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Foreword


I expect that many of you reading this will be involved in making difficult daily decisions about how to stretch resources – between conflicts, natural disasters and complex emergencies; between high profile and forgotten emergencies; and between the imperatives to act early and stay late. All of these competing demands have to be prioritised in a context where, despite record levels of humanitarian assistance, funds are still not meeting needs.

So where does the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme fit into this picture? We believe that better information is essential to inform decisions and get better outcomes for people affected by crisis. Knowing who is spending what, where, and how, can underpin better complementarity and division of labour, so that humanitarian funds can be used most effectively. So, since 2000, we have pulled together all the most recently available data and presented it clearly, accurately and objectively so that, whether you come from the UN, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, a government department, an NGO or an affected community, you can access a shared and independent evidence base.

In the following pages you will find answers to the basic questions: How many people are affected by crisis? How much humanitarian assistance is there and is it enough? Where is it spent, who provides it and what channels do they spend it through? But you will also find some new analysis on areas that we think are critical.

The first is more detail on the resources, humanitarian and beyond, that touch the lives of crisis-affected people – from development assistance, to government revenues, remittances and peacekeeping. These other flows need to play their part in addressing the multidimensional risks and vulnerabilities that can push people into crisis and keep them there.

The second area we highlight in this year’s report is the need for better data, both on resources and also on the impacts of crises on different groups of people. The call for a data revolution has highlighted the poor quality of data available for most fragile and conflict-affected countries, but also the need to disaggregate the information that is available.

For many years, GHA’s data has drawn attention to the paradox that humanitarian assistance, often predicated on emergency response, is in practice overwhelmingly long-term. The third new theme in this year’s report is timeliness and duration of funding – examining the data on both speed of response to new or escalating crises as well funding to protracted crises.

In 2015, the world will agree on a set of sustainable development goals. The first goal is the eradication of extreme poverty. The evidence is clear: chronic and extreme poverty is inextricably linked with vulnerability to crisis. We hope that the data and analysis in the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014 will inform serious deliberation on how to break this cycle. In light of this, we will be holding a series of discussions on the future of humanitarian assistance, which we invite you to join – in person or online.

On our website you can find all of the data behind this report, as well as country profiles, crisis briefings and analysis on specific themes. You can also contact our helpdesk with any humanitarian funding data queries. We are always pleased to hear from you, so do share with us your ideas for how we can get better data or make it more useful.

With thanks for your interest,

Judith Randel
Executive Director, Development Initiatives
Colombia is home to one of the world’s longest-running internal armed conflicts. Over 50 years of fighting have cost more than 220,000 lives and the displacement of around 300,000 people per year. Displaced women are among the worst affected by the conflict. This woman is one of the beneficiaries of an agricultural project funded by ECHO, which gives seeds, tools and training to communities displaced by violence. Frequently referred to as a ‘forgotten emergency’, the conflict in Colombia, like many other complex and protracted crises, fails to attract sufficient media or donor interest.
Who was affected?

Percentage of population affected: top 3 countries

- South Sudan: 66%
  - Change since 2012: 23%
  - 2013
- Syria: 63%
  - Change since 2012: 28%
  - 2013
- Yemen: 62%
  - Change since 2012: 7%
  - 2013

How much was given...

- Funding: US$8.5 bn in 2013, US$6.3 bn in 2012

...and was it enough?


Where does the money come from?


Other government donors

- Other government donors: US$2.3 bn in 2013, US$1.5 bn in 2012

Top 5 donors, 2013

- United States: US$4.7 bn
- United Kingdom: US$1.8 bn
- Turkey: US$1.6 bn
- Japan: US$1.1 bn
- Germany: US$949 m

Top 5 recipients, 2012

- United States: US$723 m
  - Largest increase 2013
- Australia: US$-98 m
  - Largest decrease 2013
Executive summary

The scale of humanitarian crises and needs in 2013 was extraordinary, as was the level of international humanitarian response, which rose to a record US$22 billion. This is a stark change from 2012, which saw no major new disasters and a slight decline in funding.

Millions of people were affected by three very different major crises – in Central African Republic (CAR), the Philippines and Syria – each designated as the highest level of emergency (Level 3) by the UN. Individually and combined, these placed unique demands on humanitarian responders and donors. Elsewhere, both on and off the international radar, many more people were caught in lower profile crises including in the Sahel, South Sudan and Yemen. Globally, the number of internally displaced people reached an unprecedented 33.3 million, while the number of refugees increased to 16.7 million.

Both public and private sources of funding increased in 2013, in contrast to the two previous years when both declined. Government donors accounted for three-quarters of the international response, contributing US$16.4 billion. This amounted to a 24% rise from 2012 levels, with nine of the ten largest government donors increasing their funding.

The role of governments outside the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has continued to rise, with this group contributing US$2.3 billion in humanitarian assistance in 2013. This was 58% more than in 2012 and represented 14% of the total from all government donors – double the proportion represented by these donors in 2011.

Funding from private sources, including individuals, trusts, foundations and corporations, also rose steeply – a 35% increase from 2012 levels to reach an estimated US$5.6 billion in 2013. Over the past five years, assistance from these sources has accounted for more than one-quarter (26%) of the total international humanitarian response.

As a barometer of global humanitarian need, UN-coordinated appeals targeted 78 million people for assistance in 2013 and called for US$13.2 billion in funding. Needs are continuing to rise: at the end of July 2014, UN-coordinated appeal requests totalled a record US$16.9 billion – the highest level of requests ever. US$6.0 billion of this was requested for the Syria crisis response alone. Overall, the 2013 appeals were 65% funded. This was the highest proportion since 2009 yet it still left over one-third of identified needs unmet.

Almost one-quarter of international humanitarian assistance (24%) went to just five countries in 2012 (the latest year for which comprehensive recipient data is available). Even before the 2013 escalation in the crisis, Syria received by far the largest volumes of humanitarian assistance: in 2012 it received US$1.5 billion – almost double the US$865 million for South Sudan, the next largest recipient.

Funding priorities, political factors and public profile create an uneven global distribution of assistance, which could be addressed by a better division of labour. Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and the West Bank & Gaza Strip have consistently appeared in the top 10 recipients list over the past five years. Conversely, many crises, including Nepal, Myanmar and Algeria, have tended to remain deprioritised. In 2013 Mauritania’s appeal was 83% funded, compared with Djibouti’s, which was 36% funded.

Funding through pooled funds was on the rise in 2013, accounting for 4.7% of the international humanitarian response – over US$1 billion. Despite the widely recognised importance of national and local NGOs in humanitarian preparedness and response, they only directly accessed US$49 million of international humanitarian assistance in 2013, a decrease of US$2 million from 2012.

However, it remains impossible to trace transactions all the way through the system to know how much these NGOs – or any other implementing partners – actually received indirectly via international agencies. If all actors reported their financial flows in a standardised format, such as to the International Aid
Timely response is critical for effective humanitarian action but, even for acute crises triggered by sudden natural disasters, the time it takes for donors to respond at scale can vary enormously. The response to the UN-coordinated Typhoon Haiyan appeal during the first month, for example, was half that of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami appeal in 2005 in terms of needs met. And conflict-related and complex crises see an even slower response: the South Sudan, Syria, CAR and Yemen appeals remained more than 50% unfunded six months after they were launched.

While quick or early response is crucial, humanitarian assistance tends not to be limited to a short emergency phase. Protracted crises continued to capture the bulk of official humanitarian assistance – 66% in 2012 – highlighting the need for both multi-year funding and better links with development spending and other resources.

In most countries, the domestic response to crises goes unreported to international systems. As a result, there is no reliable global figure for this critical and primary response. However, national budgets show that between 2009 and 2012, India’s domestic government resources for disaster relief and risk reduction amounted to US$7 billion, compared to the US$137 million it received in international humanitarian assistance. The government of the Philippines has similarly and consistently eclipsed international contributions and, in response to Typhoon Haiyan, also demonstrated the primary coordinating role a domestic government can play in disaster relief.

With domestic government expenditure across developing countries now exceeding US$6 trillion a year, these resources can support people’s long-term resilience to shocks. But for many countries, particularly those facing entrenched crises, per capita spending by the national government remains low with little prospect of growth. There were an estimated 179.5 million people living in extreme poverty in countries classified as receiving long-term humanitarian assistance in 2012. Almost 40% of long-term humanitarian assistance went to countries with government expenditure of less than US$500 per person per year – one quarter of the developing country average.

Where governments lack the capacity or the will to address the risks and needs faced by the most vulnerable people, international resources continue to play an important role. As part of this, humanitarian assistance retains a critical and unique function to provide a principled response to crisis-affected populations. It represented around 1% of the combined domestic and international resources of its top 20 recipients in 2012, but a much higher proportion in certain countries.

However, those worst affected by humanitarian crises are also the most vulnerable: people facing poverty, insecurity and marginalisation. This means it is vital that all resources – public, private, domestic and international – are used coherently. Official development assistance (ODA) represents double the proportion of international resources available in the top humanitarian recipients than in other developing countries. Peacekeeping is seven times the proportion. The mix and importance of international resources varies enormously between countries. Remittances constitute 21% of international resources for the largest humanitarian recipients – but in Pakistan, they account for 66%.

Better data is needed to understand the overall resource mix as well as people’s multi-dimensional needs. There has been innovation and progress in these areas over recent years, with many new needs assessment and aid transparency initiatives. Challenges remain in continuing to adapt and implement these – to inform resourcing and improve the lives of crisis-affected people, in the short and the long-term.
In 2013, 59% of the population of Central African Republic (CAR) was affected by the conflict there – including these children displaced in the capital, Bangui.

Called "the worst crisis people have never heard of" by US Ambassador Samantha Power, the severity of the situation in CAR led the UN to declare it a top priority (or 'Level 3') emergency. By mid-February 2014, the humanitarian community was facing the challenge of responding to four such Level 3 emergencies – CAR, Syria, Philippines and South Sudan – as well as other ongoing crises affecting millions of people elsewhere.
WHO WAS AFFECTED?

Following a year of ‘recurring disasters’¹ in 2012, 2013 saw a dramatic rise in the number of major humanitarian crises, which affected many tens of millions of people and stretched the international response. The crises in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Philippines and Syria were all classified as ‘Level 3’ (L3) emergencies by the UN – a category reserved for the most severe, large-scale and complex crises. At the same time, crises elsewhere, such as in South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen affected growing numbers of people and called for a significant international humanitarian response.

The exact numbers of people affected remains unknown but an estimated 10.7 million people were newly displaced by conflict or persecution in 2013, compared to 7.6 million people newly displaced in 2012. Globally, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) rose from 28.8 million in 2012 to an unprecedented 33.3 million in 2013 – and the number of refugees from 15.4 million to 16.7 million. At 51.2 million, the total number of people living in forced displacement in 2013 was at the highest level since the second world war.²

Around 96 million people were affected by disasters such as floods, earthquakes and storms in 2013, compared with 111 million in 2012. While 2013 figures are preliminary estimates, the fall is likely to be explained by the high number of people affected by disasters in China alone in 2012 (45 million).

Not all those affected by disaster in 2013 were in need of international humanitarian assistance. For example, domestic resources responded to the 27 million people in China and 17 million people in India affected by natural disasters. However, as Chapters 7 and 8 show, many countries repeatedly affected by crisis have low domestic capacity to respond.
It is impossible to know exactly how many people are directly or indirectly affected by crises. There are many reasons for this: emergency situations and limited access may mean that broad estimates take the place of precise figures; people who are indirectly or long-term affected may not be counted; unregistered refugees or internally displaced people outside camps might be invisible in statistics; and population data in many fragile states simply does not exist. As Chapter 9 explains, assessment methods must, and do, continue to evolve to give a picture not only of the numbers affected but also the specific nature and severity of different people’s needs and vulnerabilities.

In the absence of exact numbers of crisis-affected people, a number of indicators give some measure of who was affected and where. These include data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) on the numbers affected by natural disasters. The numbers targeted by UN appeals also serve as a partial indicator of the scale and location of crises.

On the basis of this data, China and the Philippines had the largest number of people affected by emergencies in 2013. However, South Sudan and Syria had the highest proportion of their populations affected by the ongoing crises there - 66% and 63% respectively. Yemen, CAR and the West Bank & Gaza Strip all saw well over half of their populations affected.

While not all crises generate international appeals, in 2013, UN-coordinated appeals targeted 78 million people for assistance, compared to 95 million in 2012. There may be a number of reasons for this decrease. The 2013 total does not include the two appeals launched following the Bohol earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines towards the end of 2013, which are classified by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) as 2014 appeals. Overall, there were fewer UN-coordinated appeals in 2013 than in 2012 – down to 23 from 26. In 2012, two appeals alone (for the Pakistan Floods Early Recovery and for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)) targeted over 25 million people – neither of these appeals were repeated in 2013.

As crises developed or emerged over the year, the number of affected people, as counted in UN-coordinated appeals, fluctuated. In South Sudan, UN planning figures from late 2012 estimated 4.6 million affected people. By the end of 2013 this number had escalated to 7.1 million. Numbers in Syria, Yemen, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and Niger also climbed during the year. In CAR at the end of 2012, UN planning estimates indicated that the whole population was affected by the conflict. This estimate had fallen to 59% of the population by the end of 2013.
Notes: Data on the number of people affected in each country is taken from UN-coordinated appeals, or from EM-DAT CRED data where no appeal was launched, as well as UNHCR data on numbers of refugees. Within UN appeals the figures used are those in need of assistance, not those targeted to receive assistance. The numbers include those affected within a country as well as those displaced to neighbouring countries.
In 2014 large numbers of people continued to flee the conflict in Syria – adding to the 2.9 million refugees in camps and host communities in neighbouring Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. This new camp in Jordan will be home to some of them.

The scale of the needs of both the refugees and the people remaining inside Syria prompted the largest ever appeals for humanitarian assistance – 36% of UN-coordinated global funding requirements as of July 2014. The sizeable international response to the Syrian crisis drove up the total international humanitarian response to an unprecedented amount in 2013.
The international community responded to the dramatic scale of need in 2013 with a record US$22 billion in funding. This was a significant increase from the two previous years – and over US$2.5 billion more than the previous peak of US$19.4 billion in 2010, the year of the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods. It also represented a sharp turnaround from the declines seen in 2011 and 2012. The international response to the crisis in Syria accounts for a large part of the 2013 rise. In 2013, 37% (US$3.1 billion) of funding for UN-coordinated appeals went to the Syria crisis.

Yet even at these record levels of funding, under two-thirds (65%) of the needs outlined in the UN-coordinated appeals were met in 2013. There was an increase in the overall level of funding to the appeals compared with recent years, but the shortfall remains significant.

By the end of July 2014, UN-coordinated appeal requirements had increased by 31% on the previous year to US$16.9 billion – only 37% of which had been met. This low level and slow start has implications for both delivery and planning. Both requirements and funding are expected to rise by the end of 2014.
WHAT IS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE?

Humanitarian action is designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. This definition is set out in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and Good Practice guidelines.¹ In this report, humanitarian assistance, when used in the context of data, refers to the financial resources for this action. As well as the fact that it is focused on emergencies, humanitarian assistance is different from other forms of foreign and development assistance because it is intended to be governed by the key humanitarian principles of:

• humanity – saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found
• impartiality – acting solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations
• neutrality – acting without favouring any side in an armed conflict or other dispute
• independence – ensuring autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives.

These principles are set out in the fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, reaffirmed in UN General Assembly resolutions and enshrined in numerous humanitarian standards and guidelines such as the Sphere Humanitarian Charter.

There is no universal obligation or system for reporting expenditure on humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 9), so what is counted in humanitarian assistance reporting can vary by donor. However, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) does set out clear definitions of humanitarian assistance for those donors (both member and non-member) that report to its databases.

In this report, we use the term ‘international humanitarian response’ to describe the combined humanitarian assistance of:

• international governments
• individuals, trusts and foundations, and private companies and corporations.

Figures for international humanitarian response are our own calculations based on the latest available data from several sources. For a fuller explanation of our methodology and definitions, please see the ‘Data & guides’ section at the end of this report.
International humanitarian response

International donors responded to the dramatic scale of need in 2013 with a record US$22 billion in funding. This was a rise of 27% from the US$17.3 billion given the previous year and of 13% from the previous record of US$19.4 billion in 2010 – the year of the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods.

