the Humanitarian Coordination Task Team (HCTT) and the Local Consultative Group (LCG) on Disaster and Emergency Response, reaching a wide range of LCGs on, for example, agriculture and rural development or climate change and environment. This would however first require a reinvigoration of the LCG structure. In terms of the crisis response in Cox’s Bazar district, there needs to be a close exchange of information between the DDGP – once fully formulated and operational – and the ISCG. This will ensure development activities complement the crisis response by meeting the longer term needs of host communities and refugees that cannot be addressed through the Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (JRP).

**Programming approaches**

In Cox’s Bazar district, joint programming across development and humanitarian objectives emerged to harmonise donors’ and implementers’ efforts in the absence of an integrated framework. It enables complementary assistance to host and refugee communities and thereby seeks to enhance social cohesion, although there is no shared understanding in the district on how to assess success for this common objective. It is also challenging for development donors and implementers to facilitate durable solutions for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh due to political resistance. In terms of natural hazards, Bangladesh has several well-developed disaster management and risk reduction programmes under the government’s leadership. Disaster risk is, however, yet to be incorporated into other forms of development programming. Successful anticipatory action pilots as part of the humanitarian response might also provide an entry point for development donors to support more efficient and effective disaster management. Finally, Covid-19 led to the scale up of various social protection programmes, although gaps in coverage and targeting continue to be a concern. The pandemic, however, interrupted the implementation of other longer term programmes, revealing the links between development assistance today and future crisis risk.

**Recommendations**

International actors in Cox’s Bazar district should replicate joint programming for stronger coordination between donors and greater coherence between implementers. This would allow for effective coordination and planning across development and humanitarian objectives in the absence of shared planning frameworks and can include a wider range of national and international implementers. Potential areas of synergy include: shock-responsive social protection; livelihoods, agriculture and food security; and disaster management and climate resilience.
**Financing tools**

The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW) has been an important pillar to the longer term response in Cox’s Bazar district, but it has faced challenges in driving policy reform. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the first time provided grant support to a displacement crisis, which has been an opportunity for institutional learning. Bilateral donors have made available development financing in response to unforeseen needs, for instance caused by Covid-19. This was partly made possible by reallocating funding between sectors, although flexibility to scale up or shift funds from development to humanitarian purposes has been limited. Some donors were able to secure additional funding from the capital in the absence of contingency funds. Such contingency funds are more common among national NGOs. Some humanitarian pooled funds provide surge funding for local and national NGOs in response to disasters, although few equivalent funding opportunities are available for recovery or long-term needs.

**Recommendations**

Bilateral development donors and MDBs should ensure that a sufficient amount of targeted and tailored development funding reaches crisis-affected regions in Bangladesh, such as Cox’s Bazar district. They should also ensure that their assistance to those regions is transparent through subnational reporting by, for example publishing geographic information of funded activities to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). This increased transparency is required to facilitate better targeting of development funds, enable mutual accountability processes with the government, and improve coordination and complementarity with humanitarian funding.

**Organisational issues**

There continues to be an institutional separation for several bilateral donors in Bangladesh between humanitarian and development assistance. Although the importance of an integrated response between humanitarian and development departments for individual donors is widely recognised and political will exists to facilitate it, operational guidance on how to achieve it is often lacking. Some bilateral donors therefore continue to support humanitarian and development assistance in parallel through different line ministries in the same location. The centralised development planning in Bangladesh also means that several development actors don’t have a subnational presence. It is more challenging for them to coordinate and complement the localised refugee response in Cox’s Bazar district. The government faces similar challenges for subnational development planning, although development actors provide support through the capacity building of local governments.

**Recommendations**

Donors in Bangladesh with separate agencies for humanitarian and development assistance should consider organising management structures, strategic planning and high-level budget allocation decisions around collective national priorities to strengthen
the overall coherence of their support. Within this, they could ringfence a humanitarian budget where necessary and relative to emergency needs for disaster and refugee response to safeguard humanitarian principles. If this is not possible for overall country operations, these efforts could initially focus on certain geographic regions, such as Cox’s Bazar district, or response areas, such as disaster management and response. As a minimum there should be sufficient information sharing between the humanitarian and development donor departments to ensure both types of assistance complement each other where appropriate and don’t undermine one another. Development donors and implementing agencies should also ensure that their organisational processes are tailored to subnational crisis contexts. If possible, these actors should have a local presence and support decentralised decision-making processes to enable agile and context-specific assistance. Where flexible and decentralised decision-making is not possible, existing systems should be streamlined to ensure timely and efficient decision-making and communication between the field, country and global levels.
Proportion of ODA as humanitarian assistance and other ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total ODA channels of delivery

- Multilateral organisations
- National and local NGOs
- Other NGOs
- Domestic public sector institutions (Scaled to 25%)
- Other public sector institutions
- Private sector institutions
- Other channels of delivery

Timeline

2015
- 7th Five Year Plan approved by government, focusing on sustained increases in GDP, poverty reduction and climate resilience.

2016
- Around 87,000 refugees flee to Bangladesh after military crackdown in Rakhine State.

2017
- September: Preliminary response plan for refugee influx launched by Inter Sector Coordination Group, and scaled up significantly in October to account for the size of the influx.

2018
- Military coup in Myanmar raises more uncertainty around when Rohingya refugees can repatriate.

2019
- Covid-19: First Covid-19 cases in Bangladesh are confirmed.

2020
- March: First Covid-19 cases in Bangladesh are confirmed.
- May: The first case of Covid-19 is confirmed in the Rohingya refugee camps.
- December: The WHO confirms over 513,000 Covid-19 cases and 7,559 deaths in Bangladesh.

Policy

- 2015: 7th Five Year Plan approved by government, focusing on sustained increases in GDP, poverty reduction and climate resilience.

- 2017: November: Myanmar and Bangladesh sign agreement on voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

- 2018: Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh offer Rohingya refugees the chance to return to Myanmar. No one accepts.

- 2020: 8th Five Year Plan approved, titled Promoting Prosperity and Fostering Inclusiveness.

Displacement

- 2015: 7th Five Year Plan approved by government, focusing on sustained increases in GDP, poverty reduction and climate resilience.

- 2016: Around 87,000 refugees flee to Bangladesh after military crackdown in Rakhine State.

- 2017: August–December: More than 700,000 Rohingya refugees flee from Myanmar to Cox’s Bazar District after brutal military crackdown.

- 2019: Renewed violence in Rakhine State leads to new displacement and casts doubt on feasibility of repatriation.

Coup

- 2021: Military coup in Myanmar raises more uncertainty around when Rohingya refugees can repatriate.

Natural disasters and environmental shocks

- 2017: June: Cyclone Mora damages and destroys shelters in two refugee camps and affects a total of 335,000 people in Cox’s Bazar District.

- 2019: Monsoon floods displace more than 6,000 Rohingya refugees in the camps and damage more than 3,500 shelters.

- 2020: Cyclone Amphan hits Bangladesh. Early monsoon floods affect large parts of the country. Both overlap with the peak of Covid-19 cases in Bangladesh.

Covid-19

- 2020: March: First Covid-19 cases in Bangladesh are confirmed.

- May: The first case of Covid-19 is confirmed in the Rohingya refugee camps.

- December: The WHO confirms over 513,000 Covid-19 cases and 7,559 deaths in Bangladesh.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Notes: Data is in constant 2018 prices. ODA data includes grants and loan disbursements from DAC members, multilateral development banks and core expenditure from multilaterals. Humanitarian ODA refers to the CRS purpose codes for emergency food assistance; immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation; material relief assistance and services; multi-hazard response preparedness; and relief co-ordination and support services. All remaining purpose codes are captured under other ODA. DAC channel classifications for NGOs were aligned with those shown in the chart to the extent possible. JRP = Joint Response Plan; ODA = official development assistance; WHO = World Health Organization.
Introduction

This country report on Bangladesh contributes to a multi-country study focusing on the role of development actors in addressing long-term needs in crisis contexts and supporting operationalisation of the humanitarian—development—peace (HDP) nexus (Box 1). The other focus countries are Cameroon and Somalia.

Bangladesh was selected as a focus country and its experience can inform global policy and practice for several reasons. Firstly, Bangladesh made steady progress in social and economic development over several decades with support from the international development community, but the influx of nearly one million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar into the Cox’s Bazar district has led to a localised, large-scale and protracted humanitarian crisis. It therefore offers an example of crisis management in a context in which bilateral donors and multilateral development institutions are engaged over the long term and where the government has capably pursued planned economic development. Secondly, due to its geography, Bangladesh is affected by severe and recurring natural hazards and is extremely vulnerable to climate change. It has taken a proactive and long-term approach to disaster risk reduction (DRR), which may be relevant to other contexts transitioning from emergency responses to the longer term management of climate-related shocks. Finally, Bangladesh has a tradition of nationally led disaster management, with longstanding engagement of national and local NGOs. It therefore offers a unique perspective on the challenges and opportunities to localisation and what this means in the context of stronger humanitarian and development cooperation.

As part of Development Initiatives’ broader programme of work on the nexus, 2019 research on donor approaches identified a gap in evidence on the ways in which development actors address the longer term development needs of vulnerable people and structural causes of crisis. The evidence gap was corroborated in the research of others, including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). This report aims to improve understanding of how development assistance currently targets crisis-affected people and addresses the structural causes of crisis within Bangladesh. It explores how development actors support the delivery of joined-up responses in Bangladesh by working alongside and in collaboration with humanitarian actors at the strategic, practical and institutional levels. It identifies examples of good practice, learnings and recommendations for how development assistance can better prevent and respond to crisis situations and support the delivery of the HDP nexus agenda, both within Bangladesh and potentially elsewhere. One of the limitations of this research in covering a range of issues and actors is the trade-off with the degree of depth we were able to look into specific areas. It is therefore not intended to be a comprehensive or exhaustive review, and various observations that would benefit from further research are highlighted in the report.

As this research was carried out, an additional large-scale crisis unfolded in the country in the form of the Covid-19 pandemic. Its implications for this research were taken into account.
consideration to the extent possible. Key informant interviews took place before and after the peak of Covid-19 cases in Bangladesh in 2020, so during a time when the situation in Bangladesh was changing significantly week by week. Given the pandemic had not yet existed when the research framework was designed, additional questions on its consequences for development actors were added throughout the research. This made it difficult to extract insights on all aspects covered by this research, but where relevant these are included below.

Research findings are based on a desk review of relevant documentation and key informant interviews at national and district levels with 50 representatives of bilateral donors, multilateral development banks (MDBs), UN agencies, government representatives, and international and national NGOs engaging in Bangladesh (Appendix 1).

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**Box 1: Definitions of key terms**

**Nexus**: This paper uses ‘nexus’ or ‘triple nexus’ as shorthand terms for the connections between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding approaches. We align with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) definition:

“‘Nexus approach’ refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalise on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.”

Achieving collaboration, coherence and complementarity means quite different things to different actors. We understand the three ambitions to sit on a spectrum from complementarity to coherence, with complementarity being the minimum requirement for approaching the nexus. As a maximal approach, the nexus can fundamentally challenge existing divisions between humanitarian, development and peace systems, encouraging stronger coherence and working towards shared outcomes. The concept of shared or collective outcomes was conceived by the UN in preparation for and follow-up to the World Humanitarian Summit and recently adopted in the UN-IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes. As a minimum approach, all actors continue to deliver alongside one another through their separate systems and in line with their own objectives, but they do so in a way that is mutually reinforcing and avoids undermining each other’s goals. This can include integrating peace and/or resilience approaches into their work in a way that is aligned with their mandates and goals, without necessarily working together closely.

This report focuses explicitly on the role of development actors, covering the development–peace and development–humanitarian nexuses. Specifically, this means understanding how development actors are working collaboratively,
coherently and complementarily with humanitarian and peace actors at the strategic, practical and institutional levels to address the needs of vulnerable crisis-affected populations. This will translate into actions under a range of existing concepts including resilience, recovery, inclusion and peacebuilding, and embedding risk, among others.

**Resilience:** We align with the OECD DAC definition:

“The ability of households, communities, and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty. Resilience is about addressing the root causes of crises whilst strengthening the capacities and resources of a system in order to cope with risks, stresses and shocks.”

Resilience is understood as cross-cutting to humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities.

**Recovery:** This is the restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors, largely through development assistance.

**Development:** This report focuses explicitly on the role of development actors and actions in crisis contexts. Here, we understand ‘development’ as long-term support to developing countries to deliver sustainable solutions for addressing poverty, supporting livelihoods and providing basic services, with a particular focus on those in greatest need and furthest behind. The development actors that are the main focus of this study are MDBs, OECD DAC member government entities responsible for development cooperation, and UN entities with a development (or dual humanitarian–development) mandate.

**Peace:** There are many ways to understand conflict and peace and clear overlaps with development and resilience. In this report, where there is not yet consensus on what is covered in the ‘peace’ aspect of the triple nexus, we understand it to include conflict prevention, conflict sensitivity (to ensure programming avoids harm and where possible builds peace), and mediation efforts between host and refugee communities. In this research it also includes efforts to tackle violent extremism.

**Humanitarian action:** Humanitarian action is intended to:

“...save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters caused by natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur.”

Furthermore, humanitarian action should be governed by the key humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.
Crisis context

Bangladesh has experienced sustained and strong economic growth in recent decades, which translated into the final recommendation by the UN Committee for Development Policy (CDP) to graduate the country from least developed country (LDC) status by 2026. In 2020, the country faced three different types of crises: recurrent natural hazards, the protracted Rohingya refugee crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Cyclones, floods and landslides have repeatedly threatened development progress for decades. Government-led efforts on disaster management and response, with support from international development and humanitarian actors, have increased the countries’ resilience to climate-related shocks. The large influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in 2017 triggered a localised crisis in Cox’s Bazar district. As the crisis grows more protracted, refugees continue to rely on significant volumes of humanitarian assistance with longer term needs unmet. The government maintains a strong stance on the repatriation of the refugees, which impedes long-term planning of the refugee response. The possibility of repatriation remains uncertain following the military coup in Myanmar in early 2021. Development actors have scaled up their activities in the district from 2018 onwards. The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic in Bangladesh reduced economic growth and increased poverty despite large-scale mitigation measures from the government and MDBs. It also added another dimension of need to existing humanitarian crises from natural hazards and forced displacement, while hindering the provision of assistance.

Social and economic development

Bangladesh has experienced continued strong economic growth and is set to graduate from LDC status by 2026. According to World Bank data, GDP grew by an average 6.6% annually between 2005 and 2019, recording its highest annual growth rate in 2019 at 8.2% since 1974. The percentage of the population living below the national poverty line has more than halved since 2000. This has been driven by a structural transformation of the economy from agriculture to industrial production and services, an expansion of labour-intensive employment, especially in the export-oriented ready-made garment industry, and growth in remittances from migrant workers. The country’s development progress led the UN CDP to recommend the graduation of Bangladesh from LDC status by 2026, also raising the bar for the country's crisis-management policies.

Despite this impressive progress, the pace in poverty reduction has slowed and there is a long way to go to end extreme poverty. In 2018, 22% of the population lived below the national poverty line and as of 2016 15% were living in extreme poverty. A World Bank study (2019) notes that around half of the population can be considered vulnerable to poverty and that between 2010 and 2016, despite accelerated economic growth, the rate of poverty reduction slowed compared with previous years. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerability of Bangladesh’s development trajectory, especially for households reliant on income from labour-intensive sectors and remittances, as discussed in more detail below.
**Disaster risks**

**Bangladesh is extremely prone to disasters and ranks among the most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world.** Situated in the world’s largest river delta close to sea level, Bangladesh’s heavily populated coastal zone is exposed to recurring cyclones, storm surges and floods, as witnessed again during the 2020 monsoon floods. These are becoming more frequent as climate change accelerates. Bangladesh has, however, succeeded over the last 30 years in reducing the death toll during recurring tropical cyclones from hundreds of thousands (over 500,000 in 1971 and 138,882 in 1991) to thousands (4234 in 2007)\(^{20}\) and an average of 64 lives are lost through storms per year since.\(^{21}\) Nonetheless, the current and projected consequences of increasing disaster risk due to climate change are profound. As livelihoods are destroyed and coastal areas and river deltas become increasingly uninhabitable, Dhaka and other major cities are absorbing hundreds of thousands of migrants each year. Flooding and extreme weather events are already spurring migration, and the number of internal climate migrants is projected to reach between 3.6 and 13.3 million people according to different scenarios.\(^{22}\) Some of these densely populated urban areas, including Dhaka and Sylhet, are located in zones vulnerable to earthquakes and thereby exposed to additional risks.

**Industrialisation and population growth have come at the cost of environmental degradation, threatening further economic progress.** With a population of over 160 million people in 2020 (ranked 10\(^{th}\) in density in the world), Bangladesh has seen the over-exploitation of natural resources, including gradual deforestation and loss of mangrove forests that help protect coastal areas from cyclones.\(^{23}\) These pressures are also present in the Cox’s Bazar district, where increased population density following the large influx of refugees has accelerated deforestation and the depletion of water resources.\(^{24}\) Together, these impacts threaten economic productivity and poverty reduction gains, including by negatively impacting livelihoods and increasing vulnerability to disasters.

