In 2019 and 2020, most international grant funding for the Syrian refugee response was provided to international actors, and only a small proportion was directly given to LNAs. As a result, nearly all funding that reaches LNAs, especially L/NNGOs, for the Syrian refugee response, is channelled through an international intermediary (see Figure 7).

• In 2019 and 2020, our study identified that US$3.0 billion of international grant funding was provided to Türkiye for the Syrian refugee response (US$1.4 billion in 2019 and US$1.6 billion in 2020). Of this, 86% was first channelled to international actors, of which nearly half went to UN agencies (45%).
• In total, just 14% of international grant funding for the Syrian refugee response in 2019 and 2020 was channelled directly to LNAs, of which the vast majority went to GoT.
• Just 1% of international funding in 2019 and 2020 was directly provided to L/NNGOs. This is largely consistent with global trends; in 2019 and 2020, 0.5% of international humanitarian assistance was channelled direct to L/NNGOs^[1] and 2% of all bilateral ODA was directly channelled to civil society organisations in 2018 and 2019.^[2]
• Of the total US$3.0 billion of international grant funding provided to Türkiye for the Syrian refugee response in 2019 and 2020, our research found that US$2.4 billion ultimately reached LNAs. However, of this just 17% was channelled directly to LNAs by donors and 83% was first passed through an intermediary organisation.

While international actors received the vast majority of direct funding in 2019 (91%) and 2020 (82%), the balance of recipients changed in 2020 (see Figure 8). Funding to the UN fell, while funding to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the GoT increased.

• In 2019, 91% (US$1.2 billion) of direct funding for the Syrian refugee response was channelled to international actors. The largest recipients were UN agencies who received 63% of total funding (US$861 million), followed by IFIs (17%) and INGOs (10%).
• In 2020, international actors remained the largest direct recipient of international funding (82%) however the share between actors changed significantly, with UN funding nearly halving to 30% (US$480 million), as ESSN funding was transitioned to the International RCRC Movement (28% share, up from 1.2%).

Direct funding to LNAs, especially L/NNGOs, was small in both years. While direct funding to the government grew in 2020, funding to L/NNGOs fell, and donors continued to channel more funding to INGOs than L/NNGOs.

• Total direct funding to LNAs increased from 8.8% in 2019 to 18% in 2020. This was mainly funding to the GoT, which drove the overall increase.
• Direct funding to the national government grew from 6.9% of total funding (US$94 million) in 2019, to 17% (US$279 million) in 2020.
• Direct funding to L/NNGOs fell from US$22 million (1.6%) in 2019 to US$8.4 million (0.5%) in 2020. Of this direct funding in 2019, around half went to one national NGO. By comparison, INGOs received 5.9% of total direct funding in both years.

Most international funding for the refugee response in 2019 and 2020 was ultimately channelled to LNAs (83% in 2019 and 81% in 2020) either directly or indirectly (passing through at least one intermediary). This indicates both the extensive role LNAs play in implementing the refugee response, and the existing discrepancy in access to direct funding for LNAs and international actors.

• The largest recipient of total international funding was the TRC. The TRC received 44% (US$603 million) of total funding in 2019 and 39% (US$631) in 2020, in part due to it being the implementor of the ESSN programme in 2020 (see Box 4). Despite being the largest national implementing organisation for internationally funded refugee response programmes, our data collection did not capture any direct funding provided from donors to the TRC in 2019 and 2020.
• The government was the second largest recipient, receiving 32% (US$443 million) of total funding in 2019 (both directly and indirectly). This grew to 36% (US$586 million) in 2020 due to an US$185 million increase in direct funding. As a result, the proportion reaching the government as direct funding grew from 21% to 47%.
• Of total funding, 5.9% (US$81 million) was ultimately passed to L/NNGOs in 2019. This slightly fell in 2020 to 4.7% (US$75 million), despite rhetoric about increasing funding to local actors during the Covid-19 pandemic response.

Very little funding reached local, refugee-led or women’s organisations in Türkiye in 2019 and 2020.

• International funding for civil society in Türkiye is overwhelmingly provided to national NGOs, rather than local NGOs. Of all funding to L/NNGOs in 2019 and 2020, just 4.3% (US$6.7 million) was provided to local NGOs (US$2.8 million in 2019 and US$3.9 million in 2020). This represents 0.23% of total funding.
• Of total funding to L/NNGOs in 2019 and 2020, 2.9% (US$4.5 million) was provided to refugee-led organisations (US$2.0 million in 2019 and US$2.5 million in 2020) and 2.1% (US$3.2 million) to women’s organisations (US$2.3 million in 2019 and US$0.9 million in 2020).
• Of the total funding to the Syrian refugee response in Türkiye, refugee-led organisations received 0.15% in 2019 and 2020, while women's organisations received only 0.11%.

As outlined above, LNAs access most international funding for the Syrian refugee response through an intermediary organisation. IFIs predominantly fund the GoT while UN agencies partner with the TRC, GoT and L/NNGOs to implement programming for Syrian refugees.

The UN is the largest indirect source of funding for L/NNGOs working on the Syrian refugee response, while INGOs provide smaller volumes, and government donors provide some direct contributions (see Figure 11). L/NNGOs generally apply for funding through specific calls for proposals either directly or through invitation by international partners. In certain cases, local actors were able to raise funds from international partners that they were already working with as they expanded their programmes to include response to the Syrian situation. Cluster meetings, platforms that bring together donors and NGOs, as well as funding databases were identified as useful for learning about funding opportunities.