The sharp rise was a turnaround from the lower levels of funding witnessed in 2011 and 2012. The international humanitarian response contracted by 4% between 2010 and 2011 and by a further 7% between 2011 and 2012.

This international humanitarian response includes funding reported from government donors and EU institutions, and from a diverse mix of non-governmental (or private) sources – including individuals, trusts and foundations, and companies and corporations. As shown in Figure 2.1, and as detailed in Chapter 3, both government and private donors increased their funding in 2013.

A large part of the increase in 2013 was directed to the Syria crisis. A combined total of US$4.7 billion in funding was recorded in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) for responses both within Syria and in neighbouring refugee-hosting countries.

The international community responded to the dramatic scale of needs in 2013 with a record US$22 billion of funding.
In 2013, US$8.5 billion in humanitarian funding was channelled through UN-coordinated appeals. However, most donors channel some of their assistance outside of these appeals, so the total international humanitarian response includes funding to many programmes, recipients and crises that were not covered by the 23 UN-coordinated appeals in 2013. For example, the requirements of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are not covered by these appeals (see pages 22 and 23), nor were certain crises, such as the two cyclones in Madagascar in 2013.

Despite the limitations of using UN-coordinated appeals as a measure of funding according to need, they do provide an interesting, if partial, barometer. The US$8.5 billion, provided in response to the US$13.2 billion requested in 2013, was a record sum. As a result, the appeals were 65% funded at the end of the year (compared with 60% in 2012). Yet despite this rise, the share of needs met fell short of the 2004–2013 average (66%) and also left over one-third of appeal requirements unmet.
The UN-coordinated appeals for Syria in 2013 were on a scale never seen before – and drove up total funding requirements. Together, the combined requirements of the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) amounted to US$4.4 billion. These requirements had already been outstripped by July 2014 totalling over US$6 billion; US$2.3 billion for humanitarian assistance within Syria and US$3.7 billion for support to refugees and host communities in neighbouring countries.

As the GHD principles state, funding humanitarian action in new crises should not adversely affect meeting needs in ongoing crises. It is hard to quantify the impact the Syria crisis has had on other crises in terms of funding and delivery of humanitarian response. However, at an aggregate, rather than individual country level, it appears not to have led to a reduction in funding to other UN-coordinated appeals. Excluding the appeals for Syria in 2013, the total sum requested was lower than the previous year – falling from US$9.7 billion in 2012 to US$8.8 billion in 2013. The total proportion of needs met in the appeals, excluding Syria, actually increased slightly from 60% in 2012 to 62% in 2013.

There was, however, significant variation between appeals, as Chapter 4 elaborates. Out of the 23 appeals in 2013, 14 were below this overall 62% level of funding and three had less than half their needs met. Djibouti received the lowest level funding (36%), despite having the third smallest appeal. By way of contrast, Mauritania had the highest proportion (83%) of its requirements met.
The UN-coordinated appeals process changed in 2014 with the aim of achieving a more accurate picture of needs than the previous consolidated appeal process (CAP) allowed. The CAP had a number of recognised limitations, including assessments of needs skewed by what agencies intended to deliver or could hope to receive. So the UN appeal process for each crisis or country is now split into a number of parts to reflect the different stages of the humanitarian programme cycle – including a humanitarian needs overview and a strategic response plan (SRP), which details the funding required.

By the end of July 2014, 29 SRPs had been published with total requirements of US$16.9 billion. This is not a definitive figure for 2014 – requirements may continue to rise as crises escalate or as new SRPs are added.

Of this US$16.9 billion, a total of US$6.2 billion had been funded by July meaning that seven months into the year, 37% of requirements had been met, with significant implications for planning and delivery of a timely and effective humanitarian response (see Chapter 7).

The two UN appeals for the Syria crisis account for 36% (US$6.5 billion) of the 2014 requirements, and 32% of the total met. Gambia, Nigeria Senegal and Cameroon, which have not had appeals since 2000, all have SRPs in 2014. The levels of funding were low, at 11%, 14%, 20% and 22% respectively.

**FIGURE 2.4**

Revised requirements and proportion of needs met, UN-coordinated appeals, 2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: Data downloaded 28 July 2014, and subject to change. South Sudan Regional is a Regional Refugee Response Plan covering interventions in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda.
**In focus: Requirements per targeted beneficiary of UN-coordinated appeals**

**FIGURE 2.5**

Average requirements per targeted beneficiary of UN-coordinated appeals, 2012-2014

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UN-coordinated appeals use the term ‘targeted beneficiaries’ to refer to the number of people that its programmes aim to reach with humanitarian assistance. As of July 2014, there were 83 million such targeted beneficiaries. This compares with 78 million in 2013 and 95 million in 2012.

By end July 2014, SRP requirements per targeted beneficiary stood at US$204. This is the second consecutive annual increase, up from US$168 per targeted beneficiary in 2013 and US$110 per targeted beneficiary in 2012.

The aggregated figures mask significant variations between countries. For example, as of July 2014 the South Sudan RRP (covering Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda) requested the highest amount per beneficiary (US$920). This is followed by the Syria RRP (US$576, up from US$559 in 2013) and the Somalia appeal (US$467, up from $303 in 2013). At the other end of the scale, just under half of the 2014 appeals have levels below US$200 per targeted beneficiary, the lowest being Nigeria and Cameroon (US$9 and US$19 respectively).

The costs of providing humanitarian assistance are bound to differ according to the type of needs, location and context. For example, transporting a water borehole drilling rig to a remote, conflict-affected area will cost more than food distribution in an accessible, organised camp setting. Costs associated with the food component of appeals alone can vary widely depending on factors such as:

- specific nutritional needs – for example, a food distribution with a heavy nutrition component costs more than a straightforward school feeding programme
- variation in food prices between regions and countries – for example, purchasing food locally for the Syria response may cost more per person than purchasing comparable food items in Afghanistan
- transport and access – for example, costs will rise where air transport is required
- project duration – for example, some crises require short-term emergency feeding programmes while others may require ongoing food security operations.

There are many methodological challenges in arriving at an overall appeal budget based on costing the needs per beneficiary. However, as explained in Chapter 9, a number of SRPs – including those for Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – have changed their costing models to try to do just this, and so move away from the project-based costing model of the former UN CAP appeals.

By July 2014, requirements per targeted beneficiary stood at US$204, up from US$168 in 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria RRP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Myanmar - Rakhine</strong></td>
<td><strong>South Sudan Regional</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>687</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>559</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Myanmar - Kachin</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>427</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in US$*
CHAPTER 2: HOW MUCH WAS GIVEN?

Source: Development Initiatives based on data from UN OCHA FTS, UN-coordinated appeals, UN OCHA Overview of Global Humanitarian Action at Mid-Year 2013 and UN OCHA Overview of Global Humanitarian Action, 2014

Notes: 2012 data downloaded 2 June 2014, subject to change. Does not include the UN-coordinated appeal for the Republic of Congo for which the amount requested and the target population figures were being amended at the time of analysis; nor the regional Sahel appeal, which combines nine country-specific appeals (already included separately in the analysis) with an additional regional component. 2013 data downloaded 14 May 2014. Includes CAP and non-CAP appeals (Cuba, Zimbabwe, Myanmar-Kachin, Myanmar-Rakhine, Syria RRPI). 2014 data downloaded 28 July 2014, and subject to change.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have their own appeal processes, which are separate from the UN appeals system. The primary focus of the IFRC is to respond to natural disasters, while the ICRC focuses on conflict and protracted crises. While the IFRC issues crisis-specific appeals, the ICRC produces an annual emergency appeal, which is broken down by needs per country, followed by specific appeals in the event of increased needs. At US$1.2 billion, the ICRC 2014 emergency appeal has the highest initial budget to date.\(^2\)

Budget extensions added throughout the year (i.e. in addition to the initial budget) can be substantial. For example, initial budget requirements for the ICRC emergency appeal in 2013 were set at just under US$1.1 billion but eight budget extensions were launched in response to major escalations in needs that year. The largest of these was for US$67 million in response to the Syria crisis.\(^3\)

ICRC emergency appeals are consistently well-funded compared to most UN appeals with over 80% of funding requirements met each year since 2009. And in 2013, responding to the increase in need, its appeal received US$1.1 billion – a record level of funding, which actually exceeded the initial pre-extension budget.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initial requirements</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Unmet needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>1,180</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>915</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,192</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2.7 Funding to ICRC emergency appeals against requirements, 2009–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on ICRC annual reports

Note: No income data currently available for 2014.
IFRC’s natural disaster focus creates volatile funding requirements, with peaks when there is a major disaster. The IFRC’s total requirement for appeals launched in 2013 stands at US$165 million, of which 39% had been funded by April 2014. This represents a reduction in both volume and proportion of needs met from 2012’s US$256 million appeal, which was 46% funded.

While many high profile crises have both IFRC and UN-coordinated appeals, IFRC does also launch appeals for which there are no other international appeals. In 2013, these included:

- US$1.6 million to reach 40,000 people affected by Cyclone Mahasen in Bangladesh – 71% funded
- US$3.3 million to reach over 52,000 people affected by floods in several regions across Kenya – 37% funded
- US$1.3 million to reach 11,000 households affected by drought in north-western Namibia – 80% funded
- US$2.2 million to reach 23,100 people affected by a tropical cyclone that hit Puntland, Somalia – 31% funded from latest update.

As explained in Chapter 3, the IFRC has consistently relied on private sources for the majority of its funding (65%–96% between 2008 and 2012). This is in stark contrast to the ICRC, which derives the majority from government donors.
People affected by humanitarian crises receive assistance from a diverse mix of government and private donors, both international and domestic. This mix varies enormously depending on the political, economic and social context. The international humanitarian response reached an unprecedented US$22 billion in 2013 – it is estimated that government donors contributed US$16.4 billion of this and private donors contributed US$5.6 billion.

In Ethiopia’s Dollo Ado camp, currently home to 200,000 Somali refugees, the IKEA foundation is funding provision of lighting and cooking technology. Private donors give around a quarter of the international humanitarian response.
WHERE DOES IT COME FROM?

Both governments and private funders rose to the challenge of the major needs in 2013. Donor governments and European Union (EU) institutions continued to provide the vast proportion of the total reported international humanitarian response. While figures are preliminary, this amounted to US$16.4 billion in 2013, some 75% of the total. Responding to increased needs, there was a turnaround in government funding after the small declines witnessed between 2010 and 2012.

Within this group, the role of governments outside of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continued to increase substantially, with their share of the government total more than doubling between 2011 and 2013 – from 6% to 14%.

Funding from private donors such as individuals, trusts and foundations, and companies and corporations also appears to have risen steeply in 2013, increasing by an estimated 35% to US$5.6 billion, the same amount as in 2010, the year of the Pakistan floods and the Haiti earthquake. It represented 26% of the international humanitarian response over a five-year period (2008–2012).

The unprecedented US$22 billion in international humanitarian response in 2013 is just one component, albeit a significant one, of the resources that reached crisis-affected people. National and local government structures in crisis-affected countries can play a critical role in humanitarian preparedness and response. While gaps in data mean that it is not possible to put a global figure on the total value of this domestic humanitarian response, national assessments show that volumes can be substantial. For example, our research suggests that the Philippine government contributed US$710 million of national resources towards domestic disaster response and recovery, and disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts in 2012, more than five times as much as the Philippines received in international humanitarian assistance (US$139 million).
Government donors

Humanitarian assistance from government donors reached an unprecedented high in 2013. At US$16.4 billion, it was 18% higher than the previous highest total of US$13.9 billion in 2010 – and represented the steepest annual percentage rise since 2004. For reporting purposes, donors are categorised as ‘OECD DAC donors’ – the 29 members of the OECD DAC including EU institutions – and ‘other government donors’ or ‘non-DAC donors’. In 2013, both of these groups gave their highest levels of humanitarian assistance to date. This was not the case in 2012, when a fall in OECD DAC donor contributions was cushioned by a rise in humanitarian assistance from other government donors, notably Turkey.

Governments outside the OECD DAC provided 14% of humanitarian assistance from government donors in 2013 and have provided 7% of the total over the last decade. These donors increased their combined humanitarian assistance by 58% between 2012 and 2013, while funding from OECD DAC donors increased by 20%.

Funding patterns over the last decade show a repeated ‘ratchet effect’ amongst government donors that is likely to be replicated beyond 2013. When response to major crises such as the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami generates peaks in humanitarian assistance as in 2005, it does not subsequently fall back to pre-crisis levels. As Figure 3.1 shows, the funding levels in 2005 in response to the tsunami, in 2008 in response to the global food crisis and 2010 in response to the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods, all left a residual and sustained increase in humanitarian funding from international government donors.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: OECD DAC data for 2013 is partial and preliminary. Funding from OECD DAC donors includes contributions from EU institutions.
FIGURE 3.2
Top 20 government contributors of international humanitarian assistance, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: 2013 data for OECD DAC and Turkey is preliminary. The contributions of EU member states includes an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure (see Data & guides for further details).
The largest donors in 2012 generally gave even more in 2013. Nine of the ten largest government donors in 2013 showed a rise in their giving from the previous year. The five largest in 2013 (the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Turkey, Japan and Germany) made some of the largest increases.

These increases in spending mark a clear departure from 2012 when volumes from the US, the UK and Japan all declined significantly from the previous year. The US had shown significant annual decreases in the two previous years. In 2013, the biggest decrease by far was from Australia (down by US$98 million). China also appeared to significantly reduce its humanitarian expenditure for the second year running, although this could be due to inconsistent reporting.

The top government donors remain largely unchanged since 2012. The US continues to be by far the largest donor, providing 29% of government humanitarian assistance in 2013 and more than the total of the next three largest government donors (UK, Turkey and Japan) combined. Over the last 10 years the US has provided US$40.9 billion in humanitarian funding – 33% of the total from international governments combined and nearly four times more than the next largest donor, the UK.

The UK and Turkey retained their positions as second and third largest government donors respectively in 2013. Turkey’s humanitarian assistance increased by US$591 million. Although a breakdown of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance is not yet available for 2013, it is likely that a significant part of this represents its response to the Syrian crisis and includes some assistance to Syrian refugees inside Turkey. While not a member, Turkey reports to the OECD DAC. Under OECD DAC definitions of humanitarian assistance, developing countries may report their expenditure on support to refugees within their borders as part of their humanitarian assistance.

Japan overtook Sweden and Germany to become the fourth largest government donor in 2013, nearly doubling its humanitarian assistance from US$698 million in 2012 to US$1.1 billion in 2013.

In 2013, Kuwait was the second largest government donor outside the OECD DAC group after Turkey, and the 14th largest government donor overall, contributing US$327 million. This marks a significant change from 2012, when it reported just US$14 million in humanitarian assistance and ranked as the 32nd largest government donor.

This dramatic increase is because of the Syria response – 78% of Kuwait’s reported US$327 million has gone to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. In January 2013, the First International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria was held in Kuwait City, at which Kuwait pledged US$300 million.