**These complex environmental threats repeatedly cause food insecurity and disrupt livelihoods.** As shown again by the 2020 monsoon floods and cyclone Amphan, large-scale natural hazards in Bangladesh regularly damage crops and destroy livestock,\(^{25}\) thereby limiting physical and economic access to food, and reduce livelihood opportunities by disrupting food value chains. In 2020, the strain on livelihoods by natural hazards was even greater due to the impacts of Covid-19.\(^{26}\) Prior to 2020, there was little progress in reducing food insecurity nationally. Even though the percentage of the Bangladesh population in moderate-to-severe food insecurity decreased slightly from 32.2% in 2014–2016 to 31.5% in 2017–2019, the percentage of the population in severe food insecurity saw a small increase between the two time periods from 13.0% to 13.3%.\(^{27}\) This reflects the challenge for development actors, especially in disaster-prone parts of the country, to improve food security through effective disaster management and resilient food production systems.

**The constant threat of different types of hazards highlights the need for development actors to reduce disaster risk, improve disaster management capacities, and incorporate risk analysis and contingency planning into programming subnationally.** For instance, a comparison of flood risk (2017 data) and
extreme poverty levels by district (estimated 2019 data) visually conveys these overlapping challenges (Figure 1). High flood risks and higher levels of extreme poverty can be found in the north and north east of Bangladesh, and they are most pronounced along the coastlines in the south – including Cox’s Bazar district, with 38% of its area at risk of severe flooding and an estimated extreme poverty rate of 21.6% in 2019.

Figure 1: Extreme poverty headcount ratios (2019) and area at risk of severe flooding (2017) in Bangladesh by district

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank PovcalNet, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey and Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organisation data.

Notes: Poverty data for 2019 are estimates based on our own methodology. Extreme poverty refers to the share of population living on below 2011 Purchasing Power Parity $1.90 per day.
The Rohingya refugee crisis

The large influx of Rohingya refugees in 2017 has triggered a protracted crisis in Bangladesh with refugees continuing to face longer term needs and disaster risk. The country hosts 877,710 registered Rohingya refugees, a stateless Muslim ethnic minority who were driven out of Myanmar by a violent military crackdown. In August 2017, within the space of several months over 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, driven by a wave of killings, rape, torture and persecution perpetrated by the Myanmar military and security forces in Rakhine state. This was by far the largest influx of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, which for four decades has hosted them arriving in several waves. Following the large influx, the refugees have been confined to overcrowded camps with 40,000 people per square kilometre in the Cox’s Bazar district, where they live in temporary shelters. During seasonal monsoon rains they are highly vulnerable to floods and landslides, although measures are being taken to reduce those risks. While humanitarian agencies have been able to meet refugees’ immediate life-saving needs (e.g. emergency care for injuries and rape, and distribution of food and essential non-food items), there are major gaps in addressing medium-term needs such as building resilience, durable shelter, education and tackling gender-based violence as the crisis has become protracted.

The Government of Bangladesh’s official position, backed by international partners, is that Myanmar must create conditions for Rohingya refugees to repatriate – however large-scale returns are extremely unlikely in the near term. The bilateral agreement between the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar on the repatriation of Rohingya refugees affirms that returns should be voluntary, safe and dignified. Progress through dialogue between the Government of Myanmar and Rohingya communities has been slow. According to one survey of around 1300 Rohingya refugees in 2020, 93% express the desire to eventually return to Myanmar; however, they are clear that they will not do so until the Myanmar government grants them citizenship and ensures their basic rights and security. The same survey finds that almost three-quarters of respondents don’t believe that will happen within the next two years. After continued clashes in Rakhine state throughout 2019 and 2020 between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army, a ceasefire was brokered between the two sides with help from Japan in late 2020. This fragile progress was, however, undone by a military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, which was a major setback for repatriation plans and reintroduced great uncertainty on when safe and dignified returns might be possible.

The government’s focus on repatriation has made it challenging for humanitarian and development actors to engage in longer term planning for Rohingya refugees within Bangladesh. There have been restrictions on freedom of movement, livelihood support and formal education. In 2020 there was some progress in terms of education with the piloting of the Myanmar curriculum for 10,000 secondary students, although it remains to be phased in for the majority of the student population. The Rohingya refugees do not have the right to work in the local economy and the range of income-generating activities in the camps is also restricted. While a number of small stipends for voluntary work exist, their presence and scope varies across camps. Some Rohingya refugees are also working informally in the Cox’s Bazar district, although at their own risk and thereby potentially heightening the tension with the local host population. Refugees
remains dependent upon humanitarian aid: 94% of all Rohingya refugees were highly or moderately vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs according to a World Food Programme (WFP) assessment in 2020.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{The refugee influx has been an economic and environmental strain for Bangladeshis living in Cox’s Bazar.} The influx has intensified pressure on limited environmental resources, employment opportunities, infrastructure and services. A steep rise in demand for firewood contributed to accelerated deforestation in the district. According to 2010 data, 33\% of the population in Cox’s Bazar district fell below the national poverty line, which was slightly higher than the national figure of 32\%. Updated estimates by Development Initiatives for 2019\textsuperscript{35} show that the share of the population in the district below the national poverty line increased to 39\%.\textsuperscript{36} WFP also find a higher percentage in subjective poverty rates for Bangladeshi households in Cox’s Bazar, indicating fears of reduced livelihood opportunities.\textsuperscript{37} This is partly due to the refugee camps being seen as an obstacle to the district’s development of the tourism sector and due to increased competition for employment, especially unskilled labour.

\textbf{Despite international efforts to balance support to refugees and host communities, tensions persist between host and refugee communities, largely over economic competition and perceived unfair aid allocation.} 25\% of funding through the Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (JRP) targets host communities, and the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other projects outside the JRP also benefit the district’s development (see ‘International funding to the Rohingya refugee response’ sub-section below). However, many Bangladeshis in Cox’s Bazar feel that aid has unfairly benefited the Rohingya refugees\textsuperscript{38} and that the negative impact of the crisis on host communities hasn’t been sufficiently addressed. In a 2019 survey, more than half of local Bangladeshis (58\%) and Rohingya people (55\%) reported that there was no harmonious relationship between host and refugee communities. Both cite competition for employment and livelihoods as the main reason for social tensions.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{The Covid-19 pandemic}

\textbf{The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic in Bangladesh have inhibited development progress and aggravated other crisis needs.} The first Covid-19 cases in Bangladesh were confirmed by the Ministry of Health on 8 March 2020. Around a week later, the Ministry of Education closed all educational institutions to prevent the pandemic from spreading, and except for madrasas (Islamic religious schools) they continued to be closed throughout the entire year. From the end of March until 30 May, the government declared a public holiday, closing government offices, non-essential businesses and restricting movements. This ended at the end of May despite a rise in Covid-19 cases and infection rates peaking in July/August. Since then, infection rates have decreased to a relatively stable level, while testing capacity has been scaled up.\textsuperscript{40} At the time of writing, most national containment measures are lifted except for the continued need to wear masks and schools closures\textsuperscript{41} in fear of a surge in cases.
As a consequence of the pandemic, economic growth in Bangladesh in 2020 has reduced and poverty increased. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) records real economic growth in 2020 at 3.8%, which is a drop of over 4 percentage points from 2019. Noting the uncertainty of projecting in the future, it however also expects the economy to climb back to 7.9% real growth in 2022. Still, the General Economic Division estimates that Bangladesh’s poverty rate has risen to 30% as of June 2020, which would be an 8% increase from 2018. Particularly affected by the lockdown measures are people working in the informal economy, while the garment industry – representing over 80% of Bangladesh’s exports – has been hit hard by the disruption of global trade.

The timings of cyclone Amphan and the monsoon floods affecting Bangladesh during the months of peak Covid-19 infection rates caused additional needs and made the response more difficult to implement. Livelihoods already affected by the lockdown and its economic ripple effects were put under further stress by these natural hazards. Physical distancing measures were extremely difficult to maintain in cyclone shelters and made the response more challenging. Given the pandemic context, the ability for international organisations to increase their response was also limited.

Covid-19 has also detracted from development planning and programming and caused greater needs in the Cox’s Bazar district. The government lockdown suspended ‘non-essential’ programmes, limiting activities in the district to primarily humanitarian responses in the form of emergency food and medical services. In addition, aid workers faced additional restrictions on travel to the camps. Host communities have been badly hit economically, also by additional stress on the tourism sector through the pandemic. The district administration expects over 700,000 people to be affected by unemployment as consequence of Covid-19 related restrictions. This has heightened fears over resource scarcity and food insecurity, which a recent study finds to be one of the most severe consequences of the pandemic in the district for host and refugee adolescents alike.

Domestic public resources

The Government of Bangladesh has one of the world’s lowest public expenditures as a share of its national income. It is measured at 15% of GDP by the IMF in 2020 and has remained between 13% and 15% since 2008. This is due to also having one of the lowest revenue-to-GDP ratios, with tax levels below the average for countries at a similar stage of economic development. However in the context of consistent and significant economic growth, this means the government was able to sustain or even expand its investments in crisis resilience, risk reduction and response.

Social protection programmes in Bangladesh are highly fragmented and criticised for poor targeting, despite their importance for the government’s pro-poor growth plans. Social protection in Bangladesh is enshrined in the country’s constitution and an important aspect of the government’s five year plans to make economic growth pro-poor and inclusive. To that end there are over 100 different social protection programmes in Bangladesh that are spread across more than 20 line ministries, leading to a fragmented implementation and coordination structure. The National Social Security
Strategy initiated by the government in 2015 intends to consolidate these programmes and rationalise the number of actors involved, although much remains to be done. The government’s expenditure on social safety net programmes has grown significantly over time in terms of volumes in line with national income, while remaining at a relatively consistent level of between 2% and 2.5% of GDP since 2010. Several studies have, however, identified problems of low coverage and poor targeting with social safety nets, which lead to relatively small effects on poverty reduction. This has posed a challenge for the Covid-19 response.

The Government of Bangladesh has made substantial investments in DRR across multiple ministries. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief has the primary responsibility for developing and executing the country’s disaster management plan. Its allocated budget increased by almost 75% between the 2018 and 2020 fiscal years from US$700 million to US$1.2 billion, and it remains at a slightly lower level of US$1.0 billion in the budget for the 2021 fiscal year. The expenditure on projects relevant to DRR and disaster preparedness is further spread across multiple ministries. The government’s Planning Commission identifies six ministries implementing 165 projects related to DRR between 2011 and 2015. While this reflects a cross-departmental commitment to DRR, it also highlights the challenge of effective coordination across the government and between the government and other development actors focused on DRR.

While it is challenging to quantify domestic funding allocated by the Government of Bangladesh to the Rohingya refugee response, according to the information available its volume seems limited. Since 2017 the government contributed a total of US$42 million to the different JRPs according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data. US$35 million of this went to the WFP in 2020 to support food security. The government also agreed to provide US$20 million as co-financing to the ADB’s Emergency Assistance Project in Cox’s Bazar district. The 2020 JRP makes it clear that, while the government provides leadership to the response, it is primarily implemented by humanitarian partners with the refugees and host communities and complemented by development partners operating alongside the plan. There is some evidence available on the size of the government’s investment in preparing the previously uninhabited island Bhasan Char for the relocation of some 100,000 Rohingya refugees, which amounts to US$269 million. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent this funding will benefit the response; the UN requires an independent technical and protection assessment of the island’s safety for refugees, ensuring the protection of the rights and quality of lives of refugees, before agreeing to engage operationally with the government’s initiative. It is also challenging to quantify subnational budget allocations in the absence of publicly available data. As the ongoing conceptualisation of the District Development and Growth Plan (DDGP) progresses (more detail under ‘Coordination, prioritisation and planning’ below), this might however change and provide greater insight to the funding provided by the government to different sectors and populations in the district. Nevertheless, the UN has highlighted the generosity of the Government and the population of Bangladesh in receiving and hosting Rohingya refugees. Their willingness to accommodate this sizeable population of refugees – although with a continued emphasis of repatriation – is not to be understated.
In response to the Covid-19 pandemic and as of November 2020, the Government of Bangladesh announced 19 stimulus packages to alleviate stress on the population and economy. According to an analysis by the Centre for Policy Dialogue, this represents 3.7% of GDP. While sizable, the extent of the government’s support relative to GDP ranks Bangladesh 22nd out of 31 Asian countries. Most of these packages support the most affected sectors and industries, including export-oriented manufacturing, small and medium-sized enterprises, and agriculture. While some stimulus packages explicitly target vulnerable people, such as the extreme poor and the homeless, their financial scale is comparatively small. The Centre for Policy Dialogue therefore identifies inadequacies in the design of stimulus packages and social safety net measures in terms of reaching the most vulnerable people. The section below contains a brief summary of international assistance seeking to fill those gaps.

The international financing landscape

Composition of official development assistance

Official development assistance (ODA) to Bangladesh grew significantly over the last decade, from US$2.0 billion in 2010 to a record high of US$5.5 billion in 2019 (Figure 2). Bangladesh was the second largest ODA recipient in volume terms in 2019 (out of 143 recipients of ODA that year). ODA made up 1.8% of Bangladesh’s GDP in 2019, which is significantly greater than the weighted average for developing countries of 0.6%. The leading sectors for ODA to Bangladesh in 2019 were economic infrastructure and services (energy, transport and storage, banking and business) and social infrastructure and services (health, social protection, education, governance and security, and water, sanitation and hygiene). Funding to economic infrastructure and services grew almost five-fold over the last decade from US$337 million in 2010 to US$1.6 billion in 2019. This was driven by large amounts of assistance provided to the transport sector, including road and rail infrastructure, and to energy generation and distribution. ODA to social infrastructure and services more than doubled over the last decade to US$2.3 billion in 2019. Here the largest increase in terms of volumes since 2010 was witnessed by the education sector, receiving US$699 million in 2019. Support to social protection almost doubled from 2018 to 2019, reaching US$227 million.
The increase in total ODA to Bangladesh was accompanied by a notable shift from grants to concessional loans. Between 2010 and 2019, ODA loans to Bangladesh increased almost five-fold from US$755 million to US$3.7 billion. Loans are now the prominent finance type of ODA to Bangladesh, making up 67% of the total received in 2019, up from 37% in 2010 (Figure 3). Even though the proportion of grants as a share of total ODA to Bangladesh decreased, their volume increased from US$1.3 billion in 2010 to US$1.9 billion in 2019. The three main providers of concessional loans were also the three largest donors of ODA to Bangladesh over the last decade: the World Bank’s International Development Association (28% of total ODA between 2010 and 2019), Japan (19%) and the ADB (11%). The three next largest donors of total ODA to Bangladesh were the largest providers of ODA grants: the UK (8%), US (7%) and EU (4%).

Despite the significant increase in loans taken on by the Government of Bangladesh in recent years, a joint debt sustainability analysis in 2020 by the World Bank and IMF60 concluded that the overall risk of debt distress for the country is low. The debt sustainability analysis takes into account the macroeconomic shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and notes that it leaves the ratio of external public and publicly guaranteed debt to GDP over the long term at a broadly similar level compared with pre-Covid-19 projections. Other sources with even stricter criteria for debt crises61 share this assessment and also could not identify any risk of debt distress for...
2020. This favourable position might be one reason why the government has so far decided not to participate in the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. World Bank data shows that this would result in a temporary suspension of debt service of the equivalent of only 0.1% of GDP.62 This is due to MDBs making up almost three-quarters of outstanding debt repayments between May and December 2020. MDBs are unable to participate in a comparable scheme or they would lose their credit rating, but instead they support the pandemic response through concessional loans (see ‘International funding for the Covid-19 response’ sub-section below).

**Figure 3: ODA grants and loans as percentage of total ODA, 2010–2019**

Sources: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data.

Notes: Data is in constant 2018 prices.

**International funding for DRR, management and response**

Bangladesh was the second largest recipient of ODA to DRR globally in 2018, receiving US$138 million (11% of the global total).63 Based on 2019 data and including humanitarian funding directed to multi-hazard response preparedness, Bangladesh received a total of US$264 million in ODA to disaster preparedness and risk reduction, representing 5% of total ODA received that year. The largest bilateral donors of this funding in 2019 were the EU, UK, US, Sweden, Netherlands and Japan. MDBs also play a major role in climate resilience and DRR efforts in Bangladesh. Since 2007, the World Bank has invested over US$1.4 billion in disaster risk and climate resilience programmes in Bangladesh, including rehabilitating coastal embankments, construction and improvement of cyclone shelters, improving the disaster resilience of urban infrastructure and strengthening weather forecasting systems.64 The ADB has made climate resilience, DRR and environmental sustainability a strategic priority across the entire Asia and
Pacific region. It approved over $36 billion in climate financing to the region between 2011 and 2019 and is aiming to increase this to US$80 billion for 2019–2030. In terms of ODA for DRR to Bangladesh, the ADB has consistently provided between US$15 and US$35 million per annum over the last six years.

