We would like to thank the many people who have been involved in helping us put the GHA Report 2016 together: our colleagues at Development Initiatives; Diane Broadley at Broadley Design; Jen Claydon, copy-editor and Lydia Poole, independent consultant.

We would also like to thank the many experts in the humanitarian community who provided information and advice – including Degan Ali at Adeso; Paula Gil Baizan and Vincent Trouseau at the Cash Learning Partnership; Bernard Boigelot and Hana Količ at the EC Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO); Abby Stoddard at Humanitarian Outcomes; independent consultant Sarah Bailey; Luca Vernaccini at INFORM; Ben Ramalingam at the Institute of Development Studies; Justin Ginnetti at the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; Melissa Pitotti at the International Council of Voluntary Agencies Network; Ysabel Fougery and Pierre de Rochefort at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); Ben Parker at IRIN; Barnaby Willitts-King at the Overseas Development Institute; Deepti Sastry at the START Network; Nurçin Yıldız at TIKA and Nemen Kösker at the Turkish Embassy in London; Ewen Macleod and Kimberly Roberson at UNHCR; Tensai Asfaw, Laura Calvio, Maiju Jolma, Nicolas Rost, Javier Teran, Andrew Wyllie and Andrej Verity at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Richard Garfield at the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention; Daniel Kull at the World Bank; and Tahir Nour and Sylvia Scheurer at the World Food Programme.

For their contribution to Chapter 7, we would like to thank Anton Jensen and Philippe Maughan at the EC, Niall O’Rourke at Christian Aid; Anne-Marie McCarthy at Concern Worldwide; Lisa Doherty and Michael Shanahan at Irish Aid; Michael O’Riordan at Oxfam Ireland, Linda Fuhrmann at Plan International; Orla Duke at Trócaire; Abdul Riza at UNDP; Rekiya Adamu-Atta and Sanjana Gaddam at UNICEF; Elie Gasagara at World Vision International; Sheila Garry at World Vision Ireland and Stephan Mankart at Young Innovators for their support collecting and providing data for the Nepal traceability study.

We would like to extend our gratitude and thanks to the following people for providing us with data for our private funding calculations: Susie Dudley, Joseoh Rwanjagarara and Anne Street at CAFOD; Jane Gagie at Christian Aid; Patricia McNamara at Concern Worldwide; Pi Tauber at Danish Refugee Council; Adib Nahas and Mara Ponta at ICRC; Olivier Van Bunnen at IFRC; Lindsay Michiels at International Organization for Migration; Steve Jones at MAG (Mines Advisory Group) International; Martin Baumann at Medair; Ricardo Rubio at Médécins Sans Frontières; Lance Cole at Mercy Corps; Espen Ruud at Norwegian Refugee Council; Gina Flavelle at Oxfam International; Franck Bocquet and Stefano Di Russo at UNHCR; Rekiya Adamu-Atta and Violet Sempele at UNICEF; Rima Dabbagh at UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; and Livia Paoluzzi at the World Food Programme.

We would like to thank the programme’s funders for their support: the Department for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada; the Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida); the Department for Humanitarian Action at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, and the Department for International Development (DFID), the United Kingdom.

This report was authored by Charlotte Lattimer and led by Sophia Swithern. Dan Sparks was the project manager. Data analysis was led by Luminita Tuchel with extensive analysis and research by: Jordan Beecher, Cecilia Caio, Rosanna Collins, Sarah Darlymple, Arnaud Galinié, Steve Kenei, Duncan Knox, Alex Miller, Lylaa Shaikh, Manon Simenon, Chloe Parrish, Rob Tew and Richard Watts. Donata Wasiuk provided data and was responsible for database development. Rebecca Hills managed editorial production, assisted by Simon Murphy. Daniel Coppard, Harpinder Collacott, Momodou Touray and Martin Horwood provided editorial guidance.

Thank you
Contents

Executive Summary 3
Introduction 9
Chapter 1: People 11
Poverty and vulnerability 12
People affected by conflict and disaster 17
Chapter 2: Context 21
The financing context 22
Domestic resources: refugee hosting 27
Domestic and regional resources: disaster risk reduction 30
Regional approaches to risk financing 31
Official development assistance: fragility 32
Official development assistance: health 33
Chapter 3: International humanitarian assistance 35
International humanitarian response 36
UN-coordinated appeals 37
Funding outside UN-coordinated appeals 41
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals 42
Chapter 4: Donors 43
Government donors 44
Private donors 48
Multilateral development banks 50
Chapter 5: Location 53
Recipients of international humanitarian assistance 54
Humanitarian funding to address risk 56
Forgotten crises 57
Concentration of funding 59
Donor preferences 60
Crisis types 62
Long- and medium-term international humanitarian assistance 63
Multi-year funding 64
Chapter 6: Delivery 65
Channels of delivery 66
UN agencies 68
Pooled funding 69
Localisation 70
Governments of affected states 73
Chapter 7: Effectiveness 75
Cash programming 76
Flexible funding 78
Transparency 79
Better data for a better response 82
Chapter 8: Methodology and definitions 83
Methodology 84
Data sources 88
Definitions 89
Abbreviations 92
Notes 93
What we do 101
New Year’s Day brings winter weather to thousands of Syrian refugees already living in hardship at a camp in Bekaa, Lebanon.
**IN NUMBERS**

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN NUMBERS**

ernment donors: **Donors, 2015** (largest volumes)

- US: US$6.4 billion
- Turkey: US$3.2 billion
- UK: US$2.8 billion
- EU institutions: US$2.0 billion
- Germany: US$1.5 billion
- Sweden: US$1.2 billion
- UAE: US$1.1 billion
- Donors, 2015** (largest volumes)

1. People, poverty and risk

- 76% of people in extreme poverty live in countries that are environmentally vulnerable or politically fragile or both.

2. The financing context

- Resource flows for 20 countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance, 2014:
  - Short-term debt
  - Portfolio equity
  - Peacekeeping
  - ODA gross (less humanitarian assistance)
  - Remittances
  - Long-term debt (commercial)
  - Foreign direct investment
  - Other official flows (gross)
  - International humanitarian assistance, 4.8%

3. Total international humanitarian assistance*

- 2011: US$20.2bn
- 2012: US$18.0bn
- 2013: US$20.8bn
- 2014: US$25.1bn
- 2015: US$28.0bn

4. UN-coordinated appeals, 2015

5. EU institutions are also included separately for comparison and are shaded differently to distinguish from government donors. Turkey is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey so is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure.

6. First-level channels of funding, 2014

7. Recipient countries, 2014

**Notes:** For full details of methodology, see the Methodology and definitions. *Data consists only of humanitarian assistance directed internationally by donors. Contributions of EU member states include an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, UNHCR, World Bank data, SIPRI, IMF and Development Initiatives’ unique dataset for private voluntary contributions.

EU institutions are also included separately for comparison and are shaded differently to distinguish from government donors. Turkey is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey so is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure.
Executive summary

People living in poverty are hardest hit by disasters and insecurity, which in turn make them more vulnerable to future shocks and deeper poverty. At least 76% of people living in extreme poverty – around 677 million people – are estimated to live in countries that are either politically fragile, environmentally vulnerable or both. However, the real number is likely to be much higher, since it is often those most at risk who are missing from poverty data.

As conflicts continued in 2015, including in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and South Sudan, those living in forced displacement reached another record high of over 65 million people, with most displaced people remaining in middle- or low-income countries in their own regions. In the same year, disasters caused by natural hazards affected an estimated 89 million people. This included those affected by large-scale, sudden-onset emergencies such as the Nepal earthquake, though less high-profile and localised events undoubtedly affected many more.

In the face of such human suffering, the World Humanitarian Summit and other global processes have intensified the search for new types and scales of financing, efficiencies and good practice to make finite humanitarian resources go further and bring about better results for crisis-affected people. However, international humanitarian assistance is neither sufficient nor appropriate to address the full spectrum of people’s needs and vulnerabilities in crisis contexts.

Addressing these needs requires a wide range of resources and a sophisticated financing toolkit ranging from insurance for natural hazards, to concessional loans and guarantees for long-term refugee hosting. Not all tools will work everywhere, but combining finance streams and approaches that are right for the context, timed to anticipate and prevent crises, scaled appropriately, and targeted at the right people can mitigate the escalation of high-risk situations into humanitarian crises.

Domestic governments have the primary responsibility to prepare for and respond to crises in their own territories and often invest significant resources in doing so. Many governments invest significant amounts in national disaster risk reduction and response, while refugee hosting is another crucial domestic element of humanitarian response. However, counting the contributions of all governments to support refugees in-country is complex and there is no single platform that captures this expenditure. More transparent and comparable data is needed to inform predictable, durable and equitable financing solutions to support refugees and host communities.

International resources, both private and public, can be critical in supporting the investments of local, national and regional actors to address risk, build resilience and respond to protracted crises. In 2014, official development assistance, excluding humanitarian funding, accounted for an aggregate 12% of known international flows to the recipients of the most humanitarian assistance.

International humanitarian assistance accounted for just 4.8% of all international flows to the recipients of the most humanitarian assistance in 2014. While small in comparison to other investments, it remains a vital resource for many people affected by crises. As such, international humanitarian assistance has continued to grow year on year, reaching a record high of US$28.0 billion in 2015. This is the third consecutive annual rise – though less pronounced than increases in recent years.

Rises in humanitarian funding came from both government and private donors, who increased their respective contributions by an estimated 11% and 13% from the previous year. In 2015, 20 government donors contributed 97% of all international government contributions. The largest percentage increases have
come from governments in the Middle East and North of Sahara region, a rise of almost 500% since 2011, mainly driven by contributions from Gulf states in response to crises in the Middle East.

While overall humanitarian funding increased in 2015, the gap between requirements and contributions to UN-coordinated appeals grew. The amount requested through UN appeals stood at US$19.8 billion, a slight decrease from the previous year; but contributions fell by considerably more, leaving an unprecedented shortfall of 45% (US$8.9 billion) – a funding gap that played out very differently from country to country.

Humanitarian funding in 2015, both inside and outside of the appeals, was increasingly concentrated in a relatively small group of emergencies. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Financial Tracking Service (FTS), five crises – in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for more than half of all funding allocated to specific emergencies. This is in contrast to 2011 and 2012, when the five largest crises received around one third of the total.

The annual list of persistently underfunded or ‘neglected emergencies’ frequently features the same countries year on year. The priority crises in the EC’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO)’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment index for 2015 included Algeria/Western Sahara and Myanmar, both of which have appeared on the index every year since 2004.

Long-term crises continue to absorb the largest volumes of international humanitarian assistance. In 2014, 91% of official humanitarian assistance from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee donors went to long- and medium-term recipients, reinforcing the rationale for more multi-annual humanitarian planning and financing.

How funding reaches crisis-affected populations has implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of the assistance provided. In 2014, around two-thirds of funding from government donors was channelled via multilateral organisations, mostly to the six major humanitarian-related UN agencies. Despite calls and commitments for more support to local actors, data from the FTS shows that funding channelled directly to local and national non-government organisations (NGOs) remains low, accounting for just 0.4% of international humanitarian assistance in 2015.

Pooled funding continues to play an important role in humanitarian financing. UN-led humanitarian pooled funds mobilised US$1.3 billion in 2015, a 28% rise from the previous year. Investments in country-based pooled funds grew in particular, with an increase in funding of almost 50% in 2015 from the previous year.

Flexible financing is understood to bring a number of benefits. However, the proportion of fully unearmarked contributions to UN agencies received from government donors decreased from 24% in 2012 to 16% in 2014; and unearmarked funding for NGOs represented just 8% of the overall funding they received in 2014.

Greater transparency and traceability of funding could bring efficiency gains and improve accountability to crisis-affected populations. Likewise, an overview of all relevant resources in crisis situations, including and beyond humanitarian assistance, could improve the targeting of resources to those most in need. Better reporting to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Standard provides an opportunity for achieving this.
THE STORY

Kambia, Sierra Leone
April 2015

Albert Foday-Kamara (left), and Bai Turay, from the national health ministry, work with the Kambia district health management team, overseeing the storeroom housing the burial team’s equipment.

CREDIT
© Louise Norton/CAFOD (detail)
INTRODUCTION
Introduction

Poverty, vulnerability and humanitarian need continue to challenge the world’s capacity to prevent, respond to and rebuild after crises. At the same time, global processes from the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction to the Sustainable Development Goals and the World Humanitarian Summit have demonstrated an appetite for change and instigated a major rethink of the way that financing is delivered in crisis settings. A more diverse and complex financing landscape is emerging. This is promising in the creative solutions that it offers, but also potentially challenging – more complicated to navigate and more difficult to keep track of the relevant funding flows and their impact on vulnerable populations.

This year’s Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report is designed to respond to exactly that challenge. Development Initiatives (DI) is an independent and objective organisation that has been producing the GHA report every year since 2000. With each edition we seek to add value by making complex data and information on poverty, crises and the financial resources to tackle them clearer, more accessible and easier to act on. This year, we have updated the structure and content of the report to reflect the critical issues and approaches that have emerged over the last twelve months.

As in previous years, the GHA Report 2016 provides a clear guide to the critical questions of how much humanitarian assistance there is, where it comes from, where it is spent and how it gets there. It also provides analysis on other areas that are critical in the context of the global shifts outlined above. For example, it shows that chronic poverty and vulnerability to crises are closely linked, and provides new analysis on the diversity and scale of resources already at play in preventing and responding to emergencies. It also looks in detail at some of the ways that the efficiency and effectiveness of financing in crisis situations could be improved, such as multi-year approaches in protracted crisis situations, more traceable funding to improve the accountability of the response to crisis-affected people, and flexible financing through unearmarked contributions.

Looking at the funding in such detail reveals the need for much stronger data on both the resources themselves and their impact on vulnerable people. It is clear that much more comprehensive and comparable data is required in a number of areas, including domestic contributions for crisis prevention and response, funding for local and national actors, and spending on cash-based programming.

This year’s GHA report provides a strong independent evidence base for all those involved in making decisions that lead to better outcomes for people affected by crises. It also aims to contribute to and prompt further efforts to improve the quality of information and its use.

2015 and 2016 were important years in terms of setting out a clear agenda to end poverty and reduce the impact of crises on the most vulnerable people; however, the years to come will be much more critical, as the journey to put those commitments into practice begins in earnest. The GHA Report 2016 is part of our contribution to that process. We look forward to the conversations that the report is designed to instigate and inform, as well as your feedback on how we can keep providing better data and analysis to increase the resilience of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people and ensure that no one is left behind.
A number of conflicts continued and intensified in 2015, bringing the number of people displaced by violence and persecution globally to over 65 million and generating severe suffering and humanitarian need. While attention grows on the rising numbers of people reaching Europe, the majority of displaced people are in the Middle East, North of Sahara and South of Sahara regions, and 60% of those forced to flee remain internally displaced.

Disasters caused by natural hazards appear to have affected fewer people in 2015 than the previous year – 89 million people compared with 142 million in 2014 – though smaller-scale events related to climate change and the El Niño weather phenomenon have undoubtedly disrupted the lives and livelihoods of many more.

Poverty and vulnerability to crises are inextricably linked. In 2012, 76% of people living in extreme poverty – below the $1.90 a day poverty line – were living in countries that were either politically fragile, environmentally vulnerable or both. This is at least 677 million people ‘left behind’ – excluded from the benefits of sustainable development and vulnerable to the impact of future crises.

Better data on who these people are, where they live, and the specific risks and vulnerabilities that they face can inform shared efforts to break the cycle of poverty, vulnerability and crisis. Subnational and disaggregated data exposes the different kinds and levels of vulnerabilities, risks and needs that people face. By playing to their complementary strengths more effectively, humanitarian, development and other key actors can better understand the risks, needs and capacities of vulnerable populations and target their efforts accordingly to save lives, reduce poverty and build resilience.
Poverty and vulnerability

People living in extreme poverty are often most vulnerable to crises. It is the people, families and communities with the least resources, capacities and access to services that are hardest hit by conflict, disasters caused by natural hazards or a combination of both. As their capacity to cope and recover is further eroded by crises, so their poverty and vulnerability to future shocks increases, creating a vicious cycle.

In 2012, (the most recent year of country-comparable poverty data), an estimated 76% of people living in extreme poverty – on less than $1.90 a day – were living in countries that were either politically fragile (32%), environmentally vulnerable (32%) or both (12%). This is approximately 677 million people being ‘left behind’: most likely to be excluded from the benefits of growth and of prosperous and healthy societies, and at risk of being denied their basic rights. In reality, the number is likely to be much higher as the most vulnerable people often go uncounted. For example in Figure 1.1, many fragile states including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen are not included as poverty data is simply unavailable (see also Figure 1.2). The combined population of these five countries (179 million in 2014) is therefore missing from this analysis.

The UN Secretary-General’s report for the World Humanitarian Summit suggested that data and joint analysis should become the bedrock of development and humanitarian action. Putting this meaningfully and appropriately into action demands a sophisticated approach, drawing on a mix of available data sources to identify the most vulnerable people and understand the risks and needs that they face.

However, as Figure 1.2 shows, crisis-affected countries often lack recent, inclusive and reliable poverty data to inform longer-term responses to the needs of vulnerable populations. Five of the twenty countries that have received the most international humanitarian assistance in the last decade have not conducted national poverty surveys since 2009. Sudan, for example, which received the most

FIGURE 1.1

**Number of people living in extreme poverty in environmentally vulnerable and politically fragile countries**

![Diagram showing the number of people living in extreme poverty](chart)

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank PovcalNet, World Bank World Development Indicators, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and INFORM Index for Risk Management

Notes: Chart not to scale. Poverty estimates use World Bank PovcalNet modelled 2012 data, using a 2011 PPP$1.90/day poverty line. Regional estimates are available and used for 24 out of 31 countries with no poverty data; regional estimates are not available for the remaining 7 countries with no poverty data (all located in the Middle East and North Africa region). Fragile states are defined as per ‘fragile states and economies’ in the OECD report States of Fragility 2015. The INFORM 2016 index is used to compile the list of environmentally vulnerable countries: countries scoring very high and high on the ‘natural hazard’ indicator, and excludes countries scoring ‘low’ and ‘very low’ on the ‘lack of coping capacity’ dimension.
international humanitarian assistance between 2005 and 2014, last conducted a national poverty survey in 2009. Somalia, which received the eighth largest amount, has never conducted one. Syria, Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon are all lacking up-to-date poverty data.

Although poverty data may be lacking in many crisis contexts, there are a number of examples where humanitarian and development actors have effectively pooled their resources and worked together on shared analysis. For example, in 2012, the UN country team initiated an extensive study in Palestine, drawing on a wide range of data sources to highlight the main developmental trends and challenges affecting the Gaza Strip and the priorities for humanitarian and UN development programming. In the Sahel region, the multi-year UN-coordinated plan draws on security, development and humanitarian analyses to highlight the seasonal nature of humanitarian needs in the Sahel against a backdrop of complex and chronic malnutrition and food insecurity. A new global risk platform, announced at the World Humanitarian Summit, will seek to facilitate this type of collaboration by improving data collection, analysis of inter-connected risks, and early warning efforts.

While significant institutional, political and operational barriers exist, limiting effective humanitarian and development collaboration in many contexts, these examples demonstrate the practical possibilities. With people known to be living in extreme poverty concentrated in high-risk settings, a multi-faceted approach is needed including humanitarian, development, political, climate change, peace and security dimensions. While remaining mindful of humanitarian principles, this means judging where collaboration makes sense, agreeing objectives, then drawing on comparative advantages to better understand and address humanitarian needs and the root causes of poverty.

**FIGURE 1.2**

**Year of most recent poverty survey in 20 countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance**

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank World Development Indicators, OECD Development Assistance Committee, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service and UN Central Emergency Response Fund data

Notes: Year of poverty survey refers to the most recent household survey from which poverty head count estimates (based on the national poverty line) are derived. Countries selected are the 20 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance between 2005 and 2014. South Sudan is shown as having a survey in 2009, although it has not had a national poverty survey since gaining independence in 2011. Data for 2009 is derived from all of Sudan census and household surveys. DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Case study: Subnational differences in poverty and risk in Kenya

Even where national household surveys are available and up to date, national poverty figures can mask the differences in people’s lives at the local level. Efforts to end poverty and build the resilience of the poorest people to withstand and recover from crises need to be founded on more in-depth, subnational data. An example of this can be drawn from northern Kenya, an area prone to drought and flooding, made worse by the current El Niño weather phenomenon. Food insecurity and malnutrition are rife, as are insecurity and displacement; livelihoods are fragile and access to services is poor.

Figure 1.3 maps poverty in Kenya against indicators of risk compiled by the INFORM Index for Risk Management. It shows that three counties in northern Kenya have a poverty incidence over 80% – Turkana (88%), Mandera (86%) and Wajir (84%) – each bordering either Ethiopia or Somalia. This is much higher than the aggregate national poverty incidence of 45%. At the same time, these counties have the second, third and fourth highest risk ratings respectively of all counties in Kenya. Garissa County, also bordering Somalia, has the highest INFORM risk rating of all Kenyan counties and an above average poverty rate of 59%.