Increased humanitarian funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the Syria crisis also drove up the overall level of contributions in 2013. UAE’s assistance more than doubled from US$42 million to US$90 million and its top two recipients – Jordan (US$48 million) and Lebanon (US$29 million) – are both affected by the situation in Syria. Saudi Arabia’s contributions increased by US$21 million from US$88 million in 2012 to US$109 million in 2013, of which US$24 million went to Jordan and US$20 million to Lebanon.
Top 10 largest changes in international humanitarian assistance from government donors and EU institutions, 2012–2013

Top 10 donor increases, 2013

- US$100m
- US$90m
- US$50m
- US$40m
- US$30m
- US$10m
- US$0m

Top 10 donor decreases, 2013

- -99%
- -98%
- -97%
- -45%
- -52%
- -6.5%
- -4.0%
- -26%
- -36%
- -21%

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: 2013 data for OECD DAC and Turkey is preliminary. The contributions of EU member states includes an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure (see Data & guides for further details).
Most generous countries in 2013 (% GNI)

- Turkey: 0.21%
- Kuwait: 0.20%
- Luxembourg: 0.15%
- Sweden: 0.14%
- Denmark: 0.12%
- Norway: 0.12%
- Ireland: 0.08%

Most generous countries in 2013 (per citizen)

- Norway: 120
- Luxembourg: 110
- Kuwait: 95
- Sweden: 81
- Denmark: 73
- Switzerland: 49
- Ireland: 32

Humanitarian assistance as a percentage of ODA

- Turkey: 50%
- Ireland: 18%
- Russian Federation: 18%
- Estonia: 17%
- US: 15%
- Luxembourg: 15%
- Denmark: 15%
- Sweden: 14%
- Canada: 14%

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and World Bank data
Note: Data for 2013 is partial and preliminary
Most generous countries in 2013 (% GNI)

- Kuwait: 0.20%
- Luxembourg: 0.15%
- Sweden: 0.14%
- Denmark: 0.12%
- Norway: 0.12%
- Ireland: 0.08%
- UK: 0.07%
- Finland: 0.07%
- Switzerland: 0.06%
- Netherlands: 0.05%
- Belgium: 0.05%
- Canada: 0.04%
- Qatar: 0.03%
- US: 0.03%
- Bahrain: 0.03%
- Germany: 0.03%
- New Zealand: 0.02%
- Australia: 0.02%
- UAE: 0.02%

Most generous countries in 2013 (per citizen)

- UAE: 9
- Germany: 12
- Monaco: 12
- Liechtenstein: 12
- US: 15
- Australia: 15
- Canada: 20
- Turkey: 22
- Belgium: 22
- Netherlands: 24
- UK: 29
- Qatar: 29
- Finland: 30
- Ireland: 32
- Switzerland: 49
- Denmark: 73
- Sweden: 81
- Kuwait: 95
- Luxembourg: 110

Humanitarian assistance as a percentage of ODA

- Turkey: 50%
- Ireland: 18%
- Russian Federation: 18%
- Estonia: 17%
- US: 15%
- Luxembourg: 15%
- Denmark: 15%
- Sweden: 14%
- Canada: 14%
- Spain: 13%
- Switzerland: 13%
- Latvia: 13%
- Belgium: 12%
- Finland: 12%
- Norway: 11%
- Poland: 11%
- Slovak Republic: 11%
- Czech Republic: 10%
- UK: 10%
- Greece: 10%

Note: Data for 2013 is partial and preliminary.
In focus: Japan

Japan has long been a major humanitarian donor, providing US$6.8 billion in humanitarian assistance between 2004 and 2013, ranking it the fourth largest government donor in that period. Since 2010 Japan has consistently featured amongst the top 10 most generous government donors, in volume terms, ranking second in both 2004 and 2005.

However Japan, like Turkey and China, has had to respond to crises both internationally and within its own borders. In 2011 the Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami in northern Japan caused widespread devastation and destruction, killing an estimated 19,846 people and affecting more than 360,000.1

Japan’s latest Humanitarian Aid Policy, produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2011, sets out its strategic approach to humanitarian response and financing.2 Its ‘policy of response’ identifies five priority areas: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) assistance; transition to recovery and development; natural disasters; aid-worker security; and civil military coordination.

In 2013, Japan was the fourth largest government donor, rising from sixth place in 2012 and significantly increasing its funding even factoring in the major fluctuations in the value of the Yen [see box]. In 2011, the year of the Tohoku earthquake, humanitarian assistance from Japan increased by 41% from the previous year. Following a decrease the following year, in 2013 it rose again.

Afghanistan was the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance from Japan between 2011 and 2013, receiving a total of US$325 million over the period. Japan provides humanitarian assistance to a geographically diverse group of recipients. In 2013 the top 10 recipients included countries in Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. Afghanistan, Somalia, DRC and Ethiopia have each featured every year since 2011.

FIGURE 3.5

Humanitarian assistance from Japan, 2004–2013

[Bar chart showing humanitarian assistance from Japan from 2004 to 2013 in US$ millions]

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
Note: Data for 2013 is partial and preliminary.

GHA’s calculation of humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors comprises: total bilateral humanitarian assistance (as reported to OECD DAC table 1); imputed EU contributions (for EU member states); humanitarian assistance to core UN agencies and funds, including the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). See Data & guides for more information.

In order to take into account inflation or exchange rate variations between years, we use constant 2012 prices for all of these components.3 The baseline year for OECD DAC constant prices is 2012, and therefore figures reflect exchange rates for that year. For donors experiencing extreme currency or inflation fluctuations, the difference for current and constant prices is exaggerated, as in the case of Japan. In 2012, the value of the yen against the dollar dropped dramatically, fluctuating between JYP76 and JPY90 to the dollar.4
**FIGURE 3.7**

Japan’s humanitarian assistance by sector, 2008–2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data
Donors outside the OECD DAC group

Humanitarian assistance from government donors outside the OECD DAC group increased significantly for the second consecutive year in 2013. Their contributions increased by 86% between 2011 and 2012 and by 58% between 2012 and 2013. Overall, these donors provided 14% of the total response from international governments. As shown in Figure 3.3, the largest volumes and rises between 2012 and 2013 came from Turkey and Kuwait, while Brazil’s and Qatar’s assistance decreased significantly – by 97% and 34% respectively.

The combined humanitarian expenditure of governments outside the OECD DAC group fluctuates considerably. This may be explained partly by inconsistent reporting, but also by response to major disasters or large, one-off contributions. For example, the 2005 peak reflects response to the Indian ocean earthquake and tsunami; the 2008 peak includes US$624 million from Saudi Arabia, of which 59% went to World Food Programme (WFP); and the 2012 and 2013 rises were both largely down to Turkey’s response to the Syria crisis. Turkey’s total humanitarian assistance accounted for 72% and 71% respectively of all non-DAC contributions in these years.

Donors outside the OECD DAC group provided 14% of the total response from international governments in 2013.
Over the five-year period between 2009 and 2013, the combined contributions from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE accounted for 35% of the total from non-DAC donors and 3% of the total from all government donors. Contributions from the Gulf states have historically accounted for a significant proportion of all humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors. However, their share has fallen since Turkey’s humanitarian assistance increased sharply in response to the Syrian crisis in 2012 and 2013.

UAE was the largest Gulf donor over the 2009–2013 period, providing US$809 million in humanitarian assistance – making it the 18th largest government donor overall. Saudi Arabia was the second largest Gulf donor, with contributions of US$709 million (making it the 19th largest government donor), although a recent pledge of US$500 million to the Iraq response may change this picture for 2014. Qatar was the only Gulf donor whose humanitarian assistance declined in 2013 (from US$105 million in 2012 to US$69 million in 2013). In 2013, Kuwait was the largest Gulf state donor and the 14th largest of all government donors. Its contribution of US$327 million represented 2% of total contributions from governments and EU institutions that year. Kuwait’s 2013 humanitarian assistance allocation reveals a regional preference; over three-quarters of its funding went to the Syrian crisis.

In January 2013 Kuwait hosted the First Pledging Conference for Syria, and pledged US$300 million for the crisis. Pledges from other Gulf States included Bahrain (US$20 million), Saudi Arabia (US$78 million) and the UAE (US$300 million).
Private donors

FIGURE 3.11

Private and government humanitarian assistance and annual percentage change, 2008–2012

Over one-quarter of all international humanitarian assistance came from private donors between 2008 and 2012. Private donors contributed US$4.1 billion of humanitarian assistance in 2012, representing 24% of the total international response.

Private funding tends to display sharper rises and steeper falls in response to both increasing and decreasing humanitarian need than funding from government donors. Private donors responded generously to the large-scale disasters of 2010, increasing donations by 47% from the previous year, compared with a 10% increase from governments – but these also dropped away more sharply.

Following this pattern, preliminary data for 2013 indicates a 35% rise from the previous year to an estimated US$5.6 billion. Although detailed, final data on this is not yet available, this rise is likely to have been prompted by the crisis in Syria and Typhoon Haiyan.

DATA POVERTY: PRIVATE FUNDING

A significant amount of financial and in-kind humanitarian assistance comes from private donors such as individuals, trusts and foundations, and companies and corporations. Yet the precise value of this private giving is unknown as the vast majority of it is not reported to the OECD DAC or to the UN OCHA FTS. To fill this data gap, the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme conducts original research and analysis, which provides a global estimate of funding from the private donors that directly fund humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. A full explanation of our methodology can be found in the Data & guides section. Most figures cover the period 2008–2012 as full data is not currently available for 2013. Where 2013 data is given, it is a preliminary estimate.
Individuals contribute the overwhelming majority of private funding, and their share grew in both 2011 and 2012. Private companies and corporations, foundations, Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) national societies and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) national committees have contributed 23% of the total, on average, between them since 2008.

Private companies and corporations provided an estimated US$201 million in humanitarian funding in 2012, US$1.1 billion in aggregate between 2008 and 2012. While their share of the financial total has decreased in recent years, their role and profile in humanitarian response is changing significantly. Many are moving beyond a direct donorship role towards a ‘corporate partnership’ approach, providing a range of skills and resources whose financial value is unknown. For example, a number of technology companies offer free software, as well as technical systems advice and even personnel to respond to crises.

According to data reported to the UN OCHA FTS, four of the top five largest single private donors over the past five years are foundations or charitable organisations based in Gulf states. Most of these contributions were in response to the Syria crisis. However, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation remained the largest single donor of private humanitarian assistance, reporting over US$51 million between 2009 and 2013.

RCRC national societies and UNICEF national committees provided an estimated 5% of all private giving in 2012. Over 75% of RCRC private funding comes from national societies which generate their funds from diverse sources. Full data on incoming funds for all RCRC national societies is not currently available. However, previous research by GHA has suggested that privately generated funds may account for up to 41% of their income.

This income generation includes some innovative models. The Colombian Red Cross8 raises funds for its work in the country by running a national lottery. In 2012 the lottery – La Lotería de la Cruz Roja Colombiana – raised 11.6 billion Colombian pesos (US$6.2 million) for the Red Cross’s health-related work in Colombia. In 2011 the Kenyan Red Cross and domestic mobile phone network Safaricom established the Kenyans 4 Kenya (K4K) domestic fundraising campaign in response to the Horn of Africa food crisis. The campaign raised Ksh678 million (US$7.7 million) through cash and in-kind donations, most of which was spent on children and mothers with young babies.
NGOs are the largest mobilisers of private funding, raising an estimated US$3.8 billion in 2012, and over US$20 billion in the five years between 2008 and 2012. Overall, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is by far the largest of all fundraisers of private humanitarian assistance. In 2012 it is thought to have raised 26% of total private humanitarian assistance, representing more than the combined total of the 23 other humanitarian agencies included in the GHA study set.

Collectively, the six UN agencies in our study set – UNICEF, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) – rely on private sources for less than 5% of their humanitarian funding. However, this masks large differences between agencies. In 2012, for example, 10% of UNICEF’s humanitarian income came from private sources, as did 6% of UNHCR’s. In the same year, only 0.4% of WFP’s humanitarian funding came from private sources.

Overall, Médecins Sans Frontières is by far the largest of all fundraisers of private humanitarian assistance. In 2012 it is thought to have raised 26% of the total figure.
However, UN agencies are increasing their share of private funds, particularly their share of funds from private companies and corporations. In 2008, UN agencies received less than 1% of all such funds; by 2012 this had increased to 15%. UNHCR’s private humanitarian income alone has increased almost nine-fold in just seven years, from US$22 million in 2006 to US$191 million in 2013, and it is now the world’s second highest private humanitarian fundraiser after MSF. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC) received less than 4% of total estimated private funds in 2012.9

RCRC private funding peaked in 2010 at US$400 million in response to the Haiti and Pakistan crises but has since dropped back down by 63%. Within the Movement, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has consistently relied on private funding for a greater share (65%–96% between 2008 and 2012) of its humanitarian income than has the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose share was consistently between 7% and 8% over the same period.
In focus: NGO fundraising coalitions and Typhoon Haiyan

Working through fundraising coalitions, NGOs can raise significant sums. Fundraising appeals through these platforms can bring profile for a crisis as well as funds, and also catalyse funding from government donors. The UK government, for example, match-funded the first US$5 million raised by the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) [a fundraising platform for UK-based INGOs] for its Philippines Typhoon appeal.

The nine coalitions, featured in Figure 3.15 raised more funds for Typhoon Haiyan than their respective national governments. Belgium’s Consortium 12-12 raised over six times the amount reported by its government and Switzerland’s Chaîne du Bonheur 10 times that of the Swiss government.

The data for this funding for the Haiyan appeal illustrates the reporting gaps in private funding. Only two of these nine organisations (the DEC and Dutch SHO) appear as donors in UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and, of the US$49 million raised by the SHO, only US$817,000 has been reported to the FTS. However, other funding raised through these coalitions may be captured under general categories. UN OCHA FTS data for Typhoon Haiyan includes US$89.3 million of funding from “Private [individuals and organisations]” and “Various donors [details not yet provided].”

Figure 3.15
Funds raised for Typhoon Haiyan by nine NGO fundraising coalitions, and funding from their respective governments

US$ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fundraising coalition</th>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on data from the Humanitarian Coalition (Canada), the DEC (UK), the Belgian Consortium for Emergency Situations (Consortium 12-12), Aktion Deutschland Hilft (Germany), AGIRE (Italy), the Japan Platform, Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO), Radiohjälpen (Sweden), Chaîne du Bonheur (Switzerland) and UN OCHA FTS

Notes: Germany’s fundraising coalition figure is an estimate based on the total amount raised by all Emergencies Appeals Alliance (EAA) organisations, minus the total raised by the remaining seven members. DEC includes £5 million from the UK government. Other coalitions’ data may also include funds donated to the platform by the national government. Data downloaded 3 July 2014. Exchange rates applied.
Domestic governments

**Figure 3.16**

Average annual domestic and international humanitarian contributions for India, Kenya and the Philippines, 2008–2012

Domestic governments, whether facing long-term, enduring crises or sudden onset crises, can spend substantial sums on humanitarian action and are often the primary responders. As affirmed in a UN resolution, each state has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and emergencies occurring on their own soil.¹⁰ As Chapter 7 details, international humanitarian assistance is only required when there is insufficient national capacity or readiness to respond.

The scope and scale of these domestic resources varies significantly by country. India spent an estimated US$7 billion and the Philippines an estimated US$2.4 billion between 2009 and 2012, exceeding all international support. In contrast, Kenya, a less wealthy country, spent less on domestic humanitarian expenditure than it received in international humanitarian assistance.

As well as responding to crises, many disaster-affected countries are investing growing sums in risk reduction and disaster management. Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, for example, all have dedicated disaster management governmental departments and legislative frameworks.

In conflict, the role of domestic governments can be more complex – particularly where a state is implicated in the conflict, or is unwilling or unable to assist affected populations. However, neighbouring developing countries can, and do, play an important role in hosting and assisting refugees. In 2013, developing countries hosted 86% of the world’s refugee population.¹¹

**Data Poverty: Domestic Response**

Domestic government spending on humanitarian response and preparedness is not captured at a global level, as national governments do not report their domestic humanitarian expenditure to any international tracking system.

In the absence of such global data, the GHA programme has carried out its own research into domestic government resources for DRR and disaster relief for India, Kenya and the Philippines, analysing publicly available national budgets and departmental accounts.
India

India is home to the second highest number of people affected by natural disasters in the world after China. Between 2000 and 2013, 22% of people affected by natural disasters globally lived in India. Despite this, India has met these humanitarian needs domestically while also investing in preparedness and risk reduction.

International humanitarian assistance is eclipsed by India’s own domestic spending on disaster relief and DRR. Between 2009 and 2012 India’s domestic government resources for disaster relief and disaster risk reduction stood at US$7 billion, while international humanitarian resources amounted to US$137 million. In 2013 India’s resources stood at US$2 billion, with the majority US$1.4 billion, allocated to disaster relief. DRR spending was just under one-third of this in 2013 (US$0.6 billion), representing India’s largest domestic investment in DRR in the past five years.