The UN and bilateral donors support the government by filling gaps in the emergency response with humanitarian assistance. The Humanitarian Coordination Task Team (HCTT) – co-led by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (UNRCO) – coordinates humanitarian disaster preparedness, response and capacity building in Bangladesh. It has in recent years issued response plans to support flood and cyclone responses. The international humanitarian response acts as surge capacity to complement that of the national and local governments and Bangladeshi civil society. Between 2016 and 2019, those response plans had a relatively small volume of requirements, ranging between US$7 and US$27 million. It is difficult to track to what extent those requirements were met over the years, as those plans are not tracked in the UN OCHA’s FTS. Total humanitarian funding to Bangladesh prior to the Rohingya refugee crisis, however, consistently ranged between US$31 and US$67 million since 2009. Requirements for and funding to the intersectoral response to Covid-19, the 2020 floods and cyclone Amphan are tracked in the FTS. Of the US$60 million received so far against requirements of US$206 million, over 90% is for the Covid-19 response. The HCTT’s own monitoring dashboard for the monsoon response indicated that by the end of November 2020 it had received US$12 million in funding – a 70% funding gap. By August 2020 the response to cyclone Amphan received US$11 million or 48% of its requirements. There is a clear division of labour between international humanitarian actors and domestic authorities in terms of implementing disaster response, with an increasing shift towards anticipatory action. This is explored in greater detail in the different sections below.

International funding to the Rohingya refugee response

Humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh has grown substantially in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. This applies both in terms of total volumes, from US$105 million in 2010 to US$810 million in 2019, and as a share of the total ODA to Bangladesh, from 5% in 2010 to 15% in 2019. While OECD DAC data for 2020 ODA is currently unavailable, the UN OCHA FTS data shows that the volumes of humanitarian funding to Bangladesh have declined slightly in 2020 to US$766 million. Despite the large volumes of humanitarian funding in recent years, the funding gap for the JRP’s requirements widened in 2020. After three years of almost three-quarters of requirements met between 2017 and 2019 (higher than the average for response plans globally), only 58% of requirements were met in 2020. The effect of the Rohingya refugee crisis on the share of humanitarian assistance of total ODA is evident in Figure 4, as it starts to increase in 2017 with the onset of the crisis to reach its peak in 2019. The composition of humanitarian ODA has shifted from a focus on disaster preparedness before the Rohingya refugee crisis in 2017 to the provision of services, food and other material assistance. Still, multi-hazard response preparedness received its largest amount of funding yet in 2019 at US$149 million.
The very small share of ODA to Bangladesh with the primary purpose of civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution has been scaled up slightly following the Rohingya refugee influx. Between 2015 and 2017, OECD DAC members and multilateral donors provided between US$1 million and US$3 million for the promotion of intercommunal peace as a primary objective. This increased to US$13 million in 2018 and US$10 million in 2019. Despite the large relative increase of funding to civilian peacebuilding and conflict prevention, it only represented 0.3% and 0.2% of total ODA to Bangladesh in each year, respectively (Figure 4). Also, not all of this funding is in direct response to tensions caused by the Rohingya refugee crisis. Around a quarter across both years is in support of activities that according to project descriptions aim to prevent or counter violent extremism. According to interviewees there is, however, a greater amount of funding that at least partially addresses intercommunal peace in the Cox’s Bazar district than is visible on the OECD DAC portal, which includes social cohesion alongside other objectives (such as livelihoods) and therefore is likely to be reported under different purpose codes.

Figure 4: ODA to humanitarian, peace and development, 2010–2019

The World Bank and ADB have mobilised substantial resources to support longer term needs in Cox’s Bazar. Since 2018, the World Bank has approved US$590 million in grants to assist the Government of Bangladesh to deal with the refugee influx under the International Development Association (IDA)18 Refugee Sub-Window (RSW). ADB made its first ever contribution to a refugee response, approving a US$100 million grant in 2018 as the first phase of a proposed US$200 million package. This fulfilled the government’s extraordinary request for grant assistance for the crisis response.70
Bilateral donors, the EU and global funds have provided targeted development assistance to Cox’s Bazar district since 2017, although tracking it accurately is difficult. The ISCG – the coordination body for the humanitarian community including non-governmental organisations part of the Rohingya refugee response – estimates that since August 2017 these actors have contributed at least US$454 million as support to host communities. An estimated US$280 million of this funding (over 70%) was outside of the JRP.\textsuperscript{71} This does not include all development support in the district, for example it excludes national-level development programmes implemented in the district and softly earmarked contributions to international organisations that benefit both refugees and host communities. Aside from information on crisis-specific development contributions from the World Bank or ADB, or the ISCG’s estimations mentioned above, there is a lack of data on development assistance disaggregated subnationally. It is therefore difficult to quantify the total amount of development assistance benefiting the host communities and to map out development activities in Cox’s Bazar district – or even in the Teknaf and Ukhiya sub-districts, where the refugee camps are located. While the Aid Management System in Bangladesh can capture the location of projects down to the sub-district level, the commitments and disbursements are only provided as totals for each project and budgets are not disaggregated by location.

**International funding for the Covid-19 response**

Bangladesh received significant international financial support from MDBs and the IMF in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. As of December 2020, MDBs and the IMF had approved a total of US$2.4 billion in funding to support the Bangladeshi government, of which US$2.0 billion has already been disbursed.\textsuperscript{72} This includes significant support from the ADB, IMF and World Bank. The first loans by the World Bank and ADB targeted the health sector, followed up by additional loans shortly thereafter to mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic. The credit provided by the IMF also intended to finance health and social protection measures and alleviate fiscal strain.

Grant funding to the Covid-19 response in 2020 seems equally balanced between development and humanitarian assistance. Since March 2020, a total of US$345 million in grants was provided to a range of actors in Bangladesh to support their Covid-19 response. This is US$186 million reported as humanitarian and US$159 million reported as development funding. Figure 5 shows the monthly grant contributions to the Covid-19 response alongside monthly data of new confirmed Covid-19 cases. It shows funding following a similar pattern as the two waves of the pandemic. Between March and May 2020 it seems that funding was ahead of the peak of new monthly cases; however, development funding during this time period is to be interpreted with caution as it may include annual tranches of funding to activities that only later in the year incorporated components to address the pandemic. Also, donors each choose their own approach on how to classify activities as related to Covid-19, which differ in the breadth of projects covered. However, funding for the humanitarian response to Covid-19 fell significantly short of requirements in 2020. Only a third of required funding was provided for the pandemic response both in Cox’s Bazar district and in the rest of the country by the end of the year, leaving a significant shortfall.\textsuperscript{73}
Figure 5: New confirmed Covid-19 cases by month and grant funding to the Covid-19 response in Bangladesh, 2020

Source: Development Initiatives based on data compiled by the Johns Hopkins University (downloaded 15 January 2021), UN OCHA FTS and International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) data.

Notes: IATI data here consists of transaction data extracted from the Covid-19 tracking prototype and was downloaded on 8 January 2021. Double-counting between IATI and FTS data was avoided where possible. Only disbursements are included from IATI data and both commitments and disbursements from UN OCHA FTS, given that not all committed flows on UN OCHA FTS are updated when disbursed. Data is in current prices.
Policy and strategy

This section identifies existing policy and strategy frameworks in Bangladesh that are relevant to socioeconomic development and crisis responses. It examines to what extent and how these frameworks address and enable integration of international development and humanitarian assistance. The government’s national development plans make little reference to the Rohingya refugee crisis, but they do emphasise the importance of disaster management. This is reinforced in various national strategic guidance documents on disaster management, which are reportedly rarely referenced by international development actors. While the UN has made progress in Bangladesh in formalising collaboration across the nexus on disaster management, this process is mostly led by humanitarian actors. In the context of the Rohingya refugee crisis, it is challenging for humanitarian and development actors to comprehensively address long-term needs for refugee and host communities in the absence of a multi-year strategy, which is politically not viable with the government. The DDG for Cox’s Bazar has the potential to address this gap, but its formulation has faced delays and expectations are mixed on its ability to provide coherence for the development assistance to the district.

The response strategy for Covid-19 is nationally led by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. In Cox’s Bazar district, the humanitarian community, coordinated by the ISCG, has supported the government’s Covid-19 prevention and response efforts. Humanitarian agencies have consequently expanded their relief to host communities in the district. The UN’s national socioeconomic response strategy to Covid-19 emphasises the need to simultaneously plan and implement programming across the HDP nexus, but it is too early to assess its success.

National development policy and strategy

The national development plans in Bangladesh emphasise the importance of disaster management and seek to decentralise it, but they make little reference to the Rohingya refugee crisis. The Government of Bangladesh adopted its first five-year development plan in 1973 and is currently implementing its seventh five-year plan (2016–2020). Its overarching goal is to achieve just, equitable and inclusive economic growth while protecting the environment. In section 14 on social protection it also includes directives on disaster management. The plan highlights that disaster management of natural hazards in Bangladesh spans from reducing risks to implementing response and recovery. The corresponding policies are explored in more detail below. It also notices the frequent absence of disaster management in local government planning processes and consequently aspires for the local governments to achieve self-reliance in their disaster preparedness, recovery and response. The seventh five-year plan was formulated before the influx of Rohingya refugees and therefore does not include detail on the government’s refugee response. The eighth five-year plan (2021–2025) was approved with delay due to Covid-19 in late December 2020. It reinforces the government position to repatriate the Rohingya population in a dignified and sustainable manner, and until then to provide them with humanitarian assistance in partnership with the international community.
Disaster management continues to be part of the plan; for example, it seeks to integrate DRR and climate change adaptation across ministries, build on lessons from the Covid-19 response to ensure the continued delivery of basic services, and make social safety nets more shock responsive.

**Disaster management policy and strategy**

The Government of Bangladesh’s approach to disaster management has progressed significantly in recent decades and emphasises the need for development plans to be risk informed, but this guidance is rarely referenced by international development agencies. Since 2010, the Government of Bangladesh’s strategic approach has been guided by multi-year national plans for disaster management, which are aligned with the national development plan and regional and international frameworks. The current National Plan for Disaster Management for 2016–2020 is aligned with the seventh five-year plan, and many of its core targets will be implemented before 2030. It explicitly recognises linkages between disasters and development, stating that the former are often the outcome of inadequate development choices and can undo years of development gains. It underlines that “development and investment plans should be risk-informed based on disaster risk assessments and avoid generating new risks or exacerbating existing ones” (p. iii).

The recently approved National Plan for Disaster Management for 2021–2025 reemphasises the importance of DRR as a shared responsibility across all ministries, and it places additional focus on building disaster resilience. In addition, over the last decade, Bangladesh has developed a strong policy and regulatory framework for disasters, which includes Standing Orders on Disaster (2019), National Disaster Management Policy (2015) and the Disaster Management Act (2012).

Due to Covid-19, it has been challenging for the formulation of the most recent National Plan for Disaster Management to widely engage with development partners and civil society. Therefore to enhance the uptake with those stakeholders, it will be required from the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief to invest into socialising the plan’s ambitions with those actors for effective implementation. Interviewees also noted that the Standing Orders on Disaster provide a clear reference point on the division of responsibilities in coordination and implementation in the event of natural hazards.

Like many other countries, Bangladesh has learnt due to Covid-19 that it is vital to shift policy focus from single hazards to systemic risk. This implies that there is a greater need to align the Standing Orders on Disaster with the Disease Prevention Act 2018. It was also noted that decentralisation of disaster management is challenging with limited planning and technical capacity in some local government offices, given the otherwise centralised nature of government planning.

The UN has made progress in formalising collaboration across the humanitarian–development nexus in disaster preparedness and response, with a focus on anticipatory action, although leadership for this agenda still rests with humanitarians rather than development actors. The recently published handbook Humanitarian Coordination and Collaboration in Bangladesh affirms its commitment on reinforcing national and local systems, working towards collective outcomes and anticipating crises if possible. The Strategic Preparedness for Response and Resilience approach in Bangladesh operationalises a collaborative crisis preparedness and response model through a cycle of impact and risk analysis, prioritisation, assessments of institutional capacity and action plans. Each step is outlined in a way that spans the
humanitarian-development nexus, involving a range of actors, needs and activities. While emphasising the need to harness disaster resilience and development gains, the HCTT – co-led by the UNRCO and Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief – remains in charge of the process. The national cluster system is endorsed in the 2019 Standing Orders on Disasters. It thereby provides legitimacy and clear avenues for the international community to strengthen its collaboration with the national authorities on disaster management. The additional focus on anticipatory action in Bangladesh represents another shift towards protecting livelihoods and reducing the need for potentially slow and less cost-efficient humanitarian relief after a disaster (Figure 6). As will be discussed below in the context of coordination, prioritisation and planning, this strategic focus on anticipatory action has already translated in 2020 into concrete contingency plans for climate-related disasters in the context of Covid-19. The ‘programming’ section will contain an example of anticipatory action programmes in response to the 2020 monsoon floods.

Figure 6: Traditional versus anticipatory humanitarian response

Rohingya refugee response policy and strategy

To effectively address the medium and longer term needs of displaced and host communities in Cox’s Bazar, a multi-year strategy for the humanitarian and development response is required; however, this is politically sensitive to the government. After a preliminary response plan was developed by the ISCG in coordination with the Government of Bangladesh and the humanitarian community in September 2017, annual JRP s have since March 2018 provided the strategic framework for international support to the crisis response. The JRP priorities in 2020, guided by the Government of Bangladesh, continued to be primarily humanitarian with a focus on protection for Rohingya refugees and the provision of life-saving assistance. However, two of the four strategic objectives are longer term: to foster the wellbeing of host communities in the Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts and work towards sustainable solutions in Myanmar. The former includes a range of development activities such as capacity building for the provision of basic services, livelihood generation through skills development and environmental rehabilitation. The ambition is to transition these into the DDGP, once fully formulated and endorsed. This multi-sectoral support to host communities within the JRP has evolved over the years. In 2018 in the context of funding gaps, assistance to host communities was ‘scattered and limited’ (p. 21), with only 20% of the target host population benefiting, and efforts to strengthen social cohesion and resilience were ‘ad hoc’ (p. 31). This improved in 2019, also benefiting from greater engagement from development actors with host communities, although in 2020 the socioeconomic effects of Covid-19 on vulnerable Bangladeshi households exacerbated inter-community tensions. It is, however, challenging to sufficiently address longer term needs of host communities within annual planning cycles. In terms of assistance provided to the Rohingya refugees, single-year plans militate against addressing immediate needs in a way that enables a sustainable transition towards less reliance on emergency relief. However, as noted by the International Crisis Group, the government’s strong stance on repatriation has so far opposed multi-year planning for the crisis response and restricted activities that would work towards self-reliance of the refugees. This is because it believes this would signal willingness to accommodate refugees over the long term. The Government of Bangladesh believes that openly and publicly planning for Rohingya refugees to remain in Bangladesh over the medium to long term would relax international pressure on the Myanmar government to enable conditions for a safe and dignified return. The government is also concerned about encouraging a further wave of migration if the conditions for Rohingya refugees improve and they are allowed to integrate into Bangladeshi society. Finally, the government is concerned that relaxing its stance on repatriation would be politically unpopular domestically.

The visibility and complementarity of development support in Cox’s Bazar is limited due to the lack of a common strategic framework and formal coordination process; the DDGP has the potential to overcome these obstacles but the extent to which it will address the needs of refugees is unclear. The DDGP has the potential to provide the first strategic framework for a coordinated development response in the Cox’s Bazar district, although the planning process has been delayed for a number of reasons (see ‘Coordination, prioritisation and planning’ section). While MDBs and bilateral donors have provided targeted development assistance to host and refugee communities in Cox’s Bazar district since 2018 (see ‘International funding to the Rohingya refugee...’
In the previous section, these efforts lack a shared strategic framework and formal coordination. Interviewees noted that ad hoc dialogue between bilateral donors can fill this coordination gap only to a certain extent. It remains to be seen to what extent the DDGP, once formulated, will also address the longer term needs in the camps, as its project priorities have likely evolved since the first phase of the planning process. However, the longer term way of working for MDBs has shifted the government’s stance to be more accepting of long-term activities in camps (see ‘Partnerships’ section). Even if the DDGP does not include longer term objectives for activities in the camps, it still has the potential to provide a structure for a complementary development response in lieu of a fully joined-up framework in Cox’s Bazar district.

Covid-19 pandemic response strategy

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare leads on the government’s response strategy to Covid-19, which includes a range of national and international actors. In Cox’s Bazar district, the humanitarian community, coordinated by the ISCG, has supported the government’s Covid-19 prevention and response efforts. The government published the Bangladesh Preparedness and Response Plan for Covid-19 in July 2020. It was prepared by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which also leads on coordination and the response strategy. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief is scarcely mentioned in the plan and therefore does not seem to play a significant role in the strategic formation of the government’s Covid-19 response. The number of partners for the different pillars in the plan is a range of government departments, UN agencies, bilateral donors, MDBs, international NGOs and a number of Bangladesh civil society organisations (CSOs).

While the government’s plan states that it covers Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox’s Bazar, it makes clear that the ISCG has prepared the strategic priorities and coordinates the support of the humanitarian community to the government in the district.