• The share of total funding reaching L/NNGOs from UN agencies increased from 61% (US$49.5 million) in 2019 to 71% (US$53.1 million) in 2020, despite the overall funding to UN agencies from donors falling in 2020.
• Funding from INGOs also increased both in terms of volume and proportion, from 8% (US$6.4 million) of total funding to L/NNGOs in 2019, to 14% (US$10.6 million) in 2020. This was offset by a drop in direct funding from the EU, from 12% (US$9.8 million) of total funding to L/NNGOs, to 6% (US$4.7 million) and a drop in direct funding from government donors, from 14% (US$11.4 million) to 5% (US$3.6 million).

In total, the UN passed on the majority (84%) of the funding it received in 2019 and 2020 to implementing partners. The largest recipient of UN funding was the TRC (58%) followed by the government (16%). Our study identified that 7.7% was passed on to L/NNGOs, compared to 0.7% that was passed on to INGOs. By contrast, INGOs seem to implement much more programming directly. The INGOs included within our sample passed on just 13% of their funding to other implementing partners of which 9.6% was to L/NNGOs and 3.1% to other INGOs.

The type of funding available to LNAs has been predominantly humanitarian, especially for L/NNGOs. While most funding is provided by donors to the Syrian refugee response in Türkiye as humanitarian assistance (though the proportion of development assistance has increased, see Figure 4), the funding LNAs receive is disproportionately humanitarian.

• Based on data collated from intermediaries, the majority of funding that was passed on by an intermediary organisation in 2020 was humanitarian (77%). By comparison, only 48% of total funding provided by donors in 2020 was humanitarian assistance.
• Nearly all the development funding passed on by intermediaries from donors is provided to the government (91%), meaning L/NNGOs are able to access only humanitarian funding.

Overall, international funding for LNAs in response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Türkiye has increased. In particular, the GoT has become an increasingly large direct recipient of international grant funding, as more funding is channelled through development financing instruments (see Figure 5). However, there are significant barriers for other LNAs, especially L/NNGOs, to access direct funding which can reduce transaction costs and increase effectiveness.

Donor regulations prevent L/NNGOs from being able to directly access some of the largest envelopes of funding for the Syrian refugee response in Türkiye. L/NNGOs have effectively been excluded from receiving direct funding through the FRIT as it is channelled through instruments which are not directly accessible by civil society (except the EUTF). The primary EU humanitarian and development financing instruments used to channel FRIT funds to Türkiye cannot directly fund L/NNGOs and can only fund certain international and national government actors.^[8] This includes ECHO funding which accounted for 47% of the first tranche of the FRIT. Only the EUTF can fund L/NNGOs directly, however this mechanism was not used in the second tranche.

While information about calls and tenders is often accessible through online platforms and networks, eligibility criteria imposed by the donors was reported by interviewees as one of the main barriers to accessing funds directly. Formal eligibility requirements include international NGO status, registration requirements, the size of grants previously managed, experience and organisation size, all of which are difficult for smaller L/NNGOs in particular to meet.

In other cases, donor preferences and capacities mean they prefer to channel larger amounts of funding to fewer, larger actors, mainly multilateral organisations. International intermediaries such as UN agencies and INGOs also generally prefer to fund larger, well-established L/NNGOs because they can absorb larger sums of money, are more familiar with funding proposal processes and can better meet the stringent compliance requirements. The requirements put in place by donors mean that accessing funds directly is resource intensive and requires specialist skills that not all L/NNGOs have. This can discourage L/NNGOs from applying for international funding in the first place and limits the opportunities for smaller, local NGOs to access international funding directly or indirectly. Exceptions to this include the Local Initiatives Fund for Türkiye (LIFT), a pooled fund which specifically targeted smaller local organisations (see case study below).

Complexities in the legal and regulatory environment also influence partnerships between international actors and national civil society organisations. Some international organisations reported that the complex operating environment in Türkiye has compelled them to partner with organisations that have close relationships with state institutions, limiting their partner choices. INGOs reported that they also face challenges in navigating the complex regulatory environment in Türkiye with non-compliance often resulting in fines. A lack of clarity and understanding of the law can mean that INGOs hold themselves back from expanding partnerships with local organisations further as part of perceived risk management. Nevertheless, some INGOs seek ways to partner with local and national civil society organisations despite these restrictions, for example one INGO reported to sign contracts with L/NNGOs through their headquarters, rather than at the country level, to overcome regulatory issues around partnering with local actors.

L/NNGOs have limited opportunities for strategic engagement with donors, as they receive most funding indirectly, and are therefore less able to influence donor funding priorities. Opportunities for engagement between L/NNGOs and donors are mainly limited to the 3RP coordination mechanisms, of which L/NNGOs are active members. L/NNGOs can mainly only access project-based, often short-term funding grants, rather than longer-term strategic partnerships. As a result, donors often define the formal criteria for application as well as the priority areas, location and other features of projects. When the terms of the funds are defined by the donor, projects do not always match the shifting needs of the refugees on the ground as identified by L/NNGOs. For example, while it is widely known that Syrian refugees work in the informal sector, international funds do not cover this group of workers despite many local NGOs seeking to support them. Donors and L/NNGOs may also disagree on the classification of types of activities. For instance, advocacy around the rights of refugees may be seen as protection activities by donors but as social cohesion activities for L/NNGOs. Recent research has found that local and international actors have different expectations, priorities and understandings around protection advocacy.^[12]

The movement toward more nexus and resilience programming in Türkiye may create further barriers for funding to L/NNGOs specifically. With an increase in development grant funding, FRIT 2 and post-FRIT funding trends have seen more funding being channelled to IFIs, which generally fund government institutions, and a decrease in funding to the UN, which acts as a key intermediary to L/NNGOs. Interviewees were clear that the direction of funding will increasingly be toward government actors, as well as the TRC. While this is promising in terms of further localising the response and integrating refugee support into national systems, ensuring L/NNGOs are also a part of ‘localisation’ is critical to the quality and effectiveness of the response as well as important in terms of preserving civic space.