India’s long-term investment in disaster management was driven in part in response to two huge disasters – the Odisha cyclone (1999) and the Gujarat earthquake (2001), which caused devastating economic damage and loss of life; 9,843 people were killed in the cyclone and 20,005 people in the earthquake. The subsequent domestic investment in DRR is thought to have been vital in limiting the fatalities of Cyclone Phailin (2013) to 45 people – a huge reduction from the comparable Cyclone Odisha 14 years previously.

The latest available data shows that between 2005 and 2010, 24% of all India’s state disaster management expenditure was in the four states in the Bay of Bengal. The disaster-prone state of Adhra Pradesh invested US$632 million in disaster management and the state of Odisha, US$373 million. Both states have their own disaster management departments, have built hundreds of coastal cyclone shelters and have invested in advanced weather prediction technology.

Figure 3.17

Domestic disaster relief and DRR resources, India, 2009-2013

US$ billions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>DRR</th>
<th>Disaster relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Data includes a combination of budget, actual and revised figures, depending on the year and due to conversions from fiscal to calendar years. Data may include international assistance channelled through the public sector.
The Philippines

As the Philippines is prone to natural disasters, domestic expenditure on disaster relief and preparedness has long overshadowed international assistance to the country. In 2011, the year that saw 11.7 million people affected by a surge in frequency of floods and storms in the Philippines, its domestic government resources for disaster response, recovery and risk reduction reached US$714 million – nearly six times the humanitarian assistance provided by the international community.

The Philippine government contributed US$710 million towards domestic disaster response and DRR in 2012, more than five times as much as the country received in international humanitarian assistance (US$139 million). Even taking domestic DRR resources out of the equation for data comparability purposes, the US$240 million spent on disaster response in 2012 was much higher than this international humanitarian assistance.

As Figure 3.18 shows, domestic investment in DRR is consistently higher than spending on disaster response and recovery – more than triple the amount between 2009 and 2013. Domestic resources for both DRR and disaster response and recovery reached a five-year high, totalling US$1.1 billion in 2013 – a year marked by Typhoon Haiyan and the Bohol earthquake.

It is possible that for the first time in recent years international humanitarian assistance may have come closer to levels of domestic resources in the Philippines – although comprehensive figures for 2013 are not yet available. The scale and severity of Typhoon Haiyan, coming in the same year as the Bohol earthquake, led the UN to declare a Level 3 (L3) emergency in 2013 (see Chapter 4). A UN-coordinated appeal was launched with requirements reaching US$781 million to support the government’s response. By July 2014, this appeal alone had raised over US$460 million of international humanitarian assistance – yet from the outset, the Philippine government has led this response, making it a combined domestic and international operation.

Government humanitarian assistance, either domestic or international, was only part of the financial and in-kind support to typhoon-affected communities. Remittances are an important resource flow to the Philippines, and in the three months following the typhoon were officially reported to have reached US$6.7 billion (see Chapter 8). There was also a high level of private sector engagement in the response to Typhoon Haiyan, in which Manila’s cross-sector business associations, such as the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation, played an important role in delivery and in coordination between domestic and international actors.

FIGURE 3.18

Domestic resources for disaster response and recovery and DRR and preparedness, the Philippines, 2009-2013

US$ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>DRR</th>
<th>Disaster relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>385</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>364</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>240</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on Department of Budget and Management, ‘National Expenditure Program 2014’, Government of the Philippines and José, UNISDR, 2012

Notes: Data includes a combination of budget and actual figures; DRR data for 2012 and 2013 were extracted from multiple ministry budgets and may be underestimated; data for 2009 and 2011 are principally sourced from José (2012); data from the Quick Response Fund in José’s paper has been subtracted to avoid double counting. Data may include international assistance channelled through the public sector.
Kenya

Kenya has long been prone to food insecurity, with notable peaks experienced during the 2010–2011 Horn of Africa drought. An average of 36% of the population was food insecure between 2011 and 2013. The country is also host to over 550,000 registered refugees, the vast majority of whom are from Somalia and South Sudan.

Kenya’s annual domestic humanitarian expenditure fluctuated between US$19 million and US$38 million between 2008 and 2012. The increases in 2009 and 2010 were in response to the 2009 food crisis which was declared a national disaster. In 2012, following the 2011 Horn of Africa food crisis, Kenya’s domestic humanitarian expenditure reached US$38 million – 0.3% of its national budget.

The majority of Kenya’s domestic humanitarian resources have been spent on refugee response, totalling US$138 million between 2008 and 2012. Disaster relief, which includes the categories of disaster emergency response coordination, national disaster operations, and relief and rehabilitation, totalled US$22 million in this period.

There are also investments in DRR and preparedness from domestic humanitarian and other budgets, as well as through joint projects delivered by the domestic government and financed by international bodies. Projects include the arid lands projects in Northern Kenya, and the World Bank eight-year Western Kenya Flood Mitigation Project. However, reporting makes it difficult to discern the total domestic investment in these.

International humanitarian assistance to Kenya peaked at US$436 million in 2011, in response to the food insecurity in the region. This was equivalent to fifteen times the domestic response that year. In 2012, international humanitarian assistance fell to US$363 million – over 10 times the domestic response.

FIGURE 3.19

Domestic humanitarian expenditure by type, Kenya, 2008–2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank BOOST Initiative data
While the international humanitarian response has increased significantly, it is still not enough to fully meet global needs. Although responding to needs is central to humanitarian commitments, donors make choices as to where to direct their finite resources, prioritising certain crises over others and responding to institutional preferences. In the absence of a global process for division of labour in humanitarian response, the result is an uneven coverage of needs with a set of established and high-profile recipients and an entrenched set of forgotten crises.

In 2012, 37% of the international humanitarian response went to the top 10 recipient countries – 24% to just five countries. Combined, these top five recipient countries represented 39% of all UN-coordinated appeal requirements for that year. Half of the top 10 recipient countries have long been donor priorities – appearing in the top 10 every year for the past five years. However, Syria attracted more funding than any of those well-established major recipients in 2012.

Just as priority crises with longer-term needs tend to retain donor interest for several years, forgotten crises tend to remain deprioritised for funding. The European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)’s forgotten crisis assessment (FCA) index identifies crises that have been overlooked or neglected by the international community. Many countries, including India, Nepal, Myanmar and Algeria, repeatedly appear in the index.

Levels of funding to crises with a UN-coordinated appeal also present a stark picture of uneven response to needs. While UN-coordinated appeals were, overall, 60% funded in 2012 and 65% funded in 2013, there is an average 57 percentage point difference between the best and worst funded crises over the 2009–2013 period. Private funding allows some delivery agencies a degree of flexibility to redress the balance. Only two of the top five recipients of bilateral government funding in 2012, South Sudan and Somalia, were among the top five recipients of private funds in the same year.
Half of the top 10 recipients in 2012 have featured in the top 10 every year for the past five years, and four of them – West Bank & Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Sudan – have featured every year for the past 10 years. Four of the top 10 recipients in 2012 saw increases in funding from the previous year.

Syria received US$1.5 billion in 2012 – the largest amount of international humanitarian assistance received by a single crisis that year. This was not a record figure, it was only half the amount that Haiti received in 2010 (US$3.2 billion) and less than the US$2.2 billion for Pakistan in response to the floods that same year. However, indications suggest that 2013 data will show a significant rise in funding for Syria as the conflict escalated going into its third year.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Note: ‘Top ten appearances’ indicates number of top ten appearances in the past 10 years. The Syria RRP 2012 focuses on four countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. oPt = occupied Palestinian territory; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo; RRP = Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan; SHARP = Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan
CHAPTER 4: WHERE DOES IT GO?
The top 20 recipients of international humanitarian response over this 10-year period accounted for 75% of all country-allocated humanitarian assistance. The top five recipients accounted for 36%.

Some countries are consistently in the top 20 due to protracted or recurrent crises. Amongst these are Sudan, Afghanistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Ethiopia and Somalia. Others, such as Haiti and Indonesia, appear in this list due to single, large-scale, natural disasters. Major crises have propelled others into the list more recently, including Syria, Jordan and the recently independent South Sudan.

For example, despite only receiving humanitarian assistance as an independent country since mid-2011, the volume of funding to South Sudan makes it the 19th largest recipient of humanitarian funding in the 10 years from 2003 to 2012.
Geographic priorities for private spending are not the same as those of government donors. Only two of the top five recipients of bilateral government funding in 2012, South Sudan and Somalia, were among the top five recipients of private funds allocated by 10 of the organisations in our study set [see Data & guides].

In cases such as Haiti and Nigeria, private funds supported humanitarian crises that were accorded lower priority by government donors. In 2012, Haiti was the highest recipient of private funds – and only 17th on the list of recipients of government funding. Conversely, Syria was a high funding priority for governments but was a lower recipient of private funds from our study set organisations.

Private donors tend to respond more generously to rapid-onset, natural disasters than to slow-onset, chronic crises, such as those resulting from internal conflict. As seen in Chapter 3, this is illustrated by record levels of private funding in 2005 and 2010 in response to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and the Haiti earthquake. On average, a UK Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) appeal in response to a natural disaster raises three times more than a conflict-related appeal.
The difference between the best and worst-funded UN-coordinated appeals has significantly narrowed in recent years but remains wide. Between 2009 and 2013 it averaged 57 percentage points, compared with 99 percentage points over the 2004–2008 period.

Of the 19 countries that had UN appeals in both 2012 and 2013, more than two-thirds (13) experienced a fall in the proportion of their requirements met. For a second consecutive year, Haiti’s appeal requirements were less than 50% funded. Before Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013, the Philippines had experienced the greatest fall in needs met – from 69% in 2012 to 54% in 2013.

Mauritania was the best-funded UN-coordinated appeal in 2013 with 83% of its requirements met, though this may be because it had the fourth lowest requirements (US$107 million) out of the 23 appeals that year. However, there is not a clear correlation between size of appeal and level of funding – the lowest appeals do not always have the highest levels of coverage and, of the four appeals requesting over US$1 billion, South Sudan had 75% coverage in 2013 while Somalia had just 51%.
By designating a crisis a ‘Level 3’ (L3) emergency, the UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator aims to mobilise the resources, leadership and capacity of the humanitarian system to respond to exceptional circumstances. The decision to designate an L3 emergency is based on five criteria: the scale, urgency and complexity of the needs, as well as the lack of domestic capacity to respond and the “reputational risk” for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN.2

In 2013, there were three L3 designations – for the responses to the conflicts in Syria and Central African Republic (CAR) and to the typhoon in the Philippines. Of these, the Syria appeal was overwhelmingly the largest. The combined requirements for the response within Syria (SHARP) and in neighbouring countries (RRP) was US$4.4 billion – over 22 times larger than the appeal for CAR, which had revised requirements of US$195.1 million. In February 2014, South Sudan also became an L3 emergency.

### FIGURE 4.6
Funding to L3 emergencies and all other funding reported to UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS), 2013

![Pie chart showing funding distribution](chart.png)

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Note: Level 3 appeals data downloaded 24th June 2014. ‘Other humanitarian assistance’ includes all other humanitarian assistance reported to UN OCHA FTS for 2013. While the CAR and Syria appeals are for the 2013 calendar year, the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan appeal runs from November 2013 to October 2014. As such, 2013 funding data for Typhoon Haiyan includes funding decisions made from the date of the typhoon up to and including 31 December 2013.

### FIGURE 4.7
Level 3 appeals and all other UN-coordinated appeals funding, 2013

![Pie chart showing funding distribution](chart.png)

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Note: Data for Typhoon Haiyan includes funding decisions made from the date of the typhoon up to and including 31 December 2013. Data downloaded 24th June 2014. SRP = strategic response plan.
Forgotten crises

Forgotten emergencies cannot be detected simply by looking at volumes of funding or appeals data. They might not be the subject of UN-coordinated appeals (as in the case of Colombia or Algeria), and volumes of funding at a country level may conceal neglected crises at the sub-national level.

A number of ways have therefore been developed to identify, assess and respond to such emergencies, the best known, and perhaps most widely used of which, is ECHO’s forgotten crisis assessment (FCA). The FCA is used by ECHO to identify crises that have been overlooked or neglected by the international community. These often include crises that affect particular groups or minorities within a country.

The FCA index is compiled annually using a series of weighted indicators to come up with an overall ranking of emergency situations. The following four factors are used to rank crises: vulnerability; media coverage; public aid per capita; and a qualitative assessment by ECHO geographical units and experts.

A number of countries appear in the forgotten crises rankings year on year. Appearing at the top of the index does not have a consistent correlation with the amount of humanitarian assistance received. Myanmar has appeared towards the top of the index every year since 2003-2004. Funding to Myanmar has increased and decreased in that time period in response to specific emergencies – Cyclone Nargis in 2008 in particular – but not apparently as a direct result of the FCA index.

However, in some cases, appearing at the top of the FCA index is immediately followed by an increase in funding. In CAR for example, EU humanitarian assistance has increased year on year since the country appeared in the index (with the exception of 2012) but its continued low ranking against the vulnerability, media coverage and the qualitative assessment indicators in particular mean that it remains on the list.

In 2013-2014, the highest scoring crisis on the index is Myanmar, scoring eleven points out of a possible twelve, followed by Algeria, CAR and Chad, all scoring 10 points. Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Papua New Guinea and Yemen all score nine.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data and the ECHO FCA index.
Notes: Funding from EU institutions is official bilateral humanitarian assistance. IDP = internally displaced persons.
CHAPTER 4: WHERE DOES IT GO?

Algeria has been a priority FCA index country 10 times between 2004–2014, due to the situation of Sahrawi refugees fleeing the conflict that spilled out of Western Sahara in the mid-1970s. 2005 was the only year that Algeria did not appear as a priority country on the index. That year saw a considerable decrease in EU and international humanitarian assistance from the previous year. The UN has never issued an appeal or strategic response plan (SRP) for Algeria.

As a result of internal armed conflict, Colombia has appeared as a priority country on the FCA index eight times—every year since 2007. In 2012 it received US$75 million in international humanitarian assistance—decrease of US$13 million (15%) from 2011. The UN has never issued an appeal or SRP for Colombia.

CAR has appeared as a priority country on the FCA index six times—every year since 2009. UN appeals have been issued every year since 2005 and the country now has a SRP. In 2013, its UN–coordinated appeal was 53% funded (47% underfunded).
Conflict between government forces and non-state armed groups has affected Myanmar for over 50 years. More than 640,000 people are displaced and a further 480,000 people are thought to be seeking refuge elsewhere.\textsuperscript{3,4} The Kachin conflict in Myanmar was the top forgotten crisis on the FCA index in both 2012-2013 and 2013-2014. Myanmar is the most frequently occurring country on the index, appearing every year since 2003-2004.

Myanmar is also highly prone to natural hazards, including floods, landslides, cyclones, storm surges, earthquakes, forest fires and drought. It is top of UN OCHA’s list of at-risk countries in the Asia-Pacific regions, with projections that it is likely to experience a medium to large-scale natural disaster approximately every two years.\textsuperscript{5}

In 2014, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC) included Myanmar in its list of top six under-funded operations, with a funding gap of around US$20 million.\textsuperscript{6} As at end July 2014, the UN-coordinated appeal for Kachin and Rakhine States was 43% funded, leaving a funding gap of almost US$109 million.\textsuperscript{7}

Humanitarian funding to Myanmar has fluctuated over recent years. Between 2004 and 2007, it increased slowly year on year but remained low according to the FCA funding indicator, with only US$57 million received in 2007 from all donors, and US$12m from EU institutions. The EU institutions, which use the FCA index as a key tool for ranking and prioritising emergencies, have been the top donor to Myanmar for the last five years.

In 2008, funding from all donors peaked dramatically when Cyclone Nargis made landfall in the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions, killing around 140,000 people and devastating the lives and livelihoods of an estimated 2.4 million. The UN’s initial humanitarian appeal was 96% funded within two months of the emergency, and the revised appeal for over US$477 million received contributions of US$347 million (73% of requirements). Including contributions outside of the UN appeal, humanitarian assistance to Myanmar in 2008 reached a record high of US$522 million.

From 2009 to 2011 there was a significant decrease in humanitarian assistance to the country, though not to pre-Cyclone Nargis levels. 2012 saw a 41% (US$38 million) increase to US$130 million and, in 2013, a total of US$205 million was received, predominantly as contributions to the two separate UN-coordinated appeals for Rakhine and Kachin States, which were 81% and 52% funded respectively. Despite these increased levels, the funding shortfall remains significant.