Some interviewees have questioned the burden sharing between humanitarian and development actors in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, with humanitarian agencies in Cox’s Bazar district increasing their caseload to fill gaps in the social safety net programmes. In consultation with the Government of Bangladesh and the humanitarian community, the ISCG issued an addendum to the 2020 JRP in July 2020 in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic. It targeted an additional 509,000 members of the host community (bringing the total number up to 953,000) and the same number of 860,000 Rohingya refugees. Most of the additional financial requirements of US$181 million were in the health sector, followed by food security. Some interviewees observed that the expansion of relief provision to a greater number of host community members, including the distribution of food and cash to almost one million vulnerable Bangladeshi households across Cox’s Bazar district, represented a step back in terms of the transition from internationally led humanitarian relief to a government-led response facilitated through long-term development support. The insufficient coverage of social safety net programmes in the district meant the government could not have responded as quickly with the same reach. Humanitarian actors therefore understandably sought to fulfil their mandate by expanding their emergency assistance in coordination with the District Deputy Commissioner’s Office, given their presence in the district and rising needs due to
Covid-19. Still, this shows that long-term strategic guidance on how to successfully transition from externally provided humanitarian relief to government-led, shock-responsive assistance requires renewed attention.

The UN’s Immediate Socioeconomic Response to Covid-19 strategy highlights the need to plan and implement across humanitarian, development and peace objectives simultaneously and not consecutively, but it is too early to assess its impact. The strategic framework includes social protection as a pillar for the Covid-19 response alongside other key interventions that focus on health, economic recovery, macroeconomic response, social cohesion and community-led response. All UN agencies involved with the Rohingya response participate across all of these response areas. The plan highlights that the Covid-19 pandemic and compounding challenges in the Cox’s Bazar district reinforce the need to plan and implement across humanitarian, development and peace objectives simultaneously and not consecutively. Unfortunately, this research took place too early to generate meaningful learnings on the extent to which the UN succeeded in this regard, although it will be key for the actors involved to identify gaps and opportunities in preparation for future crisis shocks.
Partnerships

This section investigates how development actors in Bangladesh worked with the government and with CSOs to support livelihoods, recovery and longer term development in crises. The Government of Bangladesh has received the largest share of ODA for development activities in Bangladesh in recent years, largely in the form of concessional loans from MDBs and Japan. Local and national NGOs have received a much smaller share of international assistance directly, and transparency is lacking on volumes received indirectly, although efforts are ongoing to rectify this. Bilateral development donors support the government on disaster management in different ways, through strategic alignment, technical assistance or direct funding. The Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief implements the centrally set policy on disaster management through its field offices and in partnership with NGOs and UN agencies. Local and national NGOs have long-standing experience in building community resilience and reducing disaster risk in Bangladesh, but directly accessing ODA for development activities remains challenging. With regards to the refugee crisis response in Cox’s Bazar district, MDBs have widened the response to address some development needs, even though the government still broadly opposes longer term policy changes that are perceived to disincentivise repatriation. MDBs have facilitated closer cooperation between the government and humanitarian agencies by channelling funding through the former to the latter. Some bilateral development donors and UN agencies have deepened their partnerships with the local government in Cox’s Bazar district in response to the influx of Rohingya refugees. The engagement of international actors with local and national NGOs in the district is mostly framed in humanitarian terms, with little funding available for development needs and scope to expand knowledge exchanges. Finally, the private sector in the district requires greater support from both development donors and implementers.

Partnerships with government

The Government of Bangladesh has received the largest share of ODA for development activities in Bangladesh in recent years, driven by large volumes of concessional loans from MDBs and Japan. The proportion of ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) delivered through domestic public sector institutions has almost doubled from 41% in 2010 to 78% in 2019 (Figure 7). Over 96% of this funding in 2019 was in the form of loans, mostly provided by the World Bank’s IDA, Japan and the ADB. The share of humanitarian ODA received by the Government of Bangladesh is lower and has decreased following the surge in humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya refugee response (Figure 4), down from 57% in 2016 to 17% in 2019 (Figure 7). Almost all of this humanitarian ODA to the domestic public sector in recent years was provided by the IDA and mostly targets disaster preparedness and response for natural hazards, with some disbursements for the Emergency Multi-Sector Rohingya Crisis Response Project first recorded in 2019.
Partnerships with the government on disaster management

The ways bilateral development donors work with the government on disaster management range from strategic alignment to capacity building and direct funding. All of the bilateral donors interviewed recognise the need to work with the government to achieve lasting progress on disaster management but approach this collaboration in different ways. For instance, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is restricted by internal limitations in providing funding directly to the government and local and national NGOs, but it ensures their programmes on DRR are overseen by the government in close partnership. Similar limitations apply to the European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), which holds the responsibility within the EU for providing assistance for disaster preparedness but is unable to directly fund the government. Support is instead provided by seconding staff to relevant line ministries and by providing technical assistance. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has three modalities for development assistance that involve the government to varying degrees. Grant assistance is managed and controlled by JICA and handed over to the government once fully implemented. Technical support is provided to the government in the form of consultants hired and managed by JICA. Finally, concessional loans are provided directly to the government, which is then in charge of implementation with support from JICA. This allows JICA to select a modality with the appropriate level of government engagement depending on the development needs and project requirements. As noted by a donor interviewee,
sustainable development requires an effectively functioning public sector and therefore finding ways to work with the government through direct support or advocacy efforts is indispensable to achieve it.

The Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief centrally sets the disaster preparedness policy, which is locally implemented by its field offices together with support from UN agencies and NGOs. The policies set by the ministry’s central office largely focus on long-term preparedness and risk reduction. Target locations are selected based on geographic indicators of vulnerability to natural hazards. In terms of assistance directly provided to affected people, the ministry’s field offices decide who will receive support and in which form. The field offices are also the first responders to any disaster, using a pool of volunteers that assist with disaster management by, for example, facilitating evacuations. They work in close partnership with local and national NGOs and UN agencies on programme design and implementation. For instance, UNDP assists the central ministry with developing national disaster management plans and provides assistance for prevention and recovery through its DRR facility, which involves the government in the decision-making process.

Partnerships with the government on the Rohingya refugee response

The World Bank and ADB is gradually shifting the emphasis towards longer term needs within the refugee response through their long-standing partnership with the government. Both institutions have supported the Government of Bangladesh through sizable financial contributions and technical assistance for decades. The resulting trust, combined with leverage due to large national funding portfolios and the ability to mobilise substantial resources, has placed MDBs in a unique position to influence the government’s approach to the refugee response. As outlined above, the Government of Bangladesh maintains its focus on repatriation and has opposed longer term policy changes for refugees that could reduce their reliance on humanitarian assistance. It has, however, shown its openness for dialogue when presented with longer term solutions that could be replicated in other parts of the country, such as infrastructure initiatives in the camps supported by the ADB. The government has so far received US$690 million in grants from MDBs for longer term needs in Cox’s Bazar district (see the ‘International financing landscape’ sub-section) and provides co-financing for some activities. These funds provide support to a range of sectors, including water and sanitation, health, social assistance, infrastructure and DRR. The government has also signalled openness to receive loans for infrastructure projects in the district, despite its reluctance so far to accept loans for the refugee response. Beyond substantial financial contributions, the technical assistance provided by the World Bank and ADB as an integral part of their support to the government ensures long-term viability and increases buy-in from the national authorities. Interviewees from humanitarian agencies operating in the camps welcome the socioeconomic lens through which MDBs approach the refugee crisis as it complements the protection-focused approach of humanitarian actors. They also note that MDBs are best placed to work towards the integration of assistance to host and refugee communities into national social protection systems, given they already work with the government on these systems nationally.
The MDB’s way of operating and funding has incentivised closer cooperation between government ministries and humanitarian implementers in the camps. The WFP, for instance, engages on projects that provide assistance to Rohingya refugees that were originally funded by the World Bank and the ADB. The ADB coordinated with the WFP to set up 10 food distribution centres in the camps. It also actively participated in meetings facilitated through the ISCG site management sector with the local government and humanitarian agencies to discuss the construction of emergency access roads.\(^9\) The World Bank allocated funding to the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, which in turn is using the WFP as third-party executing agency to implement cash-for-work and conditional cash-transfer activities in the camps.\(^8\) Given that the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief also received large volumes of funding for the provision of public services in the district under the same project, it is actively leading on it – much more so than on other parts of the refugee response in the district where humanitarian agencies usually take the lead with government oversight. The MDB’s way of providing funding directly to the government, which then might choose to channel it through contractors or humanitarian agencies, therefore fostered close cooperation between these stakeholders, at least under the respective projects. Even though interviewees from humanitarian agencies noted that the bureaucratic process to establish a funding partnership with an MDB takes more time than with other donors, these partnerships are greatly valued once in place due to their longevity and the substantial funding resulting from them. Partnership models between MDBs, the government and humanitarian UN agencies should therefore be built on and replicated where appropriate and while safeguarding humanitarian principles.

In response to the localised Rohingya refugee crisis, some bilateral development donors and UN agencies have deepened their partnerships with the local government in Cox’s Bazar district. The UN in Bangladesh, with technical leadership from UNDP, and the World Bank have worked closely with the District Deputy Commissioner’s office to conceptualise the DDGP (see the ‘Coordination of development support to Cox’s Bazar district’ sub-section) and UNDP further supports union-level planning. JICA provides technical support to local governments in Bangladesh for the development of sub-district five-year development plans, including on DRR (Box 2). This covers two sub-districts in the Cox’s Bazar district, Teknaf and Ukhiya, increasing allocation to the them following the Rohingya Refugee influx. However, efforts from these development actors target different levels of local government in Cox’s Bazar district, and it is unclear to what extent they complement each other. Greater coherence of those activities through, for example, the DDGP (once fully formulated and operational) or ad hoc coordination would benefit the evolution of local government capacity from operational to planning entities.
Box 2: JICA’s capacity building efforts for sub-districts

The Government of Bangladesh has worked over the last decade to decentralise its highly centralised public administrative system by strengthening local governments, in line with the responsibilities of local governments outlined in its constitution. In light of these efforts, JICA agreed with the government in December 2015 to launch the Upazila Governance and Development Project, financed by a loan provided to the government. This five-year project set out to promote the decentralisation efforts by financing tailored infrastructure development in a number of sub-districts and implement capacity-building measures with local government officials to improve public service delivery. Building on this project, the Government of Bangladesh requested additional support in the form of technical cooperation that would enable sub-districts to formulate and implement their own five-year development plans, broken down into separate annual plans. JICA responded to this with the Upazila Integrated Capacity Development Project in July 2017. The purpose of this project was to establish a framework for development planning at the sub-district level including model development plans, guidelines, monitoring systems and training facilities to convey this knowledge. The two sub-districts most affected by the Rohingya refugee influx (Teknaf and Ukhiya) were among the ten sub-districts selected to pilot these five-year plans. In reaction to the refugee influx, the budgetary allocation for these two sub-districts was increased, demonstrating JICA’s responsiveness to the changing crisis context.

Partnerships with civil society

National NGOs in Bangladesh receive a small share of ODA for development activities from bilateral donors and multilateral core expenditure, while transparency on the received volume of sub-grants is lacking. From this group of international donors, national NGOs received between 3% and 5% of ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) over the last five years with available data (Figure 8). This is lower than during the previous five years when that share ranged from 7% to 10%. Most of this funding was provided to the education and health sectors, with the UK, Global Fund and Australia as the largest donors. For humanitarian ODA, the proportion of funding provided directly to national NGOs is even lower at between 0.1% and 0.7% from 2015 to 2019. However, previous research on international humanitarian funding in Bangladesh showed that, while there is little direct funding to local and national NGOs, 11% of the total reached them indirectly in 2015. Given this was before the Rohingya refugee response, for which international actors playing a large role and have attracted most direct funding, it is unclear whether these percentages still apply. It is also unclear to what extent they are transferable to international development funding, although our key informant interviews indicate that a number of development and multi-mandate implementers routinely provide sub-grants to local and national organisations. This, however, points to a data gap in tracking international financial support from international
development donors and implementers to local and national NGOs. Greater transparency is needed on indirect funding to local and national NGOs through international intermediary organisations. This could be achieved through improved reporting according to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) or by expanding the Aid Management System to include this data, for example. The Localisation Technical Working Group in Bangladesh carries out its own financial tracking process to produce evidence on the volumes of funding received by local and national NGOs, alongside its other activities around promoting the localisation agenda. It should be noted that Bangladeshi NGOs don’t have to rely on international financing because they also draw on funding from the government, national foundations, private donations and by generating income through microfinance or social enterprises. BRAC, for instance, implements disaster management and response activities through its emergency funding mechanism and generates 63% of its revenue through its microfinance programme.

### Figure 8: ODA to national NGOs in Bangladesh, 2010–2019

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data.

Notes: Data for national NGOs includes ODA channelled through the OECD DAC CRS organisation type ‘Developing country-based NGOs’ and funding to NGOs that were classified as ‘international NGOs’ but could be identified to be headquartered in Bangladesh (e.g. BRAC). Data includes all ODA from OECD DAC members and from multilateral organisations that report their core expenditure to the OECD DAC CRS. Data is in constant 2018 prices.

### Partnerships with national NGOs on disaster management

Local and national NGOs have built resilience against natural hazards and reduced disaster risk in Bangladesh alongside the government for decades, although their access to development finance is limited. In its seminal report State of Humanitarian Actions in Bangladesh 2019, the National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors Bangladesh (NAHAB) summarises the measures supporting long-term disaster management that have been pursued by civil society and the government since the country’s independence in 1971. Particular progress was made on community-based DRR, for instance through the training and capacity building of large numbers of volunteers through the Cyclone
Preparedness Programme. The focus on disaster and climate-resilient development in the government’s seventh five-year plan (see the ‘Policy and strategy’ section) is equally recognised and put into action by local and national NGOs. They adopt a long-term approach and consider themselves development organisations that supplement the work of the government at the subnational level, while also responding to disasters when they occur. They participate in a continuum of activities across the nexus that includes disaster preparedness and mitigation, emergency response and recovery. International development implementers interviewed recognise that partnering with local and national NGOs is essential to gain from local knowledge on needs, context and social dynamics in communities. Progress has been made on the humanitarian side in terms of localising disaster preparedness and response. The HCTT now includes representatives from three national organisations, including NAHAB. Enhancing local and national institutional capacities and increasing focus on local engagement are key components of the HCTT’s workplan for 2021. Lessons from the response to cyclone Amphan in 2020 find that local organisations effectively participated in the joint needs assessments. On the development side, however, an international policy agenda similar to the humanitarian localisation commitment under the Grand Bargain is lacking. Interviewees from local and national NGOs stated that the due diligence processes for development finance are extremely challenging for local organisations, given they vary by donor. One possible solution called for by interviewees is the creation of a pooled funding mechanism for local and national NGOs that funds longer term development activities in crises, alongside ongoing technical support. It could build on learnings from the Start Fund Bangladesh, which so far focuses on emergency responses only.

Partnerships with civil society on longer term needs in Cox’s Bazar district

International engagement with national NGOs on the Rohingya refugee response has primarily been framed in humanitarian terms, with less emphasis on longer term needs. Given their number and longstanding engagement across humanitarian and development needs in Bangladesh, NGOs have been an important part of the refugee response from the start. A standout example of a national NGO is BRAC’s role, given its scale of operations BRAC works in all refugee camps and manages 11 directly, and provides emergency support across multiple sectors and longer term assistance in the form of skills development and agricultural support. Interviewees however also highlighted the need to engage with local NGOs in Cox’s Bazar district and in other parts of the country for disaster response alongside large, national NGOs. Local NGOs also tend to support the local population across a range of short and long term needs. They are distinct in their potential role to support nexus approaches in that they can quickly adapt to changes in the subnational context caused by crises, as they don’t face the need to standardise their operations nationally, and often have close ties with, and thereby are accountable to, the local population. Interviewees from several local and national NGOs were clear on the extremely sensitive nature of longer term support to refugees in the camps, given existing government regulations on which forms of support are admissible (see the ‘Rohingya refugee response policy and strategy’ sub-section). This is a greater challenge for local and national NGOs than for international actors given that for many their survival relies on a healthy relationship with the government – all international funding they receive requires approval from the NGO affairs bureau. The Cox’s Bazar CSO–NGO Forum (CCNF) – established in 2017 to coordinate local and national NGO’s
activities in the district – advocates for a stronger role of local organisations in relief and development. It recognises the need for international organisations to respond in the district given the scale of the crisis, but it proposes to implement systems for knowledge and skills exchanges between international and national responders. As designated humanitarian funding to facilitate this is scarce, and given the longer term benefits of capacity convergence, development funding could fill the gap to support this process. CCNF also reported that local and national NGOs are very rarely involved in the programme design of development activities in the district and usually implement as directed by international partners. Thereby an opportunity is missed to include knowledge of the local context when designing interventions. Another local and national NGO interviewee pointed out that the funding international donors provide for their activities in the district tends to focus on short-term needs. This is often in the form of humanitarian assistance to address immediate needs of refugee and host communities or as support for the Covid-19 response to address needs in the health and water, sanitation and hygiene sectors. Long-term challenges, therefore, don’t receive sufficient international attention, such as housing for refugees, education or expanding livelihoods. Funding to scale up a longer term response by local and national NGOs from international donors is not readily available and could be increased to support longer term, localised assistance.