Even this basic level of subnational data is important for assessing whether efforts and resources are being directed to the right places and whether domestic and international development and humanitarian support is genuinely targeting the poorest and most at risk populations.

SUBNATIONAL RISK PROFILES

The INFORM Index for Risk Management has developed a number of subnational risk profiles. In 2015, individual risk models were created for Colombia and Lebanon, and subnational risk breakdowns for countries in the Sahel and the Greater Horn of Africa regions. More subnational models are planned in 2016 and will be developed and managed by national-level actors with global support from the INFORM initiative.
FIGURE 1.3

Subnational data: poverty incidence and composite categories of crisis risk in Kenya


Notes: Poverty data is based on the Kenyan national poverty line. The INFORM subnational risk score combines INFORM indicators ‘hazard’ (including natural and human hazards), ‘vulnerability’ (including socio-economic vulnerability and vulnerable groups) and ‘lack of coping capacity’ (including institutional and infrastructural). Circles are different sizes for different INFORM risk scores. Map image © www.d-maps.com

CHAPTER 1: PEOPLE / POVERTY, RISK AND CRISIS

15
Case study: Poverty in the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon and Jordan

Refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and migrant populations are often not covered by national poverty statistics. National poverty estimations and World Bank poverty calculations are based on household surveys that can leave such population groups excluded.15

Refugees, both inside and outside camps, often have very different poverty profiles to those of host populations. These of course change according to the length of displacement, the causes, manner and means of their displacement, the economic background from which and to which they have fled, and the socioeconomic circumstances of exile.

The income and expenditure opportunities for refugees are also very different to those of the resident host population. Refugees have largely lost their assets and livelihoods – resources that may have already been depleted by a series of shocks culminating in their final compulsion to leave. They are typically obliged to seek informal livelihood opportunities in unfamiliar contexts, where the means, rights and opportunities to work are officially limited, as may be their access to services.

Measuring the poverty and welfare of refugees, therefore, demands a multi-dimensional understanding of both their financial and non-financial deprivation.

According to the latest national poverty surveys, 14% of the host population in Jordan (2010) and 27% in Lebanon (2011) were living under the national poverty lines. However, recent refugee populations are missing from this data. And while these figures pre-date the arrival of large numbers of Syrians, both countries were already hosting significant refugee populations, particularly Palestinian refugees who are not included in the surveys.16

Over 90% of Syrian refugees in Jordan (97%) and Lebanon (93%) are poor if measured against national poverty lines.

From 2014 to 2015, the World Bank and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) jointly undertook the first poverty and welfare assessment of a UNHCR-assisted refugee population, focusing specifically on Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan.17 The World Bank/UNHCR study gathered household data for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan registered with UNHCR. The poverty line was set at the threshold that UNHCR uses for its cash programming eligibility – equivalent to US$5.25 in 2005 PPP – while the national poverty line in Jordan is $8.20 PPP, and $10.30 PPP in Lebanon.18 The survey found that 70% of registered refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are poor (measured against the UNHCR poverty threshold), rising to over 90% (97% in Jordan and 93% in Lebanon) if national poverty lines are used.

The report also showed the relationship between poverty and other demographic indicators, as well as the places where people had fled from and to. Poverty levels were highest among the 35- to 49-year-old age group, as they had the largest numbers of dependent children. People fleeing from Aleppo and Damascus and living in the Jordanian governorate of Taifah were the poorest overall, with virtually all living under the poverty line and often already disadvantaged by previous shocks and stresses. Prolonged drought had already forced many rural Syrians into deprivation in the outskirts of major cities, where heavy fighting later forced the same people to flee both internally and across borders. Poverty was therefore a factor in a complex chain of movement that culminated in people seeking cross-border asylum.

Like displaced people elsewhere, Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon are living in precarious legal and material circumstances, which combined with their previous status and experiences, keeps them locked in a state of poverty that generally goes uncounted. The complexity of their deprivation demands not only a more in-depth understanding of poverty but also an equally sophisticated repertoire of political, humanitarian and socioeconomic responses (see Chapter 2).
People affected by conflict and disaster

Currently, there is no way of counting the number of people affected by conflict or the severity of their needs. There are a number of databases and indices that track, for example, the location, duration and intensity of conflicts worldwide or the number of battle-related deaths. Experts have gathered extensive data to estimate the global economic cost of conflict and violence, amounting to US$14.3 trillion in 2014. However, there is no estimate of the overall human cost of violent conflict on civilian populations. Many people go uncounted and the real impact of conflict on the lives of those affected is difficult to quantify.

That said, the number of displaced people can provide an indication of the impact of conflict. In 2015, displacement increased for a fifth year running, with an estimated 65.3 million people forced to flee their homes because of violence and persecution. Many more people remain displaced within their own countries (40.8 million) than have fled across borders (24.5 million). A close look at the latest data shows a number of important shifts in the geographic location and economic situation of displaced populations, all of which have implications for who takes responsibility for providing assistance and how.

Europe saw a rise in the number of refugees and asylum seekers between 2014 and 2015 of 50%, from 3.8 million people to 5.7 million – 23% of the displaced population globally. Within the region of Europe (as classified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the majority of people displaced in 2015 were in Turkey (2.75 million people), the vast majority of whom are Syrian refugees.

However, the numbers of displaced people in the Middle East and North of Sahara and South of Sahara regions are significantly higher than those in Europe.

In 2015 displacement increased for a fifth year running with an estimated 65.3 million people forced to flee their homes.
FIGURE 1.5

Number of displaced people by income group of host country, 2006–2015

Over one-third of displaced people – refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs – were living in the Middle East and North of Sahara in 2014 (39%) and 2015 (37%), and a further quarter (27%) in the South of Sahara region in 2015. Most of the people displaced in the Middle East and North of Sahara were in Syria (7.1 million), Iraq (4.7 million), Jordan (2.8 million), Yemen (2.8 million), Palestine (2.1 million) and Lebanon (1.5 million).

In the South of Sahara region, Sudan (3.5 million people displaced), Nigeria (2.2 million), South Sudan (2.1 million) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.9 million) accounted for the majority of displaced people.

In 2015, 94% of displaced people were living in countries that were either classified as middle income countries (MICS – 79%) or low income countries (LICs – 15%). Continued and intensified conflict in the Middle East and North of Sahara, particularly in Syria, meant that that there were more displaced people in MICS than in LICs in both 2014 and 2015. Lower middle income countries (LMICs) such as Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, Palestine and Nigeria accounted for a large proportion of the total (41%), as did upper middle income countries (UMICs) such as Colombia, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey (38%).

Although country income levels are wide groupings and a crude indicator of poverty and coping capacity, they can be a determinant of the kind of aid a country is able to access, with the World Bank’s previously applied income criteria making most MICS ineligible for concessional loans. As explored in Chapters 2 and 4, the fact that the largest proportion of refugees are now in MICS is impelling a new approach to the repertoire of financing instruments to support refugees, their host communities and national authorities.

In 2015, an estimated 89.4 million people were affected by disasters caused by natural hazards, a decrease of 51.7 million from the previous year. Not all of those affected need humanitarian assistance. People themselves may have the resources to survive and recover, and in many
instances national and local authorities are able to cope without the need to call on international support. As Figure 1.6 shows, people affected by natural hazards over the last decade have predominantly been in MICs. However, in 2015, the number of people affected by disasters who were living in LICs significantly increased, reaching 43 million – 48% of the total – placing further strain on already poor and vulnerable populations.23

The vast majority of people affected by disasters over the last decade were in countries in the Far East Asia region (see Figure 1.6). South and Central Asia followed with the second largest number of people affected; latest figures show that this number nearly doubled between 2014 and 2015 to 30 million people, over half (55%) of whom were affected by widespread flooding in India.

The South of Sahara region also witnessed a noticeable increase in the number of people affected by natural hazards in 2015, increasing from 7.6 million people in 2014 to 23.5 million. Almost all (99%) were affected by drought and flooding across 22 countries in the region, approximately half of whom (44%, 10.2 million people) were in Ethiopia. Ethiopia ranked third in 2015 for the number of people affected by disasters, behind the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (18 million people) and India (16.6 million people).

In 2015 an estimated 89.4 million people were affected by disasters caused by natural hazards.
Three major accords – the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement on climate change – all identify actions to build resilience against hazards. As Chapters 2 and 5 explore, a wider and more sophisticated set of tools and resources is needed to inform appropriate investments in risk reduction. Governments, civil society and other actors will need to work together within these frameworks to ensure that strengthening disaster preparedness and management is an integral part of sustainable development. This should happen not only in the case of large-scale emergencies, but also where frequent and localised disasters continue to impact heavily on livelihoods and exacerbate poverty.

THE IMPACT OF EL NIÑO

The global increase in numbers of drought- and flood-affected people in the South of Sahara region in 2015 is likely to be associated with the current El Niño weather phenomenon. The extreme conditions that this creates can exacerbate weather patterns that are already volatile, unpredictable and subject to extremes. The impact of El Niño continues to be felt in 2016, with the UN estimating that the number of people likely to be affected during the year in high risk developing countries could reach 60 million.
The bigger financial picture

Reducing the vulnerability of populations at risk and responding to their urgent needs requires a clear understanding of the available resources and a sophisticated financing toolkit. Different financing approaches, modalities and instruments already exist and many more are emerging. These need to be deployed and scaled up according to their comparative advantage in different types, phases and contexts of crises.

Within this evolving financing landscape, international humanitarian assistance remains a vital resource in crisis-affected settings. However, in 2014, it represented just 4.8% of known international resources to the 20 recipients that received the most humanitarian funding. This compares with non-humanitarian development assistance, which accounted for 12%, and remittances, which according to available data represented a quarter of international in-flows. Context is critical though and these aggregates mask considerable differences between countries.

Domestic governments have the primary responsibility to respond to crises in their territories and often invest significant amounts in both preparedness and response. Refugee hosting is a crucial domestic element of humanitarian response and the majority of refugees are hosted in countries with low domestic capacity to support them. However, a lack of comparable data makes it difficult to measure the full value of the contributions of developed and developing host states.

The need for more long-term development investments to address risk, prevent crises and build resilience has prompted calls for increased investments in vulnerable settings. In environmentally vulnerable settings, risk transfer and insurance mechanisms are attracting renewed attention with additional investments in many disaster prone countries.

In the case of fragile states, agreement is needed on which states are actually fragile and what constitutes fragility, as is a refocus on people and local vulnerabilities, rather than on countries. In the case of disease, the 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak showed the need for sustained investments in health infrastructures. The recent peak in humanitarian assistance and official development assistance (ODA) for infectious disease control now needs to give way to sustained investment in the development of resilient health systems and infrastructures.
The financing context

It is not only a question of finding more funding to fill the shortfall in crisis prone and affected settings (see Chapter 3). Rather, there is growing awareness that a more sophisticated financing toolkit for crises is required – one that can respond and adapt to different contexts as needed. A number of reports and initiatives have made the case for a diversified set of mechanisms, tailored to specific needs, working to their comparative advantage and moving away from a ‘one size fits all’ approach.

In this complex and proliferating lexicon of financing, Figure 2.1 maps out the key sources, means of mobilisation, modalities and financing instruments against different types and phases of crisis, vulnerability and risk. It shows that diverse approaches and financing instruments are already beginning to emerge, though not all will work everywhere, particularly in the case of market-mediated instruments. The options are currently more limited in efforts to address conflict and fragility than natural hazards. A glossary of terms is available in Methodology and definitions.

These tools are clearly at different levels of evolution and scale. They range from those that are well established and already operating at considerable volume (such as grants and concessional loans), to those that are relatively new additions to the crisis financing landscape (such as risk transfer tools and refugee financing facilities). Others have potential but are yet to be applied effectively and at scale in crisis settings (such as social impact bonds and advance market commitments).

Notes: This graphic shows major sources of financing, means of mobilisation, financing modalities, modes of intervention, instruments and primary recipients of financing for crisis prevention, resilience and response. It is intended to be illustrative and therefore not comprehensive. Sizes of shapes are not representative of scale and because of its complex nature, how financing flows between these components is not shown.
The challenge of meeting people’s immediate humanitarian needs in crisis settings, while simultaneously addressing the underlying causes of their vulnerability, requires a range of domestic and international resources. Not all resources at play in a country will be available or appropriate for these purposes, but understanding the overall financing context is important.

International humanitarian assistance is a vital resource that serves to alleviate the worst of human suffering. However, even in countries receiving the largest amounts of international humanitarian assistance in 2014, it still accounted for just a small proportion of overall resources – 4.8% of all international resources.

Domestic governments have the primary responsibility to prepare for and respond to crises in their own territories and often invest significant amounts in both preparedness and response. In aggregate in 2014, domestic resources represented 61% of total resources in the 20 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance. Yet these crisis-affected countries relied more on international flows than did other developing countries, where domestic resources constituted 78% of the total.

ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) to the group of 20 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance in 2014 accounted for 12% of all international resources – compared with an aggregate 34% for all other developing countries. In both groups, however, ODA was dwarfed by remittances, which accounted for almost 25% in the group of recipients of the most humanitarian assistance. The opportunities created by foreign direct investment (FDI) were clearly lower in the group of 20 crisis-affected states – at 13%, they represented half the proportion in other developing countries.

While aggregates may be useful to illustrate differences between groups, different countries experience very different needs and the resource mix varies considerably from place to place – as Figure 2.3 illustrates.

Yemen is a country in the midst of violent conflict. Even in 2014, before the most recent escalation of violence, more than half of the population (around 14.7 million people) were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance. In that year, Yemen’s overall mix of resources was dominated by domestic government revenue, accounting for nearly 70% of all financing. Internationally, however, remittances were by far the most significant source of financing, representing 70% of total international inflows (compared with an aggregate 25% for the 20 recipients of the most humanitarian assistance and 20% for all other developing countries). Yemen is a strong example of the relevance of the UN Secretary-General’s call to lower transaction costs and commission rates for remittances and for the need to implement relevant commitments made by the G8, G20 and in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains in a state of protracted crisis where humanitarian needs persist and outbreaks of conflict continue to cause displacement. At the same time, DRC has considerable mineral wealth and the extractive sector is a significant contributor to the formal and informal economies, accounting for around 95% of the country’s total exports. Subsequently, FDI is DRC’s main source of international financing, accounting for 34% of all international inflows (compared with an aggregate 13% for the 20 recipients of the most humanitarian assistance). Unlike in Yemen, international financing overall makes up more than half of all resources in DRC – just over 56% (US$6.1 billion) of the total resource mix. Within that amount, peacekeeping costs in DRC (which is host to the largest peacekeeping mission in the world) were the second largest globally in 2014, accounting for almost a quarter of all international resources to the country (24%).

Even in the countries receiving the largest amounts, international humanitarian assistance accounted for a small proportion (4.8%) of overall international resources.
Resource mix in the 20 countries receiving the most international humanitarian assistance, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service and Central Emergency Response Fund data

Notes: Negative flows for net portfolio equity, short-term debt and FDI have been set to zero at the country level. Recipients data for some resource flows is not available and therefore is excluded from the graph. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Resource mix in Yemen and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee, UN Conference on Trade and Development, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service and Central Emergency Response Fund data

Notes: Negative flows have been set to zero (foreign direct investment (FDI), long-term official debt, long-term commercial debt, short-term debt, net portfolio equity). Data is not available for peacekeeping and net portfolio equity. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Domestic resources: refugee hosting

Protecting refugees is primarily the responsibility of states. A large number of governments, local authorities and host communities make significant investments to uphold the material aspect of this responsibility. Yet their contributions – both non-financial and financial – are hard to measure, particularly as national and local budgets may be difficult to access and contributions come from multiple budget lines.

The largest numbers of refugees are in countries neighbouring conflicts. In 2015, Jordan hosted the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers (2.81 million, mostly from Palestine and Syria), followed by Turkey (2.75 million, mostly from Syria) and Pakistan (1.57 million, mostly from Afghanistan). However, the countries that host the largest numbers of refugees and asylum seekers generally do not have the highest levels of domestic public resources. Pakistan for example, as the country hosting the third largest numbers of refugees in 2015, had a non-grant revenue of US$208 per capita. Sweden, which hosted a fifth of the number of refugees and asylum seekers as Pakistan that same year, had revenues 116 times higher (US$24,124 per capita). In Turkey, the figure stood at US$3,400.

There is no single or comparable way of measuring the financial value of national and local contributions in refugee-hosting countries, and in many places budget data is lacking. However, even where there is little data, changes in budgets and spending may be indicative. Resource-constrained governments may increase their use of domestic financing mechanisms (through commercial borrowing and accessing central bank reserves) in order to respond to the needs of refugees and host communities. In Lebanon, net domestic financing rose 65% in real terms between 2010 and 2015 – the period in which the number of refugees in the country rose from 464,853 to 1,535,662. The rise cannot be exclusively attributed to the increase in refugee numbers, but is suggestive.

In Jordan, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation has conducted a number of impact and needs assessments that provide some indication of domestic expenditure, which stood at around US$251 million in 2012, excluding sector-specific and security spending. In the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016–2018, the government presented an upper estimate of a US$1.1 billion funding gap. This scale of funding required to fill the gap is around 8.6% of total government expenditure in 2016.

As the report of the UN Secretary-General on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants highlights, the search continues for greater sharing of global responsibility in response to rising levels of displacement. This includes deploying a more tailored and diverse repertoire of financing instruments to support host countries to meet the immediate and long-term needs of refugees. New initiatives on financing to protracted displacement situations are emerging, such as the New Financing Initiative to Support the Middle East and North Africa Region (see Chapter 4). In addition, the World Bank announced at the World Humanitarian Summit that it is developing a global financing response platform to facilitate long-term support in protracted emergencies, including in large refugee-hosting settings.
Number of refugees/asylum seekers hosted against non-grant government revenue for the 20 countries hosting the most refugees and asylum seekers, 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and International Monetary Fund World (IMF) Economic Outlook (April 2016 version) and IMF article IV reports

Notes: All revenue data is from the financial year 2015. For five countries (Pakistan, Iran, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) revenue data is based on the financial year 2014/2015. In 10 countries, in-year projections were used and for one (Sudan) a projection for 2015 revenue data was made in late 2014. The number of refugees hosted within Palestine and Syria according to UNRWA data are not included due to lack of available data on non-grant government revenue for Palestine and Syria.
While there is no platform for reporting comprehensive and comparable refugee-hosting expenditure, donors that report to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) can count some of their domestic refugee-hosting costs as ODA. Turkey, though not a DAC member, voluntarily reports its ODA to the DAC. As a developing country eligible for aid, Turkey counts its own expenditure related to the hosting of Syrian refugees within its own territory as humanitarian assistance, and counts some other refugee-hosting costs as part of its ODA.

The amount of in-donor refugee-hosting costs reported as ODA had risen steadily for a number of years, but increased markedly in 2014 and even more sharply in 2015. The aggregate rise in volumes reported to the DAC for refugee-hosting costs between 2014 and 2015 was 86% (US$7.7 billion). Over the same period, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in countries reporting to the DAC rose by 47%. Germany, the donor with the largest spike in funding, reported 20 times as much ODA to refugees within its territory in 2015 as in 2014. Importantly, however, these increases from DAC donors in aggregate have not come at the expense of other combined ODA spending. DAC-reported figures only tell part of the story, however. Not only is more spent outside what can be counted as ODA, but what is reported within this category varies significantly between countries. As per OECD DAC guidelines, donors can only report refugee-hosting costs as ODA for the first 12 months, meaning that longer-term assistance is not counted. Within what can be counted, there are also inconsistencies and variations in how donors report refugee-hosting costs, resulting in very different totals and per capita averages. For example, some donors only count costs for the period while asylum seekers are awaiting decision, some only count costs after a decision on asylum has been made, and others include costs for both periods. The extent to which donors include the costs associated with participating in quota refugee resettlement programmes as ODA also varies. The differing methodological approaches taken by donors when reporting refugee-hosting costs are outlined in the note produced by the OECD DAC following its High Level Meeting in February 2016.

Refugee-hosting costs, whether reported to the DAC or not, also need to be understood in the context of broader conditions of support provided to refugee populations. For example, the cost of hosting people in camps is different to hosting people in communities; and maintaining benefits packages can be more costly than extending the right to work. A number of recent studies have also evidenced the actual and potential economic contribution of refugees in their host countries, rather than the costs related to hosting them.
Domestic and regional resources: disaster risk reduction

Risk reduction is not only crucial for saving lives and protecting assets, but is also essential for building resilience to the impact of crises in the long run and a cost-effective investment to protecting development gains. A recurrent theme from Sendai to the World Humanitarian Summit has been the need for increased investments that can respond to and mitigate risk. As Figure 2.1 shows, there is a wide range of different instruments and vehicles for addressing disaster risk, ranging from international humanitarian spending on disaster prevention and preparedness (see *Humanitarian funding to address risk*, page 56), risk transfer tools (see the following section on the African Risk Capacity as an example), climate adaptation financing, social protection schemes and other mechanisms.

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction outlines a number of guiding principles to help build resilience and reduce disaster risk. These assert the primary responsibility of governments to prevent and reduce risk and set out the need for coherent and inclusive national and local plans, as well as for adequate, complementary and needs-based resourcing.