In focus: Forgotten crisis - Myanmar

\textbf{FIGURE 4.9}

\textbf{Humanitarian assistance to Myanmar}

Source: Development Initiatives based on the ECHO FCA index, OECD DAC data for 2004 to 2012 and UN OCHA FTS data for 2013
HOW DOES IT GET THERE?

International humanitarian assistance is not a direct transaction between the donor and recipient. Funding moves through chains of transaction of varying lengths and complexity. Donors choose to direct their funding through a first level ‘channel of delivery’, such as a UN agency, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC) or a non-governmental organisation (NGO), which in turn decides how to reach the intended recipient. They may do this directly themselves, or indirectly by providing funding to another delivery agency – for example, a UN agency may fund an international NGO, which in turn partner with a local NGO to deliver the assistance.

In 2012, the most recent year for data on channels of delivery, the largest proportion of international humanitarian assistance from government donors (61%) was channelled through multilateral agencies – 88% of which went through UN agencies. In contrast, according to data reported to the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), private donors tend to channel the larger share of their funding through the RCRC and NGOs. National and local NGOs form an essential part of the humanitarian response, but in 2013 only directly received US$49 million - just 0.2% of the total international humanitarian response.

In 2013, over US$1 billion (4.7% of all international humanitarian assistance) was channelled through pooled funds, representing a 6% increase on the previous year (US$966 million). The United Kingdom (UK) is the largest contributor to pooled funds, providing US$1.3 billion between 2009 and 2013 – nearly US$600 million more than Sweden, the second largest donor. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the largest recipient of pooled funding between 2009 and 2013, receiving US$592 million.

After a significant peak in 2010, the amount of humanitarian assistance reported as channelled through the military declined drastically, accounting for just 1% of humanitarian funding from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor governments and EU institutions in 2012. Given the levels of international support via the military in response to Typhoon Haiyan, this proportion may increase in 2013.
Channels of delivery

**DATA POVERTY: TRACEABILITY**

The flow of funding in Figure 5.2 (opposite) is a partial estimate – and the data becomes increasingly sparse at each transaction level. In 2012, only US$12.1 billion of the total international humanitarian response (70% of the total) could be traced to a first-level recipient – data on the remaining 30% was missing. The amount of information available varies substantially between different humanitarian providers – less than 4% of private funding reported to UN OCHA FTS was traceable to a first-level recipient in 2012.

Data is not systematically captured beyond this first level of transaction, so it is impossible to track humanitarian funding step by step from the donor to the crisis-affected person, or to have full accountability or understanding of the cost-effectiveness of the various transaction chains. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) ultimately aims to provide a common reporting system that will allow funding to be geocoded and fully traceable from donor to recipient (see Chapter 9 for details).

**FIGURE 5.1**

**Humanitarian assistance traced to first-level recipients by donor type, 2012**

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Figure 5.2
Humanitarian funding channels, 2012

Donor

OECD DAC donors
US$11.8 billion

Private funding
US$4.1 billion

Other governments US$1.5 billion

First-level recipient

Multilateral organisations
US$7.4 billion

NGOs
US$2.3 billion

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
US$1.2 billion

Public sector
US$0.8 billion

Other
US$0.4 billion

Second-level recipient (and further levels)

Unknown
US$5.2 billion

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF data and GHA’s unique dataset of private voluntary contributions
Nearly two-thirds (61%) of international humanitarian assistance in 2012 went directly to multilateral organisations, primarily UN agencies. NGOs were the next largest first-level recipients of humanitarian assistance, directly receiving US$2.3 billion (19%). Donors display different preferences for delivery channels. Overall, those outside the OECD DAC group are more likely to channel their assistance through the public sector. Public sector channels include central, state or local government departments in both donor and recipient countries, and may also include situations where the donor delegates implementation of a given activity to another donor country. Over the 2008–2012 period, governments outside the OECD DAC channelled nearly one-third (31%) of their humanitarian funding through the public sector (US$1.1 billion), compared to just 10% for OECD DAC donors.

While multilateral organisations are the preferred channel of delivery for all international donors, this preference is strongest for OECD DAC donors. In the past five years, OECD DAC donors have given 60% of their funding to multilateral organisations. This compares with 44% for non-DAC donors and 35% for private contributors.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Note: The ‘other’ category is driven by OECD DAC data and includes funding to public private partnerships, to be defined, and other.
Funding to UN agencies

UN agencies are the largest first-level recipients of humanitarian assistance. In 2012, US$6.5 billion (54%) of international humanitarian assistance from government donors was channelled through UN agencies. Of this, 78% (US$5.2 billion) went to four major UN agencies engaged in humanitarian response – the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Government donors provide the majority of funding to these UN agencies, and donors from the OECD DAC group provide the bulk of this – 97% in 2012 (US$ 5.1 billion), a proportion which has increased from 92% in 2008. However, this high proportion may partly be due to more detailed reporting by this group of donors. The highest individual donors to these UN agencies in 2012 were the United States (US$2.5 billion), the United Kingdom (US$ 355 million) and Japan (US$349 million).

The proportion provided by countries outside the OECD DAC group has more than halved, from 8% (US$429 million) in 2008 to 3% (US$146 million) in 2012.

Pooled funds and private donors provide further sources of funding for UN agencies (see Chapters 3 and 5). In 2012 the CERF, ERFs and CHFs provided a total of US$452 million to UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA and WFP combined.

WFP received more humanitarian funding than UNHCR, UNRWA and UNICEF put together over the 2008–2012 period. In the past five years, US$14.1 billion of humanitarian assistance has been channelled through WFP – 52% of total funding to these four UN agencies. The proportion received by UNHCR increased steadily from 23% in 2008 to 33% in 2012, and it received the second highest amount in this period overall (US$7.7 billion, or 28%).

UN agencies often play multiple roles, including coordinator (as cluster lead), donor, appealing agency and implementer. As Figure 5.2 shows, comprehensive data to show how much of the funding received by UN agencies is spent on the programmes they implement themselves, the costs directly incurred by these agencies, or how much is passed on to second-level recipients is not available. While some of this data is captured in the financial reports of individual agencies, it is not comprehensively gathered in a single reporting format.

**Figure 5.5**

Government funding to four UN agencies: UNHCR, UNRWA, UNICEF and WFP, 2008–2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS data
Pooled funds

Humanitarian pooled funds aim to facilitate coordinated funding that is more responsive to changing crises, and can act as a counter-weight to bilateral donor preferences. They also provide a trusted channel for donors who are new to responding in a particular context.

An increasing volume (but not proportion) of funding is being channelled through pooled funds. In 2009 they received US$824 million (5.0% of the total international humanitarian response); in 2013 they received over US$1 billion (4.7%).

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) provides funding to new – or sudden escalations in – crises, as well as to forgotten emergencies. It is managed at a global level by UN OCHA and disburses funds only to UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In 2013, 72 government and private donors provided US$464 million through the CERF, which disbursed funds to 45 countries. Roughly half – 46% – of all pooled funds have been directed through the CERF over the past five years.

At country level, pooled funding mechanisms include common humanitarian funds (CHFs), which typically support projects outlined in UN-coordinated response plans, and emergency response funds (ERFs, sometimes known as humanitarian response funds). ERFs aim to fill unforeseen needs outside of UN-coordinated response plans. They are designed to disburse smaller grants, predominantly through NGOs, which received 58% of ERF funding in 2013. Less funding was channelled through the 13 ERFs in 2013 (US$178 million) than through the four CHFs (US$382).

The total volume of pooled funds and the proportion of total assistance channelled through them varies between countries. In 2013, Sudan received the highest volume of pooled funds (US$115 million, or 18% of international assistance to Sudan). Pooled funds constituted the highest proportion of humanitarian assistance for the Philippines (35%) – but only 2.2% of the humanitarian assistance directed to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Humanitarian pooled funds are a small part of the complex architecture of multi-donor funding mechanisms. Some countries have a myriad of funds - including for humanitarian assistance, recovery, reconstruction, stabilisation, peace-building and development. Some are country-specific, such as the UN Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Others, like the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Achievement Fund, have global coverage. The volume, accessibility and speed of disbursement vary enormously between these different mechanisms. With the exception of the World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which disbursed almost US$700 million last year, none of these funds released significant volumes for the top 10 recipients of humanitarian assistance in 2013.

### FIGURE 5.6

Total funding to humanitarian pooled funds, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CERF</th>
<th>ERF</th>
<th>CHF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and CERF data
Note: Constant 2012 prices.
FIGURE 5.7

Top 10 government contributors to humanitarian pooled funds, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF and OECD DAC data

FIGURE 5.8

Top 10 recipients of money channelled through pooled funds, 2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and CERF data
FIGURE 5.9
Top 10 recipients of humanitarian assistance 2013, by pooled funding mechanism type

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, CERF, UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office and World Bank data
### Somalia
- **CERF**: US$21m (3.0%)
- **CHF**: US$77m (10.8%)
- **Total**: US$98m (13.7%)

### Sudan
- **CERF**: US$47m (7.4%)
- **Total**: US$115m (18.0%)

### Ethiopia
- **CERF**: US$24m (4.4%)
- **ERF**: US$27m (5.0%)
- **Total**: US$51m (9.3%)

### Afghanistan
- **CERF**: US$17m (3.3%)
- **ERF**: US$9m (1.8%)
- **Total**: US$26m (5.2%)

### Kenya
- **CERF**: US$3m (0.7%)
- **ERF**: US$3m (0.7%)
- **Total**: US$6m (1.4%)

---

**Other pooled funds**

- **Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (multi-country)**: US$5.5m
- **Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund**: US$0.7m
- **Ethiopia One UN Fund**: US$1.9m
- **MDG Achievement Fund (global)**: US$1.2m
- **World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund**: US$693m
- **Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (multi-country)**: US$0.3m
Funding channelled through domestic NGOs

National and local NGOs directly access a tiny share of international humanitarian funding but represent an essential part of the humanitarian response; they have presence, access and knowledge where international actors often do not. In 2013, only 93 national NGOs and 22 local NGOs were recorded as having received funding in the UN OCHA FTS, compared with 294 international NGOs.

Between 2009 and 2013, local and national NGOs combined received a total of US$212 million – 1.6% of the total given directly to NGOs and 0.2% of the total international humanitarian response over the period. However, this represents only the amount they received as first-level recipients, and both types of NGOs access unreported quantities of funding further down the transaction chain. Direct funding to national NGOs peaked at US$45 million in 2011, US$16 million of which was for Somalia – an operating environment largely inaccessible to international humanitarian agencies.

ERFs and CHFs are designed to be accessible to NGOs, including national and local NGOs, while CERF funding is only available to UN agencies and the IOM. ERFs are predominantly intended to facilitate the work of NGOs in an emergency and to support local NGO capacity-building. However, in the past five years national and local NGOs have only accessed US$31 million of the US$464 million disbursed through ERFs. This represented 12% of the total disbursed to all NGOs by ERFs in the period compared with the 82% received by international NGOs, many of whom may have then allocated funding to local or national partners.

Between 2009 and 2013, local and national NGOs combined received a total of US$212 million – 1.6% of the total given directly to NGOs and 0.2% of the total international humanitarian response over the period.
**Figure 5.10**

Humanitarian assistance to NGOs, by type, 2009-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount (US$)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>11,400m</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated national NGOs</td>
<td>134m</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern international NGOs</td>
<td>169m</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National NGOs</td>
<td>43m</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>1,140m</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>3m</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: Scaled by percentage. NGO coding methodology, see Data & guides.

**Figure 5.11**

ERF funding channelled through NGOs, by type, 2009-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount (US$)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>210m</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern international NGOs</td>
<td>7m</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated national NGOs</td>
<td>4m</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National NGOs</td>
<td>24m</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>6m</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>3m</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: Scaled by percentage. NGO coding methodology, see Data & guides.
In focus: NGO-led pooled funds

NGO-led pooled funds are smaller in number and financial volume than those led by multilaterals but provide complementarity and innovation in terms of focus, agility and balance of recipients.

In South Sudan, the Small Grants Mechanism within the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF), managed by United National Development Programme (UNDP) and coordinated by BRAC South Sudan, awarded US$2.7 million in grants to national and local NGOs and community-based organisations between 2009 and 2012. In Sudan, the Small Grants Scheme within the larger Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund, aims to engage and build capacity of local NGOs and community-based organisations between 2009 and 2012. In Sudan, the Small Grants Scheme within the larger Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund, aims to engage and build capacity of local NGOs and community-based organisations between 2009 and 2012. In Sudan, the Small Grants Scheme within the larger Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund, aims to engage and build capacity of local NGOs and community-based organisations between 2009 and 2012.

Also operating at a country level, the RAPID Fund in Pakistan is managed by Concern Worldwide, with funding from USAID. Between 2009 and 2013, the RAPID Fund provided over US$29 million to local, national and international NGOs. The fund is small in comparison to the Pakistan ERF, which disbursed US$52 million in the same period, but fills a gap in terms of the speed and flexibility of disbursements. It has no fixed funding windows and takes an average of 9 or 10 days from proposal to disbursement, compared to the 75 days reported by the ERF in its 2013 annual report. It also puts an emphasis on supporting local and national NGOs that otherwise may not be able to secure international funding. In 2013, 78% of grants went to local and national NGOs, compared to 34% from the ERF.

Operating at a global level, the Start Fund is described as a “multi-donor pooled fund managed by NGOs, for NGOs”. It launched in April 2014 for an initial six-month trial period with a budget of US$3 million from the UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Irish Aid. Grants are available to the 19 international NGO members of the START Network (formerly the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA)) and their implementing partners.

The Start Fund is set up to fill identified gaps in emergency funding. It particularly focuses on small-to-medium-scale ‘under-the-radar’ emergencies, providing early response to slow-onset crises and rapid response to spikes in chronic emergencies. On receiving an alert from a member agency, the allocation committee must meet within 24 hours, funding must be disbursed within 72 hours and spent within 45 days. In the four months following its launch, the Start Fund disbursed over US$2 million for crises in South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Yemen and Cameroon, targeting around 1.3 million people.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and RAPID Fund data
Military channels

In keeping with humanitarian principles, the delivery of humanitarian assistance through military channels should only be considered as a last resort, taking place in exceptional circumstances when other agencies are unable to deliver the assistance.

For the past two years, military delivery has indeed represented a small proportion of humanitarian assistance. This followed a peak in 2010 when donors spent relatively high levels of humanitarian assistance through their militaries, the overwhelming majority (US$462 million of US$500 million) of which was spent in Haiti. In 2012 it reached a new low, accounting for just 1% of humanitarian funding from OECD DAC donors. The United States (US) is the main reporter of humanitarian assistance delivered through defence agencies.

Between 2008 and 2012, Afghanistan received US$247 million of humanitarian assistance via military actors, including provincial reconstruction teams. This figure decreased substantially throughout the period from a peak of US$125 million in 2008 to US$8 million in 2012.6

National militaries have played a significant role in the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. At least 20 countries lent support through military assets. These assets ranged from the delivery of relief and airlifting of survivors to providing medical response personnel. The US was one of the main countries providing military support but smaller countries such as New Zealand, Vietnam, Brunei and Singapore also contributed military assets and personnel. It will be interesting to see the extent to which this assistance is reflected in the 2013 data when this becomes available.

Reporting of humanitarian assistance channelled through the military is particularly poor. The data relating to almost three quarters of this type of assistance in 2012 failed to specify the recipient country.

FIGURE 5.13
Official humanitarian assistance via donor defence agencies, 2004–2012

% of total official humanitarian assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States, US$ millions</th>
<th>All other donors, US$ millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>585</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data
The humanitarian situation in South Sudan continues to deteriorate. Almost three years after its independence over 60% of the total population of 11.6 million are thought to be at risk. Reports suggest that civilians are being deliberately targeted, and women and girls are increasingly in danger of sexual and gender-based violence. Organisations like the Danish Refugee Council raise awareness of the problem through large-scale campaigns and training in displacement camps, such as this one in Maban County. Addressing sexual and gender-based violence and advancing gender equity are priorities for many humanitarian agencies and donors.
Humanitarian assistance is spent on a range of activities and services, the mix of which depends on the particular needs of a particular crisis. Overall, the majority of humanitarian assistance in 2012 (the latest year for which sector data is available) was spent on activities to provide basic goods and services such as water and sanitation, health and shelter. Food aid accounted for just under one quarter.