**Engagement of development donors and implementers with the domestic private sector has been neglected in Cox’s Bazar district, but donor support was scaled up nationally in response to the pandemic.** The refugee influx impacted the district economy in different ways. According to the Cox’s Bazar District Chamber of Commerce, locals that depended on income from the forests surrounding the camps are now unable to access them and therefore out of work. Some international organisations brought in vendors from outside Cox’s Bazar to supply goods in support of different aspects of the humanitarian response, generating pressure on local businesses. Some local businesses provide goods to the refugee response, but for others the bureaucratic procedures around tender processes are an obstacle. The tourism sector in Cox’s Bazar district has also suffered first from uncertainty around the refugee influx and in 2020 from Covid-19. The pandemic forced tourism activities to shut down for months, leaving people depending on these businesses without income and unable to repay their loans. The domestic banks are not usually open to providing bridge loans for small businesses, and the Chamber of Commerce does not have any contingency funds itself to draw on. There is hence a gap in the support provided by international development donors to sustain the private sector in Cox’s Bazar district through business emergency loan facilities, human development or new employment opportunities. At the national level, several development donors announced support to various sectors of the economy in response to the impacts of the pandemic (see the ‘International financing landscape’ sub-section). However, the private sector in Cox’s Bazar faces a double burden and therefore requires targeted development solutions.
Coordination, prioritisation and planning

This section outlines the coordination mechanisms in Bangladesh for humanitarian and development assistance to assess the potential to join up assessments, planning and delivery across the two. For both, there are different coordination bodies depending on the type of crisis (humanitarian) or sector (development). There is no designated body to bring together development and humanitarian actors at the national level, and an integrated framework for coordinating financing across the two is also absent (although in the initial stages of formation). At the district level in Cox’s Bazar, the RRRC is responsible for management and oversight of the Rohingya refugee response. The Senior Coordinator of the ISCG Secretariat in Cox’s Bazar district ensures the overall coordination of the Rohingya refugee response, including liaison with the RRRC, District Deputy Commissioner and government authorities. The Rohingya refugee response can only include a limited range of development activities in a primarily humanitarian plan. There is hope that the DDGP will eventually fill this coordination gap in Cox’s Bazar district, however the planning process has been delayed and is met with varying expectations. The government has a strong role in coordinating disaster management at the national and local levels. For international actors, separate coordination mechanisms exist for development and humanitarian activities related to natural hazards. These distinct functions are perceived to be justified, even though there is greater scope to transfer humanitarian expertise on risk assessments into development planning.

Humanitarian and development coordination

Distinct humanitarian coordination mechanisms in Bangladesh for different crisis responses, with different ministries and UN agencies involved, are challenging to integrate with separate development cooperation at the national level. There are currently three humanitarian coordination structures in Bangladesh:

1. The Rohingya response is led and coordinated by the Government of Bangladesh. For the humanitarian community, the Strategic Executive Group (SEG) provides overall guidance for the Rohingya refugee response and engages with the Government of Bangladesh at the national level, including through liaison with the National Task Force (NTF) chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant line Ministries. The NTF provides oversight and strategic guidance for the overall response. The UN Resident Coordinator, United National High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Representative and International Organization for Migration (IOM) Chief of Mission serve as the SEG co-chairs. At the field level in Cox’s Bazar, the Senior Coordinator of the ISCG Secretariat
ensures the overall coordination of the response, including liaison with the RRRC, District Deputy Commissioner and government authorities at the sub-district level. The ISCG Senior Coordinator chairs the Heads of Sub-Office Group, which brings together the heads of operational UN agencies and members of the international and Bangladeshi NGO community working on the response, as well as donor community representatives based in Cox’s Bazar. The Senior Coordinator also convenes the Sector Coordinators’ Group, to ensure inter-sector coordination in the response.\textsuperscript{109}

2. The HCTT, which meets in Dhaka, coordinates the humanitarian response to disasters caused by natural hazards and is co-led by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and the UNRCO.

3. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare coordinates the Covid-19 response with support from the WHO-led Inter-Agency Covid-19 Task Team. The HCTT also coordinates complementary humanitarian support in response to natural disasters within the pandemic. Given the fast-changing nature of the pandemic response in Bangladesh at the time of our research, we were unable to interview the actors involved and therefore coordination of the Covid-19 response is not covered in detail.

**On the development side, different forums exist for top-level strategic alignment and sectoral coordination – the latter with varying levels of engagement.** The Economic Relations Division in the Ministry of Finance is in charge of the government’s National Policy on Development Cooperation. The policy’s goal is to ensure the coherence of international development assistance to Bangladesh, its alignment with national development priorities and greater aid effectiveness.\textsuperscript{110} However, it does not explicitly cover disaster relief. The government’s Joint Cooperation Strategy further defines the institutional hierarchy of coordinating development assistance to Bangladesh. An annual Bangladesh development forum convenes government ministries and development partners to review progress and outline priorities for the coming year at a strategic level. The platform for a regular dialogue between the government and development actors is LCGs. The Joint Cooperation Strategy for 2010–2015 identifies 18 LCGs across a range of sectors and an additional six sub-working groups in the governance LCG.\textsuperscript{111} The activity of the LCGs and engagement of stakeholders, however, differs between them depending on the actors involved. A 2019 evaluation of the LCGs’ ways of working in Bangladesh found that overall their capacity to provide effective coordination between the government and development partners weakened in recent years.\textsuperscript{112} The regularity of meetings and participation declined, leading the evaluators to call for reducing the number of LCGs and to formalise their operational procedures and governance, for instance by establishing a standing secretariat that oversees the LCGs. Substantial changes to the LCG structure will be required to reinstate it as an effective development cooperation mechanism.

**Despite detailed domestic development planning and forums for international development cooperation, Bangladesh lacks a coordinated framework to bring these funding streams together.** The process of working towards an Integrated National Financing Framework to fund the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is currently underway, having started in July 2020 and scheduled to complete its first phase in 2022 with support from the Joint SDG Fund.\textsuperscript{113} The ambition is to revisit the Development Finance Assessment prepared in 2017 with a particular focus on gender, to
operationalise a gender-sensitive financing strategy for the eighth five-year plan, and to establish a coordination and monitoring mechanism between different sources of financing.\textsuperscript{114} Across these three objectives, emphasis is placed on improving the volume and effectiveness of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation. The Government of Bangladesh has a strong commitment to reaching the SDGs, and its corresponding high-level SDG committee is currently considering the inclusion of funding coordination in its terms of reference. The next step is the establishment of multi-stakeholder platforms – bringing together government ministries, national civil society, international development actors and the private sector – to align funding efforts for each of the three SDGs targeted by the Integrated National Financing Framework.\textsuperscript{115} At this stage, climate change and its impacts is a focus of one of these three SDGs. It provides an opportunity to harmonise wider resource flows, including development and humanitarian assistance, for the risk reduction and management of climate-related disasters. While the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change is the leading government ministry for the corresponding SDG, it will be crucial to involve the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and appropriate development and humanitarian actors. With regards to the Rohingya refugee crisis, funding flows to address it will not be incorporated into the framework in the near future as current plans do not yet seek to align financing for any SDG related to forced displacement. Development and humanitarian financing to support the refugee response in the Cox’s Bazar district will continue separately from a national framework, and at the district level they will be largely separate from each other. These will be through JRPs for humanitarian funding\textsuperscript{116} and eventually the DDGP (once fully formulated and operational) for development funding.

\section*{Coordination of development support to Cox’s Bazar district}

At the district level in Cox’s Bazar, the Rohingya refugee response can only include limited development activities in a primarily humanitarian plan. Immediately following the influx of refugees, a large-scale emergency response was drawn up quickly with little capacity to address consequences for the district’s development. Discussions between the ISCG and MDBs and bilateral donor development agencies, which sought to complement the JRP’s activities with development funds, started in 2018, with funding scaling up in 2019. While the JRP continues to focus on emergency relief, one of its strategic objectives focuses on the wellbeing of host communities in the Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts, thereby directly targeting development needs in the areas surrounding the camps.\textsuperscript{117} This has been well received by development actors interviewed, who expressed little interest in setting up parallel coordination structures. Coordination through the JRP, however, remains challenging for development actors that only have a country presence in Dhaka and not in Cox’s Bazar district (see the ‘Organisational issues’ section). Also, the structural development needs in the district go far beyond what could be covered through annual crisis response plans, requiring a government-led coordination mechanism that can provide long-term structure to the increasing development assistance in the region.

The joint UN and World Bank effort to support the government in developing the DDGP aims to address this gap, but the process is gradual – buy-in varies across stakeholders. In 2019, the UN in Bangladesh, with technical leadership from UNDP, started (at the request of the District Deputy Commissioner) the conceptualisation of a five-year, government-led development plan for Cox’s Bazar district. The ambition
is to streamline development support to the respective line ministries across UN agencies and other development actors in the district. The World Bank has since partnered with the UN in conceptualising the DDGP. Several interviewees recognised the need for the DDGP and welcomed the initiative. However, in practice, the process has faced challenges and is gradual. While government engagement with the process at the district level is strong through the District Deputy Commissioner, more political engagement at the national level is necessary. There is no precedent for district-level development planning in Bangladesh, meaning that it is challenging to create a new subnational development planning approach. It is also a challenge to embed this new, long-term planning process in existing local governance structures given the historically centralised nature of development planning in Bangladesh. Some interviewees felt that not all UN agencies were committed to contributing sufficiently given the amount of technical expertise required to support the various line ministries in their planning. There were further concerns that the DDGP might be a list of distinct infrastructure projects and lack a coherent strategy for the development trajectory of Cox’s Bazar district. However, the DDGP has evolved to address this, for instance through the World Bank’s forthcoming Inclusive Growth Diagnostic for the district that will highlight critical growth drivers and potential constraints for leveraging these drivers for sustainable growth. It also remains to be seen to what extent the DDGP will include long-term planning in the camps. The most recent concept submitted to the government proposes the DDGP as an inclusive, phased and multi-sectoral approach that focuses on the medium to long-term development of Cox’s Bazar district. Even though the concept for the DDGP is now with the national government and awaiting endorsement, the Covid-19 pandemic diverted attention from this process and further delayed approval. At the time of our research, it was uncertain whether, when and in what form the planning will be resumed and what implications this might have for the scope of the DDGP.

**Coordination of disaster management**

The Government of Bangladesh is committed to disaster management at the highest levels and coordinates this through structures at national and subnational levels. The National Disaster Management Council, headed by the Prime Minister, provides strategic direction, while the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief coordinates disaster management and response across all government agencies. At the subnational level, disaster management committees (at district, sub-district, union and ward level) coordinate implementation of disaster management and relief. The greatly reduced number of casualties from natural hazards in Bangladesh over the last few decades are a testament to the improved coordination and implementation of disaster management by the government and local communities.
For international actors, separate humanitarian and development mechanisms for the coordination of disaster-related activities are perceived to function well, but separation makes joint assessments and planning difficult and undermines risk-informed development planning. The HCTT is the mechanism to coordinate the preparedness and humanitarian response to natural hazards between the government, the UN and international agencies, while longer term support to DRR is coordinated through the LCG on Disaster Emergency Response (LCG-DER). Both are co-led by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and, according to interviewees, the government generally plays a stronger leadership role in the LCG than in the HCTT. Many of the same institutions participate in both the HCTT and the LCG-DER and stakeholders consulted felt that despite overlap the two groups had distinct functions and there was good information flow between the two as formalised in the HCTT’s terms of reference. For example, humanitarian multi-sectoral assessments carried out under the HCTT feed into and inform the LCG- DER’s activities. However, the LCG-DER was inactive at the time of our research, creating a gap in leadership and coordination on DRR issues. The separation of the two coordination mechanisms mirrors the separation in the international aid system between DRR and disaster relief. The HCTT is a standing mechanism – therefore called into action only to respond to particular disasters – and increasingly focused on preparedness and anticipatory action (see the ‘Programming approaches’ section). It is therefore moving closer towards a crisis financing system with a larger share of pre-agreed financing for predictable needs and based on modelable risk and less on ex-post funding as last resort. However, as pointed out by the Centre for Disaster Protection, this should be underpinned by risk-conscious development efforts. The HCTT already implements risk monitoring and warning systems in contingency plans. Consideration of these risks should be mainstreamed across development actors, which will have to provide most international support to reduce risks over the longer term. This requires a closer exchange of information on risks and coordination between the HCTT with other LCGs beyond the LCG-DER, for instance the LCGs on agriculture and rural development and on climate change and environment that are led by line ministries other than the HCTT’s primary point of contact, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief.
Programming approaches

This section explores the programming approaches employed by development actors to target crisis-affected people in Bangladesh and related challenges. It explores the extent to which risk is embedded into their programming. In Cox’s Bazar district, joint programming across development and humanitarian actors emerged to harmonise donors’ and implementers’ efforts in the absence of an integrated framework. It enables complementary assistance to host and refugee communities and thereby seeks to enhance social cohesion, although there is no shared understanding in the district on how to assess success for this common objective. It is also challenging for development actors to facilitate durable solutions for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh due to political resistance. In terms of natural hazards, Bangladesh has several well-developed disaster management and risk-reduction programmes under the government’s leadership. Disaster risk is, however, yet to be incorporated into other forms of development programming. Successful anticipatory action pilots as part of the humanitarian response might also provide an entry point for development donors to support efficient and effective disaster management. Finally, Covid-19 led to the scale-up of various social protection programmes, although gaps in coverage and targeting continue to be a concern. The pandemic, however, interrupted the implementation of other longer term programmes, revealing the links between development assistance today and future crisis risk.

HDP programming in Cox’s Bazar district

Humanitarian and development programming has largely been carried out in parallel, focusing on refugee and host communities, respectively. Most humanitarian assistance focuses on the refugees who are hosted in the camps. As outlined above, the JRP to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis includes a strategic objective on support to host communities in the two sub-districts surrounding the camps. Following its revisions due to Covid-19, it targeted a greater number of people in the host community (953,000 people) than refugees (860,000 people). Still, meeting the different needs of the host and refugee communities remain a challenge (Figure 9). As a result, shorter term humanitarian relief is insufficient to sustainably address the structural development needs of the host community. Development assistance provided by MDBs and a number of government donors (see the ‘International financing landscape’ sub-section) seeks to address this by improving infrastructure, local government capacity for public service delivery, and social safety nets, but it largely takes place outside of the JRP. The delay in the approval of the DDGP and a lack of subnational reporting on development activities make it difficult to integrate programming in Cox’s Bazar district across the nexus.
In the absence of a joint and long-term strategy on integrated programming in the district, joint programming consolidates donors’ and implementers’ efforts at the activity level to strengthen collective impact. It can also formalise cooperation across sectors and across humanitarian and development agencies, as seen in the Safe Access to Fuel and Energy Plus Livelihoods (SAFE Plus) project launched by the FAO, IOM and WFP (Box 3). This project implements an integrated response to fuel and livelihood needs for refugee and host communities, while reversing environmental degradation. Joint programming is an effective way to prevent implementing agencies in the same location from overlapping in their activities, potentially outside their remit. Several interviewees reported that due to a lack of understanding of who is operating in Cox’s Bazar district in different sectors, some development donors require their implementing partners to provide a ‘complete’ package of activities – for instance, to expand to the distribution of food packages or the provision of agricultural inputs. These demands disincentivise cooperation between agencies; while individual agencies are able to secure a greater amount of funding for multi-sectoral activities, it can increase the number of actors in each sector (with some operating outside their recognised area of expertise) and thereby lead to a fragmented response. Multi-donor funding to consortia of implementers – which can include the UN, international NGOs and national and local NGOs, alongside government departments – consolidates funding and incentivises cooperation between implementers according to their sectoral expertise.
Box 3: Joint programming to address refugee and host community fuel and livelihood needs

In 2018 three UN agencies started a joint programme to address cooking fuel needs, environmental degradation through deforestation and food security for refugee and host communities in Cox’s Bazar district – the Safe Access to Fuel and Energy Plus Livelihoods (SAFE Plus) project. The three agencies implemented aspects of the programme corresponding to their expertise: FAO led on agricultural livelihood activities, forestry and land stabilisation; IOM on the distribution of liquefied petroleum gas, inside and outside the camps; and WFP scaled up its livelihoods and market linkage programme for Bangladeshi households, while promoting self-reliance approaches for Rohingya households. A large number of government donors provided development assistance in support of the programme, either bilaterally or through the Multi-Partner Trust Fund. The project was anticipated to run for three years until August 2021, with an estimated budget of US$118 million.

The project addresses the HDP nexus in several ways. It protects intercommunal peace between host and refugee populations by alleviating the pressure on shared natural resources (in the form of deforestation as a consequence of fuel needs) and providing support to both communities according to their respective needs. The narrative progress report for 2019 notes that the programme has contributed to reducing tensions between the communities by limiting competition for firewood. The provision of liquefied petroleum gas to both Rohingya and Bangladeshi households satisfies basic needs while reducing the demand for firewood, thereby allowing FAO to pursue reforestation together with the local forestry department. Through FAO’s land stabilisation measures inside and outside the camps, the programme also contributes to DRR by reducing the vulnerability to floods. Livelihood activities improve the resilience of host communities, and IOM and WFP lead on the implementation of a range of activities designed to build self-reliance for Rohingya refugees in the camps, which are negotiated with the government.