**Case study: Colombia’s risk management and adaptation investments**

Colombia is classified as an upper middle income country, with a gross national income per capita of US$7,970 in 2014. The country has relatively strong levels of governance and institutional capacity, including several specialised institutions set up to respond specifically to emergencies caused by conflicts and natural hazards. However, five decades of armed violence, as well as frequent disasters caused by natural hazards, have left around 5.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Colombia is particularly vulnerable to climate change and floods, landslides and other extreme weather phenomena that affect many tens of thousands of people every year. The 2010 to 2011 El Niño weather phenomenon had a profound impact on the country, costing an estimated US$6.2 billion, and the current 2015 to 2016 phenomenon is causing droughts and crop damage likely to add up to considerable further losses.

In response to these risks, Colombia has established a multi-faceted climate adaptation and prevention system. In 2012, the national risk management system was adopted into law, defining the structure and roles and responsibility of actors, both at the central and subnational level. This also involves non-state actors, including the Federation of Colombian Insurers and the Red Cross. The structure has been further refined and mainstreamed in the latest national development plan.

Many different government ministries, departments and agencies are responsible for risk reduction and management and climate adaptation. While this makes it difficult to estimate total government spending for resilience to natural hazards, in the 2016 central government budget, the adaptation fund accounted for 1% of the total, of which the National Unit for Disaster Risk Reduction has a 0.05% share.

International support through ODA for Colombia’s climate adaptation action appears to have increased overall in the last five years, though investment in projects that identify adaptation to climate change as either a principal or significant policy objective fluctuated considerably in that period. Disbursements for climate adaptation-related action in 2014 totalled US$102 million – equivalent to 8% of total ODA to Colombia that year.
Regional approaches to risk financing

Insurance can operate at a number of levels in disaster-prone contexts, offering payouts in the first instance to states, organisations, communities or individuals. As well as offering a safety net in the event of disaster, insurance can provide the security to protect livelihoods and incentivise and support investments in risk reduction. Regional risk transfer and insurance mechanisms such as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility have been part of the portfolio of mechanisms to respond to and mitigate risk for nearly a decade, but are gathering renewed political attention and investment.

The African Risk Capacity (ARC) is Africa’s first sovereign catastrophe insurance pool. It is informed by data from the Africa RiskView, which combines weather and crop data with information on vulnerable populations and historic analysis of the costs of response. Payouts to ARC policy-holding governments are triggered when the estimated cost of responding crosses a certain pre-defined threshold. Since its launch in May 2014, nine countries have joined the ARC pool and three participating countries (Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) have received their first payouts totalling a combined US$26 million. ARC aims to target between 20 and 30 countries for membership in the next four years, reducing the cost of overall insurance premiums for participating governments by pooling their risk.

A recent ‘replica’ coverage facility opens up ARC services to international organisations, including UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This initiative enables those organisations to work alongside governments with matching coverage, and to align their response plans with nationally agreed priorities. At the World Humanitarian Summit, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that funding from the Government of Denmark and the European Commission will allow the WFP to extend ARC replica coverage to more African countries.

A UN-led multi-stakeholder initiative – Anticipate, Absorb, Reshape (A2R) – was launched during the Climate Conference (COP 21) in November 2015. Working with ARC and other partners, A2R aims to provide over 30 countries with US$2 billion in coverage against droughts, flooding and cyclones.

FIGURE 2.6
Timeline of the evolution of the African Risk Capacity (ARC)

Sources: Africa Risk Capacity, DEVEX and the World Food Programme
Notes: COP21: 2015 UN Climate Change Conference.
Official development assistance: fragility

While humanitarian assistance is vital, longer-term development assistance is also needed to address the causes and consequences of instability and fragility. The UN Secretary-General has called for increased investments in stability and conflict prevention, and for donors to set targets to allocate a significant percentage of their aid budgets to fragile situations.\(^{40}\)

Analysis of aid to fragile states clearly depends on their classification, but this is shifting and contested. Knowing how much donors allocate to them requires agreement on which states are actually fragile and what constitutes fragility.

The Fund for Peace (FFP) Fragile States Index groups countries according to degrees of fragility ranging from stable to warning and alert. Depending on which categories are considered ‘fragile’, different figures emerge. For example, looking at the alert and warning categories combined, Figure 2.7 shows that there is only a marginal difference (an average of 1%) between the proportion of official humanitarian assistance and other ODA. However, looking at the alert category alone the difference is wider (on average 32%) over the eight-year period. There are also significant year-on-year variations when individual countries move between categories.\(^{41}\)

ODA is an important resource in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Figure 2.7 shows that between 2007 to 2014, 42% of ODA excluding humanitarian assistance was allocated to countries falling in the ‘alert’ categories of fragility and 56% was allocated to countries in the ‘low warning’ category. In the same period, almost three-quarters (74%) of official humanitarian assistance within ODA was targeted at developing countries falling within the ‘high alert’ categories of the index.

There are also a number of other lists that include different indicators and countries. For example, the UK Department for International Development has recently developed its own list of fragile states and regions\(^{42}\), and the OECD DAC is exploring a framework for clustering countries based on different types of vulnerability, and is considering moving away from a list.\(^{43}\) Considering subnational fragility – people rather than country classifications – may also be a more accurate means of identifying where resources to reduce fragility are most needed.

The technical and political challenges of scaling up aid to fragile situations require new ways of working.\(^{44}\) This is particularly the case in contexts where the government is itself a party to the conflict and/or has weak institutional capacity. There are some examples emerging, including through experiences of implementing the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”\(^{45}\). Individual projects like the Tamkeen programme in opposition-held territories in Syria – with funding from the UK Government and the EC Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) – also aim to support local people through strengthening local government bodies, even in the midst of civil war.\(^{46}\)

### FIGURE 2.7

**ODA (excluding official humanitarian assistance) and official humanitarian assistance to developing countries by Fund for Peace category, 2007–2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) by Fund for Peace category</th>
<th>Official humanitarian assistance by Fund for Peace category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More stable</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less stable</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low warning</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High warning</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High alert</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high alert</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on Fund for Peace (FFP) Index and OECD Development Assistance Committee data

Notes: For each FFP category, aggregate ODA (excluding humanitarian assistance) and official humanitarian assistance flows include the sum of disbursements to developing countries included in each category. FFP categories ‘Sustainable’ and ‘Very sustainable’ have been excluded from the analysis since they include no eligible ODA recipients.
The 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak challenged both development and humanitarian models with a scale and type of crisis that neither was prepared for. Many lessons have emerged on how national and international agencies could have worked better, faster and in a more coordinated manner, particularly in the worst-affected countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The crisis highlighted how a lack of sustained and adequate development investment in public health infrastructure, including wider systems strengthening, left countries unable to cope with sudden shocks. Weak health systems were unable to treat patients, halt the spread of the virus, or deal with other ongoing health needs, including those related to infectious diseases such as malaria.47

Sierra Leone has one of the lowest levels of government spending per capita. In 2014, at PPP$367 per person,48 it was among the lowest 20 globally. In the nine years leading up to the Ebola outbreak, ODA was an important source of income to the country and averaged over half of all international inflows over the period, though levels of investment fluctuated year on year.

ODA investments specifically in the health sector in Sierra Leone before the Ebola outbreak represented an average of 16% of ODA between 2005 and 2013. However, levels also fluctuated over the period, varying from between 11% and 22% as a proportion of ODA, or between US$38 million and US$94 million in volume.

Although the average proportion of investment was in line with global averages of health-related ODA (13% of ODA), rather than focusing on strengthening public health infrastructures, the largest proportion (almost one-third) of Sierra Leone’s health-related ODA was directed to disease-specific interventions, particularly malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. In contrast, around a fifth was invested in health system strengthening – a total of US$111 million between 2005 and 2013; and again, disbursements were volatile, ranging from US$22 million in 2005 to just US$6 million in 2010.49

Following the virus outbreak in Sierra Leone in 2014, ODA to the country more than doubled – up from US$433 million in 2013 to US$929 million in 2014. This was largely driven by a forty-fold rise in emergency response, which reached US$344 million – over five times greater than the average annual health-related ODA before the outbreak between 2005 and 2013. Unsurprisingly, health-related ODA directed to infectious diseases also rose in 2014. At US$66 million, it was more than 340 times higher than during the previous year.

Detailed and comparable ODA data is not yet available for 2015 and 2016, making it too early to judge the scale or consistency of investments following the peak of the outbreak in 2014 or the declaration of its end in 2015. It is, however, clear that Sierra Leone, as well as Liberia and Guinea, will require predictable, sustained and significant investments to help rebuild their health systems and economies. If future crises are to be averted, the major peak in humanitarian assistance must give way to sustained investment in developing resilient health systems and infrastructures.
Kanchi Shrestha stacks blocks that she and her neighbours will use to build new homes after the April 2015 earthquake that devastated Nepal.
Ongoing large-scale emergencies continued to drive increases in the amount of international humanitarian assistance provided in 2015, which reached a record high of US$28.0 billion. This was the third consecutive annual increase. However, the rise in 2015 was less pronounced than the year before – a rise of 12% on the 2014 figure, compared with an increase of 20% between 2013 and 2014.

At the same time, the amount of international humanitarian assistance required to respond to humanitarian needs represented in UN-coordinated appeals dipped slightly in 2015, following a major rise the previous year. The combined appeal request was down 3% on 2014’s unprecedented total to US$19.8 billion.

However, reported contributions to these appeals actually decreased by more than the fall in requirements, leaving an increased funding gap of US$8.9 billion, as donors also directed assistance outside of appeals. This was the largest funding gap for UN-coordinated appeals ever recorded, both in volume and the proportion of requirements met, with just 55% of the total requirements funded in 2015. As before, there was much disparity between donor responses to the UN appeals, with Iraq at one end of the spectrum receiving 74% of its requested funding and Gambia at the other end receiving just 5% of total requirements.

A number of sectors within UN-coordinated appeals are persistently underfunded, such as education, agriculture and staff security. Multi-sector requirements in UN-coordinated appeals have increased more than 13-fold between 2005 and 2015, now accounting for almost one-third of all requirements across sectors, though only 55% of these requirements were met in 2015.

Requirements from the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement, which are also significant barometers of humanitarian need, increased again in 2015 (up by US$96 million to US$2.4 billion), attracting US$1.9 billion in funding.
International humanitarian assistance increased for the third consecutive year, reaching a record high of US$28.0 billion in 2015. This was a rise of US$2.9 billion, or 12%, on the previous year’s high of US$25.1 billion and over 50% more (up US$10.0 billion) than the amount provided in 2012.

Despite the record amount provided in 2015, the rise between 2014 and 2015 was less remarkable than increases in the previous two years. Between 2012 and 2013, international humanitarian assistance rose by 16% (US$2.9 billion) and between 2013 and 2014 by a further 20% (US$4.2 billion).

This total is the combined amount reported by government donors, including the EU institutions, and private donors – individuals, trusts and foundations, companies and corporations, and national societies (see Methodology and definitions). In 2015, government donors increased their contributions by around 11%, and private donors increased theirs by 13%. Chapter 4 covers funding by different donor types in more detail.

The most severe and large-scale crises, or ‘mega-emergencies’, were undoubtedly driving the continued increase in funding in 2015. Ongoing conflict and displacement in the Middle East region attracted generous contributions from international donors, though still not enough to meet the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations according to the amounts requested in UN appeals (see the following section UN-coordinated appeals). In 2015, almost one-third of the total funding was allocated to the Syria crisis and the top five emergencies combined – Syria, as well as Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for over half of all international humanitarian assistance. Chapter 5 explores this concentration of funding for major crises further and also highlights persistently underfunded or ‘neglected’ emergencies.

**FIGURE 3.1**

International humanitarian response, 2011–2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee data, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service, UN Central Emergency Response Fund and Development Initiatives’ unique dataset for private voluntary contributions

Notes: Figures for 2015 are preliminary estimates. Totals for some years may differ from those reported in previous Global Humanitarian Assistance reports due to updated data and methodology. Government and EU institutions data is in constant 2014 prices. Private figures are in current prices.
UN-coordinated appeals

UN-coordinated appeals present an overview of the impact of crises in different contexts and communicate a collective ‘ask’ to the international community on the part of UN agencies, a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and in some cases governments, to meet the most urgent identified humanitarian needs. Not all countries in crisis are covered by UN-coordinated appeals and not all international humanitarian organisations take part in appeal processes. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC), for example, has its own mechanisms for appealing for emergency funding, as does Médecins Sans Frontières. That said, UN-coordinated appeals are currently the main collective measure of humanitarian needs and the estimated cost of responding for most major crises.

In 2015, the amount requested through UN-coordinated appeals was slightly lower than in the previous year, with a total request of US$19.8 billion compared with US$20.3 billion in 2014. This decrease of 3% (down US$0.6 billion) contrasts with the significant increase in appeal requests between 2013 and 2014 when requirements rose by 54% (US$7.1 billion).

As requirements decreased from 2014 to 2015, so did the funding to meet them. The funding decrease was much sharper, however – while requirements fell by 3%, funding fell by 13% (US$1.6 billion). It is also the first decrease in funding since a three-year run of increases from 2012 to 2014.

The UN Secretary-General’s report for the World Humanitarian Summit called on donors of international humanitarian assistance to urgently narrow the gap between requirements and funding provided within humanitarian appeals, setting a minimum average of 75% coverage. Levels of funding for UN-coordinated appeals in 2015 fell well below this target. Only 55% of the requested funding was received in 2015, leaving a shortfall of US$8.9 billion. This makes 2015 the year of the largest funding gap ever recorded for UN-coordinated appeals for both the volume and proportion of requirements met, and well below the average of 65% of appeal requirements met over the past decade.

In 2015, there were 36 UN-coordinated appeals, five more than in the previous year and thirteen more than in 2013, though more of the appeals were smaller than in either of the two previous years (twelve appeals with requests of less than US$100 million in 2015, compared with eleven in 2014 and just four in 2013). The 2015 appeals comprised 24 country-specific humanitarian response plans; five flash appeals for responses to sudden-onset emergencies or sudden escalations of crises; six regional refugee response plans; and one appeal for a response to chronic humanitarian needs in the Sahel region.

New appeals were launched for a number of rapid-onset emergencies, while others including for the Ebola outbreak response and Typhoon Haiyan closed. The new appeals included the Nepal earthquake; Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu; drought in Honduras and Guatemala; conflict and displacement

---

**FIGURE 3.2**

Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2006–2015

![Graph showing funding and unmet requirements from 2006 to 2015](image-url)

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data.

Notes: 2012 data includes the Syria Regional Response Plan 2012 monitored by the UNHCR. 2015 data does not include the Yemen Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. To avoid double counting of the regional appeals with the country appeals, the Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) does not include the Democratic Republic of the Congo component; the Central African Republic RRRP only includes the Republic of Congo component; the Nigeria RRRP is not included. For this analysis we use the FTS summary tables and totals may not match appeals analyses using custom download data. Data is in current prices.
in Libya; and a deterioration of the chronic humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The number of regional appeals coordinated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has multiplied in response to increased displacement across borders, demonstrating efforts to coordinate regional approaches to the protection, response and resilience needs of refugees and host communities. In 2015, UNHCR requested funding for six regional refugee appeals: Syria, South Sudan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Yemen and Nigeria. Combined, these regional appeals amounted to requests for US$5.3 billion, representing 27% of the total funding requested through UN appeal processes in 2015. This compares with 24% requested for two regional appeals in 2014, Syria and South Sudan, amounting to US$4.4 billion.5

Large appeals continued to dominate. The five largest appeals combined requested 58% of the 2015 total.

Large appeals continued to dominate appeal requirements and response. The five largest appeals combined requested 58% of the 2015 total requirements, similar to levels in 2014. As in 2014, the largest amount requested for a single crisis was for Syria (combining both the regional and in-country Syria appeals), accounting for 37% of the total appeal requests in 2015 (compared with 30% in 2014).

There were major differences in the responses to appeal funding requests. At one end of the spectrum, Iraq was the best-funded appeal in 2015 with 74% of its requirements met followed by Afghanistan with 70%; while Gambia, with one of the smallest appeals in 2015 (requesting just US$23.7 million for immediate needs in the context of chronic food insecurity), received the lowest proportion of requested funding at just 5%. The difference between the best- and worst-funded appeals was 69-percentage-points, lower than the 79-percentage-points difference in 2014.

Concerns remain over the inconsistent ways that donors respond to appeal requests, and disparities in the way that humanitarian response

FIGURE 3.3

Revised requirements and proportion of requirements met, 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service
Notes: The data does not include the Yemen Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. To avoid double counting of the regional appeals with the country appeals, the Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) does not include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) component; the Central African Republic RRRP only includes the Republic of the Congo component; the Nigeria RRRP is not included. CAR: Central African Republic; DPR Korea: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Data is in current prices.
plans are costed. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee continues to look at alternative ways of costing humanitarian response plans. It is hoped that more consistent and transparent identification and costing of the needs of crisis-affected people will strengthen donor confidence in the appeals system and result in more adequate and predictable donor responses.

With the increase in the overall amount of funding requested through UN-coordinated appeals between 2005 and 2015, the volumes requested by individual sectors have also grown. In some sectors the increases have been particularly significant. Requirements in the shelter and non-food items sector, for example, increased by 300% – from US$424 million in 2005 to US$1.7 billion in 2015. Similarly, requirements in the health, water and sanitation, and protection sectors have all grown by over 200% in the last 11 years.

Despite increases in the volume of funding received for most sectors, the funding received as a proportion of the total amount requested reveals persistent underfunding in a number of areas. Safety and security of staff and operations (22% funded in 2015) has received less than half of its requested amount every year for the last 11 years; and the agriculture (33% funded in 2015) and protection (35% funded in 2015) sectors received less than half of their required funding in 9 and 10 of the last 11 years respectively.

Other sectors in UN-coordinated appeals have become increasingly underfunded. The education sector, for example, received just one-third of its requested amount in 2015 (31% or US$197.4 million) compared with two-thirds in 2005 (66% or US$189.1 million). Despite a 126% increase in requirements for education over the 11-year period, funding increased by just 4% (US$8.3 million). Similarly, while requirements in the water and sanitation sector have increased more than three-fold between 2005 and 2015, the proportion of funding received failed to keep pace, falling by 21% (from 61% to 40%) over the 11-year period.

This underfunding for specific sectors can partially be explained by looking at the rise in multi-sector funding requests and responses. ‘Multi-sector’ refers to projects and activities with no one dominant sector and often applies to assistance provided by UNHCR for refugee populations. As the number and scale of regional refugee-related appeals have grown – including the Syria Regional Response Plan, the largest appeal in 2015 (see Figure 3.3) – so has the scale of multi-sector requirements. The amount requested for multi-sector programming has increased more than 13-fold between 2005 and 2015, reaching US$6.2 billion in 2015 – almost one-third of the total requirements for all sectors. By 2015, funding for multi-sector approaches accounted for a third (32% or US$3.4 billion) of the total amount received for UN-coordinated appeals. However, this still only represented 55% of the multi-sector funding requested.

The prevalence of cash programming in recent years has also contributed to increases in multi-sector funding. Cash transfers in humanitarian programming can in some cases be multi-sector, allowing people to choose for themselves what they want to buy to best meet their own needs (see Chapter 7 for analysis of funding for cash programming).

Multi-sector planning and cash programming are welcome advances in humanitarian action. However, humanitarian operations are still largely organised around the provision of goods and services to recognisable sectors and humanitarian clusters, making it relatively easy to identify specific funding categories. Different approaches such as multi-sector planning, area-based programming and cash transfers present a challenge to transparent funding, though surely not an insurmountable one. As humanitarian action evolves to better serve those affected by crises, so must its reporting systems advance to keep track of the increasingly complex flow of resources.

As the number and scale of refugee-related appeals have grown, so has the scale of multi-sector requirements.
FIGURE 3.4

Requirements and funding levels in UN appeals by sector, 2005, 2010 and 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA FTS)

Notes: The term 'multi-sector' is predominantly used for multi-sector assistance to refugees. In the FTS, contributions are tagged with both 'standard sectors' and clusters. Cluster names vary across different appeals, whereas sectors are standardised into 12 categories and allow for comparative analysis across countries, years and appeals. 'Protection/human rights/rule of law' has been abbreviated to 'protection'. 'Safety and security of staff and operations' has been abbreviated to 'safety and security'. For this analysis we use the FTS summary tables, therefore totals may not match appeals analyses using custom download data. Data is in current prices.
Funding outside of UN-coordinated appeals

Just as the UN-coordinated appeals do not represent the totality of humanitarian needs, so not all international humanitarian funding is channelled to the projects included in them. International government and private donors contribute significant amounts to crises, agencies and projects that are outside the scope of the appeal frameworks, either bilaterally or through implementing organisations. In 2015, approximately 45% of humanitarian funding reported to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) alone was not reported as directed to projects inside of UN appeals; in 2014 this was 49%. However, the figures may include some funding that is actually directed to appeal projects but not reported as such.\textsuperscript{10} The total figure might be higher if the volumes of international humanitarian assistance not reported to the FTS are taken into account.\textsuperscript{11}

In 2015, the countries receiving the largest volumes of international humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS as channelled outside of appeals were Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq and South Sudan – perhaps not surprisingly, since they also received the most international humanitarian assistance overall. However, of the emergencies covered by UN-coordinated appeals, the crises that received the largest proportions of their funding reported as outside of UN-coordinated appeal processes were Kenya (83% of funding was received outside of the UN appeal), Ethiopia (80%) and Haiti (77%). This can be explained by the fact that Kenya and Ethiopia were part of regional appeals (regional response plans) that only addressed the specific needs of South Sudanese refugees, rather than all needs in these countries. Haiti also had a small appeal to cover most urgent needs.