In certain contexts, such as the Syria refugee response, providing assistance in the form of cash rather than goods has proven benefits for recipients, local economies and for cost effectiveness. But while donor interest in cash programming is on the rise, reported spending is at a five-year low.

The proportion of humanitarian assistance spent on disaster prevention and preparedness (DPP, or disaster risk reduction, DRR) by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors remains low but has steadily increased in recent years. Following the aftermath of the 2010 mega-disasters, there has also been a slight shift from post-disaster reconstruction to pre-disaster programming. These figures do not, however, capture the significant investment in this area from domestic governments or from international donors’ development budgets; such investments remain hard to track.

Promoting gender equality is a stated commitment of UN agencies and many donors and should be explicit in the reporting of any kind of programming that donors choose to fund. A gender marker has been created to track funding against this commitment but in the three years since it was implemented, reporting remains too poor to yield an accurate picture of how much is spent.
## Types of expenditure

**Figure 6.1**

OECD DAC donors’ bilateral humanitarian assistance by expenditure type, 2008–2012

US$ billions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material relief assistance and services</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency food aid</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief coordination; protection and support services</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster prevention and preparedness</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

Notes: Includes EU institutions. Percentages show the proportion of bilateral humanitarian assistance made up by each expenditure type for the given year.
Humanitarian assistance funds a wide range of programmes to respond to specific needs of crisis-affected people. These programmes are categorised in different ways by different actors for the purposes of planning, coordination and reporting. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) has 12 standard sector categories (see Figure 6.4). The OECD DAC currently groups humanitarian assistance into five categories for the purposes of financial reporting of bilateral expenditure, see box.1

The distribution of spending between the OECD DAC categories has remained relatively constant over the past five years. Year on year, the largest proportion of bilateral humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors is spent on material relief and assistance, which includes water and sanitation, shelter and health. Food aid is consistently the second largest, notably expanding in response to the 2008 global food crisis, but not showing a similar variation in response to the 2011 and 2012 food crises in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. Since 2008, the proportion and volume of humanitarian assistance delivered as emergency food aid has declined.

There is, however, a perceptible shift in the balance of spending between pre-disaster preparedness and post-disaster reconstruction, although volumes spent on both remain comparatively small. The proportion of expenditure on reconstruction decreased significantly following the aftermaths of the Haiti earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010 and 2011. At the same time, the small proportion spent on DPP increased from 2.9% in 2008 to 6.2% in 2012.

Increased policy attention in this area has both driven more funding to the sector and generated incentives to improve the reporting of such expenditure, and it is unclear which of these most explains overall reported increases in disaster prevention.

### OECD DAC CATEGORIES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material relief assistance and services</td>
<td>Shelter, water, sanitation and health services, supply of medicines and other non-food relief items; assistance to refugees and internally displaced people in developing countries other than for food or protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency food aid</td>
<td>Food aid or special supplementary feeding programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief coordination; protection and support services</td>
<td>Coordination measures, including logistics and communications systems; measures to promote and protect the safety, well-being, dignity and integrity of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation</td>
<td>Short-term reconstruction work after an emergency or conflict limited to restoring pre-existing infrastructure; social and economic rehabilitation in the aftermath of emergencies to facilitate transition and enable populations to return to their previous livelihood or develop a new livelihood in the wake of an emergency situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster prevention and preparedness</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction activities; early warning systems; emergency contingency stocks and contingency planning including preparations for forced displacement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Different types of crisis and country contexts require different types of assistance. In keeping with this, food aid was the dominant expenditure type for Ethiopia (68%) and South Sudan (52%) in 2012, while material relief assistance and services dominated for Syria (83%), and Lebanon (97%). The highest proportions of reconstruction relief and rehabilitation were in Afghanistan (19%), Pakistan (20%) and the West Bank & Gaza Strip (18%). However, DPP spending was low for all 10 of the top recipients in 2012 at less than 2% in all countries except Ethiopia (2.4%).

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data
The types of expenditure also change with time. In Pakistan, the years following the 2010 floods saw a clear shift to reconstruction and also growth in preparedness for future disasters. Expenditure in Lebanon shows a move away from rehabilitation and reconstruction following internal violence to a funding landscape dominated by material assistance to Syrian refugees in 2012. There was a brief investment of US$1.3 million in DPP in 2011, the year of a high-level meeting in Beirut on risk reduction in the region. Ethiopia has long received high levels of food aid. However, there was a slight but noteworthy shift in proportions from food aid to DPP after the 2011 Horn of Africa food crisis. In terms of volume, food aid has decreased year on year since 2008, from US$630 million to US$246 million in 2012 – a decline that continued even through the 2011 food crisis.
Funding by sector in UN-coordinated appeals

UN-coordinated appeals categorise requirements under twelve standard sectors. Food programmes have made up the largest share of these over the last five years. At US$17 billion, requirements were nearly one-third of the total over the 2009–13 period. Requirements for food aid have been consistently high since 2009, averaging over US$3 billion each year.

The proportion of requirements met varies considerably by sector. Food aid, the largest in terms of requirements, also has the highest proportion of those requirements met (84%). Four other sectors received over half of their requested requirements: coordination and support services (73%); health (59%); multi-sector (58%); and mine action (58%). The remaining seven sectors were all under 50% funded. The most underfunded were protection (32% funded) and safety and security (32% funded).

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
Notes: ‘Multi-sector’ is predominantly used for multi-sector assistance to refugees. In the FTS, contributions are tagged with both ‘standard sectors’ and clusters. Cluster names vary across different appeals, whereas sectors are standardised into 12 categories and allow for comparative analysis across countries and appeals.
CHAPTER 6: WHAT IS IT SPENT ON?

Providing people with cash or vouchers, rather than commodities, can have a number of benefits, including stimulating local markets and increasing choice. It can also allow people to invest in rebuilding their livelihoods and so boost their resilience to future shocks.

There is a wide range of cash programming modalities, including transferring cash directly to individuals or households, grants schemes, providing payment for work, or vouchers for goods. For reporting purposes, programmes are defined either as ‘full’ or entirely composed of cash transfers, or ‘partial’, indicating that a programme has some element of cash transfer within it.

Approximately US$692 million was spent on full humanitarian cash transfer programmes by 53 donors between 2009 and 2013. A further US$78 million has been reported to the FTS in the first six months of 2014. Funding peaked at US$236 million in 2010, mainly in response to disasters in Haiti and Pakistan – with large contributions from the United States in particular.

Yet despite widespread interest in cash programming, funding for both full and partial cash-based interventions represents over 1.5% of international humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS over the last five years – and reached a five-year low in 2013.

There was also a notable shift in 2013 in the kinds of full-cash programmes – funding to voucher programmes nearly doubled. This was mainly due to the Syria crisis response, which included a US$20 million programme for food coupons in Lebanon and a US$7.5 million voucher programme for refugees in Turkey.

Fifteen government donors reported spending on cash programmes in 2013, compared with 13 in 2009. The US and the European Union (EU) have consistently been the largest donors to cash programmes. The US ranks as the top donor every year since 2009, providing a total of US$266 million between 2009 and 2013 – the equivalent of 1.5% of its total humanitarian assistance reported to UN OCHA FTS during this period.

Figure 6.5

Humanitarian assistance to cash programmes by type, 2009–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Note: ‘Full’ indicates funding for programmes that are purely cash transfer.

‘Partial’ indicates funding for mixed cash and non-cash programmes.

DATA POVERTY: FUNDING TO CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES

Tracking funding to cash transfer programmes is problematic as it is often integrated into larger contributions or programmes, so not distinctly labelled. GHA therefore undertakes its own customised analysis of the available data (see Data & guides). This can only capture donor funding that is clearly labelled as such, or that has been reported to FTS by the recipients specifically for cash programming. First-level recipients often pass on funding to implementing partners and this is not recorded in FTS.

In 2013, in response to the lack of current and comprehensive data, the Cash Learning Partnership launched the Cash Atlas, an online interactive map to track funding to cash programmes in humanitarian settings.
The largest share of US funding for cash programmes went to occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) – 46% (US$122 million), followed by Pakistan 25% (US$67 million) and Haiti 5% (US$14 million). However, the amount from the US fluctuates significantly, with a peak in 2010, largely driven by the Pakistan floods response, and more than halving between 2012 and 2013, after a 2012 rise, which was partly driven by response to the food crises in West Africa. In 2010 the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) reported US$3 million to Haiti for cash-for-work for early recovery and stabilisation following the earthquake. In 2013 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided the second highest amount of funding for cash-based programming, directing US$20 million to the Syria response – US$4 million more than the EU’s total global funding for full cash programming activities. Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and Russia also increased their contributions for cash-based programming in 2013. OPt remains the highest recipient of funding for cash programming. It has received US$304 million in the past five years – more than the combined total of all the other top nine recipients over the same period.

**FIGURE 6.6**

Top 10 government donors of humanitarian cash transfer programmes, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>2009 US$m</th>
<th>2010 US$m</th>
<th>2011 US$m</th>
<th>2012 US$m</th>
<th>2013 US$m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
Note: For cash transfer methodology see Data & guides.

**FIGURE 6.7**

Top 10 recipients of humanitarian cash transfer programmes, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>2009 US$m</th>
<th>2010 US$m</th>
<th>2011 US$m</th>
<th>2012 US$m</th>
<th>2013 US$m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
Note: For cash transfer methodology see Data & guides.
Disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction

There is widespread consensus that a number of trends, such as climate change, resource scarcity and urbanisation, are combining to increase the risks faced by vulnerable people. There is also evidence that as well as preventing suffering and loss of life, investment in DRR, including early warning systems, is cost effective.²

Although DRR (or DPP in OECD DAC reporting), falls within the scope of humanitarian assistance, it is clear that it cannot be exclusively addressed by humanitarian funding or approaches. Supporting disaster prevention and management systems and addressing the long-term factors that increase risk and vulnerability also demands other resources: from domestic budgets (as seen in Chapter 3); and from development assistance, climate financing and new risk financing modalities (as detailed in Chapter 8).

In March 2015, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) will expire and be replaced by a new international DRR framework to be agreed in Sendai, Japan. Member states have also highlighted the need to address DRR and climate change adaptation in setting the sustainable development goals.

Against the backdrop of these inter-governmental processes, OECD DAC donors spending on DPP continues to increase – but remains a very small share of their bilateral humanitarian assistance, accounting for just US$630 million in 2012, or 6% of the total. In comparison, the most recent estimate from 2011 suggests that DRR made up less than 0.7% of all development assistance from OECD DAC donors.⁴

**FIGURE 6.8**

OECD DAC donor spending on DPP as a share of total bilateral humanitarian assistance, 2008–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (US$ Millions)</th>
<th>Disaster Prevention and Preparedness as a Share of Humanitarian Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
As detailed in Chapter 3, Japan’s DPP funding has steadily increased from US$51 million in 2008 to US$146 million in 2012. Japan’s long history of responding to disasters domestically has placed it at the forefront of DRR policies and approaches.

Five donors contributed 74% of total DPP funding from OECD DAC donors’ humanitarian assistance in 2012: Japan (US$146 million); EU institutions (US$101 million); the US (US$98 million); Australia (US$87 million); and Sweden (US$37 million). This does not represent all of DPP or DRR funding from these donors, or others, as it is likely that they are also funding this sector through development channels.

DATA POVERTY: DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

DRR is often delivered as a component of other programmes, making expenditure hard to track within both humanitarian assistance and overall official development assistance (ODA). Searching project descriptions for DRR-related activities within the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) can provide some indication of the variety of sectors into which DRR is integrated. However, this is heavily reliant on donor reporting, and lack of standardised guidelines for recording these investments means that estimates are not likely to be comprehensive.

A marker for disaster risk management (DRM) is currently under consideration by the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics at the OECD, as a way of improving visibility of spending on risk management (including DRR) within the current data. The marker will not be able to pull out the specific volumes of funding dedicated to DRM within broader programming, but will help to identify where it has been mainstreamed within development and humanitarian assistance and which sectors it crosses. It is hoped that the presence of the marker will encourage the mainstreaming of DRM into development planning, as it will require the review of every aid activity through a “DRM lens”.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on all UN-managed funds to implement a gender marker “to assist in tracking the proportion of funds devoted to advancing gender equality”. In 2010, he set a target that the primary purpose of 15% of all UN-managed funds in support of peacebuilding should “address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality or empower women”, including preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In 2010, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) rolled out a gender marker for donors and agencies to use as a tool to track gender equality in humanitarian assistance. Coding is based on the extent to which: (i) a project has considered the needs of men and women equally; (ii) its activities respond equally to these needs; and (iii) the project has led to gender-related outcomes.

Most projects that are reported under the gender marker in UN OCHA’s FTS have a significant or limited gender equality element to them. The investment in such projects has increased from US$3.2 billion in 2012 to US$4.9 billion in 2013. However, the US$566 million spending on projects that did not consider gender (gender marker zero) in 2013 is nearly four times more than was spent on projects whose ‘main purpose’ was to advance gender equality (US$147 million). Expenditure under the gender marker zero category has also increased two and half times since 2012, whereas it has decreased for the main purpose projects.

Gender reporting remains poor, resulting in an unreliable picture of whether commitments to gender equality are being met. In 2013, 56% of funding (US$7.9 billion) recorded in the UN OCHA FTS was left blank or ‘undefined’ – meaning that the project was not coded for a gender marker.

A more standardised and systematic approach to donor reporting on gender in emergencies would help to fill this gap in information, strengthen accountability, and enable resources to be better allocated to respond to the different needs of girls, women, men and boys. The current IASC Gender Marker could be expanded for this purpose - from a proposal development tool to a programme cycle tool - drawing lessons from the application of the Gender and Age Marker developed by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) department in 2013.

**FIGURE 6.10**

Funding to gender, as per IASC gender marker, 2011–2013

![Chart showing funding to gender](chart.png)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0. No signs gender issues were considered</th>
<th>1. Limited gender equality element in project</th>
<th>2. Main purpose of project is to advance gender equality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

Notes: 4 – not applicable: only used for very small number of projects, such as ‘support services’
Addressing SGBV during and after humanitarian crises is a priority for many donors and agencies yet, once again, data is scarce on the financial resources directed to this. According to the OECD DAC’s CRS, a total of US$346 million in ODA was spent on programming to address SGBV in 2012, of which 19% came from humanitarian funds (US$64 million).

According to reported data, in 2012 the US was the largest donor funding projects to address SGBV from overall ODA programmes (US$115 million), followed by Sweden (US$51.7 million) and Norway (US$34 million). The three largest donors supporting projects to address SGBV through their humanitarian assistance were Sweden (US$33.7 million), the US (US$13 million) and the EU (US$5.2 million).

DRC was the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance for SGBV (US$10.1 million) in 2012, receiving more than the next two largest recipients, Iraq and Ethiopia, combined (US$4.8 million each).

The extent that donors channel spending to address SGBV through humanitarian assistance, rather than through development assistance, varies substantially. Almost two-thirds (65.2%) of Sweden’s spending on SGBV-related projects is reported as humanitarian assistance. In contrast, the UK, which in 2012 launched a series of high profile unilateral and multilateral initiatives to address sexual violence in crises, reported just US$5,000 of bilateral humanitarian funding for SGBV to the CRS. This was only 0.04% of the UK’s spending on SGBV-related projects that year (US$13 million of ODA).

In November 2013, a number of donor governments (including the UK, US, Australia, Sweden and Japan), six UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Organization for Migration endorsed a communiqué outlining future action and commitments to keep women and girls safe in emergencies. As a result, the UK committed US$33.2 million of humanitarian assistance in November 2013 to support relevant programmes of the UN Population Fund, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the ICRC in emergency contexts. In addition, US$30.4 million was also committed by Switzerland, Japan, the US and the European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. The US government has since established the Gender-Based violence Emergency Response Initiative to provide financial support to women and girls in emergencies. These recent commitments suggest that spending on gender in humanitarian contexts might increase.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data

Notes: Figures only include projects reported by donors, so relevant projects may not be included due to inaccuracies in reporting. Figures include spending on SGBV in all countries (conflict/post-conflict and non-conflict) and capture all projects using terminology related to SGBV (in various languages). Figures include projects that focus on SGBV or ‘mainstream’ it/focus on it as a sub-objective.
HOW QUICKLY and for how long?