Restrictions on longer term assistance to refugees are an obstacle to achieving durable solutions for displaced people. Activities involving cash transfers and skills development that are carried out in the camps are limited in their scope and each have to be negotiated with the government. These initiatives are not sufficient for Rohingya refugees to become independent from humanitarian relief. There is not enough space in the densely populated camps for the refugees to plant enough crops to be self-sufficient, hence they indefinitely rely on food distributions. Actors such as the UN and MDBs are working with the government to find sustainable solutions for different sectoral needs (e.g. water supply, electricity, shelter, infrastructure), but progress on these issues is slow given the continued emphasis on repatriation. The government’s approval of piloting the Myanmar curriculum for secondary Rohingya students is, however, a sign of such
progress in the education sector. Conversations around expanding the type of assistance provided to the Rohingya refugees are politically sensitive, as the perceived imbalance between support provided to refugee and host communities already causes tensions.

**Several development programmes in Cox’s Bazar district seek to improve social cohesion, but there is no shared understanding of how to measure success.** Actors in Cox’s Bazar district attempt to alleviate tensions between host and refugee communities in two ways: prioritising the improvement of intercommunal relationships, and addressing host communities’ needs and thereby alleviating tensions created by sentiments of unfair distribution of resources. As shown in the ‘International financing landscape’ section, the volume of direct financial support to programmes that primarily target social cohesion in Cox’s Bazar district seems small compared with total humanitarian and development assistance. An example of such programmes is Canada’s funding to the Global Network for Women Peacebuilders to empower Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh and Burmese women, and youths to lead and participate in community-based peacebuilding.125 Similarly, USAID funds an education and employment programme targeting host community youths, aiming to reduce aggression and increase empathy towards refugee youths. It is much more difficult to quantify or even identify the effects on social cohesion of other development assistance provided to host communities. Programmes in the district might mention social cohesion in the project plans as an overarching ambition, but they do not contain indicators of success because it is not the primary objective. Interviewees shared that there is a recognition in Cox’s Bazar district that despite most development actors’ desire to improve social cohesion there is no shared understanding of the concept or how to measure improvements. In the absence of this agreement there is a risk that many actors can proclaim to have contributed to social cohesion and the nexus in different ways, without concrete evidence of their impacts on intercommunal relationships. Research on social cohesion in Cox’s Bazar district is emerging through efforts of Brac University in Dhaka, for example,126 but it has yet to form part of most programming approaches. Within the new phase of the SAFE Plus project (Box 3), FAO, IOM and WFP are already in the process of developing indicators to measure the project’s impact on social cohesion.

**Disaster risk reduction, relief and recovery programming**

Over the last several decades, Bangladesh has moved from focusing on emergency responses to longer term disaster management and DRR. The range of programmes contributing to this process is broad, including the construction of coastal embankments, multi-purpose cyclone shelters or training on disaster-resilient agriculture. UNDP also advises the private sector on where to direct investment taking into account disaster risk. The government is proactive on disaster management through its policies and budgetary allocations as outlined above, providing a framework for development actors’ activities. Challenges remain, however, around infrastructure projects and urbanisation, which may increase disaster risk and vulnerability. Among the factors contributing to the severe monsoon floods in 2020 were the construction of roads across flood plains and changes to land cover associated with agriculture and urbanisation.127 In its National Plan for Disaster Management 2021–2025 the government recognises the importance of disaster risk-sensitive development,128 but this has yet to be integrated
beyond targeted DRR efforts with all relevant development programming. This includes both an assessment of the disaster risks that might affect implementation over the course of the programme and ensuring that the programme itself does not amplify existing risks or create new ones. Humanitarian actors in Bangladesh already include considerations of disaster risk in their contingency planning.\textsuperscript{129} The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction together with OCHA, the UNRCO and the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief started a joint project in 2020 to consolidate information systems on disasters, seeking to join up data on DRR and humanitarian responses. Early reflections from this pilot show that multi-mandate implementers of development and humanitarian assistance – including the UN and local and national NGOs – have already been engaged in DRR and are open to incorporating it more in their programming. Humanitarian and DRR actors in Bangladesh that have more experience with risk assessments can support implementing agencies of development activities with risk-sensitive planning and programming; it is unclear to what extent this knowledge transfer already takes place. An example of knowledge sharing around disaster risk is the Land Slide Early Warning System recently developed by FAO in Bangladesh, in cooperation with IOM and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. This system includes a landslide susceptibility map of Cox’s Bazar district, which enables risk-informed development planning and will warn relevant stakeholders of impending landslides to allow for early action. Some development donors (e.g. JICA) already mainstream DRR throughout their own development portfolios and might be able to share their learning and best practice with other bilateral donors.

**Successful anticipatory action pilots in the 2020 humanitarian monsoon response provided an opportunity for development actors to scale up and better integrate disaster preparedness, response and recovery.** Since 2015, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and WFP have tested and developed forecast-based financing in Bangladesh. Additional actors have recently progressed this agenda – including Start Network, CARE Bangladesh, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief Worldwide and others – and implemented an anticipatory response to the 2020 monsoon floods. In light of this pre-existing engagement on forecast-based financing in Bangladesh, the country was chosen by OCHA in 2020 as one of five anticipatory action pilots for the UN OCHA’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (Box 4). Early evidence shows the pilot was successful in enabling a faster, more cost-efficient and effective response while protecting development gains.\textsuperscript{130} Still, OCHA notes that the pilot was relatively small compared with overall needs for disaster response in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{131} This raises questions on how to further scale up funding for anticipatory action, given the risk of diverting limited humanitarian funds from existing needs.\textsuperscript{132} Even though the anticipatory activities were implemented as part of the humanitarian response to the 2020 monsoon floods and were financed from humanitarian funds, they provided a possible entry point for development actors. Those currently engaged in disaster management can learn from CERF’s experience to establish similar funding mechanisms to support anticipatory action. Expanding the donor base would allow anticipatory action to scale up quickly and reduce the risk of diverting scarce humanitarian resources. Another argument in favour of involving development actors is the need for a longer term process to engage relevant government agencies and thereby support co-ownership, requiring sustained technical support and financing that humanitarian funds are unlikely to provide. Given the ability of
anticipatory action to protect development gains, in particular by supporting agriculture and livelihoods, its scale up could also support a faster recovery following disasters.

**Box 4: UN OCHA’s CERF anticipatory action pilot in Bangladesh**

In 2020 UN OCHA coordinated a pilot to scale up anticipatory action to minimise the impacts of predicted monsoon flooding in Bangladesh, following calls from OCHA’s Emergency Response Coordinator Mark Lowcock for a concerted shift towards anticipatory action in humanitarian responses. Initiated when thresholds for flood warning were reached in July 2020, pre-positioned finance was released within four hours through OCHA’s CERF to implementing partners FAO, UN Population Fund and WFP. Preliminary evidence shows that the fast release of funding before the peak floods enabled a faster response that was more cost-effective than comparative rapid responses in previous years. It also allowed implementers to plan ahead and ensure the protection of livelihoods, thereby providing more dignified and higher quality assistance.

As the Centre for Disaster Protection notes from its independent learning exercise on the process, “those involved in the pilot described it as a great achievement, demonstrating that anticipatory action at scale is possible.”

The CERF anticipatory action pilot in Bangladesh focused on responding to needs in five districts highly vulnerable to monsoon flooding. There were two pre-agreed triggers based on flood forecasts: the first trigger to release funds to the pilot’s partners for preparatory costs (activated 4 July) and the second to disburse funding for full implementation (activated 11 July). By streamlining application and disbursement procedures, the pre-allocated funds were disbursed within four hours of activating the second trigger. Within five days of activating both triggers and thereby ahead of the flood peak on 16 July, WFP had provided cash transfers to 23,000 vulnerable households, the UN Population Fund had supplied hygiene and dignity kits to over 15,000 women and girls, and FAO had reached 18,761 households with inputs to protect agricultural assets and livestock feed.

Key informants involved in the pilot recognised its success but cautioned that the push for anticipatory action must not leave a gap in the response. The transition from anticipatory action to response and recovery deserves more attention and coordination. Key informants highlighted that this requires awareness of the affected communities’ needs at different stages of disasters to be able to assist appropriately and effectively.
Implications of Covid-19 on aspects of development programming

While progress has been made in strengthening national social protection systems, with renewed efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, they are not yet comprehensive in their coverage of the most vulnerable. As outlined in the ‘Domestic public resources’ sub-section, there are over 100 social protection programmes in Bangladesh across more than 20 line ministries. These target the poorest households and various other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, widows and people with disabilities. Issues on targeting and coverage for these social safety nets were identified above (see ‘Domestic public resources’ sub-section). International development donors, including the World Bank, ADB, the UK and the EU have supported the government to strengthen national social protection systems over the last decade. In the context of Covid-19, these efforts were scaled up significantly to expand social assistance to the most affected people. This includes workers – in particular women – in export-oriented industries,137 small and medium enterprises, workers in the informal sector138 and the poorest and most vulnerable households. Even though Rohingya refugees are not targeted by national social safety nets, the World Bank approved an additional financing project to address the socioeconomic resilience of vulnerable host and Rohingya refugee communities. This engaged both communities in community services and cash-for-work schemes and has targeted 85,000 Rohingya refugees and so far supported 175,000 vulnerable households across all its components.139 The various initiatives to scale up social protection provide an opportunity to expand assistance to more people and improve delivery systems. As the Country Director of ADB in Bangladesh Manmohan Parkash says, “in a post Covid-19 era, the social protection schemes can be mainstreamed, with increased budget allocation, wider coverage, better targeting, and strengthened administration and effective delivery to the beneficiaries using digital technologies”.140 As identified above in the ‘Domestic public resources’ sub-section, existing issues with targeting and coverage of social safety nets are an obstacle to reaching people most affected by Covid-19 despite scaled-up international assistance. The speed of recovery for the most vulnerable people in Bangladesh from the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic will reveal how well the government is able to fill gaps with support from development actors.

A wide range of ‘non-essential’ development programming was put on hold by the government’s regulatory efforts to contain the spread of the pandemic, exacerbating vulnerabilities. Initially, this included all programming except for life-saving activities, such as humanitarian assistance provided to Rohingya refugees, in the aftermath of natural hazards or as part of the pandemic response. For instance, most education and skills development initiatives in the refugee camps were paused, even though the Government of Bangladesh allowed (after some delays) the introduction of home-based, caregiver-led education to prevent further learning loss due to Covid-19. According to the ISCG, this caused a shortfall in informal education and skills development for women and girls in particular.141 Piloting the Myanmar curriculum with Rohingya secondary students, approved in early 2020, was also delayed due to Covid-19. Social cohesion between host and refugee communities faced a double burden as socioeconomic repercussions of the pandemic for vulnerable Bangladeshi households...
heightened tensions and community engagement programmes to sustain peace had to be put on hold. Agricultural training and the provision of inputs (e.g. as part of the SAFE Plus programme) were also disrupted. Development actors had to convince the government that resuming support to food production should be considered an essential function to prevent future food insecurity. The Covid-19 pandemic and related regulations therefore point to the close relationship between current development efforts and potential future humanitarian needs.
Financing tools

This section explores the funding mechanisms development actors in Bangladesh have employed in crisis contexts and the degree of flexibility for development financing. The World Bank’s IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW) and its IDA19 counterpart, the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR), have been an important pillar to the longer term response in Cox’s Bazar district, but they have faced challenges in driving policy reform. The ADB for the first time provided grant support to a displacement crisis, which is an opportunity for institutional learning. Bilateral donors made available development financing in response to unforeseen needs, for instance caused by Covid-19. This was partly made possible by reallocating funding between sectors, although flexibility in terms of scaling up funding or shifting funds from development to humanitarian purposes has been more limited. Some donors were able to secure additional funding from the capital in the absence of contingency funds. Such contingency funds are more common among national NGOs. Some humanitarian pooled funds also provide surge funding for local and national NGOs in response to disasters, although few equivalent funding opportunities are available for recovery or longer term needs.

Development funding mechanisms in Cox’s Bazar district

The World Bank’s financing through the IDA18 RSW to host and refugee communities has been substantial, although it has been challenging to drive policy reform through this mechanism. Bangladesh became eligible for support through the RSW in June 2018, which enabled a portfolio of projects amounting to US$590 million in grant support for the benefit of the refugees and host communities. The World Bank therefore has been active in Cox’s Bazar district since an early stage of the crisis. The implementation of this portfolio is primarily based on the continued adequacy of the refugee protection framework. Projects funded through the RSW were designed to provide support for host and refugee communities in a range of sectors including health, gender-based violence, social protection, basic services and infrastructure. The third aspect of the RSW eligibility criteria (to formulate a policy reform for long-term solutions benefiting refugees and host communities) has been most challenging. As the World Bank put it in 2020, “some elements of policy and practice in this regard have improved, while many remain constant, and some new risks have emerged” since Bangladesh’s initial eligibility for the IDA18 RSW in 2018. For instance, the World Bank is concerned by the government’s restriction of telecommunication services in the camps and construction of a fence around the camps as this might hinder an effective disaster response, among other things. However, in consultation with UNHCR, the World Bank assessed that overall the protection framework in Bangladesh continues to be adequate. It will therefore be a continued discussion between the Government of Bangladesh, the World Bank, relevant UN agencies, bilateral donors and national civil society to establish further long-term solutions for refugees and host communities. The
approval of the use of the Myanmar curriculum by the government was highlighted as a sign of progress, but there remains much room for improvement across education, health, social protection and access to gender-based violence prevention services. To aid the process of advancing policy dialogue, the World Bank is developing the Refugee Policy Review Framework as part of the IDA19 WHR policy commitment. This presents an opportunity to progressively measure and assess refugee protection policies and practices over time and build on those insights with the relevant stakeholders.

The ADB’s grant support to the Rohingya refugee response was the first of its kind and generated institutional learning. Unlike the World Bank, the ADB does not have a standing mechanism to support grant funding for displacement situations. Bangladesh is also usually not able to access grant funding from the ADB through the Asian Development Fund as its strong, sustained growth and creditworthiness allow it to access a blend of concessional and non-concessional loans. Still, after the Government of Bangladesh requested grant support from the ADB in May 2018 to provide high-priority infrastructure and basic services as part of the Rohingya refugee response, the ADB was able to conceptualise the project and approve funding within only 2 months. The US$100 million of grant funding provided by the ADB for the project is co-financed with US$20 million from the Government of Bangladesh. There is the possibility of financing a second phase of the project with an additional US$100 million, although that depends on the progress achieved during the first phase, existing needs and the availability of additional grant funds. The learnings from conceptualising and rolling out the Emergency Assistance Project for the Rohingya refugee response informed the ADB’s approval of the US$500 million Covid-19 support loan to address livelihoods and economic impacts from the pandemic, building on lessons learnt from bolstering social sectors in times of crisis. While guidance within the ADB on the provision of emergency assistance loans exists as part of staff instructions, it could be useful for other contexts to capture and formalise the learnings from the emergency grant provided to the Rohingya refugee response.

Strong political will and acute funding needs can fast-track development financing, despite otherwise lengthy bureaucratic procedures. The planning and budgeting process for development finance is usually slower than for humanitarian finance. To some extent, this is necessary – development planning is carried out jointly with the national government and sometimes other UN or NGO partners, is longer term and often involves larger volumes of funding for larger scale projects. Development donors with crisis financing vehicles and established modalities for engaging in crises (e.g. the World Bank’s RSW) can often react more quickly and engage earlier. Nonetheless, where there is a strong rationale and political support, decision-making and funding approval can happen quickly, even when development institutions lack experience of crisis financing and don’t have established procedures. The case of the ADB’s emergency grant in support of the refugee response is one example of this, but it was also reported in the context of Covid-19. Several bilateral development donors, MDBs and the IMF (see the ‘International financing landscape’ sub-section) were able to release additional funds quickly for long-term support of the health sector or to support the recovery from economic impacts caused by the pandemic. For development donors newly engaging in crisis contexts this provides an opportunity to build on their learnings to establish protocols and best practices for future crises.
Strictly separate budgets for development and humanitarian funding, without sufficient coordination between the two, can provide challenges for an effective response. Multi-mandate implementers operating in the refugee camps reported that there remains scope to employ additional development funds to improve the camp infrastructure, for instance with regards to DRR or site development. Interviewees from these organisations welcomed the investments by the ADB and World Bank and emphasised that going forward the MDBs should continue to capitalise on their comparative advantage in improving infrastructure and tackling longer term issues. This notion was shared by key informants from the respective MDBs. These longer term investments, however, require close coordination between MDBs, the national and local government, and the humanitarian actors in charge of the camps. As outlined above, this coordination process can be challenging. Multi-mandate actors also reported that there is a reliable donor base providing humanitarian funding to meet the refugee’s essential needs. However, it is much more difficult for these actors to secure funding from the same donors for longer term projects, such as for the empowerment of women in the host community through micro-grants for businesses. Strict delineation between humanitarian and development budgets among many on the donor side – in place to ensure funding to life-saving assistance cannot be diverted – can then be a challenge for multi-mandate implementers if emergency needs are met but development needs are not. Flexible financing such as that provided from Australia to WFP allows for funds to be directed where needed most – whether for short or long-term needs. On the humanitarian side, multi-year funding for the refugee response is also very limited according to interviewees. This restricts humanitarian actors’ ability to jointly plan ahead with the government on multi-year programmes to reduce needs and build resilience. Donors should therefore consider providing a greater proportion of their funding through multi-year agreements to enable longer term planning with the government for a sustainable response in Cox’s Bazar district.