Certain donors demonstrate a preference for funding outside of appeal processes. Collectively, governments in the Middle East and North of Sahara reported proportionately more of their funding outside of appeals than did any other region (57%). South America and North and Central America also gave close to 50% of their total funding outside of UN appeal processes.

In 2015, 22% of funding to UN agencies was reported as outside of appeals, compared with 56% for NGOs. Within the NGO category, it is worth noting that local and national NGOs rarely participate in UN-coordinated appeals (international NGOs do so more). Nor do all international NGOs consistently include their funding requirements within appeals – Médecins sans Frontières is particularly well known for remaining independent of UN appeal processes. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement also remains independent of UN appeals, maintaining separate appeal processes (see Figure 3.6).

\textbf{FIGURE 3.5}

Funding reported to UN OCHA FTS inside and outside UN-coordinated appeals, 2011–2015

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{funding_fts_uncoordinated Appeals.png}
\caption{Funding reported to UN OCHA FTS inside and outside UN-coordinated appeals, 2011–2015}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source:} Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service data (FTS)

\textbf{Notes:} For this analysis we use the FTS custom download function and totals may not match appeals analyses using summary tables data.
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement has three main components:

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which predominantly works in situations of conflict
- The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which coordinates and provides international assistance following disasters caused by natural hazards in mainly non-conflict situations
- National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies made up of volunteers and staff in 190 countries across the world providing a wide variety of services to vulnerable people in their own countries and contributing to international fundraising efforts.12

This section covers funding generated and spent by the ICRC and IFRC, while Chapter 6 looks at an example of funding channelled through a national Red Cross society.

In 2015, the ICRC requested US$1.7 billion through its appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance, an increase of 15% on 2014’s request and up more than 56% on the amount requested in 2012. Donors responded to ICRC appeals in 2015 with contributions of US$1.4 billion, leaving a shortfall of US$259 million or 16% of requested funding. Funding requirements were dominated by continuing humanitarian need in the Syria crisis (10.3% of appeal requirements), South Sudan (9.7%), and new appeals for Ukraine, Nigeria, Yemen, Colombia and Jordan.13 Together the three largest ICRC appeals (Syria, South Sudan and Iraq) accounted for more than a quarter (27%) of the total amount requested.

Combined, all active appeals from the IFRC requested US$779 million in 2015 – a decrease of 14% from the amount requested in 2014 (US$903 million). The reduction in requirements was mainly due to the closure of Ebola-related appeals that represented 95% of the IFRC’s total appeal requirements launched in 2014.14 Donor funding, which for the IFRC predominantly comes from private sources, met 69% of those requirements in 2015 compared with 73% the previous year.

A number of the IFRC’s appeals in 2015 were for continued responses to ongoing crises, such as Pakistan’s flood and earthquake response. However, new appeals were also launched, notably for the response to the earthquake in Nepal (US$78.3 million)15, Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu (US$8.5 million), and population movements in Europe and Central Asia (US$31.4 million). These made up 77% of the total amount requested through new IFRC appeals in 2015 and 87% of the funding received.16

ICRC appeals were relatively well funded in terms of the proportion of requirements met compared with UN-coordinated appeals, and even compared with those of the IFRC. While there is some disparity between funding levels for different countries and crises, the overall donor response generally came much closer to the amount requested. The more modest scale of ICRC requests compared with those of the UN-coordinated appeals, the clearly defined mandate of the organisation, and trust in the ICRC as an institution may all partially explain why this is the case. However, given the different scale and scope of ICRC appeals compared with UN-led appeal processes, it is not possible to draw clear conclusions.

FIGURE 3.6
Funding to ICRC and IFRC emergency appeals against requirements, 2011–2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on IFRC reports, ICRC annual reports and OECD DAC
Notes: IFRC figures in this graph may differ from previous year reports. CHF amounts have been converted to US$ based on OECD exchange rates. Requirements for ICRC are based on initial requirements and budget extensions/reductions from annual reports. No data is available for IFRC appeal requirements met from 2011 to 2013. Abbreviations: ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross; IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Data is in current prices.

42
Both government and private donors increased their international humanitarian assistance in 2015 for a third year running. Contributions from government donors rose by 11% from the previous year and those from private donors by an estimated 13%.

Donors in the Middle East and North of Sahara region continued to increase their volume and share of international humanitarian assistance in 2015. Mainly driven by contributions from Gulf states in response to crises in the Middle East, their contributions reached around US$2.4 billion in 2015, an increase of almost 500% since 2011.

In 2015, 20 government donors contributed 97% of all international government contributions. The donor that contributed the most, the United States (US), alone gave almost one-third of all international humanitarian assistance from governments in 2015. When considered alongside the international contributions of government donors, Turkey’s assistance to Syrian refugees on its own territory make it the donor contributing the second largest amount in 2015.

The significance of the contributions of government donors can depend on how their humanitarian assistance is measured. For example, when considered as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Sweden were the four donors that provided the most in 2015.

Private donors have historically responded more generously to sudden onset emergencies caused by natural hazards than to protracted, conflict-related crises. However in 2015, the Syria crisis received the most reported private funding. Unlike funding from governments, the majority of private funding for the Syria crisis was allocated outside of the UN-coordinated appeals and was channelled through non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Multilateral development banks already play a critical role in crisis response and recovery, particularly in protracted crisis settings. Their significance as key players in protracted emergencies is predicted to increase further as new financing initiatives to support middle income countries hosting refugees come into play, and as additional resources are allocated to support the capacity of domestic authorities in crisis prevention, response and recovery.
Government donors

Government donors gave a record amount of international humanitarian assistance in 2015 for the third year running. Their combined contributions of US$21.8 billion represent a 11% increase on the previous year. The increase is not as sharp as the almost 27% rise between 2013 and 2014. However, it continues to indicate an upwards trend in terms of the efforts of international donor governments to meet the cost of humanitarian needs.

The largest percentage increase in international humanitarian assistance in recent years comes from governments in the Middle East and North of Sahara region. Their contributions reached almost US$2.4 billion in 2015 – an almost 500% increase since 2011. This accounted for around 11% of the overall amount provided by government donors in 2015, compared with just 3% in 2011. Most of this region’s international funding came from four Gulf states: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. Their increased funding was largely in response to increased humanitarian need in the Middle East region (Figure 5.5) and can also be partially explained by improved reporting.

The majority of funding from government donors continues to come from countries in Europe (48%) and North and Central America (33%). The United Kingdom (UK) contributed 27% of the European regional total and the US 88% of the regional North and Central America total. However, the increase in funding from these regions is less pronounced than in the previous two years. Contributions from government donors in Europe increased by 11% between 2014 and 2015, compared with a 21% increase the previous year, while funding from governments in North and Central America increased by 6%, compared with a 24% increase between 2013 and 2014.

International humanitarian assistance from government donors in the Far East Asia region reached US$1.2 billion in 2015, an 11% increase from 2014. The majority of this region’s funding (89%, US$1 billion) came from the Government of Japan.

Contributions from governments in the Middle East and North of Sahara Region reached almost US$2.4 billion – an almost 500% increase since 2011.

Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) accounted for 88% (US$19.2 billion) of reported international humanitarian assistance from government donors in 2015. However, the share of international humanitarian assistance from other government donors has trebled in the last decade – from 4% of the overall

FIGURE 4.1
International humanitarian assistance from governments by donor region, 2011–2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Central Emergency Response Fund and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service data
Notes: OECD DAC data for 2015 is preliminary. Funding from OECD DAC donors includes contributions from EU institutions. Countries are organised according to the OECD’s classification of regions, except for the Middle East and North of Sahara, which have been combined. ‘Other regions’ includes the combined total of regions where funding was below US$1 billion over the 5-year period. Calculations only include humanitarian assistance spent internationally, not in-country. See Methodology and definitions. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
In 2015, 20 states contributed 97% (US$21.0 billion) of all international humanitarian assistance from government donors.

2014. Assistance disbursed by the EU derives from contributions made by member states and is captured in our calculations of the total international humanitarian assistance provided by individual EU member states.\(^6\)

The group of government donors providing the most humanitarian assistance displayed in Figure 4.2 also includes Turkey in view of its financing of the Syria refugee response on its territory, which it reports as humanitarian assistance. When considered alongside the international contributions of government donors, this shows Turkey as the second largest donor of humanitarian assistance in 2015, with contributions of US$3.2 billion – a rise of 31% from its reported contributions the previous year. Although not a DAC member, Turkey voluntarily reports its aid expenditure to the DAC. As part of this, unlike other countries, Turkey reports its expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey as humanitarian assistance (see Figure 2.2 for further analysis). According to Turkish government sources, US$3.1 billion (97%)\(^6\) of its funding reported as humanitarian assistance to the DAC in 2015 was directed to Syrian refugees within Turkey’s borders.\(^1\)

The significance of individual government donors changes depending on how international humanitarian assistance is measured. When international humanitarian assistance is considered as a percentage of GNI, the list of the donors that provide the most changes (Figure 4.3). Looking at government contributions in this way demonstrates the emphasis that governments place on providing international humanitarian assistance in relation to the size of their overall economy. For example, the US, which in 2015 gave the most international humanitarian assistance in volume, ranked 19th when considering its international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI (0.04%).

When considered alongside other government donors in 2015, Turkey gave the most humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI (0.37%). Kuwait – the government donor contributing the 11th largest amount of international humanitarian assistance in volume in 2015 – contributed the second largest amount of international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI (0.33%, up from 0.18% of GNI in 2014).\(^7\)

Three other Gulf states were included in the 20 government donors providing the most when measuring international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI: the UAE (3rd at 0.25%); Saudi Arabia (12th at 0.08%); and Qatar (17th at 0.04%). Oman and Bahrain, both in the group of donors providing the most international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI in 2014, did not make it into the same list in 2015.

Sweden contributed the fourth largest amount of international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI in 2015 (0.19%), and the fourth largest amount in 2015 in terms of overall volume. In total, there were 11 European donors in the 20 donors of the most international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI in 2015.

A number of other government donors appear in the 20 providers of the most international humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI in 2015 that do not appear in the group of government donors providing the most by volume: Luxembourg (0.16%), Finland (0.08%), Ireland (0.08%), Bhutan (0.05%) and Qatar (0.04%).
FIGURE 4.2

20 contributors of the largest amounts of humanitarian assistance, 2015 – governments and EU institutions

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Central Emergency Response Fund and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service data

Notes: 2015 data for OECD DAC is preliminary. Contributions of EU member states include an imputed amount of their expenditure (see Methodology and definitions). EU institutions are also included separately for comparison and are shaded differently to distinguish from government donors. Turkey is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey so is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
**FIGURE 4.3**

Humanitarian assistance as percentage of GNI for 20 donors providing the most humanitarian assistance, 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service, UN Central Emergency Response Fund, World Bank World Development Indicators and International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook data

Notes: 2015 data for OECD DAC is preliminary. GNI data for 2015 has been estimated using historical data on GNI and real GDP growth rates for 2015. Countries for which no GNI data is available have been excluded. Turkey is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey so is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure.
Private donors

Despite the significance of private donors as providers of international humanitarian assistance, any attempt to put an exact figure on their overall funding can only be done in estimate. Development Initiatives gathers and analyses data on an annual basis from a range of humanitarian organisations to provide a global estimate of the amount of international humanitarian assistance provided by private donors (see Methodology and definitions for full details). However, the total value of giving by private donors, both national and international, is likely to be much higher. In particular, the contribution of domestic private sector actors is largely absent from this global calculation as is direct giving between individuals.

The development of technologies and the growth in online giving provide new opportunities for private individuals to directly support humanitarian action, but also creates new challenges for keeping track of the total response. For example, data from UN OCHA FTS indicates that the crowd-funding platform Global Giving generated US$3 million of donations from individuals in response to the Nepal earthquake. It is likely that much more private funding is generated in this way through other direct giving channels but the exact amount is unknown. Other sources of finance that generally bypass international humanitarian actors, such as faith-based giving (including Islamic social finance), are also difficult to track and go largely uncounted in global estimates of private humanitarian assistance.

As the call to deepen and broaden the resource base for humanitarian action continues, private donors are increasingly seen as an important potential source of additional funding. Encouragingly, international humanitarian assistance from private donors – comprising individuals, companies and corporations, trusts and foundations, and national societies – has increased for a third year running in 2015 (this time by 12.7%), reaching an estimated US$6.2 billion and surpassing the previous peak in private funding of US$6.1 billion in 2010. Private donors accounted for just less than a quarter of international humanitarian assistance in 2014 at 22%, with early estimates indicating a similar share in 2015.

The historical trend for private donors to respond more favourably to disasters caused by natural hazards than to conflict-driven emergencies has been interrupted by the Syria crisis. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), the Syria crisis received the most reported private funding in 2015. Private donors, predominantly individuals, reported a combined US$398 million to the Syria crisis in 2015: 6% of total reported funding in the year – triple the 2% (US$114 million) of private funding to the same emergency in 2014. Two-thirds (66%) of that funding was channelled outside of

Source: Development Initiatives based on our unique dataset of private voluntary contributions
Notes: Figures for 2015 are preliminary estimates (see Methodology and definitions for full details). Data is in current prices.

FIGURE 4.4
International humanitarian assistance from private donors, 2010–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US$ BILLIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the two UN-coordinated appeals for the Syria crisis, unlike funding from government donors that was predominantly channelled through the Syria appeals (71%).

Giving from individuals, rather than from trusts, foundations or the private sector, accounts for the majority of private humanitarian funding.18 A review of different private donor types between 2010 and 2014 shows that donations from individuals accounted for around 69% of all private funding. The significance of the general public as a donor group is to some extent due to expanded fundraising campaigns by humanitarian organisations – both UN and NGOs – that tap into private generosity.19 NGOs rely particularly heavily on funding from individuals. In 2014, approximately 64% of the humanitarian income of NGOs in our dataset came from individuals.

Contributions from national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and UNICEF national committees remained at a similar level in 2014 (US$386 million) as in 2013. Their share of total private humanitarian assistance, which is mobilised from diverse sources, has declined in the last five years, from 18% in 2010 to just 8.6% in 2014 (see Chapter 6 for more details on funding for national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies).

2014 saw the largest contribution from private companies and corporations (US$409.9 million) in the last five years. Combined, they provided an estimated US$1.8 billion of humanitarian funding between 2010 and 2014, which accounted for an average of 6.6% of total private donor contributions. Funding from trusts and foundations also increased in the last reported period, from US$189 million in 2013 to US$274 million in 2014.

In line with efforts to expand and diversify the humanitarian funding base, there has been increased attention on the role of the private sector and its support for humanitarian action. This has included in-kind contributions from mobile communications and logistics providers, and examples like MasterCard’s investment in new payment technologies in cash programming.20 It may not always be possible to measure these contributions in financial volumes. However, they do indicate a shift in the ecosystem of humanitarian financing and the increasingly important role of private sector actors as partners and collaborators in humanitarian settings.

Private giving may further increase as humanitarian aid organisations consider new means of resource mobilisation, including impact bonds and voluntary ‘solidarity levies’ (see Definitions on page 89), based on models such as UNITAID’s micro-levy on airline tickets for disease control in low income countries.21 Similarly, efforts to focus on faith-based giving, as discussed at the World Humanitarian Summit, and the proposed establishment of a global humanitarian endowment fund resourced through Islamic social finance, have the potential to transform private giving.22
Multilateral development banks

Regional development banks and international financial institutions – the multilateral development banks (MDBs) – play an important role as providers of humanitarian and development assistance in crisis settings. The World Bank Group has long recognised that fragility, conflict and violence are obstacles in the fight to end poverty and promote shared prosperity. Similarly, other development banks such as the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, include facilities and resource streams to support governments in their efforts to protect populations from the impact of crises and recover afterwards.

MDBs provide resources to countries in a number of different ways: using a range of grants, loans, bonds, insurance facilities, risk transfer instruments and targeted trust funds. Examples of specific instruments include the World Bank’s International Development Association’s Crisis Response Window, established in 2011 to support countries to deal with the impact of major disasters caused by natural hazards, public health emergencies and epidemics; the newly approved World Bank Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility that will provide surge funding to prevent rare, high-severity disease outbreaks from becoming pandemics; the Inter-American Development Bank’s contingent credit facility for disasters caused by natural hazards; and the Asian Development Bank’s Disaster Response Facility.

In 2014, expenditure from the MDBs reported as official humanitarian assistance to the OECD DAC was approximately US$373 million. However, preliminary analysis of relevant DAC-reported funding outside of the humanitarian aid sector – for disaster risk reduction, flood prevention and control, and infectious disease control for example – reveals considerable additional funding, amounting to around US$962 million.

Other official flows reported to the OECD DAC from these institutions in 2014 – non-concessional finance for development purposes, such as post-disaster recovery loans and crisis mitigation programmes – constituted a further US$1.3 billion of funding in response to natural and man-made hazards. In total, US$241 million was reported as humanitarian aid and a further US$1.1 billion derived from analysis of reported funding to other areas. In total, the MDBs reported an estimated US$2.6 billion of crisis-related funding in 2014.

In addition, the MDBs acknowledge the clear link between climate change, poverty and vulnerability to crises and seek to mitigate the effects of climate change on vulnerable populations throughout their work. Funding that is largely not captured in the totals given in this section. The Asian Development Bank, for example, mobilised US$2.9 billion of climate finance in 2015, aimed at making mitigation and adaptation actions more competitive and affordable for developing countries in the region.

Since 2011, the World Bank Group has committed US$52 billion to climate-related projects – an average of US$10.3 billion per year.

Within the myriad of funding modalities and instruments (see Chapter 2), concessional financing including official development assistance (ODA) grants and low-interest loans can provide vital support to low income countries to boost economic growth, reduce inequalities and improve living conditions. As Figure 4.7 shows, the 20 recipients of the most humanitarian assistance did receive a higher proportion of concessional financing through grants and concessional loans than did all other recipients in 2014. The 20 recipients of the most

---

**FIGURE 4.6**

Humanitarian assistance and related expenditure from multilateral development banks, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>ODA, 2014</th>
<th>Other official flows, 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flows relating to DRR, emergency response</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and recovery reported outside the humanitarian aid sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data

Notes: Includes OECD CRS disbursements from nine multilateral organisations. Humanitarian assistance is called ‘humanitarian aid’ in DAC reporting. Flows relating to disaster risk reduction (DRR), emergency response and emergency recovery reported outside of the humanitarian aid sector are derived from the flood prevention/control purpose code and a word-search on CRS fields. Data does not include earmarked flows channelled through multilateral development banks from government donors, which are recorded as bilateral aid.
humanitarian assistance received 44% from the MDBs in the form of ODA loans and equity (compared with just over a quarter – 26% – for all other recipients); and 15% in the form of grants, compared with all other recipients that received only 4% of their funding from MDBs in this way. The Democratic Republic of Congo (US$724 million), Haiti (US$273 million) and Afghanistan (US$271 million) received the most ODA grants from MDBs; while Pakistan (US$2 billion), Ethiopia (US$1 billion) and Kenya (US$818 million) received the largest amount of ODA loans plus equity investments.

In recent years, forced displacement – particularly from Syria – has increasingly impacted on middle income countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon (see People affected by conflict and disaster, Chapter 1, page 17), previously ineligible for concessional loans and grants from the World Bank’s International Development Association. In 2014, over half of the other official flows (OOFs) – which are non-concessional in nature – from the MDBs to the 20 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance went to Jordan and Turkey.

In response to recommendations from the UN Secretary-General and the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, the World Bank announced its plans at the World Humanitarian Summit to launch a global crisis response platform to provide resources for risk mitigation and crisis response to low and middle income countries, with a particular focus on large refugee-hosting countries. The platform will be launched at the UN General Assembly in September 2016 and will include access to long-term, low-interest loans.

This will complement the New Financing Initiative to Support the Middle East and North Africa Region, launched jointly by the World Bank Group, the UN and the Islamic Development Bank Group in October 2015. Within the initiative, eight governments and the European Commission pledged a package of over US$1 billion of concessional finance to help the governments of Jordan and Lebanon cope with the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis, and for overall recovery and reconstruction efforts across the region. The initiative has both concessional loans and guarantees facilities, including guarantees for the issuance of a special type of sukuk (Islamic bonds) administered by the Islamic Development Bank Group.

At the World Humanitarian Summit, a group of MDBs came together to set out a range of commitments and practical measures to respond to forced displacement. This includes working together in refugees’ countries of origin and refugee hosting countries, developing innovative financing mechanisms, and improving the data and evidence to inform policies and programmes.
Malaysia
6 June 2015

Kamal and Bibi were forced to flee from Myanmar when conflict broke out between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state. They came to Malaysia hoping to be resettled to another country.