Crises rarely fit neatly into ‘sudden onset’ or ‘protracted emergency’ boxes; and people’s needs and vulnerabilities can rarely be described as neatly ‘humanitarian’ or ‘development’. Humanitarian assistance encompasses action “during and in the aftermath” of emergencies as well as preparedness and prevention. So humanitarian actors are stretched between the imperatives to act early and stay late. The diversity of demands on humanitarian response requires flexible approaches as well as availability of other kinds of funding.

The humanitarian imperative requires quick response, often within a short window of time, to heed early warnings, meet urgent needs and prevent further loss of life or escalation of suffering. Timely humanitarian action depends on timely funding. Rapid response funds and other gear-shifting mechanisms have been designed to enable this.

Yet overall, even for acute crises triggered by sudden natural disasters, the time it takes for donors to respond at scale can vary enormously in the first weeks and months. In conflict and complex emergencies, humanitarian funding tends to get off to a much slower start following the launch of an appeal, and shows an unpredictable pattern of response to increases in severity of humanitarian need.

The overwhelming majority (78%) of humanitarian spending from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors continues to be for protracted emergencies in long- and medium-term recipient countries, prompting new initiatives including multi-year appeals and funding. Most long-term assistance is also spent in countries with high levels of poverty and low levels of government spending, once again highlighting the need for both longer-term funding models and better links with development spending and other resources to build resilience.
Speed and timing of response

Timely response to humanitarian crises is critical for effective action. This involves heeding early warning signs, reacting to sudden crises or deteriorations and responding promptly and predictably to appeals. While appeals may be for a response over many months, having strong funding commitments early on enables better planning, continuity and pre-positioning.

For disasters triggered by sudden natural hazards, such as earthquakes or extreme weather events, the speed of response varies significantly (see Figure 7.1). The anomalous response in 2005 to the UN-coordinated appeal following the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami saw more than double the proportion of needs met in the first month than the appeal following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. Again, the proportion of needs met in the first month of the Haiti appeal (49%) was more than double that at the same point following the Pakistan floods (24%). It was only around the fifth month after each of the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods that the differences began to level out and both saw over 65% of their requirements met. Yet, at the same point, the proportion of needs met for Typhoon Haiyan was trailing at just above 55%.

Conflict-related and complex crises saw a slower response to the requirements set out in their UN-coordinated appeals (see Figure 7.2). Levels of requirements, access, lack of sustained media and political attention, as well as donor preferences and funding cycles, all play a role in this. None of the appeals for South Sudan, Syria, Central African Republic (CAR) or Yemen were 50% funded by the sixth month. Indeed, at this point, even the relatively high-profile Syria humanitarian assistance response plan (SHARP) and regional response plan (RRP) appeal requirements were only 24% met.

These collective appeal responses do, however, mask the individual response times of specific donors and funding mechanisms. There are a number of pooled funds that seek to support a rapid humanitarian response, including the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)’s rapid response window as well as the NGO-led RAPID and Start Funds (see Chapter 5). The UK Department of International Development (DFID)’s rapid response facility (RRF) also aims to support more agile humanitarian response. In certain rapid onset emergencies, or sudden spikes in chronic disasters, it releases funds within 72 hours to pre-screened and pre-qualified implementing partners. RRF funding has been disbursed in situations including the South Sudan conflict in January 2014 and flooding in northern India in July 2013.

While humanitarian funding needs to be able to scale up rapidly for early response, development funding needs to anticipate and respond to cyclical and predictable crises – both conflict- and natural disaster-related. One development financing mechanism designed to enable a rapid gear-shift in reaction to warning signs or sudden changes is the ‘crisis modifier’. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) introduced these after the 2011 food crisis, to speed up the pace of disaster response in the Horn of Africa and other drought-prone areas. Project activities are linked with triggers to alert decision-makers to a worsening of food security, livelihoods and nutrition indicators. Before a critical tipping point has been reached, the system prompts a simplified and accelerated funding approval process and an expansion of interventions including the provision of emergency fodder and animal health services. DFID is experimenting with a similar initiative in Yemen.
CHAPTER 7: HOW QUICKLY AND FOR HOW LONG?

FIGURE 7.1
Timing of funding response to four natural disasters: Indian Ocean tsunami-earthquake, Haiti earthquake, Pakistan floods and Philippines’ Typhoon Haiyan

![Graph showing the proportion of requirements met for each disaster over time.]

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data

FIGURE 7.2
Timing of funding response to five UN appeals, 2013: conflicts and complex emergencies in Syria, Central African Republic, Yemen and South Sudan

![Graph showing the proportion of requirements met for each appeal over time.]

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data
**FIGURE 7.3**

Funding to Syria crisis and number of registered Syrian refugees, December 2012 to December 2013

- **19 December 2012**: UN launches Syria 2013 SHARP and RRP, with combined requirements of US$1.6bn
- **30 January 2013**: Donors pledge more than US$1.5bn towards the crisis at a pledging conference in Kuwait
- **April 2013**: Number of registered Syrian refugees exceeds 1 million
- **July 2013**: Syrian death toll reaches 100,000
- **19 December 2013**: UN launches Syria 2014 SHARP and RRP. Needs in excess of US$6bn

**NUMBER OF REFUGEES (MILLIONS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of registered Syrian refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Funding to Syria emergency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding to Syria emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 7.4**

Funding to CAR crisis and number of internally displaced persons, December 2012 to December 2013

- **December 2012**: Séléka rebels launch offensive against CAR government
- **January 2013**: Séléka seize power – CAR President François Bozizé flees
- **November 2013**: CAR declared a Level 3 Emergency
- **10 December 2012**: UN launches CAR 2013 consolidated appeal, with requirements of US$129m
- **17 July 2013**: CAR UN appeal requirements increase to US$195m
- **5 December 2013**: UN Security Council approves new peace-keeping force in CAR amid mounting violence
- **18 August 2013**: Séléka coup leader sworn in as CAR president
- **24 March 2013**: Sectarian violence flares up between Séléka and anti-Balaka groups

**NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (THOUSANDS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of internally displaced persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Funding to CAR emergency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding to CAR emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS, UNHCR, IDMC data and media reports
Long and medium-term humanitarian assistance

The majority of international humanitarian assistance continues to go to long-term recipient countries. In 2012, 66% of humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors went to such countries, defined as those having received an above-average share of their official development assistance (ODA) in the form of humanitarian assistance for eight or more of the last 15 years. In the same year, a further 12% went to medium-term recipients – those receiving an above average share for three to seven years inclusive.5

OECD DAC recipient country data for 2013 is not yet available, so these figures do not reflect the high levels of funding to Syria or neighbouring countries affected by the conflict. Most of these countries would currently fall into the short-term recipient category, as they have been in receipt of high levels of humanitarian assistance for less than two years. However, it appears that the conflict and the refugee situation will not be short-term crises and Syria and some of its neighbours may become medium or long-term recipients.

Despite the fact that less than one-quarter (22%) of humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors in 2012 went to short-term recipients, humanitarian assistance still tends to be conceived and delivered in short-term cycles. The fact that the majority of humanitarian assistance goes to long-term recipients experiencing recurrent or protracted crises and people facing chronic poverty (see Figure 7.6), poses a challenge to humanitarian donors and implementing organisations to fund and plan over a longer timeframe. As this and the analysis in Chapter 8 shows, it also poses a challenge to development actors to invest in building resilience and in addressing the chronic poverty, risks and vulnerabilities that cause crises to recur or become entrenched.

FIGURE 7.5
Long, medium and short-term recipients of official humanitarian assistance from DAC donors, 1990–2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
The need for a longer-term humanitarian assistance and resilience approach in protracted and recurrent crises has prompted the advent of multi-year, UN-coordinated appeals. In 2013, Somalia was the first and only country to launch a multi-year appeal. In 2014, a further 13 countries had multi-year strategic response plans (SRPs).

The Somalia plan integrates life-saving and livelihood support to address the cycle of recurring crises brought on by drought and conflict. Within its multi-year framework (called a consolidated appeal process (CAP) appeal because it was introduced in 2013, before the changes to the system), annual SRPs are developed to reflect changes and short-term shocks.

This framework could be an opportunity to secure multi-year funding, supporting predictability, continuity and long-term approaches in programming. However, while the umbrella document for the Somalia CAP provides an indication of financial requirements for the full three-year timeframe, the annual response plans present strategies with one-year financial requirements only; and multi-year initiatives are not easily distinguishable from short-term projects.

The two largest donors in Somalia (the United States (US) and the EU institutions) continue their 12 or 18-month funding cycles but the following donors are providing multi-year funding:

- United Kingdom (UK) – US$89 million over four years (late 2013 to late 2017), including US$41 million to a joint UNICEF/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/World Food Programme (WFP) resilience programme and US$33 million to the Livelihoods and Resilience Consortium; DFID agreed this multi-year programme prior to the introduction of the multi-year CAP.
- Sweden – US$15 million over three years (2013–2015), of which US$9 million is for the multi-year (2013–2016) Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP); Sweden cites the multi-year CAP as the main reason for its multi-year funding.
- Denmark – over US$11m to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over two years (2012–2013), and over US$20 million over three years (2013–2015) including grants to FAO and SomReP. Notably, this funding comes from both development and humanitarian budget lines; grants were awarded prior to the multi-year CAP but are in line with its priorities.

The Somalia Humanitarian Donor Group (chaired by European Commission’s Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and Sweden) is currently considering the effects of this multi-year CAP. One concern is that its strong resilience focus may over-shadow insufficiently sign-posted urgent humanitarian needs. Indeed, in June 2014, the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) issued an urgent request to the UN Security Council for an immediate injection of US$60 million to meet the most urgent funding needs within the critically underfunded appeal. A full evaluation of the Somalia multi-year CAP is not in OCHA’s plans, but such a review would yield lessons for all multi-year appeals – including effects on volumes and duration of humanitarian assistance and other resource flows, as well as challenges in balancing urgent response with resilience-building.
Financing for resilience

Resilience has been defined as “the ability of individuals, communities and states and their institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty.” The concern for resilience arises from the need to address the underlying poverty, inequalities and insecurities that drive people into crisis and prevent them from emerging and staying out of crisis. As such it demands resources and policies beyond humanitarian assistance, a context-specific blend including those resource flows explored in Chapter 8.

The concept of resilience continues to gain momentum in the run-up to three major global processes in 2015: the creation of a successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA2) 2005–2015, the agreement of the post–2015 sustainable development goals and a new, international climate change agreement. The World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 represents an opportunity to develop a humanitarian ecosystem that supports and complements the commitments emerging from these three processes. To date, resilience discussions and initiatives have tended to focus on drought, food insecurity and natural disasters, with strong links to DRR. Application of this approach to conflict settings is much more emergent, with UNICEF trialling the first multi-stakeholder resilience systems analysis in Eastern DRC in 2014.

While resilience demands a major change in policy, institutional structures and programming, it also demands shifts in funding; and shifts in funding can, in turn, change behaviour and approaches. Some donors have developed resilience funding initiatives to better bridge humanitarian and development aid.

European Commission: Supporting Horn of Africa’s Resilience (SHARE)

Established in 2012 after the food crisis, SHARE is a US$358 million joint humanitarian and development initiative to build resilience to drought. It aims to improve the livelihoods of farming and pastoralist communities as well as the capacity of public services to respond to crises. SHARE-funded programmes include improving land resource management, as well as the income opportunities for livestock-dependent populations. In the long term they aim to find lasting solutions for the heavy burden of both chronic malnutrition and protracted displacement.

USAID: Resilience in the Sahel-Enhanced (RISE) initiative

Through the five-year RISE initiative, USAID aims to join up its humanitarian and development efforts in the Sahel to address the root causes of vulnerability in the region. In its first two years, US$130 million has been allocated for areas in Niger and Burkina Faso. Its stated goal is to break the crisis cycle of an estimated 1.9 million people, and to reduce the need for future humanitarian assistance. RISE is not a new programme as such but rather an initiative to integrate existing humanitarian and development programming (or assistance).

DFID: Multi-year approach in Yemen

As seen in the Somalia example on page 86, multi-year humanitarian assistance can contribute to resilience-building but cannot be expected to do so alone or automatically. To better understand this relationship, DFID has commissioned a global review of its multi-year funding, including in DRC, Pakistan and Yemen. In Yemen, a major medium-term recipient of humanitarian assistance, DFID is the first donor to move to multi-year humanitarian financing and is doing so with an explicit resilience focus. A pilot ‘crisis modifier’ (see page 82) is under development; this aims to help people maintain their purchasing power in the event of dramatic changes in food prices.

Sweden: Inclusion in humanitarian and development assistance

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) considers reducing risk as a key component of both humanitarian and long-term development assistance and is committed to including risk reduction and resilience in its programming. Financial contributions include US$7 million to UNDP’s Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme in Bangladesh, 2011–2012. The programme aims to strengthen national capacity to manage risks, including during response and recovery efforts. An important part of this approach is recognising all hazards, as well as integrating DRR and adaptation measures to build communities’ resilience.
Figure 7.6

Long, medium and short-term recipients of humanitarian assistance: levels of poverty, domestic resources and humanitarian assistance, 2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank and OECD DAC data
Note: Chart uses a logarithmic scale. Bubble size represents the volume of humanitarian assistance each country received in 2012. Poverty data is the latest available estimate (note that for some countries estimates are pre-crisis). For South Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan there are no estimates of $1.25 a day poverty. Longer-term recipients are defined as those having received an above average share of their ODA in the form of humanitarian assistance for eight or more of the last 15. Medium-term is defined as three to seven years inclusive and short-term as under three years.
International humanitarian assistance should act to fill the gap where domestic resources are not able to meet urgent needs. Government spending across all developing countries is on average PPP$2,170 (2011 PPP$) but in many countries that receive humanitarian assistance, the figure is much lower.

Indeed, 35% of total humanitarian assistance in 2012 went to countries where government spending is less than PPP$500 per citizen per year, such as Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Niger and Mali; and a further 19% to countries where government spending is between PPP$500 and PPP$1,000 per citizen per year.

It is not surprising that long-term crisis, poverty and limited domestic capacity are often found in the same places. Crises both drive people into poverty and erode their ability to improve their wellbeing, while poverty, in turn, undermines their resilience to shocks. An estimated 179.5 million people were living in extreme poverty in the 30 long-term recipient countries of humanitarian assistance.17

In 2012, 38% of funding to long-term humanitarian recipients was spent in countries with per capita government expenditure of less than PPP$500 and 50% was spent in those with less than PPP$1,000. This can be seen in Figure 7.6 where recipients of large volumes of humanitarian assistance are long-term recipients (shaded blue) and also tend to appear in the top left corner of the distribution as they have large populations living in poverty and low per capita government expenditure.

Conversely, in countries such as Turkey, which has relatively high levels of government spending and low incidence of poverty, international humanitarian assistance acts to support response to short-term shocks rather than to respond to recurrent or protracted crises that are rooted in chronic vulnerabilities.

The relationship between poverty and humanitarian crisis is long-understood and is increasingly gaining recognition. Resilience is providing a common concept to bring humanitarian and development actors together to address the challenges of poverty, risk and crisis. While this connection was not explicit in the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals, it is informing the negotiation of the forthcoming sustainable development goals, due to be finalised in 2015.

DATA POVERTY: POVERTY DATA

Of the 30 countries categorised as long-term recipients over the past 15 years, 25 were classed as fragile states in 2013.9 Reliable data, such as government expenditure and poverty rates, is often absent in such countries, part of the pervasive challenge of measuring poverty faced in many contexts. For example, the levels of extreme poverty are not known for eight of the 30 long-term recipient countries, including Somalia, Afghanistan and Myanmar.