Funding mechanisms for disasters

Contingency financing mechanisms at the national or programmatic level are reportedly rare with international development actors but more common among national NGOs. Of the interviewed development donors, very few had designated contingency funds available to scale up activities in sectors relevant to unforeseen disaster needs. Several bilateral donors reported that there is a degree of flexibility in shifting funding between sectors if justified by evidence on needs, as occurred in response to the Covid-19 pandemic by shifting funds to the health sector. Implementers highlighted that funding provided for a specific crisis context but otherwise fully flexible can act as contingency funding once unforeseen needs arise. For instance, as the pandemic hit, WFP used the flexible funding from Australia to adapt its response while waiting for further funding to become available following re-negotiations with other donors. Interviewees from other UN agencies highlighted that donors were overall flexible and quick in approving additional emergency funding for Covid-19 or the reprogramming of non-critical activities towards the pandemic response. In terms of the total volumes of funding for a programme or the national portfolio, most bilateral donors reported less flexibility. Usually an application would need to be submitted to the global headquarters to secure additional funding, for example for the pandemic response or flood recovery. While this leaves open the opportunity to boost development assistance in response to
higher needs, it brings with it a delay through application, approval and disbursement processes. In terms of implementing organisations, several national NGOs noted the existence of their own contingency funds. The size of these funds ranged from 3% to 15% of the operational budget among the interviewed organisations and tended to be from private donations or self-generated revenue. For instance, CSO BRAC encompasses several entities alongside its NGO arm, including for-profit social enterprises and social investments. The generated profit is reinvested and used for BRAC’s emergency response and to supplement its contingency funds. Interviewees from national NGOs with contingency funds, however, also recognised that large-scale events such as Covid-19 deplete resources quickly. Contingency funding efforts therefore might have to be supplemented through pooled fund arrangements to sufficiently support response and recovery.

There are several funding mechanisms for local and national NGOs following disasters, although they remain small, focused on emergency responses and driven by humanitarian actors. For instance, the Start Network established Start Fund Bangladesh with UK funding in 2017, a national pooled fund that gives local and national NGOs direct access to funding and decision-making power in the fund’s management. The fund transferred 60% of its funding in the second half of 2019 to local and national NGOs. An interviewee from a national NGO however pointed out that the Start Fund’s localisation efforts could be progressed further by seeking to mobilise local resources and reduce dependency on international funding. It was also pointed out that it could go even further in transitioning decision-making power and funding allocations from international to local and national NGOs. In addition, Oxfam established a pilot humanitarian response grant facility in Bangladesh, which funds local and national NGOs and strengthens their voice in shaping the humanitarian agenda. Interviewees from local and national NGOs highlighted the Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF) as another positive example of a pooled funding mechanism in support of localisation efforts. MJF provides grants and capacity building to local and national NGOs for a wide range of activities including human rights, prevention of gender-based violence and community resilience against climate change. It has also provided funding for the provision of relief during the Covid-19 pandemic. MJF receives direct funding from international bilateral donors such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark and Canada. Interviewees valued that the organisation is governed by a Bangladeshi board. While progress has been made in setting up these inclusive funding mechanisms, the volume of funding channelled through them remains small relative to the total volume of ODA directed to Bangladesh. Comparable pooled funds available to local and national NGOs for disaster recovery or longer term needs also seem to be lacking. NAHAB therefore recommends establishing government-run contingency funds, accompanied by contingency plans. These funds could exist at the district and/or sub-district level, depending on subnational vulnerability to disasters, and could boost efforts for locally led disaster response and recovery. An example of a pooled funding mechanism to address immediate infrastructure issues following natural hazards is the Disaster Recovery Fund set up by Japan to support the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. It was activated for projects following cyclone Amphan but is still in its pilot phase.
Organisational issues

There continues to be an institutional separation for several bilateral donors in Bangladesh between humanitarian and development assistance. Although the importance of an integrated response between humanitarian and development departments for individual donors is widely recognised and political will exists to facilitate it, operational guidance on how to achieve it is often lacking. Some bilateral donors therefore continue to support humanitarian and development assistance in parallel through different line ministries in the same location. Centralised development planning in Bangladesh also means that several development actors don’t have a subnational presence. It is more challenging for them to coordinate and complement the localised refugee response in Cox’s Bazar district. The government faces similar challenges for subnational development planning, although development actors support through capacity building of local governments.

HDP cooperation within donor institutions

Many bilateral donors have an institutional separation between humanitarian and development assistance, which then usually translates into the same separation at country level. The separation into different ministries or departments makes it challenging for the development counterparts to build an understanding of humanitarian assistance and vice versa, and thereby harder to identify potential entry points for collaboration or complementarity. In Bangladesh the EU supports disaster preparedness and response from different angles with development assistance provided through the Department for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and humanitarian assistance through ECHO. DEVCO supports the government in improving its social protection programmes and also works on climate-resilient agriculture initiatives. ECHO works with the government at the central and local levels to strengthen contingency planning. Both departments have a strategic collaboration and have held a nexus workshop in Bangladesh. Despite the high-level demand and in-country push to coordinate disaster preparedness and response through a shared framework, there is a lack of guidance on how to achieve this. The need for practical guidance on how to operationalise the nexus was identified in previous research on donors at the HDP nexus and seen as obstacle to an integrated response by donor key informants. In the case of the EU, such guidance is available in the context of protracted displacement but not yet on disaster preparedness and response to natural hazards.

For other donor governments with an even stronger separation between development and humanitarian assistance, there sometimes is limited communication between the responsible line ministries. Needs assessments, planning and funding are carried out independently from each other, even in the same subnational location (e.g. Cox’s Bazar district) in response to the same crisis. This is due to the clearly perceived division of labour, meaning that for instance the humanitarian
side will only support assistance provided in refugee camps and the development counterpart will support the host communities in parallel. Interviewees from these donor agencies, however, see the response in Cox’s Bazar as a good example for the HDP nexus as the consequences from the same crisis are addressed from different angles in parallel and separately. Operating through separate systems and with separate objectives for development and humanitarian assistance is the minimum approach for achieving coherence and complementarity, as long as both sets of activities are mutually enforcing and don’t undermine each other. However, to be effective this requires regular communication, information sharing and careful monitoring between the respective donor departments, which needs to be strengthened and formalised systematically.

Balance between centralised and subnational presence

The lack of a subnational presence makes it difficult for some development actors to coordinate or collaborate with the localised humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar district. Given the centralised nature of national development planning, development actors are naturally located in Dhaka and do not tend to have staff stationed subnationally. Many interviewed development donors lack a field presence in Cox’s Bazar district. Some development implementers have subnational field presence, but the decision power lies in Dhaka. For these development actors, it is difficult to plan or carry out complementary or collaborative development activities in Cox’s Bazar together with other actors operating in the region. Coordinating with the humanitarian actors’ programmes with refugee and host communities is even more challenging, given humanitarian coordination and planning takes place in Cox’s Bazar. The reverse also applies for humanitarian actors trying to build on development efforts in the district. Actors in Bangladesh have already started to address this disconnect. The ADB has strengthened its presence in Cox’s Bazar with designated personnel to coordinate its Rohingya refugee response. On the humanitarian side, UNHCR has created a senior development officer position based in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar, acting as policy liaison with the government and development actors. For actors without the ability to expand their presence due to limited resources or staffing, communication or partnership with actors closely involved in shaping the national and subnational response (e.g. the UNRCO, praised by several interviewees for its convening efforts) helps to overcome this coordination challenge. The pending DDGP in Cox’s Bazar district, once formulated successfully, has the potential to provide comprehensive guidance on gaps in the development response for actors based only in Dhaka.

The challenge to coordinate activities and communicate between Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar district also exists for the Government of Bangladesh. According to interviewees, the cooperation between officials in central and local governments can be difficult. This is less so on the humanitarian side, given the presence of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner in the district coordinating the government authority for the refugee response. However, given the centralised nature of development planning and budgetary authority, it is challenging for the local government to address the context-specific development needs in the district. The DDGP (once fully formulated) is intended to address this, although the lack of experience in subnational development planning has been a challenge (see the ‘Coordination, prioritisation and planning’
section). To that end, a range of actors including UNDP, EU and JICA (see the ‘Partnerships’ section) provide capacity building to the local government in support of planning and administrative processes.
Conclusion and recommendations

Bangladesh has experienced strong and continued economic growth despite its high vulnerability to natural hazards, partly owing to significant progress in disaster management. The highly localised and large-scale Rohingya refugee crisis in Cox’s Bazar district also has not affected the country’s development trajectory. However, as the crisis has become more protracted, longer term needs of the host and refugee communities have grown. Covid-19 has further exposed the crisis vulnerability of large parts of the Bangladeshi population and has been met with large volumes of support from development donors. While Bangladesh continues to improve its disaster management capabilities through innovative approaches, the government’s focus on repatriation has limited the scope for long-term assistance to refugees. Development assistance to host communities has increased but is fragmented and insufficient. With the added stress of the Covid-19 pandemic, it remains to be seen how well the government with support from international development actors will be able to assist with its population’s recovery.

Recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness with which development actors address risk and vulnerabilities and build resilience and peace for people affected by or at risk of crises are set out below. These recommendations are intended primarily for international development actors working in Bangladesh, but they may also have wider relevance for actors in other protracted crisis contexts.

Recommendations

Policy and strategy

Ensure joined-up diplomatic engagement with the government to facilitate durable solutions to protracted crises

Bilateral donors, MDBs and UN agencies should use their diplomatic representations with the Bangladesh government in a concerted effort to overcome political obstacles to achieving sustainable solutions to the Rohingya refugee crisis. There is growing evidence that structural needs in host and refugee communities in Cox’s Bazar district are growing, are an obstacle to socioeconomic development and cannot be fully met by humanitarian assistance. With pressures on bilateral donors’ aid budgets due to the Covid-19 pandemic, there is no guarantee that they can continue to provide sufficient funding for short-term emergency assistance in annual cycles. Development actors should build on this information and their long-standing partnerships with the government to progress the dialogue on durable solutions as, for instance, the MDBs already have started to do. Especially now, as safe and dignified repatriation has become more uncertain in light of...
the military coup in Myanmar in early 2021, there is an increasing need to implement a coordinated medium-term approach to the crisis response. Research on what this might look like in the context of the Rohingya refugee response already exists and the Global Compact on Refugees provides corresponding objectives to draw on. It will be critical to build the evidence base on the potential cost-effectiveness and socioeconomic benefits that a longer term approach would bring to allow for an informed discussion with the government.

**Partnerships**

**Expand support to the local government in crisis-affected regions**

MDBs, bilateral donors and UN agencies should deepen their engagement with the local government in Cox’s Bazar district for it to better cope with the localised refugee crisis. This offers them a way to address the ‘missing middle’ between top-level institutional support to the central government and public service delivery in crisis-affected regions. In a country with historically centralised development planning processes, the districts are an operational entity to implement policies set nationally in a vertical ministry structure. They lack the capacity and resources for subnational development planning, which is increasingly necessary as the refugee crisis grows more protracted. Bilateral donors and MDBs already provide some support to build the local government’s capacity to deliver public services in Bangladesh. They need to increase their long-term investment in local government capacity to Cox’s Bazar district and to regions most vulnerable to natural hazards to ensure no one is left behind in the development process. The DDGP in Cox’s Bazar district, once fully formulated, will form part of these decentralisation efforts, but it requires strong backing from the national government and wide buy-in from UN agencies, bilateral donors and MDBs to be able to provide a coherent framework that guides local, national and international development efforts in the district.

**Provide increased support to local civil society and private sector in crisis-affected regions**

Bangladesh represents both opportunities and challenges for increased engagement of development actors with local and national NGOs and the private sector. Greater support for the latter was provided by development donors in response to the economic impacts of Covid-19, but it was largely neglected in the context of the refugee response in Cox’s Bazar district. Targeted measures in the form of emergency loan facilities, vocational training and the generation of employment opportunities will be necessary to boost private sector development in the district. There are few financing mechanisms directly funding local and national NGOs to support longer term recovery in terms of disaster management or to meet development needs in Cox’s Bazar district. Development assistance with a longer timeframe would be well placed to address some of the key challenges to a localised crisis response and recovery by, for example, providing designated funding for capacity building. To avoid a proliferation of implementing partners for individual donors, assistance to local and national NGOs could be provided through intermediary funding mechanisms such as pooled funds or by increasing support to NGO consortia. Consortia of international and local and national NGOs can facilitate
knowledge exchange between participating organisations and provide reassurance to risk-averse donors by including both trusted and new partners.

Coordination, planning and prioritisation

Increase the coherence of existing coordination structures for humanitarian and development assistance

The coordination mechanisms in Bangladesh for disaster management and response are perceived to be functioning well separately, even though the LCG-DER was inactive at the time of research and needs to be reactivated to fill the coordination gap on longer term disaster management. However, there is scope to incorporate the disaster risk monitoring and warning systems that are already used by the HCTT into development planning for agriculture and rural development or for climate change and environment by connecting with the respective LCGs. A joint analysis of needs and risks in those sectors, involving humanitarian and development actors, could enable risk-informed development planning, which the Government of Bangladesh explicitly calls for in its National Plan for Disaster Management 2021–2025. As disaster risks differ by region, this risk-informed planning is linked with building the planning capacity of local governments in disaster-prone regions.

In Cox’s Bazar district, the Rohingya refugee response can only include a limited range of development coordination activities in the primarily humanitarian JRP, which also covers assistance to host communities in the two sub-districts with refugee camps. While some development actors, for instance the MDBs, already coordinate their activities with the ISCG, other development actors operating in the district need to follow their lead. The DDGP could in future provide coherence to these development efforts at the subnational level, but interviewees highlight that this is unlikely to be operational soon due to ongoing discussions with the government. Until then, development donors should coordinate their assistance to Cox’s Bazar district on an ad hoc basis with the help of the UNRCO. Another transitional approach suggested by research participants is to employ the SDG localisation framework in the district. The discussions around the use of this framework in Bangladesh are still in their early stages. Once the DDGP is operational, it should ensure a close exchange of information with the ISCG to ensure that it complements the crisis response by meeting the longer term needs of host communities and refugees.

Programming approaches

Replicate joint programming for stronger coordination between donors and greater coherence between implementers

In the absence of shared planning frameworks for the Rohingya refugee response, joint programming across humanitarian and development objectives is an effective means to operationalise coordination and planning between multiple donors and implementers. These arrangements thereby provide a way for donors to incentivise planning across collective outcomes and according to the respective implementers’ areas of expertise.
with a clear division of labour. In Bangladesh, joint programming in Cox’s Bazar district has enabled multiple UN agencies to combine their sectoral expertise to address issues of deforestation, livelihoods and fuel needs in the refugee and host communities. Funded through the global Multi-Partner Trust Fund and with several bilateral donor contributions it provides coherence to donors’ efforts in the district. Building on this experience, there might be scope to establish similar joint programming initiatives in other sectors in dialogue with the ISCG and the respective line ministries. Potential areas of synergy for humanitarian and development actors include shock-responsive social protection; livelihoods, agriculture and food security; and disaster management and climate resilience.

### Financing tools

**Increase tailored development assistance to crisis-affected regions and improve subnational reporting**

Bilateral development donors and MDBs need to ensure that sufficient financial resources from their support for national development programmes reach people affected by the protracted refugee crisis in Cox’s Bazar district. While several donors have targeted some of their development assistance subnationally to the district since 2018, it remains fragmented and is perceived to be insufficient to address structural development needs. Targeted development assistance to crisis-affected regions should be captured through comprehensive subnational reporting by, for example, publishing geographic information of activities to the IATI. The DDGP (once fully formulated and operational) should provide a comprehensive overview of development needs in the district, against which the volume of contributions can then be assessed. There needs to be increased transparency on development efforts and needs in Cox’s Bazar district to facilitate better targeting of development funds, enable mutual accountability processes with the government, and improve coordination and complementarity with humanitarian funding.

**Use development finance to scale up anticipatory programmes**

Development donors should provide additional funding for the scale up of forecast-based financing and anticipatory action in Bangladesh while gradually embedding both with the government’s own response and recovery systems. The innovative anticipatory action pilots that took place as part of the humanitarian response to 2020 monsoon floods could be an entry point for development funding to cover upfront investments in preparedness and support embedding the learnings with government systems and procedures. In the short term, development assistance could support the creation of forecast-based contingency funds or other forms of risk financing in disaster-prone parts of the country. This process should involve humanitarian funds (e.g. CERF or Start Fund) and implementers with experience in anticipatory funding and programming models. This could be accompanied by a longer term process to consolidate and mature social protection systems so that they can provide shock-responsive support to crisis-affected people. Development funding should support the long-term process necessary to change government mindsets and systems reorienting from approaches that respond after an emergency to include those with a greater focus on anticipatory action.
Organisational issues

Improve coherence of bilateral donors’ planning and financing of humanitarian and development assistance

Donors in Bangladesh with separate agencies for humanitarian and development assistance should consider organising management structures, strategic planning and high-level budget allocation decisions around collective national priorities to strengthen the overall coherence of their support. Within this, they could ringfence a humanitarian budget where necessary and relative to emergency needs for disaster and refugee response to safeguard humanitarian principles. Donor-specific coherence can be strengthened through shared strategic frameworks for development and humanitarian departments in the context of disaster resilience and response, or for protracted displacement situations. Guided by a joint strategy, donors should put in place or strengthen internal processes for joint needs assessments, planning and programming. This could initially focus on certain geographic regions, such as Cox’s Bazar, or response areas, such as disaster management and response. As a minimum (if restructuring is not possible in the medium term and all organisational processes continue to be carried out in parallel) there should be sufficient information sharing between the humanitarian and development donor departments to ensure both types of assistance complement each other where appropriate and don’t undermine one another.