CREDIT
© The Spacemen/Overseas Development Institute (detail)
In 2014, the latest year for which data is available, the recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance were generally a familiar group. Three in particular – Palestine, Ethiopia and Afghanistan – have been among the 10 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance for 10 consecutive years.

Humanitarian funding is increasingly concentrated in a relatively small group of crises. In 2015, five crises – in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for more than half of all funding allocated to specific emergencies, in contrast to 2011 and 2012, when the five largest crises received one-third of the total.

Just as the list of the recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance often features the same countries year on year, so does the annual list of neglected emergencies – crises that are persistently underfunded. The priority crises in the EC’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment index for 2015 included Algeria/Western Sahara and Myanmar, both of which have appeared on the index every year since 2004. The Libya conflict and the refugee crisis in Egypt appeared for the first time in 2015.

Distinct types of crises or different geographic areas attract different responses from donors. For example, donors in the Middle East and North of Sahara region generally gave most to crises in their own region.

In 2014, the vast majority (91%) of official humanitarian assistance from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors went to long- and medium-term recipients, with long-term recipients receiving 61% of total country-allocable official humanitarian assistance and medium-term recipients receiving 29%. While there is a strong and compelling rationale for more multi-annual humanitarian planning and financing in these contexts, indications suggest that the volumes remain modest overall.
Recipients of international humanitarian assistance

A total of 145 countries received international humanitarian assistance in 2014 (the latest year for which the most comprehensive data is available). The volumes received ranged from US$2 billion for Syria at one end of the spectrum to US$10,000 for the Seychelles at the other. The 10 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance accounted for 59% of country-allocated international humanitarian assistance in 2014. This trend is consistent with recent years, during which most funding has been concentrated in a relatively small group of countries (see Concentration of funding section on page 59).

Four countries received upwards of US$1 billion of assistance in 2014. In the group of the 10 recipients of the most humanitarian assistance in 2014, funding related to the Syria crisis accounted for 36% of their combined total, with US$3.5 billion of international assistance going to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Five of the 10 countries were in the Middle East and North of Sahara region: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, accounting for US$5.8 billion – 35% of country-allocated international humanitarian assistance that year.

Three of the 10 countries were in sub-Saharan Africa: South Sudan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with combined contributions of US$2.6 billion – 16% of the total international humanitarian assistance allocated to countries in 2014.

The 10 countries that received the most international humanitarian assistance in 2014 are broadly consistent with recent years. Three of the 10 countries in 2014 have been on the list every year since 2005: Palestine (received US$1.2 billion in 2014); Ethiopia (US$539 million); and Afghanistan (US$532 million). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which received US$529 million of international humanitarian funding in 2014, has been on the list in nine of the last 10 years.

Two new countries appeared on the list in 2014. Iraq last appeared in 2009 and returned in 2014 because of escalating conflict and displacement. The Philippines appeared for the first time in the last 10 years, due to significant international contributions (US$847 million), primarily in response to the devastating effects of Typhoon Haiyan.

Sudan received US$527 million (compared with US$1.1 billion in 2013) putting it 11th in 2014, and Somalia became the 12th with a decrease in funding from US$549 million in 2013 to US$504 million in 2014.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERP) data.

Notes: ‘Top 10 appearances’ indicates the number of appearances in this list in the past 10 years. DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Humanitarian funding to address risk

International financing can complement national and regional efforts to strengthen early warning and reduce disaster risk. However, there is no comprehensive data available on how much is spent globally on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster prevention and preparedness (DPP).

In DAC-reported official development assistance (ODA), DPP is included as a sector under humanitarian assistance. As such, it does not capture additional investments in risk reduction delivered through other reported development assistance and so represents only one component of the total international effort. It also does not capture DRR and DPP spending that may be mainstreamed in other types of projects.

Bearing these limitations in mind, the total amount of official humanitarian assistance reported as DPP by all donors reporting to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) has increased significantly in the last five years – from US$506 million in 2010 to US$981 million in 2014. The proportion of funding spent on DPP has also increased over this period from less than 4% of official humanitarian assistance in 2010 to 6% by 2014, though this may be partially explained by changes in reporting practices.

Not all of this spending is allocated by country. A quarter (25%) in 2014 was allocated at regional and global levels, highlighting the importance of multi-lateral approaches to risk (see Chapter 2). Beyond this, DPP spending was allocated to 139 countries in 2014, though largely concentrated in a smaller sub-set of countries. Four countries – India, Bangladesh, Turkey and the Philippines – together received over a third (34%) of all country-allocated DPP humanitarian ODA spending that year.

When mapped against indicators of exposure to natural hazards from INFORM’s Index for Risk Management, as shown in Figure 5.2, official humanitarian assistance spending on DPP, while low, does appear to generally align with those countries most at risk. The 12 countries considered to be at highest risk of disasters caused by natural hazards received 39% of country-allocable DPP spending in 2014, compared with 10% for the 42 countries with low and very low levels of risk. This pattern of spending has remained broadly similar for the last five years, with countries at high or very high risk of disasters receiving the greatest share of funding every year since 2010.

FIGURE 5.2

Official humanitarian assistance for disaster prevention and preparedness categorised by level of natural hazard risk, 2005–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System and INFORM data
Notes: Risk classifications based on INFORM natural hazard exposure scores at fixed thresholds. Amounts based on country-allocable gross disbursements only. Additional amounts not allocable by country are excluded.
Forgotten crises

While some crises attract considerable attention and thereafter large amounts of international humanitarian assistance, others remain persistently underfunded and ‘forgotten’. Despite strong evidence of vulnerability and humanitarian need, these crises are routinely missing from international media headlines and repeatedly absent from the list of countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance (see Donor preferences, page 60).

ECHO’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) index is one of the most widely recognised tools for identifying and responding to ‘neglected’ emergencies. This uses the INFORM Index for Risk Management indicators of risk, combined with an assessment of media coverage, donor interest and other qualitative analysis, to rank countries according to the most ‘forgotten crises’. ECHO then uses this list to inform its own funding allocations to countries. The list is also used to direct ECHO’s targeted outreach to others – both internally to relevant EU services and externally in its advocacy with other donors and partners.

A number of crises appear in ECHO’s FCA index year on year, representing an entrenched set of neglected situations. Forgotten crises often affect particular minority groups within a country, such as the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria and ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Both of these crises have appeared on the index every year since 2004 – a total of 13 appearances. Other crises to frequently appear on the index include ongoing conflict in India’s north-east, which has featured in 12 out of the last 13 years; conflict and displacement in Colombia (10 consecutive appearances); and the treatment of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, which has featured in 9 of the last 10 years. All of these crises remained on the index in 2015.

Two new crises appeared on the index for the first time in 2015: the Libya conflict and the refugee crisis in Egypt. A significant rise in conflict-related displacement in Mindanao led to a reappearance on the index for the Philippines in 2015, having last featured in 2009.

Mechanisms to identify and respond to under-served emergencies include the underfunded emergencies window of the UN-managed Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the non-governmental organisation (NGO)-led START Fund. Between 2011 and 2015, 35% of CERF allocations were provided through the underfunded emergency window with the intention of bolstering emergency response in situations where funding is scarce but risk levels are high. The START Fund also aims to respond to small- and medium-scale crises that receive insufficient funding or attention from other existing funding mechanisms or donors. See Chapter 6 for more about each fund.
FIGURE 5.3

Countries appearing most frequently in the ECHO Forgotten Crisis Assessment index since 2004

Source: Development Initiatives based on the EC’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) index

Notes: CAR: Central African Republic; DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo; IDP: internally displaced person.
Concentration of funding

A small number of major emergencies, or ‘mega crises’, have dominated international humanitarian response in recent years. These include, but are not limited to, ‘Level 3’ emergencies – those designated by the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator to need additional leadership, capacity and resources to respond due to exceptional circumstances. According to funding reported to OCHA’s FTS, in 2015, five emergencies – Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan – accounted for more than half of all funding allocated to specific emergencies (53% or US$11.6 billion). This shows an increased concentration of funding from 2012, when five emergencies received a third of all country-specific humanitarian funding.

Given the protracted nature of the dominant crises in 2015, the concentration of resources is unlikely to diminish significantly in the immediate future. This relatively predictable pull on resources should make it possible to plan ahead. Coordination between donors and pre-emptive choices about the allocation of resources could help to save lives and facilitate a more cost-effective response, as well as mitigate the negative effect on smaller or ‘forgotten’ emergencies of this concentration of funding on the mega crises (see Forgotten crises, page 57).

**FIGURE 5.4**

Five emergencies receiving the most international humanitarian assistance reported to the UN OCHA FTS, 2012–2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data

Notes: Totals shown are by crisis rather than country and, in the cases of Syria and Yemen, funding is for the regional crises. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Donor preferences

Different types of crises in different parts of the world attract different responses from donors. A breakdown of the sources of funding for the 10 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance in 2015 demonstrates distinct geographic preferences between different donor regions.

International humanitarian assistance from government donors in the Middle East and North of Sahara region in 2015 was generally highest to countries in their own region. They gave their largest combined reported contributions to the six countries within the group in the Middle East and North of Sahara region (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine). Middle East and North of Sahara donors provided the largest share of international humanitarian assistance to Yemen, with the two donors who provided the most – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – providing just less than half (49% or US$826 million) of all FTS-reported funding to the crisis. However, for the other nine of the 10 recipients of the most funding in 2015, donors in North and Central America and Europe provided the two largest regional sources of funding.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data
Notes: The 10 recipients of the most humanitarian assistance for 2015 are based on funding reported to UN OCHA FTS only. Private figures are based on FTS data, not on Development Initiatives’ dataset for private funding. OECD country naming has been used for regions, with the exception of Middle East and North of Sahara which has been combined.
Europe as a region showed the most even spread of funding to the 10 recipients of the most funding in 2015, while of the individual donor governments, the United States (US) showed the least variation between recipients. The US also contributed the most to nine of the 10 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance in 2015 (with the exception of Yemen).

Private donors tend to favour responses to disasters caused by natural hazards (with the exception of the Syria crisis – see Chapter 4). Nepal received the 11th largest amount of international humanitarian assistance in 2015 following the earthquake in April that year. Private donors provided just under a third (32%) of all humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS for the Nepal earthquake, amounting to US$169 million.

Resource allocation on the basis of humanitarian needs continues to be a grounding principle for many donors. However, it is clear that many other factors also play a part in donor decision-making – including stated policy priorities and commitments to particular regions, sectors or themes; as well as other factors, such as geographic proximity, historical ties, language and culture. Some donor coordination groups exist at both country and global levels to gather and share information on donor priorities and practice. However, there is currently no formal or comprehensive way of coordinating donor responses to promote a ‘division of labour’ and avoid a concentration of funding to some crises and the entrenched neglect of others.

FIGURE 5.6

Funding by donor region to Nepal, 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data
Notes: Private figures are based on FTS data, not on Development Initiatives’ dataset for private funding.
Crisis types

The causes and symptoms of humanitarian crises are diverse and often intertwined. Typologies of crises have categorised crises by their cause – such as violent conflict, natural hazards and disease (or often a combination of such factors); or the symptoms experienced by populations affected by crisis – including, for example, hunger or displacement. Other typologies focus on categorising situations according to the context – limited access to affected populations, for example, or the capacity of national actors to lead the response; or on the duration and frequency of the crisis, comparing, for example, rapid-onset emergencies with protracted and recurrent crises.

Figure 5.7 uses data from the UN OCHA FTS in 2015 to categorise recipient countries of international humanitarian funding according to major causes and symptoms of crises. These are simplified into three categories: conflict situations; disasters caused by natural hazards; and refugee-hosting settings.

In 2015, 87% of reported humanitarian funding went to countries hosting large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from other countries. This includes 51% to countries that were also affected by conflicts, including Yemen, South Sudan and Iraq; and 7% to countries also at risk of disasters caused by natural hazards, in places such as Nepal and Mozambique.

Over two-thirds (67%) of funding reported to the FTS in 2015 was spent in countries currently affected by conflict. Most of these were also hosting refugees from other countries (51%) or facing high disaster risk (5%), or both (5%). Only 6% of reported funding went to countries where conflict alone was the primary crisis type, such as in the Central African Republic and Ukraine, though both countries have large internally displaced populations.

In 2015, 18% of reported contributions went to countries affected by or highly prone to disasters caused by natural hazards. This includes a small proportion – just 1% – that went to countries affected by disasters only, in contexts such as Vanuatu. Otherwise, 5% of funding was spent in contexts where there was significant conflict–disaster overlap, such as Somalia, Colombia, Myanmar and the Philippines; 7% was spent in disaster-prone countries hosting large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers; and 5% was spent in countries simultaneously affected by all three (disaster, conflict and refugee-hosting), such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The complexity of most humanitarian response settings demonstrates the need for multi-faceted and adaptable financing modalities. The need to move beyond a ‘one size fits all’ approach is evident – not just between countries but also within them, recognising that people at different subnational levels and at different points in time often face distinct risks and shocks. Depending on the context and existing capacities, this means layering of different sources of financing, modalities and instruments (see Figure 2.1) according to their comparative advantage to address the various dimensions of risk and need.
Long- and medium-term international humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance may be required to respond quickly to sudden changes in need and as such is often narrowly perceived as being only short-term in nature. In reality, however, crisis vulnerability and humanitarian needs are seldom short-lived and the assistance provided is rarely a quick-fix intervention. The data shows that disasters caused by natural hazards affect the same regions, countries and communities time and time again, often on a cyclical basis (see Chapter 1). Data also shows that most people displaced by conflict remain displaced for protracted periods – often for between 10 and 20 years.19

Funding disbursed through a range of financing instruments over a longer period is required to enable a sustained response to chronic or recurrent needs. In 2014, almost two-thirds (61%) of official humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors went to long-term recipients – those in receipt of an above-average share of their ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance for eight years or more. A further 29% went to medium-term recipients who met the same criteria for between three and seven years. Combined, this means that the vast majority – just over 91% – of official humanitarian assistance went to long- and medium-term recipients in 2014, continuing a trend of recent years. Long- and medium-term recipients also often received the most international humanitarian assistance. Almost all (19 of 20) of the recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance in 2014 were either long-term (13) or medium-term (6) recipient countries.

As Chapter 1 explores in more detail, poverty and vulnerability to crises are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, many medium- and long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance are countries with high poverty rates and low levels of domestic spending. Of the 19 long- and medium-term recipients that featured among the 20 recipients of the most international humanitarian assistance in 2014, seven had over a third of their populations living below the international poverty line20 and of these, five had over half. Four of these countries are also among the 10 countries with the lowest government expenditure per capita globally – all below PPP$300 (2014), and in the case of the DRC and the Central African Republic, below PPP$100 (2014).21

New solutions are clearly needed to build resilience and reduce the impact of crises on the most vulnerable people. International humanitarian assistance is neither sufficient nor appropriate to address the full spectrum of these needs.22 As explored in Chapters 2 and 4, many other financing tools and approaches exist, and several others are in the pipeline, to both prevent and respond to crises. Used alongside appropriately sustained and predictable humanitarian assistance (see Multi-year funding overleaf), and with a clear focus on the most vulnerable populations, these different funding streams and mechanisms should work together to address the risks and needs of affected populations.

FIGURE 5.8


Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee and UN Central Emergency Response Fund data

Notes: Long-, medium- or short-term classification is determined by the length of time the country has received an above-average share of its ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance. Calculations are based on shares of country-allocable humanitarian assistance. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
With growing recognition that most humanitarian crises are protracted or recurrent and the majority of humanitarian assistance is provided year on year over the medium to long term (see previous page), there is a strong and compelling rationale for more multi-annual humanitarian planning and financing. However, implementation continues to be challenging.

The idea of multi-year planning and resource mobilisation for UN-coordinated appeals has gathered pace in recent years; in 2015, 15 of 3123 were multi-annual appeals.24 However, the extent to which projects in these appeals are genuinely multi-year – rather than repeated single-year interventions – is unclear. For example, last year OCHA estimated that only 9% of the 527 projects within the Sahel Humanitarian Response Plan 2014–2016 could be legitimately classified as multi-year.25

While many donors are able to commit funding over a multi-year period in principle (16 out of 29 OECD DAC donors in a recent study);26 for others, annually determined budgets and legal restrictions make awarding multi-year grants difficult. Current financial tracking platforms and standards do not allow funding provided as part of multi-annual commitments to be identified as such, making it currently impossible to accurately determine the real scale of multi-annual funding at the global level.

While the potential gains of multi-year approaches and funding are well established in theory, early indications suggest that returns on multi-annual investments have been uneven. Most notably, primary recipients of multi-year funding (typically UN agencies and international NGOs – see Chapter 4) do not appear to routinely pass on multi-year and flexible funding to their implementing partners, limiting gains further down the transaction chain.27 Aligning multi-year humanitarian planning timeframes and objectives with development-oriented planning frameworks has also been problematic in practice, hampering the potential synergies of multi-year humanitarian approaches with longer-term development outcomes.28

### Multi-year funding

Multi-year humanitarian assistance is becoming more prevalent in certain contexts, providing a predictable flow of resources over longer time-frames and probably facilitating more cost-efficient and effective ways of working. For example, multi-year funding to WFP has grown steadily in recent years, from around US$200 million in 2011 to US$591 million in 2014, by which time WFP had multi-year agreements in place with 12 government donors.29 In 2014, 10.6%30 of total donor contributions to WFP were received as part of multi-year funding agreements.

#### 10 contributors of the most multi-year funding to World Food Programme in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Multi-year Contributions as a Percentage of Total Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Food Programme 2015
How funding is channelled to respond to the needs of people in crisis situations has implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of the assistance provided. However, reporting platforms currently only provide visibility for the money going into the system – the first link in often complex and lengthy transaction chains between donors and the intended recipients of assistance.

From available data, we know that the majority of international humanitarian assistance is channelled, at least in the first instance, through UN agencies. In 2014, approximately two-thirds of all funding (64% or US$12.5 billion) from government donors was channelled via multilateral organisations. Most of this went to the six major UN agencies involved in humanitarian response and coordination, of which the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received the largest shares.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) received the second largest proportion of direct humanitarian funding in 2015 (19% or US$4.2 billion). International NGOs received the bulk of this funding, though both the volume and their share of overall NGO funding decreased between 2014 and 2015.

Localisation of aid has emerged as a rallying cry in the run up to and since the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). It is widely accepted that humanitarian action is best planned, managed and delivered as close to crisis-affected populations as possible. Despite this logic, funding for national and local actors remains low. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data, funding channelled directly to local and national NGOs accounted for just 0.4% of international humanitarian assistance in 2015 – albeit an increase on the 0.2% they received the previous year. At the same time, domestic authorities received just 1.2% (US$256 million) of international humanitarian assistance in 2015, compared with 3% (US$734 million) in the previous year.

Pooled funds continue to play an important role in humanitarian financing. UN-managed humanitarian pooled funds mobilised US$1.3 billion in 2015 – a 28% rise from the previous year. Investments in country-based pooled funds grew in particular, with an increase in funding of almost 50% in 2015 from the previous year.
Channels of delivery

UN agencies continue to be the main recipients of direct humanitarian assistance from donors. In 2014, the latest year for which recipient data is available, government donors channelled approximately two-thirds of their funding (64% or US$12.5 billion) via multilateral organisations (primarily UN agencies) – an increase in volume but a slight decrease in proportion from the year before when 66% or US$10.2 billion of funding was channelled in this way. Estimates show that private donors gave proportionately much less of their funding to multilateral organisations than government donors did in 2014 – 9%; this is similar to levels in the previous year.

NGOs received the second largest amount and proportion of direct international humanitarian assistance in 2014: a total of US$8.0 billion, up 7% from the US$7.4 billion they received the year before. Private donors showed a strong preference for channelling their money via NGOs – giving 86% of their funding this way in 2014 (US$4.7 billion). In contrast, government donors only channelled 17% (US$3.2 billion) of their humanitarian assistance directly through NGOs.

The volume of international humanitarian assistance channelled through the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC) rose by nearly a third between 2013 and 2014 – from US$1.6 billion to US$2 billion; the majority of this came from government donors. RCRC funding is a combination of contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (see Chapter 3), and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (see Case study: Funding to the Nepal Red Cross earthquake response, page 72).

In 2014, government donors channelled approximately two-thirds of their funding via multilateral organisations, primarily UN agencies.
FIGURE 6.1

Funding channels of international humanitarian assistance, 2014

Sources: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) data and Development Initiatives’ unique dataset for private voluntary contributions

Notes: Our first-level recipient data from government donors and EU institutions uses OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), UN CERF and UN OCHA FTS data. The figures in our calculations for total humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors use data from OECD DAC Tables 1, 2a and ‘Members’ total use of the multilateral system’, so totals may differ. ‘Public sector’ refers both to the OECD definition and reporting to the FTS. OECD DAC CRS codes ‘other’, ‘to be defined’ and ‘public-private partnerships’ are merged to ‘other’. Private funding figures use our unique dataset on private voluntary contributions for humanitarian assistance. RCRC: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Data is in constant 2014 prices.

Total international humanitarian response US$25.1bn

CHAPTER 6: DELIVERY / CHANNELS AND IMPLEMENTERS
UN agencies

A large share of international humanitarian assistance is channelled, at least in the first instance, through UN agencies. Six UN agencies in particular receive the bulk of that funding, given their central role in humanitarian response and coordination: WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN OCHA, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

In 2014, 46% of international humanitarian assistance from government donors was channelled through these six UN agencies (US$8.9 billion). This was an increase in volume but a slight decrease in proportion from the 49% they received in 2013 (US$7.6 billion), though in line with their average share over the last five years. Of these six UN agencies, WFP and UNHCR received the largest shares of humanitarian assistance from governments – 44% and 29% respectively between 2010 and 2014.

The volume of funding increased to five of the six major UN agencies between 2013 and 2014. The largest increase in volume was for WFP, with a rise of US$456 million (14%), but UNRWA and UNICEF experienced the largest proportional increases in funding for humanitarian activities, with funding growing by 42% for both agencies.

In 2014, 46% of international humanitarian assistance form government donors was channelled through six UN agencies.

FIGURE 6.2

International humanitarian assistance from governments to six UN agencies, 2010–2014

Sources: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service and UN Central Emergency Response Fund data.

Notes: The calculation for the figure includes earmarked and unearmarked humanitarian assistance given by governments to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UN OCHA. Data represents contributions reported by governments to the DAC and FTS and may vary from income reported by agencies in their annual reports. Unearmarked humanitarian contributions for FAO and UN OCHA from the DAC governments are not included for 2010 due to a lack of available data. Full methodological notes on how unearmarked funding is captured can be found in Methodology and definitions. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Pooled funds can provide an important counterbalance to geographic or project donor preferences and ensure a flexible and responsive source of financing for emergencies. Funding channelled through UN-managed humanitarian pooled funds – the global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) as well as country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) – received combined contributions of US$1.3 billion in 2015. This represented a 28% increase from the previous year and a record volume since they were first introduced, accounting for 6.2% of the international humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS in 2015.

Contributions to the CERF (which disburses only to UN agencies and the International Organisation for Migration) accounted for 34% of UN-managed pooled funding in 2015 (US$462 million) – a slight increase from 2014 but consistent with its five-year average. In 2015, the CERF funded responses in 45 countries through either its rapid response or underfunded emergencies windows. To narrow the gap between urgent humanitarian needs and the funding provided, a proposal was put forward at the WHS to increase the CERF from US$500 million to US$1 billion; this was met by broad support from UN member states.7

CBPFs, which currently operate in 18 countries, are increasingly seen as an effective way of making funding responsive to identified humanitarian needs and accessible to humanitarian organisations, including national and local NGOs, without placing a heavy administrative burden on donors. Their popularity was evident in 2015 with an almost 50% increase in their funding from the previous year, reaching a total of US$883 million. This increase was primarily a result of large contributions from the governments of the UK and the Netherlands, as well as a significant carry-over from the previous year, which combined accounted for 44% of funding for CBPFs in 2015.

A small number of countries receive the bulk of UN-managed pooled funding. In the past five years, nearly half of all contributions through the CERF and CBPFs have been allocated to five recipient countries: South Sudan (US$722 million), Sudan (US$415 million), Somalia (US$294 million), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; US$384 million), and Ethiopia (US$293 million). In 2015, South Sudan received the most pooled funding for the second year running, at US$114 million (mostly through the South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund). Yemen followed, receiving allocations of US$99 million (through both the Yemen Emergency Response Fund and the CERF’s rapid response window).

A number of government donors are consistently the largest supporters of pooled funds, many of whom are also among the group of donors who provide the most humanitarian assistance bilaterally. The UK (US$1.5 billion), the Netherlands (US$561 million), Sweden (US$760 million), Norway (US$511 million) and Germany (US$205 million) are the five donors who contributed the most to pooled funds between 2011 and 2015, accounting for 65% of total contributions in that period.

The CERF and CBPFs are not the only multi-donor humanitarian funding mechanisms; NGOs also manage pooled funds at global and country levels.8 The NGO-managed START Fund is a notable complement to UN-managed pooled funds.9 In 2015, the Fund was activated in 20 countries with reported funding totalling US$12.9 million; in many cases this was in response to small and medium-scale emergencies that otherwise received relatively little international funding.
Localisation

NGOs receive international humanitarian assistance from donors both directly as first-level recipients and indirectly, in the form of sub-grants from other agencies. In 2015, data reported to UN OCHA FTS shows that NGOs received US$4.2 billion of direct funding – 19% of the total humanitarian funding reported to the FTS.

International NGOs (INGOs) received over three-quarters of that direct funding in 2015, almost half of which went to the 10 INGOs that received the most. However, the volume of funding channelled through INGOs between 2014 and 2015 decreased – from US$4.6 billion to US$3.2 billion – as did their share of the overall NGO funding, down from 88% to 77%.

National and local organisations are widely recognised as having a key role to play in preparing for and responding to crises, though generally only receive a small proportion of the reported funding. Direct funding to national and local NGOs did increase in 2015, however. Local NGOs received US$7.6 million of direct funding in 2015, up from US$5.6 million in 2014; and the amount of direct funding to national NGOs more than doubled between 2014 and 2015, from US$36.9 million to US$80.0 million. Local and national NGOs combined received 2.1% of all direct funding to NGOs in 2015, compared with 0.8% the previous year.

National and local organisations are widely recognised as having a key role to play in preparing for and responding to crises, though generally only receive a small proportion of the reported funding. Direct funding to national and local NGOs did increase in 2015, however. Local NGOs received US$7.6 million of direct funding in 2015, up from US$5.6 million in 2014; and the amount of direct funding to national NGOs more than doubled between 2014 and 2015, from US$36.9 million to US$80.0 million. Local and national NGOs combined received 2.1% of all direct funding to NGOs in 2015, compared with 0.8% the previous year.

The UN Secretary-General’s report for the WHS called on the international community to put local response at the heart of humanitarian efforts, not least by increasing direct funding to local partners. The summit saw the launch of NEAR (Network for Empowered Aid Response), a network of local and national NGOs that aims to “restructure the global response to economic, human and environmental threats”. A number of initiatives are also underway to increase direct and indirect funding to national and local NGOs, including the ‘Charter for Change’ that sets a specific target of 20% of humanitarian funding to be passed to southern-based NGOs by May 2018. Signatories to the WHS-related Grand Bargain have committed to “a global, aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible”.

Other reforms are also needed if local and national NGOs are to more equitably access resources to assist their communities. These include investments to build local partner capacity; simplified grant allocation and reporting requirements; and finding ways to combat the negative impact of counter-terrorism legislations on local and national humanitarian organisations working in conflict settings.16
FIGURE 6.4

International humanitarian assistance channelled directly to NGOs by category, 2013, 2014 and 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service data

Notes: Figure shows humanitarian assistance to each category of non-governmental organisation (NGO) as a percentage of the total humanitarian assistance channelled through NGOs; it does not show funding channelled to categories of NGOs as a percentage of total international humanitarian assistance. Discrepancies between the totals in this chart and in the narrative are due to rounding. Data is in constant 2014 prices. Circles are scaled by percentage. For NGO-coding methodology, see Methodology and definitions.
Case study: Funding to the Nepal Red Cross earthquake response

One of the strongest messages resonating from the WHS was the call for more international support for localised humanitarian action. Most crisis prevention, response and recovery is designed and implemented by national and local actors – including domestic authorities, local civil society groups and crisis-affected community members.

National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies represent a sizeable and significant body of this localised response, with presence in 190 countries and a network of over 13 million active volunteers. They receive direct and indirect funding from a diverse and complex set of sources, including domestic government and private funding, bilateral grants from international governments, funds passed through RCRC appeals and bilaterally between national societies.

Figure 6.5 illustrates this complexity in the case of funding for the Nepal Red Cross Society following the Nepal earthquake in April 2015. An IFRC appeal for the earthquake response requested US$81.4 million and received US$56.5 million in cash and in-kind contributions – 69% of the requested amount.

The majority of funding for the Nepal Red Cross Society’s response, as shown in Figure 6.5, was transferred from other national societies but originated in donations from government donors (US$9.1 million), private donors (US$0.1 million) and unspecified donors (US$34.0 million). Funding channelled bilaterally in this way between national societies provided US$43.2 million of cash and in-kind assistance, accounting for 77% of the total response.

Almost half of the funding from other national societies (48%) came from Europe and just less than a quarter (24%) from North and Central America. Funding from other national societies in South and Central Asia, which includes Nepal, accounted for just 0.2% of the total.

Funding from government donors accounted for 22% or US$12.7 million of the total amount received – US$3.6 million in direct transfers from governments to the Nepal Red Cross Society, and US$9.1 million received indirectly from governments to other national societies.

FIGURE 6.5

Funding sources for the Nepal Red Cross Society in response to the Nepal earthquake, 2015

Source: Development Initiatives based on International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) data

Notes: Coding on funding sources based on our own methodology. ‘Other’ refers to ‘Other multi’ and NGOs (Save the Children, OPEC fund, United Way, World Health Organization’s Voluntary Emergency Relief Fund and IFRC at the UN Inc). Data is in current prices.
Governments of affected states

Within the context of the same localisation debate, the role of domestic authorities in crisis-affected countries is also critical. Even in the case of large international responses, national governments retain the primary responsibility of responding to crises in their own territories and often invest significant sums in both crisis preparedness and response (see Chapter 2).23

There are some obvious constraints to national and international alignment at operational level in conflict and complex settings. However, where the will and the capacity to lead humanitarian response exist, international actors should respect and support those efforts while simultaneously complying with humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality.24

National leadership may be widely accepted in theory, but very little international humanitarian assistance is generally channelled via the authorities of crisis-affected states. In 2015, only 1.2% (US$256 million) of the total international humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS was channelled through governments, a significant decrease on the amount reported in the previous year (3% or US$734 million).

Peaks in the amount of funding channelled through governments of crisis-affected states can be largely attributed to specific disasters or health emergencies – for example, the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010, and the Ebola virus disease outbreak in 2014.25 However, the recipients of the most bilateral humanitarian assistance between 2011 and 2015 also included Yemen (US$186 million), which received direct funding from Gulf state donor governments in response to violent conflict and displacement.

Donors vary in their willingness to provide humanitarian assistance via the governments of affected states. Donors outside of the OECD DAC are generally more likely to provide bilateral support than are their DAC counterparts. In 2015, 70% of all funding channelled to affected governments directly was provided by government donors outside the DAC group. The three that gave the most were Saudi Arabia (US$121 million), the United Arab Emirates (US$34 million), and Kazakhstan (US$8 million).

According to FTS data, DAC donors chose to channel only 0.5% (US$75 million) of their international humanitarian assistance through the governments of affected states in 2015. This compares with 3% (US$478 million) in 2014,26 when bilateral support to governments in Ebola-affected countries accounted for a peak in funding, almost half of which (46%) was contributed by the government of the UK.

### FIGURE 6.6

International humanitarian assistance to governments of affected states, 2006–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding to government of affected state</th>
<th>% of total humanitarian assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>373 million</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>320 million</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>593 million</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>299 million</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>813 million</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>206 million</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>74 million</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>84 million</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>734 million</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>256 million</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (FTS)

Notes: Data for this figure includes only funding that is channelled through the domestic government in the affected country as reported to the FTS. (Note that data from the ‘Public sector’ in Figure 6.1 refers to funds that were channelled through the donor-government public sector, the recipient-government public sector and a third-party-government sector as reported to OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System and FTS). Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Displaced Iraqis are provided with food vouchers that can be exchanged for food items at local supermarkets or select vendors.
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian action is essential to better meet needs. At a time when available resources are failing to meet urgent humanitarian requirements within appeals (Chapter 3), it’s inevitable that questions are being asked about how to improve the impact of financing.1

Previous chapters have highlighted areas of reform that could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of complementary efforts in crisis situations. These include enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development actors to understand and respond to the risks and needs of vulnerable populations (Chapter 1); putting to best use the resources provided beyond international humanitarian assistance in vulnerable and fragile contexts (Chapter 2); and multi-year planning and funding for a more predictable and cost-efficient response to protracted crises (Chapter 5).

A scale up in cash programming has the potential to further improve the quality of humanitarian response and reduce costs. Providing people with money instead of goods enables them to choose how best to spend it to meet their needs and can stimulate the local economy. An estimated US$1.3 billion to US$1.9 billion was invested in cash-related programmes in 2015 – between 4.4% and 6.9% of total international humanitarian assistance that year – though a lack of data prevents a more accurate estimate.

Flexible financing through unearmarked contributions to humanitarian organisations brings a number of effectiveness benefits. However, the proportion of funding that the leading humanitarian UN agencies received in the form of fully unearmarked contributions from government donors decreased from 24% in 2012 to 16% in 2014. Unearmarked funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represented 8% of the overall funding that they received in 2014 – a slight increase from 7% in 2010 – but still a long way from the donor commitment to provide 30% of unearmarked or ‘softly earmarked’ funding by 2020.

Effectiveness can also be improved through more transparent and traceable funding. Allowing all actors to follow funding, earmarked or not, through the system could highlight potential cost savings along the way and make the overall response more accountable to populations in need. Increased and improved publication of data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Standard is crucial to achieving this.
Cash programming

Humanitarian agencies are increasingly providing cash or vouchers as a means of assisting vulnerable populations in crisis situations. While cash and voucher programming has been implemented for some time, including in Somalia and Ethiopia, the response to the Syria crisis in particular has accelerated their use. This is the case for interventions both inside Syria, where direct cash and voucher distribution are supplemented by partnerships with local businesses and e-voucher systems; and in neighbouring countries, where in some cases cash-based programmes are linked to national safety net programmes benefitting both refugee and host populations.

Cash transfers cover a variety of modalities, including the distribution of physical money, vouchers (both paper and electronic), bank transfers and debit cards. Evidence has shown that cash and voucher programming can bring a number of important benefits. These include giving greater choice and dignity to affected people, particularly in the case of unconditional cash transfers; supporting local markets; increasing the speed of getting assistance to people in need; reducing the cost of delivery; and potentially improving the transparency and accountability of the response, particularly through the use of digital payments.

The extent to which cash transfers are already implemented in humanitarian response, either as stand-alone activities or as part of wider programming, is unclear. Cash and voucher programmes can cut across a number of sectors and are not ‘tagged’ as cash in financial reporting systems, making it difficult to accurately track how much funding is provided in this way. A recent High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers put the estimate in the region of US$1.2 billion to US$1.5 billion in 2014.

An approximate figure for humanitarian cash and voucher programming in 2015 can be derived from a number of different sources. These include: data extracted from project descriptions in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS); project budgets recorded in the Cash Atlas; and expenditure on cash provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) – the implementer of the largest amount of cash and voucher programming globally. Comparing available data from these sources suggests that somewhere in the range of US$1.3 billion and US$1.9 billion was delivered in the form of cash and voucher programming in 2015 – between 4.4% and 6.9% of total international humanitarian assistance that year. However, the actual amount is likely to be higher.

Cash and voucher-based programming may not be suitable in every context, but in settings where it is appropriate, there is a groundswell of support for a significant scale up. The UN Secretary-General, in his report for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), recommended that cash be the preferred and default mode of operation. Others are calling for a ‘cash revolution’, whereby humanitarian response providers begin to automatically and instinctively ask themselves ‘why not cash’? While ‘Grand Bargain’ commitments on humanitarian financing announced at the WHS do not go so far as to set a collective target for cash-based programming, they do convey the general aims of increasing cash programming beyond current levels and more routine use of cash alongside other forms of assistance.

Along with this increase must come better data on the extent to which cash is used within humanitarian action and in what form (cash versus vouchers for example), as well as its links to national social protection systems. Not only will this facilitate learning on the efficiency and effectiveness of cash-based programming compared with other humanitarian programming modalities, it can also provide evidence of cash as a potential bridge between humanitarian response and longer-term efforts to strengthen national and local coping mechanisms in fragile contexts.
Case study: World Food Programme’s cash and voucher programming

WFP’s cash and voucher programme of work has grown from US$10 million in 2009 to US$681 million in 2015, making WFP the implementer of the largest amount of ‘cash-based transfers’ (the catch-all term used by WFP to refer to a range of cash and voucher modalities) globally. Even taking into account the US$163 million decrease between 2014 and 2015, which was due to funding shortfalls in 2015 for WFP’s relief operations for Syrian refugees, this represents an increase of more than 6000% since 2009. In 2015, WFP reached nearly 9.6 million people with its cash-based transfers. WFP’s response to the Syria crisis has undoubtedly catalysed the rapid increase in the use of cash-transfer mechanisms. Spending on cash-based transfers coordinated by the regional bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia region increased from US$36.5 million in 2011 to US$489 million in 2015. Programmes targeted at Syrian refugees accounted for almost half of WFP’s global spend on cash-based transfers in 2015 and around 70% of its spend in this region. Before 2012, cash, in the form of physical money, was WFP’s dominant modality of cash-transfer programming. By 2015, however, around 80% of WFP’s cash-based transfers were provided in the form of vouchers, again driven by the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia region where vouchers accounted for 97% of its regional cash programming between 2013 and 2015.

FIGURE 7.1
Total transfer values to beneficiaries of the World Food Programme’s cash and voucher programme by region, 2009–2015

Source: World Food Programme (WFP)
Notes: Data is broken down by WFP regional bureau and consists of combined cash and voucher transfer value to beneficiaries only, excluding additional costs. Data is in current prices.
Flexible funding

Flexibility of humanitarian financing, including through reduced earmarking of funding, is a core element of the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles agreed by member donors in 2003. Publications in the run-up to the World Humanitarian Summit went so far as to describe flexible funding as the ‘lifeblood of humanitarian operations’. Commitments to reduce earmarking of donor contributions through the Grand Bargain – which calls for a target of 30% of unearmarked or softly earmarked humanitarian contributions by 2020 – state that flexible funding could facilitate swifter responses to urgent needs, strengthen accountability to affected and refugee-hosting states, and reduce grant-specific administration costs and reporting requirements.

Earmarking refers to conditions placed on donor contributions stipulating how the funds may be spent. In practice, earmarking is applied in varying degrees: ranging from fully unearmarked contributions to tightly earmarked funding, specifying in detail the location, activities or commodities for which funds are intended. In between these two extremes are varying degrees of ‘soft earmarking’ that may stipulate, for example, general thematic or regional priorities.

Despite strong commitments otherwise, fully unearmarked funding provided to the leading humanitarian UN agencies – UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, WFP, UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization and UN OCHA – as a proportion of the total they receive has decreased in recent years. While overall contributions to these six UN agencies increased from US$5.7 billion in 2012 to US$8.9 billion in 2014, this increase was driven almost entirely through rises in earmarked funding. Consequently the proportion of the funding that they received in the form of fully unearmarked contributions from government donors decreased from 24% (US$1.4 billion) in 2012 to 16% (US$1.5 billion) in 2014.

Unearmarked funding to NGOs and the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement also accounts for a small proportion of their total funding; however, they have experienced some modest gains. In 2014, unearmarked funding for NGOs represented 8% of the overall funding they received that year – a slight increase from their 7% of unearmarked funding in 2010. Much of this unearmarked funding is likely to be attributable to partnership arrangements with donors.

Unearmarked funding is by its very nature less easy to track and attribute to specific crises or projects in current financing reporting platforms. However, this need not be a barrier to traceability and transparency. Publishing good quality data to the IATI Standard, and specifically reporting spending in relation to particular activities, should still allow expenditure of unearmarked or less earmarked funding to be tracked further down the chain.

FIGURE 7.2

Earmarked and unearmarked international humanitarian assistance from governments to six UN agencies, 2010–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service, UN Central Emergency Response Fund data

Notes: The calculation is composed of earmarked and unearmarked humanitarian assistance given by governments to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, World Food Programme, UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UN OCHA. Unearmarked humanitarian contributions for FAO and UN OCHA from DAC governments are not included for 2010 due to a lack of available data. See Methodology and definitions for more details. Data is in constant 2014 prices.
Transparency

Transparency of financing is a fundamental part of improving the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of crisis prevention and response. Knowing how much funding is provided – and more importantly, how much of that assistance is received by the people affected – is a prerequisite for prioritising reforms in humanitarian financing and tracking their progress, as well as ensuring better value for money and accountability to donors and recipients. Reporting to the IATI Standard provides the opportunity to strengthen the transparency of humanitarian assistance.

Our report, Better information for a better response: The basics of humanitarian transparency, sets out the ‘3Ts’ for transparent information flows:

• **Traceability**: being able to ‘follow the money’ through the transaction chain from donor to crises-affected people
• **Totality**: reflecting all relevant resource flows including and beyond humanitarian assistance, bridging the humanitarian and development reporting divide
• **Timeliness**: real-time data on available resources to ensure an up-to-date picture in fast-moving humanitarian settings.

Traceability of funding is particularly important for improving the efficiency of humanitarian action. Different constituencies have their own reasons for demanding more traceability in humanitarian funding. Donors, for example, are keen to see how efficiently their contributions are being spent; responding organisations want to improve their decision-making processes based on the best-available information; and civil society organisations need better data in order to advocate for more equitable access to resources for local and national actors. Most importantly, access to information is a key part of making humanitarian action accountable to affected people – allowing people to know how much assistance is being provided in response to their needs and whether it is reaching them in the most efficient and effective way possible.