Adapt organisational processes for subnational crisis contexts

Development donors and implementing agencies should ensure that their organisational processes are tailored to subnational crisis contexts, such as the Rohingya refugee crisis, and embed crisis-sensitive response approaches. If possible, these actors should have a local presence, which some donors have already implemented but others are yet to follow suit. Donors and implementers should support decentralised decision making processes to enable agile and context-specific assistance to Cox’s Bazar district. Local partnerships can add context-specific knowledge and understanding of crisis dynamics. Presence at the subnational level can also leverage engagement in the capital with the central government on development needs of crisis-affected people through greater awareness of subnational priorities. Actors that are closely involved at the national and subnational levels, such as the UNRCO, can act as an intermediary for donors unable to post staff subnationally. Once the DDGP is formulated successfully, it can provide a valuable point of reference for donors on subnational development needs in Cox’s Bazar district. Where flexible and decentralised decision-making is not possible, existing systems should be streamlined to ensure timely and efficient decision-making and communication between the field, country and global levels. This should build on learnings from the development response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which underlined the importance for development donors and implementers to be flexible and shock responsive. Both sets of actors should consolidate learnings on what organisational processes enabled or prevented them to stay engaged as the crisis hit.
## Appendix 1: Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lutfor Rahman</td>
<td>Coordinator – Innovation lab</td>
<td>Access to Information (a2i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manmohan Parkash</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>ADB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyotsana Varma</td>
<td>Principal Country Specialist</td>
<td>ADB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esrat Karim</td>
<td>Founder and Director</td>
<td>AMAL Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipi Rahman</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Badabon Sangho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasina Akhter Huq</td>
<td>Area Director, Humanitarian Crisis Management Programme</td>
<td>BRAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayesha Siddiqua</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
<td>CARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Gomes</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
<td>Caritas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Murshed Chowdhury</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Cox’s Bazar Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezaul Karim Chowdhury</td>
<td>Executive Director (and Co-Chair of CCNF)</td>
<td>COAST Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Slater</td>
<td>Head of Programs</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirajul Islam</td>
<td>Head Clerk</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Management, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Cox’s Bazar field office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. M. Enamul Kabir</td>
<td>Director, Research and Training</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Management, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniela D’Urso</td>
<td>Head of Office</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurizio Cian</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farazi Binti Ferdous</td>
<td>National Programme Consultant</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botagoz Nartayeva</td>
<td>Programme Specialist</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marco De Gaetano</td>
<td>Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Agnew</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taufique Joarder</td>
<td>Research Director</td>
<td>FHI 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caren Blume</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation</td>
<td>German embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelika Fleddermann</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamlesh Vyas</td>
<td>Regional Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
<td>Helvetas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrão Filipe Cunga</td>
<td>Economic Security Delegate</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Katende</td>
<td>Senior Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Advisor</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Marques Pereira</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission and Head of Cox’s Bazar office</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margo Baars</td>
<td>Deputy Coordinator</td>
<td>ISCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korvi Rakshand</td>
<td>Founder and Chairman</td>
<td>JAAGO Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anisuzzaman Chowdhury</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>JICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanjida Haque</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer</td>
<td>JICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziaul Karim</td>
<td>Coordinator, Governance Program</td>
<td>Manusher Jonno Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bimal Chandra Dey Sarker</td>
<td>Chief Executive (&amp; Co-Chair of CCNF)</td>
<td>Muki Cox’s Bazar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehsanur Rahman</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>NAHAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeroen Steeghs</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission and Head of Economic Affairs and Development Cooperation</td>
<td>Netherlands embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filip Lozinski</td>
<td>Interim Country Director</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Guittet</td>
<td>Counsellor / Coordinator – Humanitarian &amp; Development Assistance – Cox’s Bazar</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawhidul Islam</td>
<td>Monitoring and Results Management manager</td>
<td>Swisscontact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flora Macula</td>
<td>Head of Sub-Office Cox’s Bazar</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Sophie Pettersson</td>
<td>Humanitarian Action and Resilience Building Programme Specialist</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khurshid Alam</td>
<td>Assistant Resident Representative</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arif Abdullah Khan</td>
<td>Programme Specialist</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nodoka Hasegawa</td>
<td>Senior Development Officer</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julien Graveleau</td>
<td>WASH Specialist</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry Glorieux</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Advisor</td>
<td>UNRCO</td>
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<td>Mazedul Islam</td>
<td>Development Coordination Officer</td>
<td>UNRCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazi Shahidur Rahman</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Specialist</td>
<td>UNRCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahnaz Zakaria</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumana Amin</td>
<td>Governance and CVE Adviser</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naila Sattar</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to the Representative</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shreya Mukherjee</td>
<td>External Partnerships Officer</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleiman Namara</td>
<td>Rohingya Response Coordinator; Senior Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahidul Islam</td>
<td>Head of Rohingya Response</td>
<td>Young Power in Social Action (YPSA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2: Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCNF</td>
<td>Cox’s Bazar CSO–NGO Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDGP</td>
<td>District Development and Growth Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Department for International Cooperation and Development (EU)</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (EC)</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCTT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination Task Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Humanitarian, development and peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IATI</td>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>Inter Sector Coordination Group</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRP</td>
<td>Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCG</td>
<td>Local Consultative Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCG-DER</td>
<td>Local Consultative Group on Disaster Emergency Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral development bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHAB</td>
<td>National Alliance of Humanitarian Actors Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTF</td>
<td>National Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRRRC</td>
<td>Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSW</td>
<td>Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFE Plus</td>
<td>Safe Access to Fuel and Energy Plus Livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEG</td>
<td>Strategic Executive Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRCO</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHR</td>
<td>Window for Host Communities and Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 Here, we understand ‘development’ as long-term support to developing countries to deliver sustainable solutions for addressing poverty, supporting livelihoods and providing basic services, with a particular focus on those in greatest need and at risk of being left furthest behind. The development actors that are the main focus of this study are MDBs, OECD DAC member government entities responsible for development cooperation, and UN entities with a development (or dual humanitarian–development) mandate.


3 Development Initiatives, 2019. Key questions and considerations for donors at the triple nexus: lessons from UK and Sweden. Available at: https://www.devinit.org/resources/questions-considerations-donors-triple-nexus-uk-sweden/

4 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective. Available at: www.nrc.no/resources/reports/financing-the-nexus-gaps-and-opportunities-from-a-field-perspective


7 Development Initiatives, with support from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Norwegian Refugee Council, is leading the wider policy study under the umbrella of the IASC Results Group 5 (on financing). The framing of the research is available in: Development Initiatives, 2020. How can development actors meet longer term needs in crises? Available at: https://devinit.org/resources/how-can-development-actors-meet-longer-term-needs-in-crises/


11 IASC, 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective. Available at: www.nrc.no/resources/reports/financing-the-nexus-gaps-and-opportunities-from-a-field-perspective


18 This is according to the ADB’s poverty data on Bangladesh, available at: https://www.adb.org/countries/bangladesh/poverty (accessed 17 January 2021)
20 World Health Organization (WHO), 2020. Reduced death rates from cyclones in Bangladesh: what more needs to be done? Available at: https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/2/11-088302/en/
21 Data on lives lost through storms since 2007 is sourced from the Emergency Events Database compiled by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Available at: https://www.adb.org/countries/bangladesh/poverty (accessed 17 January 2021)
28 Development Initiatives’ subnational poverty estimates for Bangladesh 2019 are based on most recent available World Bank PovcalNet national poverty data (2016), household final consumption expenditure growth nationally (2019), and subnational Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey wealth data (2019). Poverty headcounts are projected for 2019 based on assumed distribution-neutral household consumption growth between 2016 and 2019. Household wealth scores are used to estimate the relative subnational distribution of poverty.
29 Data is according to information jointly collated by UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh, available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar_refugees (accessed 16 March 2021)
30 For more information on the results of the investigation by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar please refer to its website at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/MyanmarFFM/Pages/Index.aspx
35 Development Initiatives’ subnational poverty estimates for Bangladesh 2019 are based on most recent available World Bank PovcalNet national poverty data (2016), household final consumption expenditure growth nationally (2019), and subnational Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey wealth data (2019). Poverty headcounts are projected for 2019 based on assumed distribution-neutral household consumption growth between 2016 and 2019. Household wealth scores are used to estimate the relative subnational distribution of poverty.

36 This is in line with World Bank evidence on increased poverty in the district in the 2019 Bangladesh Poverty Assessment, which estimates that the refugee influx led to a localised increase in poverty rates in the district between August 2017 and May 2018 by 52% through decreasing daily wages. World Bank Group, 2019. Bangladesh Poverty Assessment. Available at: http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/793121572582830383/pdf/Bangladesh-Poverty-Assessment-Facing-Old-and-New-Frontiers-in-Poverty-Reduction.pdf


41 The Government of Bangladesh decided in late February 2021 to gradually reopen schools and colleges from March 30 onwards.


43 USAID, iMMAP and Data Friendly Space, 2020. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Bangladesh%20COVID%2019%20Situation%20report%20November%202020.pdf


47 Data is taken from the IMF Datamapper, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/exp@FPP/USA/FRA/JPN/GBR/SWE/ESP/ITA/ZAF/IND (accessed 24 January 2021)


A 2013 study of the targeting effectiveness of Bangladesh’s social safety nets concluded that a large share of households receiving assistance are above the poverty line, although still in lower income deciles: Manob Sakti Unnayan Kendro, 2013. Improving the Targeting Effectiveness of Social Safety Nets in Bangladesh. Available at: http://fpmu.gov.bd/agridrupal/sites/default/files/ToR%20Social%20Safety%20Net%20Targeting-Final%20Report_MSUk.pdf. Low coverage, poor targeting and thereby relatively small effects on poverty reduction were also identified by another study in the same year (Development Pathways, 2013. Scoping report on poverty and social protection in Bangladesh. Available at: http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Bangladesh-SP-Review-2014Feb20-Final.pdf) and then again found in 2020 for the means-tested old age pension (Development Pathways, 2020. Hit and Miss: An assessment of targeting effectiveness in social protection with additional analysis. Available at: https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Hit-and-miss-long-report.pdf).

Data is in constant 2017 prices.


An example is this news update from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2018. Funds for Rohingya crisis needed to sustain robust response efforts ahead of the monsoon season. Available at: https://www.unocha.org/fr/story/funds-rohingya-crisis-needed-sustain-robust-response-efforts-ahead-monsoon-season.


This assessment carried out by the Jubilee Debt Campaign has stricter criteria than, for example, the IMF’s analysis. While the IMF focuses on whether or not a country can pay its debt, the Jubilee Debt Campaign defines a debt crisis as being when debt payments undermine a country’s economy or its ability to provide basic services to its citizens. Their data and more information their methodology is available at: https://data.jubileedebt.org.uk/.


Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus: Lessons from Bangladesh


The average percentage of requirements met for all response plans tracked by FTS globally ranged between 55% and 60% between 2017 and 2019.

Funding to the 2020 Joint Response Plan was US$78 million less than in the previous year. Its requirements were US$138 million higher due to additional funding needs caused by Covid-19. Data was accessed on 27 January 2021. For real-time updates on funding to the 2020 Joint Response Plan please refer to: https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/906/summary

The Government of Bangladesh is usually not eligible to access grant support from the ADB due to its creditworthiness and strong sustained growth.


This is according to data collected and analysed by the Centre for Disaster Protection, updated regularly and available at: https://www.disasterprotection.org/funding-covid-19-response (accessed 16 January 2021)


Data and more information on the methodology can be found at the Covid-19 response tracking prototype, available at: https://covid19.humportal.org/


Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, General Economics Division, 2020. 8th Five Year Plan July 2020 – June 2025. Available at: http://www.plancomm.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/plancomm.portal.gov.bd/files/68e32f08_13b8_4192_ab9b_a bd5a0a62a33/2021-02-03-17-04-ec95e78e452a813808a483b3b22e14a1.pdf

The international frameworks that are mentioned in the National Plans for Disaster Management for their linkages between disaster management and development are the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the SDGs and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.


The health coordination process in Bangladesh for the Covid-19 pandemic response was therefore developed based on the disease prevention act.


According to the Joint Response Plan 2020, these bilateral donors include: the EU, US, UK, Japan, Korea, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Australia.


A full list of partners by pillar published by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1JLZsUSgl9z1MOKQ_0ln2-dVb9r8bKvGgDUb68a_wbY/edit?usp=sharing


ADB, 2020. Project Result / Case Study: Emergency Assistance in Bangladesh. Available at: https://www.adb.org/results/emergency-assistance-bangladesh


More information on the Upazila Governance and Development Project is available on the project’s website at: http://www.ugdp.org/index.php

For more information please refer to the project website at: https://www.jica.go.jp/project/english/bangladesh/011/outline/index.html

While the OECD DAC includes a ‘Developing country-based NGO’ category to report funding against, the data quality is relatively poor and comprehensive data is only available for DAC members and on the core expenditure from multilateral organisations. The implementing partners are not comprehensively captured in the National Aid Management System, which focuses on the donor side.

IATI is a global initiative and data standard with the objective of improving the transparency of development and humanitarian assistance. More information is available at: www.iatistandard.org/en/

For more information on the activities of the Localisation Technical Working Group in Bangladesh and to access the evidence produced by it, please refer to:
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/bangladesh/localisation-technical-working-group


For more information please refer to the programme page on the Joint SDG Fund’s website at: https://jointsdgfund.org/programme/integrated-national-financing-framework-accelerating-achievement-sdgs-inff4sdgs


The intention of INFFs is to provide a framework and monitoring process for financing towards all SDGs, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders and incentivising private investment in recognition of the shared responsibility to achieve the SDGs. The INFF process in Bangladesh at this early stage seeks to address three SDGs before potentially expanding to additional SDGs in the future.

Currently, the Joint Response Plans also include development assistance to host communities in the Ukhiya and Teknaf sub-districts. Coordination of this funding will be handed over to the District Development and Growth Plan (DDGP) once it is up and running.


However, in sectors where agencies were more engaged, this engagement has fed into ongoing sectoral planning processes. For instance, FAO contributed to the DDGP sub-sector analysis reports for agriculture, livestock and fishery. FAO is now using the outcomes of this analysis to present them back to the new District Commissioner and to inform new interventions.

For more information see: Centre for Disaster Protection, 2020. The Future of Crisis Financing: A Call to Action, page 9. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c9d3c35ab1a62515124d7e9/t/5ff69a5e02834dc8f0ff/160580273551/Crisis_Financing_19Nov_screen.pdf


UNHCR is distributing LPG for half of the 34 refugee camps. Even though these activities are not under the SAFE Plus project, UNHCR is working closely with the project’s implementing agencies. For more information on UNHCR’s distribution of LPG, please refer to the programme’s assessment report available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/73248

For more information on the project’s finances and for annual narrative reports please refer to the project’s page on the Multi-Partner Trust Fund website at: http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/JBD50


For instance, the EU will make US$112 million available towards income support for workers export sectors, including the ready-made garment industry.
The ADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have co-financed respective loans of US$500 million and US$250 million to the Government of Bangladesh to support to the country’s most poor and vulnerable, focusing on job losses in small and medium-sized enterprises, the informal sector and on women in export-oriented industries.

The World Bank’s Safety Net Systems for the Poorest project has reduced the impact of Covid-19 in the camps by supporting awareness building for preventative measures with regards to the pandemic and by improving access to food. For more information please refer to the project’s website at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/operations/project-detail/P132634


The immediate reprogramming of US$12 million under the World Bank Health Systems Support Project, however, strengthened the government’s systems for infection prevention and control, early detection, isolation and case management, among others. While separate to national social safety nets, this health systems support was equally important in reaching the most vulnerable.

The Government of Bangladesh to this end also allowed the assignment of Burmese language instructors to support and build the educational capacity of caregivers and to monitor implementation during their household visits.


Usually this assessment is based on adherence to international agreements, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, or on examination of whether national policies are in line with international refugee protection standards. Given that the Government of Bangladesh has not signed any of the relevant international conventions and does not have any specific national legislation on refugee rights, adequacy is assessed differently in Bangladesh. It instead focuses on the government’s policy decisions by the National Task Force and resulting practice towards refugees.


Contingency financing mechanisms in this context refer to reserve funding for use in the case of crises at the national or programmatic level. This could be in the form of contingency reserves in development donors’ country budgets or as contingency budgets/crisis modifiers for individual grant agreements and programme budgets. It does not refer to global development funds that are employed in response to crises such as the World Bank’s Crisis Response Window.


For more information on the Manusher Jonno Foundation please refer to its website, available at: http://www.manusherjonno.org/


As of 1 January 2021, the Department for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) was re-named the Directorate-General for International Partnerships.


Development Initiatives (DI) is a global organisation harnessing the power of data and evidence to end poverty, reduce inequality and increase resilience.

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