As outlined in Chapter 6, current reporting practices focus on tracking funding going into the system but not thereafter, when the assistance passes through sometimes complex and lengthy transaction chains of implementers and sub-grantee organisations before finally reaching the intended beneficiaries.

Figure 7.3 provides an example of one such transaction chain, using as its starting point all humanitarian assistance provided by Irish Aid in response to the Nepal earthquake in April 2015 (based on data provided to Development Initiatives by Irish Aid and their Nepal earthquake response grantees). It shows the complexity of funding provided by just one international donor to six international NGOs, which is then passed to second- and in some cases third-level recipients before being delivered to earthquake-affected communities in the form of vital goods and services.

The information for this transaction chain was provided voluntarily by humanitarian agencies in a way that allowed the funds to be traced from donor through to recipient, and demonstrates the quality of data and information that could be made available. However, the ability to scale up this type of detailed and transparent reporting for the entire Nepal earthquake response, or indeed for all crisis responses globally, is far from being a reality. Getting there will demand a critical mass of donors and agencies reporting good quality data to the IATI Standard (see Better data for a better response, page 82).
Irish Aid funding in response to the April 2015 Nepal earthquake

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
<td>€75,000</td>
<td>30 April 2015</td>
<td>Oxfam Nepal (2nd disbursement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Ireland</td>
<td>€604,500</td>
<td>5 August 2015</td>
<td>Distribution of hygiene kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan International Ireland</td>
<td>€100,000</td>
<td>1 May 2015</td>
<td>Distribution of hygiene kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trócaire</td>
<td>€100,000</td>
<td>5 May 2015</td>
<td>Unconditional cash transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision Ireland</td>
<td>€79,500</td>
<td>29 April 2015</td>
<td>Air transport of NFI kits and child-friendly space tents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 7.3**

**GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE REPORT 2016**

- Donor amount: Irish Aid
- Ireland: €75,000 (30 April 2015)
- Concern Worldwide: €604,500 (5 August 2015)
- Oxfam Ireland: €100,000 (1 May 2015)
- Plan International Ireland: €100,000 (21 May 2015)
- Trócaire: €100,000 (28 April 2015)
- World Vision Ireland: €79,500 (29 April 2015)

**Notes:**
- HQ: head quarters; NFI: non-food items; WASH: water, sanitation and hygiene.
- Funding released to Goreto Gorkha by Oxfam Nepal before funding was received from Oxfam Ireland; results and clusters disaggregated by district where possible.
Those working to tackle the causes and consequences of crises can be hindered by inadequate and unreliable information, which challenges efforts to garner sufficient resources, target affected populations and measure results. Better data can inform a better response.

As well as financing data, better information is needed on the needs and circumstances of people affected by or vulnerable to crises (see Chapter 1). Quality data is often particularly lacking in situations where humanitarian needs are high, existing information on populations is low, and access to them is constrained. However, investment and innovation can contribute to filling urgent information gaps and keeping datasets relevant, inclusive and responsive to sudden deteriorations in already fragile and vulnerable situations.

There is good work already underway in this area. Progress has been made to strengthen the quality and coordination of humanitarian needs assessments; and guidance and commitments are in place to further strengthen assessment processes and their use in strategic decision-making. Humanitarian actors are already capturing and using digital data to inform their knowledge of vulnerable communities – obtained, for example, through social media, satellite imagery, mobile phone records and financial transactions. Guidance on the ethics and practice of using such data within humanitarian action is evolving along with the technology. Sharing of data and enabling users to combine data from different sources is facilitated by initiatives such as the Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL) and Joined-up Data Standards.

In terms of financing, the IATI Standard offers a tool for improving the quality, availability and transparency of data. The Standard can cover all international funding flows from a broad range of actors, thereby allowing humanitarian assistance to be considered in the context of wider resources. Good quality data published to this level can also allow funding to be traced through the delivery chain, showing what reaches crisis-affected populations and highlighting the potential for reductions in transaction costs. But realising this potential depends on donors and agencies publishing good quality and timely data. The Grand Bargain launched at the WHS includes a commitment to publish timely, transparent, harmonised and open high-quality data on humanitarian funding by mid-2018, using IATI as the basis of a common standard.

‘Markers’, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s ‘gender marker’ and the European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)’s ‘gender and age marker’ provide some level of visibility for the targeting of international humanitarian assistance to meet the needs of particularly vulnerable groups. Parties to the Grand Bargain have agreed to work with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to develop and apply a ‘localisation marker’ that measures direct and indirect funding to local and national NGOs working in crisis environments. Discussions also continue on the best way of measuring how much humanitarian assistance is provided in the form of cash transfers (see Cash programming, page 76).

The clear need and demand for better data, combined with today’s technological possibilities and the momentum of the open data movement, provide both the motivation and the means to make better quality data a very real possibility. Progress will come through building on existing initiatives and joining up the efforts of national and international partners, including those in the private sector with relevant knowledge and expertise, to collaboratively and persistently bring about change. To achieve better data on financing, success depends on the commitment of all those disbursing or spending aid to report comprehensively and consistently and to use that information to inform their decision-making.
CHAPTER 8

METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS
Methodology

What is humanitarian assistance?

Humanitarian assistance is intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters caused by natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur. Humanitarian assistance should be governed by the key humanitarian principles of: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These are the fundamental principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC), which are reaffirmed in UN General Assembly resolutions and enshrined in numerous humanitarian standards and guidelines. In this report, when used in the context of financing data, humanitarian assistance refers to the financial resources for humanitarian action.

There is no universal obligation or system for reporting expenditure on international or domestic humanitarian assistance. The main reporting platforms for international humanitarian assistance are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA’s) Financial Tracking Service (FTS). The 29 OECD DAC members are obligated to report their humanitarian assistance to the DAC systems as part of their official development assistance (ODA), in accordance with definitions set out by the DAC. Some other governments and most major multilateral organisations also voluntarily report to the DAC. The FTS is open to all humanitarian donors and implementing agencies to voluntarily report contributions of internationally provided humanitarian assistance, according to an agreed set of criteria for inclusion.

The analysis in the GHA report draws on data reported to the OECD DAC, as well as that reported to the FTS. Between these sources there is variation in the criteria for what can be included as humanitarian assistance, as well as volumes reported, so we aim to consistently explain and source the data that we use.

Cash

Our estimate of the amount of humanitarian assistance delivered in the form of cash and voucher-based programming is based on data from the FTS, Cash Atlas and World Food Programme (WFP). The Cash Atlas is an online global mapping tool that tracks funding to humanitarian cash programmes. There is no specific identifier for cash in FTS data, so we carry out a keyword search for relevant terms on project titles, descriptions and clusters. Our estimate includes partial cash projects (those that combine cash transfer interventions in broader activities), and as such may include projects with non-cash elements.

Reporting to the Cash Atlas on project timelines is by project duration and includes projects spanning a number of years. To estimate the value of cash transfers in 2015, we multiply the overall total by the number of project months in 2015 divided by the total number of projects months. Adding WFP data to Cash Atlas data may cause some double counting, but measures have been taken to limit this to the least possible.

Channels of delivery

We use ‘channels of delivery’ to describe the organisations receiving funding for the delivery of humanitarian assistance – multilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the public sector and the RCRC – whether they deliver the assistance themselves or pass it on to partner organisations. Our channels of delivery data comes predominantly from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the FTS.

Constant prices

Our trends analysis on financial flows is in US$ constant prices (base year 2014) unless otherwise stated. We use data from the OECD DAC and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook October 2015 release to convert financial data from current to constant prices.

Country and region naming conventions

Country naming conventions used throughout this report are based on those used by the OECD DAC or the UN. Region naming conventions are based on those used by the OECD with the exception of the Middle East and North of Sahara regions, which have been combined. In some cases, UN region naming conventions have also been used. The conventions used do not reflect a political position of Development Initiatives.

Crisis categories

For our analysis of crises by categories of conflict situations, disasters caused by natural hazards, and refugee-hosting settings, we used 2015 data from the FTS organised by emergency title. To identify countries affected by conflict and by disasters caused by natural hazards, we used indicators in INFORM’s Index for Risk Management; and to identify refugee-hosting countries, we used data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Relief and Works Agency Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
The thresholds applied to these indicators mean that 12 countries were excluded from the analysis because they fell below these thresholds used to categorise countries according to crisis type. The combined humanitarian funding to these 12 countries in 2015 was US$171.3 million, representing around 1% of the total country-allocable funding reported to the FTS.

Earmarked funding

Our multilateral unearmarked funding calculation is the sum of ‘core’ humanitarian assistance given by DAC governments to UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, UNICEF, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNOCHA (data taken from the OECD DAC). Earmarked funding is calculated by totalling all other data (non-core) channelled via multilaterals reported to the OECD DAC for DAC donors and all funding reported to the FTS for other government donors.

Earmarked and unearmarked funding for NGOs is calculated using OECD DAC data only. To calculate unearmarked funding we use OECD DAC’s type-of-aid definition for ‘Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes’. Earmarked funding comprises all other DAC-reported funding channelled to NGOs.

Environmental vulnerability

Our list of environmentally vulnerable countries includes all countries classed as ‘very high’ and ‘high’ risk in the natural hazard category of the INFORM Index’s mid-2016 release. The extent of a country’s ability to withstand hazards is also factored into the definition by removing countries scoring ‘low’ and ‘very low’ on INFORM’s ‘lack of coping capacity’ dimension.

Exchange rates

We use exchange rates from the OECD DAC for OECD DAC members and data from the IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2015 release) for countries outside of the OECD DAC.

Fragility

Classification of fragile states for Figure 1.1 is based on the list of fragile states and economies used in the OECD’s report States of Fragility 2015; since it draws a clear distinction between fragile and non-fragile states. Analysis for Figure 2.7 is derived from fragility groupings in the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, where all countries are ranked on a continuum and grouped by a composite fragility score developed from social, economic and political indicators.

International humanitarian assistance

Our estimate of total international humanitarian assistance is the sum of that from private donors (see Private funding later in this chapter) and from government donors. Our calculation of international humanitarian assistance from government donors is the sum of:

- ‘Official’ humanitarian assistance (OECD DAC donors)
- International humanitarian assistance from donors outside of the OECD DAC.

Our ‘official’ humanitarian assistance calculation comprises:

- The bilateral humanitarian expenditure of the 29 OECD DAC members, as reported to the OECD DAC database under Table 1.
- The multilateral humanitarian assistance of the 29 OECD DAC members. This in turn comprises:
  - The unearmarked ODA contributions of DAC members to seven key multilateral agencies engaged in humanitarian response: UNHCR, UN OCHA, FAO, IOM, UNRWA, UNICEF and WFP, as reported to the OECD DAC under Table 2a and the CRS. We do not include all ODA to FAO, IOM, UNICEF and WFP but apply a percentage to take into account these agencies that also have a ‘development’ mandate. These shares are calculated using data on humanitarian expenditure as a proportion of the total received directly from each multilateral agency.
  - The ODA contributions of DAC members to some other multilateral organisations (beyond those already listed) that although not primarily humanitarian-oriented, do report a level of humanitarian aid to OECD DAC Table 2a. We do not include all reported ODA to these multilaterals but just the humanitarian share of this.
  - Contributions to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) that are not reported under DAC members’ bilateral humanitarian assistance. We take this data directly from the UN CERF website.

When we report on the official humanitarian assistance of individual OECD DAC countries who are members of the EU, we include an imputed calculation of their humanitarian assistance channelled through the EU institutions, based on their ODA contributions to the EU institutions. We do not include this in our total international humanitarian assistance and response calculations to avoid double-counting.

To calculate funding from government donors outside the OECD DAC we use data from the FTS. Some governments that voluntarily report to the DAC report higher contributions to the DAC than to the FTS; for these the amounts reported to the DAC were used. In 2015, this was the case for the United Arab Emirates, Russia and Turkey.

However, Turkey is captured and shaded differently in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 because the humanitarian assistance that it voluntarily reports to the DAC largely comprises
expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey so is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure. We do not include Turkey’s expenditure on Syrian refugees within Turkey in our total international humanitarian assistance and response calculations as these only include amounts directed internationally by donors.

Multilateral development banks

Our analysis of funding from the multilateral development banks includes amounts reported within the OECD DAC humanitarian aid sector, as well as preliminary analysis of relevant DAC-reported funding outside of the humanitarian aid sector. Humanitarian-related expenditure was captured through (1) inclusion of activities reported under the DAC flood prevention/control purpose code; and (2) a curated word-search on CRS fields for terms relevant to disaster risk reduction, emergency response and recovery. Classification based on word-searching relies on the quality of donor reporting to the CRS and involves a degree of subjectivity. Data shown does not capture climate change adaptation, resilience and coastal development unless a disaster risk reduction element was specified within the activity or it was included under the DAC humanitarian aid sector.

NGO classifications

Analysis of funding to NGOs is based on our own categorisation of five types of NGO, which was established following consultation with stakeholders.

Categories are:

• International NGOs – those based in an OECD DAC member country and carrying out operations in one or more developing countries
• Southern international NGOs – those not based in OECD DAC member countries and carrying out operations in one or more developing countries
• Affiliated national NGOs – nationally-operating NGOs that are affiliated to an international NGO
• National NGOs – those operating in the developing country where they are headquartered, working in multiple subnational regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO
• Local NGOs – those operating in a specific, geographically defined, subnational area, without affiliation to either a national or international NGO; this grouping can also include community-based organisations.

Poverty

We refer to the $1.90 a day line in this report and use data from World Bank’s PovcalNet. This measure is expressed in ‘international dollars’, based on 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. We use the updated extreme poverty line with estimates modelled to 2012 in this year’s report. This allows poverty line comparability between countries, provides the most comparable up-to-date analysis possible, and is designed to be more accurate than other available estimates as it uses more up-to-date comparisons of international prices.

Private funding

We approach humanitarian delivery agencies (including NGOs, multilateral agencies and the RCRC) directly and request financial information on their income and expenditure to create a standardised dataset. Where direct data collection is not possible, we use publicly available annual reports and audited accounts to extract key data. Our dataset includes the following:

• 287 NGOs that form part of 10 representative and well-known NGO alliances and umbrella organisations such as Oxfam International, and a further 12 large international NGOs operating independently
• Multilateral contributions from six key UN agencies engaged in humanitarian response and coordination: UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, UN Development Programme and the World Health Organization, as well as 162 IOM member states
• The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Our private funding calculation comprises an estimate of total private humanitarian income for all NGOs, and the private humanitarian income reported by the six UN agencies, IOM, the IFRC and ICRC. To estimate the total private humanitarian income of NGOs globally, we calculate the annual proportion that the 287 NGOs in our dataset represent of all NGOs reporting to the UN OCHA FTS. The total private humanitarian income reported to us by the NGOs in our dataset is then scaled up according to this proportion.

Data is collected annually, and new data for previous years may be added retrospectively. Global estimates for previous years may therefore be different to those presented in past reports, as our data becomes more comprehensive and these estimates become more precise. Due to limited availability of data, detailed analysis covers the period 2010 to 2014.
Our 2015 private funding calculation is an estimate based on data provided by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), pending full data from our full dataset. We calculate the average share that MSF’s contribution represents in our private funding figure for the five previous years (2010–2014). Using this proportion we scale up the private funding figure provided by MSF to get our estimated total for 2015. The rationale for this methodology is that the share of MSF’s private funding remains relatively consistent year on year (ranging between 19% and 21% of the total amount over the last five years).

Rounding

There may be minor discrepancies in some of the totals in our graphs and charts, and between those in the text; this is because of rounding.

UN-coordinated appeals

We use this generic term to describe all humanitarian response plans and appeals coordinated by UN OCHA or UNHCR, including strategic response plans, flash appeals and regional refugee response plans. We use data from UN OCHA’s FTS for our financial analysis of UN-coordinated appeals.
## Data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.aidtransparency.net/">www.aidtransparency.net/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund for Peace</td>
<td>Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace, Washington DC</td>
<td><a href="http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/">http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee and European Commission</td>
<td>INFORM Index for Risk Management</td>
<td><a href="http://www.inform-index.org">www.inform-index.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
<td>IFRCs appeal reports, ICRC, Geneva</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifrc.org/fr/publications/donor-response/">www.ifrc.org/fr/publications/donor-response/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development</td>
<td>UNCTADstat, UNCTAD, Geneva</td>
<td><a href="http://unctadstat.unctad.org">http://unctadstat.unctad.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
<td>UNRWA in figures reports</td>
<td><a href="http://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa">www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance market commitment</td>
<td>A binding contract, typically offered by a government or other financial entity, used to guarantee a viable market if a product such as a vaccine or other medicine is successfully developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blended finance*</td>
<td>Combination of public-sector funding (and sometimes philanthropic funding) with private-sector capital to finance a given project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond</td>
<td>A form of debt security whereby the issuer of the bond owes a debt to the holder of the bond and must pay the holder interest on the debt and/or repay the face value of the bond at a set date (the maturity date). Bonds may be negotiable – ie able to be bought and sold between bond holders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfers</td>
<td>Refers to all programmes where cash (or vouchers for goods or services) is directly provided to beneficiaries. The term is used to refer to the provision of cash or vouchers given to people, household or community recipients. Other commonly used related terms include cash programming, cash and voucher programming, and cash-based transfers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of delivery</td>
<td>The agencies and organisations receiving funding for the delivery of humanitarian assistance – multilateral agencies, NGOs, the public sector, the military, pooled funds (for definition overleaf) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – whether they deliver the assistance themselves or pass it on to partner organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate adaptation financing</td>
<td>Funding for interventions that aim to build the capacity to adapt and respond to climate change, while reducing the vulnerabilities to shocks and stresses induced or exacerbated by it and their associated impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessional (financing and loans)</td>
<td>Lending terms that are more favourable for the borrower than those that can be obtained through the market. Benefits can include longer repayment periods, grace periods (before repayments have to begin), or interest rates offered below market terms. Concessions are typically provided directly by a government agency or, for a commercial loan, as a government grant to a lending bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency credit</td>
<td>A separate fund or a budget provision set aside to meet unforeseen and unavoidable requirements that may arise. Certain types of contingency (such as crisis response and reconstruction, or meeting loan guarantee obligations) may be specified as a potential use for such funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief*</td>
<td>A reduction in the repayment terms of a loan. This may include forgiveness (the loan is written off), rescheduling the repayments, or refinancing by extending the loan period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt swaps</td>
<td>A debt cancellation by a donor on condition that the partner country invests part of the cancelled amount in development projects (and/or environment projects). Debt swaps can also involve a third party, usually an NGO or intergovernmental agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarked funding*</td>
<td>Conditions placed on funding by donors stipulating how or on what recipients may spend funds. Conditions can range from overall thematic and geographic priorities to requirements to spend money on specific goods and services delivered to a particular recipient group. They range from tightly earmarked to fully unearmarked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity investments</td>
<td>In general terms this is the acquisition of shares in an enterprise in order to obtain dividend income of capital gains in the future. To be counted as ODA, an equity investment must be made by an official-sector agency in an enterprise in a country on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s list of ODA-eligible states, and the investment is not made to acquire a lasting interest in the enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment (FDI)</td>
<td>Investment that reflects an objective to establish a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor), in an enterprise that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor (direct investment enterprise).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See full glossary at: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/glossary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Guarantee** | The agreement made by a donor government to cover (for example) loan repayments if the partner country defaults, thus reducing the risk associated with the loan, and in turn allowing the loan to come with better terms, such as a reduced interest rate.  
8 |
| **Impact bonds** | Finance tool designed to improve social, environmental or development outcomes of publically funded projects/services, by making funding and payments to investors conditional on achieving agreed results.  
9 |
| **Islamic social financing** | A range of financial mechanisms employed by the Muslim community that are designed to promote social protection of poor people, reduce vulnerability and increase economic equality. Includes Zakat (contribution of 2.5% of annual assets), and sukuk (investment bonds compliant with Islamic law). |
| **Loan*** | Transfers either in cash or in kind for which the recipient incurs a legal debt. |
| **Long-term debt (commercial)** | A debt owed to a commercial bank or agency that has a maturity of more than one year. Maturity can be defined either on an original or remaining basis.  
10 |
| **Long-term debt (official)** | A debt owed to a bilateral government agency or a multilateral development agency that has a maturity of over one year. As well as debt arising from ODA and other official flows, it includes former private sector debt that has been rescheduled by the official sector.  
11 |
| **Multilateral development banks** | Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are supranational institutions established by a group of countries with the common task of fostering economic and social progress in developing countries by financing projects (in the form of loans or grants), supporting investment, generating capital and providing technical expertise.  
12 |
| **Net portfolio equity** | A form of international investment that does not confer significant control or influence. ‘Portfolio’ refers to a group of assets. Investments of 10% or more of the value or control of an asset or company are considered FDI, while investments below this threshold are portfolio equity. Investors receive returns through interest payments or dividends and can use equity to spread financial risks across different markets. They can also sell their equity on to other investors. |
| **Non-grant (government) revenue** | The total amount of government revenue collected in a given year, excluding international grants for project or budget support. The exclusion of grants better reflects a government’s available domestic public resources and avoids double counting of international assistance. Non-grant revenue includes both tax (eg income and VAT) and non-tax (eg rent/fees) components.  
13 |
| **Other official flows (OOFs)** | Transactions by the official sector with countries on the list of eligible recipients that do not meet the conditions for eligibility as ODA or official aid, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25%.  
14 |
| **Pooled funds*** | Mechanisms used to receive contributions from multiple financial partners and allocate such resources to multiple implementing entities. Humanitarian pooled funds can be global (eg CERF or the START Fund) or country-based. For recovery and development purposes, the main pooled mechanisms currently used by the UN system are UN multi-donor trust funds, national multi-donor trust funds and stand-alone joint programmes.  
15 |
| **Purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates** | An attempt to go beyond using market exchange rates, adjusting for the relative buying power across different countries so enabling international comparisons of the welfare of inhabitants. |
| **Remittances*** | Monies earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their country of origin.  
16 |

*See full glossary at: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/glossary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk financing</td>
<td>The retention of risks combined with the adoption of an explicit financing strategy to ensure that adequate funds are available to meet financial needs should a disaster occur. Such financing can be established internally through the accumulation of funds set aside for future use or obtained externally through pre-arranged credit facilities. The banking sector, capital markets and international lending institutions are sources of risk financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk transfer</td>
<td>The shifting of risks to others who, in exchange for a premium, provide compensation when a disaster occurs, ensuring that any financing gap that might emerge is partially or fully bridged. Risk transfer may be obtained through insurance policies or capital market instruments such as catastrophe bonds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term debt</td>
<td>Debt that has maturity of one year or less. Maturity can be defined either on an original or remaining basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection</td>
<td>Public actions – carried out by the state or privately – that both enable people to deal more effectively with risk, vulnerability to crises and changes in circumstances, and help tackle extreme and chronic poverty. Social protection includes various types of approaches, policies, programmes and actions that address risks, deprivation, poverty (eg income security payments, or basic health coverage), or vulnerability to shocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity levy</td>
<td>Solidarity levies are a tax imposed on people for a specific purpose, in addition to other regular taxes. The purpose should be one intended to ‘unify’ or ‘solidify’ payees, such as a national rebuilding project. Global taxes have been proposed under this banner, for example directed towards health.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See full glossary at: [www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/glossary](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/glossary)
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBPF</td>
<td>Country-based pooled fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common humanitarian fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Disaster prevention and preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (EC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Forgotten Crisis Assessment (ECHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHA</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Assistance (programme by Development Initiatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATI</td>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM</td>
<td>Index for Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSh</td>
<td>Kenyan shilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>Lower middle income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral development banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Middle income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National disaster management authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOFs</td>
<td>Other official flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing power parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRC</td>
<td>Red Cross Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>Upper middle income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEO</td>
<td>World Economic Outlook (IMF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Humanitarian Summit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

Chapter 1


2. To compare poverty data across countries, prices must be converted into a common price basis known as purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. PPPs are constructed by comparing the cost of a common basket of goods in different countries. To reflect an internationally comparable poverty line, we use the $1.90 poverty line derived from 2011 prices, which buys approximately the same as the previous $1.25 poverty line derived from 2005 prices. The World Bank updated the extreme poverty line from $1.25 in 2005 PPP to $1.90 in 2011 PPP in 2015.

3. Differences to the findings of this analysis compared with a similar analysis in the GHA Report 2015 are due to: the use of a different source to define the list of fragile states; a change in INFORM’s methodology of defining environmentally vulnerable countries; and changes in vulnerability ranking for countries between years.


10. This data was collected by the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, now the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics – the official statistical agency of the Government of South Sudan.


13. Poverty incidences are based on the national poverty line. Indicators of risk are drawn from the INFORM Index of Risk Management risk score; this combines indicators on hazard and exposure (both human and natural), vulnerability and lack of coping capacity.


18. Although it can give a broad basis for comparing the refugee and host populations, the poverty line for the study and the national poverty lines cannot be strictly compared as they are anchored in different sets of measures.

19. These include data on conflict collated by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University; the Conflict Barometer, published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research; and the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) developed by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission.


21. 22 Groupings of countries by level of income incorporate a broad range of incomes, poverty levels, access to resources and vulnerabilities. In addition, the thresholds that separate countries’ income into ‘low’, ‘middle’ (lower and upper) and ‘high’ do not reflect subnational disparities within countries.

22. It should be noted though that broad categories such as MICs and LICs cover very different contexts with varying capacities to withstand shocks.


Chapter 2


4 ACAPS global emergency overview country profile for DRC: www.acaps.org/country/drc

5 Initiative pour la Transparence des Industries Extractives (2015) Republique Democratique du Congo: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1C1Aj5TqAqgW00R1A5VUV5c1k/view?pref=2&pli=1

6 Based on multilateral peace operations data in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2014.

7 UN Refugees Agency. Refugee protection: A guide to international refugee law; drawing on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14(1).

8 Numbers of refugees and asylum seekers are taken from end of year 2015 data from UNHCR and end of year 2014 data from UNRWA.

9 Non-grant revenue excludes externally funded grants, such a budget support and project assistance.


11 http://static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39ccd1e00/t/56b9abe107ea0af6db35f02/1455008783181/JRP%2B2016-2018%2BFull%2B160209.pdf

12 UN (May 2016). In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants – Report of the Secretary-General.

13 OCHA (2016) Chair’s Summary from the WHS. Standing up for humanity: Committing to action (advance unedited version).

14 The DAC list of ODA recipients, effective for reporting flows for 2014, 2015 and 2016 includes Turkey: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014%20final.pdf

15 This differs to the category of in-donor refugee costs as per OECD DAC guidelines on reporting, as noted later in the section.

16 Refugee-hosting costs from DAC members more than doubled (up 110%) during this period. The figure of US$7.7 billion includes Turkey’s expenditure related to the hosting of Syrian refugees within its own territory.


18 www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf

19 Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

20 Canada, Germany and the United States.

21 Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Finland, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.


24 www.preventionweb.net/files/43291-sendaframeworkfordrren.pdf

25 Colombia is classified as an upper middle-income country by the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/income-level/UMC

26 According to INFORM, Colombia scores 4.3 for ‘lack of coping capacity’ out of a possible 10.


28 ACAPS global emergency overview country profile for Colombia: www.acaps.org/country/colombia

29 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that 21,000 people in Colombia were newly displaced by disasters in 2014: http://internal-displacement.org/americas/colombia/

30 www.mmmechanisms.org/cop20_japanpavilion/files/12101300_presentation_5.pdf

31 http://latin-correspondent.com/2016/02/el-nino-wrecks-havoc-in-colombia/

32 www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/legislation/countries/colombia/

33 www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/1057ES.pdf

34 https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/PND/PND%202014-2018%20Tomo%202%20Internet.pdf

35 Partially reflecting greater reporting efforts and growing use of the Rio Markers in donors’ reporting to the OECD DAC. The adaptation marker was introduced in 2010.

37 www.ccrif.org/
38 www.artemis.bm/blog/2015/12/02/arc-opens-parametric-insurance-products-to-organisations-ngos/
40 See note 3.
41 In 2014 the decrease of over 100% in humanitarian assistance to the ‘alert’ sub-category was caused by Syria shifting from ‘alert’ to ‘high alert’, while Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso shifted to ‘alert’ to ‘high warning’.
44 OECD (2016) Good development support in fragile, at-risk and crisis affected contexts, OECD Development Policy Papers, No.4
45 See Hearn S (2016) Independent Review of New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States: www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/43fe8e189211c8f2d1b96816dab60623/d8ab0723-574b-41b9-abd2-53ae75b80031.pdf?ua=1
46 www.project-tamkeen.org
48 To compare poverty data across countries, prices must be converted into a common price basis known as purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. PPPs are constructed by comparing the cost of a common basket of goods in different countries.
49 It may also be the case that the real figures are somewhat lower than these as some disease-specific expenditure may have been coded to health strengthening purpose codes. For example, of the US$16.5 million spent on health policy and administrative management in 2005, US$4.0 million was spent on an ‘HIV/AIDS Response Project’.

Chapter 3

1 Staff security refers to the safety and security of staff and operations sector in UN-coordinated appeals.
2 Multi-sector is defined by the UN OCHA FTS as projects and activities with no one dominant sector and often in connection with UNHCR assistance to refugee populations.
3 This analysis is based on data from UN OCHA FTS only and does not directly correspond with our calculation of overall international humanitarian assistance, as shown in Figure 3.1.
5 Elements of regional appeals are deducted from the total for UN-coordinated regional appeals to avoid double counting. The Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) does not include the Democratic Republic of the Congo component; the Central African Republic RRRP only includes the Republic of Congo component. The Nigeria RRRP does not include any country-specific component and therefore does not appear in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
6 Figure 3.3 shows that the Central African Republic Regional Refugee Response Plan is the worst-funded appeal, with just 4% of requirements met. However, all country components other than for the Republic of Congo have been removed from the analysis to avoid double counting and this low proportion of funding does not apply for the regional appeal overall.
8 Protection covers protection, human rights and rule of law.
9 Definition from FTS glossary: https://ftsbeta.unocha.org/glossary. Note that ‘multi-sector’ is different from ‘sector not specified’.
10 Data for this analysis is taken from reported contributions/commitments to the UN OCHA FTS. Comparisons should not be made with our overall international humanitarian assistance totals, which are drawn from multiple sources.
11 However, other reporting systems beyond FTS, in particular the OECD DAC, do not track funding to UN appeals making it difficult to say with any certainty how much funding is appeal related or otherwise.
12 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies website: http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are-the-movement/(accessed 8 June 2016)
15 For this figure we use IFRC data from donor responses to emergency appeals in 2015, which differs from the data source for Fig 6.6. http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/Appeals/statistic/cover15_emer.pdf
Chapter 4

1 Not including the Government of Turkey and the EU institutions.


3 OECD regions have been used for this analysis, with the exception of Middle East and North of Sahara, which are combined.

4 ‘Europe’ here refers to countries in the geographic regional grouping, as used by the OECD, not the grouping of EU member states.

5 The 29 OECD DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US.

6 The EU institutions are not included in this calculation because they are not a bilateral government donor. However, the contributions of EU member states includes an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure (see Methodology). Funding from Turkey is not included because its contributions largely consist of support to refugees residing in Turkey and this assistance is not by definition international.


8 The European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office (ECHO) administers most of the EU institutions’ humanitarian assistance, with some funds also originating from the EC’s Development and Cooperation division, EuropeAid.

9 See Methodology and definitions for more details of our methodology for calculating international humanitarian assistance from governments.

10 Figure in constant 2014 prices.

11 Turkey’s humanitarian contribution is not included in the total calculation of international humanitarian response (see Figure 3.1).

12 Not including the Government of Turkey and the EU institutions.


14 We provide an estimate for 2015 private funding. For details of the methodology used, see Methodology.

15 See note 2.


18 It is not possible to breakdown our 2015 estimate by private donor type.

19 See note 13.


21 See note 13.

22 Islamic social finance, Special Session Prospectus, World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat, April 2016.


29 www.adb.org

30 www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/overview#1


33 See note 13.


36 The MDB statement was made on behalf of the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank Group.


Chapter 5

1 This US$2 billion includes international humanitarian assistance spent within Syria and not the expenditure from Turkey on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey.

2 Includes spending on some disaster risk reduction activities, early warning systems, emergency contingency stocks and contingency planning, including preparations for forced displacement.

3 This includes spending at regional and geographically unspecified levels.

4 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid-needs-assessments_en


7 For more details on the START Network and Fund see: www.start-network.org/how/start-fund/#Vz28Lif97iV

8 The term ‘mega-crisis’ was used by the UN Secretary-General at the launch of the High-Level Panel report on Humanitarian Financing. 17 January 2016: www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53022#.Vz3BQ_I97IV

9 Designated Level 3 emergencies at the time of writing were: Iraq, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen: www.unocha.org/where-we-work/emergencies


11 http://ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/home-page.html


16 ALNAP (2014) Responding to changing needs: Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian action: www.alnap.org/resource/19246

17 For the purposes of our methodology, refugee-hosting settings include refugees and asylum seekers with a threshold of over 20,000 people.


20 The international poverty line being used here is the $1.90 poverty line, derived from 2011 prices, which buys approximately the same as the previous $1.25 poverty line derived from 2005 prices. In 2015, the World Bank updated the extreme poverty line from $1.25 in 2005 PPP to $1.90 in 2011 PPP. PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which is a common price basis used to compare data across countries. PPPs are constructed comparing the cost of a common basket of goods in different countries.
21 GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP).
23 In 2015, there were 36 UN-coordinated appeals in total. However, for the purposes of this analysis, five have been excluded since they were flash appeals that are generally short term in nature.
25 See note 24.
28 See note 24.
29 In 2014, WFP had ongoing multi-year agreements with Australia, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom; and signed new agreements with Finland and the Republic of Korea.
30 This calculation is based on a fundraising total of US$5.6 billion for WFP in 2014 as reported in the following funding update: WFP, WFP Funding in 2014, September 2015: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/research/wfp277763.pdf

Chapter 6

4 See note 3.
5 The Grand Bargain was initiated following recommendations from the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (see note 1) on improving the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It includes a series of commitments made by a number of government donors, UN agencies, the EC, the RCRC Movement, the World Bank Group, and NGO consortia to institute reforms to better and more efficiently serve people in humanitarian need. The Grand Bargain commitments – The Grand Bargain document: A shared commitment to serve people in need – was signed at the World Humanitarian Summit on 23 May 2016.
6a This analysis is based on contributions reported by governments to the DAC and FTS and may vary from income reported by agencies in their annual reports - see for example OCHA’s annual report http://www.unocha.org/about-us/publications/flagship-publications/2%
7 Chair’s Summary from the World Humanitarian Summit, Standing up for humanity: Committing to action, advance unedited version, 24 May 2016: https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/key-documents#chairsummary-linking
9 START Fund: www.start-network.org/how/start-fund/#!VzVUFoR97IV
10 The 10 INGOs that received the most in 2015 were: Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, Danish Refugee Council, Oxfam GB, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, Concern Worldwide, CARE International and International Medical Corps.
11 Country based pooled funds, October 2015, UN OCHA: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20CBPF%20Allocation%20Contribution%20October%202015.pdf. Our analysis of funding to NGOs is calculated from FTS data and uses different NGO categorisations. For some CBPFs, for example the Turkey Humanitarian Pooled Fund, no detail is provided on the type of NGOs receiving funds. However, summary reports suggest that a significant proportion of our undefined NGO total for CBPFs has been channelled through national NGOs.
12 Analysis of data from 2014 resident and humanitarian coordinators reports on the use of CERF funds: Sub grants under 2014 CERF projects, UN CERF, 2016: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Reports/OCHA%20CBPF%20Allocation%20Contribution%20October%202015.pdf. For some CBPFs, for example the Turkey Humanitarian Pooled Fund, no detail is provided on the type of NGOs receiving funds. However, summary reports suggest that a significant proportion of our undefined NGO total for CBPFs has been channelled through national NGOs.
14 Local implementing partners, which include national and local NGOs, governments and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, received this sub-granteed funding.
Chapter 8: Methodology and Definitions

17 See note 5.


19 See note 1.

20 www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement/national-societies/

21 For this figure we use the IFRC Nepal earthquake emergency appeal operation update which differs from the data source for Fig 3.6. http://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=122573

22 Following completion of this analysis, new data was published in a donor response document that showed appeal requirements of CHF84.9 million (US$88.2 million) and funding received at CHF55.9 million (US$58.1 million): http://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=122573

23 UN resolution 46/182

24 See note 13.

25 See note 2.

26 Significantly more is reported to the OECD DAC CRS as directed to the ‘public sector’; however, this includes a much wider group of recipients – both the public sectors of recipient and donor countries as well as third party public sector authorities.

Chapter 7

1 The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need. Signed at the World Humanitarian Summit, May 2016: https://consultations.worldhumanitariansummit.org/bitcache/70ccab5bd711f742dc8d001fa89d58c062539d5?vid=581058&disposition=inline&op=view


6 See note 2.

7 Cash Atlas is part of CaLP: the Cash Learning Partnership. It provides a global overview of cash transfer programming for advocacy and learning purposes: www.cash-atlas.org

8 Estimates at the lower end of this range are drawn from data in the UN OCHA FTS on full and partial contributions to cash-based programmes and data provided directly from WFP. Mid-point estimates use data from the Cash Atlas (starting date) of projects and data from WFP. Upper-end estimates are based on data from the Cash Atlas (first cash date) of projects and data from WFP.


10 See note 2.

11 See note 1.

12 See note 2.

13 See note 1.

14 www.wfp.org/world-humanitarian-summit/empowerment-through-cash-transfers

15 See note 14.

16 See note 14.

17 Number 13 of the 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship: http://ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/home-page.html

18 UN (2015) Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap, High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing Report to the Secretary General.

19 See note 1.

20 See note 1.


23 See note 22.

24 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2015) Multi-sector Initial Rapid Assessment Guidance, Revision July 2015:
Meeting information needs? A review of ten years of multi-sector coordinated needs assessment reports, ACAPS, January 2016: www.acaps.org/resources

See note 1.


See note 22.


See note 22.

See note 1.


See note 1.

See note 2.

Chapter 8

1 This definition is set out in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice Guidelines: www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html

2 OECD DAC definitions and reporting guidelines can be found here: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/methodology.htm

3 UN OCHA criteria for inclusion of reported humanitarian contributions in FTS and for donor/appealing agency reporting to FTS: https://fts.unocha.org/exception-docs/AboutFTS/FTS_criteria_forPosting_contributions.pdf

The Cash Learning Partnership

OECD glossary of statistical terms


See note 3.

The Grand Bargain – A shared commitment to better serve people in need, Istanbul 23 May 2016. Annex 1

Adapted from a definition taken from the OECD glossary of statistical terms

See note 3.


Adapted from definition(s) taken from the OECD glossary of statistical terms

See note 10.

Adapted from a definition provided by the European Investment Bank website: www.eib.org/about/partners/development_banks/

See note 2.

Definition adapted from Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office Gateway: http://mptf.undp.org/overview/funds

International Organization for Migration: www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Remittances


See note 16.

See note 2.


Definitions
Development Initiatives (DI) is an independent international development organisation that focuses on the role of data in driving poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Our mission is to ensure that decisions about the allocation of finance and resources result in an end to poverty, increase the resilience of the world’s most vulnerable people, and leave no one behind. We want efforts to be underpinned by good quality, transparent data and evidence on poverty and resources that lead to increased accountability and sustainable long-term outcomes.

We work in Brazil, Kenya, Nepal, Uganda, the UK and the US.

Our work focuses on three key areas:

- **Poverty**: Improving knowledge and understanding of people in poverty, and tracking the progress of the poorest people to help ensure no one is left behind
- **Resources**: Informing national, regional and international actors on how to assess the effectiveness of investments and best target resources that can address poverty, vulnerability and crisis
- **Data use**: Breaking down barriers to data use by improving data availability and accessibility, and helping people to use data effectively to drive sustainable outcomes

Publications

We have been publishing the annual Global Humanitarian Assistance Report since 2000. We also produce a number of other reports, briefings and blogs on poverty, crises and relevant financing. Recent reports include:

- Better information for a better response: The basics of humanitarian transparency
- Investments in peace and security: an overview
- Humanitarian assistance to education for the Syrian emergency
- Trends in humanitarian financing: Middle East and North Africa region
- Humanitarian assistance to East and Central Africa
- The World Humanitarian Summit: Making financing work for crisis-affected people

We also produce profiles of donor and recipient countries and regular briefings on specific humanitarian crises, which provide a snapshot of available funding and analysis of donor trends. These are often produced as part of our partnership with the START Network to inform its funding allocation decisions.

Data and methodologies

We provide guidance on data sources and methodologies, and offer a range of simple visual tools that help to explain financing in crisis contexts. All of the new datasets from the GHA Report 2016 are available on our website. In addition to the *Methodology and definitions* section within the report, our website includes an expanded glossary of key terms featured in our work and a detailed description of our methodologies and data sources.

Development Data Hub

Our Development Data Hub is the most comprehensive online resource for mapping, exploring and unbundling resource flows that address poverty and vulnerability. It includes data from the OECD DAC, World Bank, IMF, UNCTAD, WHO, UN OCHA FTS and more.

Explore the Data Hub at [data.devinit.org](http://data.devinit.org)
Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) reports use the latest data to present the most comprehensive assessment of the international financing at work in humanitarian situations. This GHA Report 2016 outlines the links between poverty, risk and crisis, and examines the resources directed to those caught up in humanitarian crises. It looks in detail at the changing landscape of humanitarian financing – including how much is given, who it is provided by, where it goes, how it is delivered – and at efficiency and effectiveness. Transparent and reliable information, as provided by the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016, is essential for all those working to address humanitarian crisis and vulnerability.

Please visit our websites to download and share this report and other relevant analysis. To ask questions or provide comments please contact us by email (gha@devinit.org). We welcome your feedback.