Even in countries where data is available, it is possible that humanitarian crises have increased poverty levels and affected government expenditure even further since figures were last gathered. In Syria for example, there is no data to show how steeply the conflict has driven up poverty; the most recent data on poverty was collected a decade ago and shows pre-conflict poverty at the relatively low rate of 1.7% (2004). The conflict has had a dramatic effect on the poverty levels of the population in Syria, both directly and indirectly as a result of falling agricultural production and a contracting economy. Measured against national benchmarks, almost two-thirds of the population are now living in extreme poverty.18

In sub-Saharan Africa, 43 of 49 countries conduct poverty surveys – but only 28 of these have been conducted in the past seven years. A quarter of the region’s population is estimated to be living in extreme poverty – but this figure is derived from data collected in 2005 or earlier.
### Figure 7.7
Poverty and major resource profiles of three long-term recipients of humanitarian assistance, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Republic of Congo</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty Rates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1.25 a day, % of pop</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2 a day, % of pop</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Spending Per Capita</strong></td>
<td>$88</td>
<td>$206</td>
<td>$939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net ODA Per Poor Person</strong></td>
<td>$110</td>
<td>$127</td>
<td>$99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Assistance Per Crisis-Affected Person</strong></td>
<td>$68</td>
<td>$124</td>
<td>$104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and IMF WEO data, and UNHCR, EMDAT CRED, IDMC and UN appeal documents.
WHAT OTHER RESOURCES ARE IMPORTANT?

While humanitarian assistance constitutes just 3% of international resource flows to the top humanitarian recipients, it retains a critical and unique function. It is intended to impartially and independently reach those who are in most acute need – and who are often beyond the reach of other resources. However, those worst affected by humanitarian crises are the most vulnerable: people facing poverty, insecurity and marginalisation. This means it is vital that all resources – public, private, domestic, international – are used coherently to improve the lives of these crisis-affected people in the long and the short term.

This chapter compares resource flows to the top recipients of humanitarian assistance against developing countries more broadly and finds some notable differences. For many major humanitarian assistance recipients, per capita government expenditure – a measure of a government’s capacity to meet the needs of its people and manage challenges – is low, with little prospect for growth. This accords greater importance to international resources.

Official development assistance (ODA) represents more than twice the proportion of international resources for top humanitarian recipients than for other developing countries. Peacekeeping is seven times the proportion: in conflict-affected states, peacekeeping missions represent a significant source of international expenditure. Conversely, private investment constitutes a much lower proportion of international resource flows, and much of this is captured by a limited group of countries. Climate financing and new risk financing products exemplify areas where both private and public resources have a role to play in building resilience and reducing risk – but currently have limited application in crisis-affected countries. Remittances constitute an average 21% of international resources for the largest humanitarian recipients. But their significance varies widely between countries – in Pakistan, for example, they account for 66% of incoming international resources.
Funding flows to top humanitarian assistance recipients, 2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, UNCTAD and SIPRI data

Notes: Recipient data for some flows, such as private development assistance from NGOs, is not available and is therefore excluded from this analysis. Data in this graph and throughout the chapter includes 17 of the top 20 recipients between 2003 and 2012. Due to data limitations, West Bank & Gaza Strip, Somalia and Syria have been excluded from the analysis. Negative values for short-term debt and portfolio equity have been changed to zero.

Not to scale
Of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance over 2003–2012, seventeen have comparable data across a range of other financial resources. Comparing this group to developing countries as a whole reveals substantial differences in the scale and range of resources available.

Domestic government expenditure is by far the largest resource available to developing countries – US$6.4 trillion on aggregate in 2012. But in the top humanitarian assistance recipients, domestic expenditure per person is extremely low, averaging PPP$1,190 (when adjusted for purchasing power parity) across the group. This is just over half the PPP$2,170 average for all developing countries and just 7% of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) average of PPP$16,920.

Among the ten largest humanitarian assistance recipients, six have extremely low domestic spending levels: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [PPP$88 per person in 2012, just 4% of the all developing country average]; Ethiopia (PPP$206, 9%); Haiti (PPP$433, 20%); Sudan (PPP$457, 21%); Afghanistan (PPP$471, 22%); and Pakistan (PPP$939, 43%).

Debt was notably the largest single international resource flow to the group, in 2012: short and long-term debt combined accounted for 36% of international resources ($75.3 billion). However, three quarters of this was driven by one large emerging economy, Indonesia: debt accounted for 62% of its total resource inflows that year.

Remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) are also significant, each accounting for over US$40 billion of inflows to the largest humanitarian recipients. Remittances account for 21% of total inflows (US$43.9 billion) and are the largest single international resource for Pakistan (66% of all international flows), Sri Lanka (51%), Jordan (43%), Haiti (39%) and Lebanon (38%).

FDI reached US$41.2 billion for the group of largest humanitarian recipient countries in 2012. This accounts for 20% of all international flows to these countries, a notably lower proportion than the 26% for developing countries. However, it accounted for more than half of inflows for Myanmar (67%) and Iraq (59%) and large proportions for DRC (41%) and Sudan (40%). All four are resource-rich countries and FDI is attracted by their large extractive industries.

In the top recipient countries of humanitarian assistance, domestic spending per person is half of the average in developing countries – and just 7% of that in DAC member countries.
FIGURE 8.2

2012 resource mix for the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance, 2003–2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on IMF WEO, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, UNCTAD and SIPRI data

Notes: Figures are based on 2012 funding flows for 17 of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance between 2003 and 2012. Humanitarian assistance is GHA’s international humanitarian assistance figure. Development assistance is total ODA minus official humanitarian assistance. Negative values for short-term debt and portfolio equity have been changed to zero.
2012 resource mix for all developing countries, 2003–2012

Source: Development Initiatives based on IMF WEO, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, UNCTAD and SIPRI data
Note: Figures are based on 2012 funding flows for 17 of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance between 2003 and 2012. Negative values for short-term debt and portfolio equity have been changed to zero.
2012 resource mix for top humanitarian recipients, 2003–2012

Figure 8.4

Source: Development Initiatives based on IMF WEO, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, UNCTAD and SIPRI data

Notes: Humanitarian assistance is GHA’s international humanitarian assistance figure. Development assistance is total ODA minus official humanitarian assistance.
CHAPTER 8: WHAT OTHER RESOURCES ARE IMPORTANT?

International resources

Domestic government expenditure

Afghanistan

Haiti

Democratic Republic of Congo

Indonesia

Humanitarian assistance
Development assistance
Remittances
Portfolio equity
Long/short-term debt
OOFs (gross)
Peace-keeping
FDI

US$8.3bn
US$5.1bn

US$8.0bn
US$5.4bn

US$4.2bn
US$2.2bn

US$91.6bn
US$173.1bn

US$8.3bn
US$5.1bn

US$4.2bn
US$2.2bn

US$4.2bn
US$2.2bn

US$173.1bn

US$5.1bn

US$2.2bn

0.02%
1%
11%
6%
6%
75%
0.1%

1%
11%
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Remittances

Remittances play an important but often overlooked role in the international humanitarian resourcing ecosystem. As a means of financing that reaches households relatively directly (with the only intermediary being the money transfer system), remittances represent an immediate, flexible and often predictable source of income. As such, they can support people and local economies to build resilience and preparedness, meet basic needs during a crisis and recover and rebuild afterwards.

Globally, the exact value of remittances to developing countries through both formal and informal channels is unknown. The World Bank estimates that remittances received by developing countries through formal channels reached US$379 billion in 2012, a real increase of 169% since 2000. In the top 20 humanitarian recipients, reported remittances through formal channels amounted to US$43.9 billion in 2012 – over one-fifth of international inflows to these countries.

The significance of remittances in relation to other international flows varies between countries. For Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Haiti and Lebanon, remittances are the largest single international resource (see Figure 8.4). While the World Bank does not collect remittance data for Somalia, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that remittances to Somalia amount to at least US$1.2 billion per year – double the amount of international humanitarian assistance received by Somalia in 2012 (US$627 million). International concern was raised in 2013 when measures taken to counteract terrorism financing and money-laundering jeopardised major formal money transfer channels to Somalia from the UK.

Remittances to the Philippines have more than trebled over the past decade, reaching US$23.4 billion in 2012. The number of Filipinos living abroad rose by 3.1 million between 2000 and 2012. Globally, the Philippines is now the third largest recipient of remittances, after India and China.

The Central Bank of the Philippines reported US$6.7 billion of remittances in the three months following Typhoon Haiyan – nearly 10 times more than the US$709 million of international humanitarian assistance reported to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA’s) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) for the Philippines in the same period. These remittances were of course not all prompted by or directed to the typhoon response. But the volume was 2.1% higher than the total in the previous three months and a larger increase than observed in previous years. In recognition of the importance of this flow, financial services companies such as Western Union reduced or waived remittance fees for a specific period in the aftermath of the typhoon.

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**DATA POVERTY: REMITTANCES**

Global data on remittances is collected by the World Bank’s Development Prospects Group, which covers annual remittance inflows for 170 countries and monthly information for 20 countries. However, global data on remittances does not exist for several crisis-affected countries. This includes the top four recipients of humanitarian assistance in 2012 (Syria, South Sudan, West Bank & Gaza Strip and Somalia) and seven of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance between 2003 and 2012. Monthly data is available for only two of these countries – Pakistan and Kenya.

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**FIGURE 8.5**

Percentage change in remittances to the Philippines from previous quarter, November to January, 2009–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 09-Jan 10</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 10-Jan 11</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 11-Jan 12</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 12-Jan 13</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 13-Jan 14</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Central Bank of the Philippines [Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas]
Official development assistance (ODA) is the only international flow explicitly aimed at the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), governments united around specific poverty and deprivation objectives backed by financial commitments. By 2013, two years from the 2015 MDG deadlines, ODA reached US$135 billion. This represents an average of 0.3% of donor countries’ gross national income (GNI), against the 0.7% commitment made by a number of donors.

Increasing numbers of countries are providing international development assistance. Some former aid recipients are now aid donors, such as South Korea, whose development cooperation has tripled over the last decade, while current aid recipients like India and China are also donors.

ODA and ODA-like flows from donors outside the OECD DAC members group increased to an estimated US$14.3 billion in 2012, equivalent to 10% of total global development cooperation. Levels also appear to have grown at twice the rate of ODA from OECD DAC donors over the last decade – though this is partly due to better reporting, including from the 17 non-DAC donors that now report to the OECD DAC. Donors that do not report to the OECD DAC use and report on their own definitions of official development cooperation - making direct comparison with ODA problematic.

ODA plays an important role for crisis-affected countries. It represents 14% of all international resource flows to the largest recipients of humanitarian assistance – more than double the proportion going to developing countries overall, even when humanitarian assistance is excluded (see Figure 8.2). And for some countries, it is particularly significant: ODA represents 75% of Afghanistan’s international resource flows, 49% of Kenya’s and 39% of Ethiopia’s.

**REDEFINING ODA**

While ODA can be provided in many forms, the OECD DAC has strict eligibility criteria for what can and cannot be included: it must have as its primary objective the economic development and welfare of a defined group of developing countries; it must be concessional through the provision of grants or ‘soft’ loans; and certain activities, including military aid, peacekeeping operations and anti-terrorism cannot be counted. Funding from non-government donors, such as philanthropic foundations or public contributions to non-governmental organisations, cannot be considered as ODA.

In December 2012, the DAC High-Level Meeting set out an agenda to modernise the ODA definition in an attempt to make it more relevant to a post-2015 development finance agenda. It recognised that some of the rules defining the eligibility criteria (such as how concessionality is defined) have become outdated. It also recognised that government support outside the ODA definition may have beneficial outcomes. The agenda thus attempts to recognise the wider official effort, measured both in terms of costs to donors and benefits to recipients, while maintaining a core definition of ODA that allows donors to be fairly assessed and held to account. Final recommendations are due to be adopted by OECD DAC ministers in December 2014.

Central to this may be a focus on the stated purpose of ODA. Redefining this away from economic growth and welfare to an explicit attention on people in poverty, such as the global bottom 20%, could address a number of concerns. It ensures, for example, that a focus on poverty eradication, whether direct through bilateral assistance or by supporting global public goods, is maintained. And by requiring a demonstrable focus on poor people, the debate can shift from a focus on what types of resources qualify as ODA to how they best are used.

As a proportion of ODA, humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors has remained consistent at around 10% over the last decade, fluctuating only by one percentage point over the period. The relationship between this humanitarian assistance and other ODA is important, as Chapter 7 has shown. Harnessing development assistance to address people’s underlying risks and vulnerabilities, including chronic poverty, is crucial for breaking the cycle of crisis.
FIGURE 8.6

ODA and development cooperation flows from OECD DAC and non-DAC donors, 2004–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data and national development cooperation data for those countries not reporting to the DAC

FIGURE 8.7

Official humanitarian assistance as a share of ODA from OECD DAC donors, 2004–2013

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
Note: 2013 data is partial and preliminary
A small proportion of security and peacekeeping expenditure can currently be counted as ODA, if it has a development objective and does not involve direct military support. This includes funding for peace-building and conflict resolution, for landmine clearance and for some security sector reform activities.

The percentage of gross ODA reported as allocated to conflict, peace and security has declined to 2.4% (US$2.8 billion) from a peak of 3.3% (US$3.7 billion) of overall ODA in 2009. However, the scope of this ODA category is controversial and fluctuations may be a result of reporting decisions by donors, as well as of changes in actual expenditure.

Between 2008 and 2012, civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution accounted for the largest share of ODA from within the category of conflict, peace and security spending (47%). Landmine clearance accounted for 10%. According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, in 2013, 59 states and four other areas were mine-affected, causing direct casualties as well as limiting land-based livelihoods. The smallest share (1% or US$0.1 billion) went towards the prevention or demobilisation of child soldiers. A 2014 UN report documented cases of child soldiers in eight national armies and 51 armed groups including in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria and South Sudan.

### Figure 8.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47%</td>
<td>US$7.9bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>US$1.9bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>US$1.7bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>US$1.0bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>US$0.1bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>US$4.1bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS data
Notes: Post-conflict peace building code (15230) was changed to participation in international peacekeeping operations in 2010. SALW = small arms and light weapons
Peacekeeping

Global military and security expenditure in 2012 was an estimated US$1.8 trillion, or 2.5% of global gross domestic product (GDP). This expenditure encompassed a vast range of objectives, activities (military and non-military) actors (state and non-state), and of course had a vast range of impacts on civilians. Against this, an estimated US$212 billion was spent worldwide by states on multilateral peacekeeping and foreign military interventions in developing countries in 2011. Of this, US$197 billion was spent in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 2012, the latest year for which comprehensive data is available, spending on multilateral peacekeeping missions was US$9.1 billion, US$5.7 billion of which was on UN missions. During the same year, government contributions to humanitarian assistance totalled US$13.2 billion.

However, available data since 2012 indicates that the global peacekeeping figure may rise in 2013 and 2014, reflecting a rise in the number as well as the cost of peacekeeping missions. In 2013, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission to Mali (MINUSMA) with a 2013–2014 budget of US$602 million, and, in 2014, to the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) with estimated costs of US$313 million for the year.

The 2013–2014 UN peacekeeping budget was set at just over US$7.8 billion, and the 2014–2015 budget estimated at US$8.6 billion, to cover 16 peacekeeping missions with just under 120,000 personnel. The largest of these missions is in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with over 25,000 personnel and a 2013–2014 budget of US$1.5 billion. By way of comparison, DRC received US$464 million in humanitarian assistance in 2012.

FIGURE 8.10

Cost of multilateral peacekeeping operations, 2003–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on SIPRI and UN data
Notes: Includes ECCAS, OAS, ECOWAS missions as well as bilateral or independent missions such as the Swiss/Swedish on the Korean border. Iraq multinational force has been left out. UN figure includes political and observer missions. For 2013 only full figures for UN operations are available, and for 2014 only estimates for UN operations.
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is the largest of the NATO peacekeeping missions, with estimated costs of US$601 million (excluding troop-contributing country costs). ISAF expenditure peaked in 2011 with a surge in troops but mission costs decreased in 2012 and 2013 as troops and assets were progressively withdrawn and donors shifted attention to support the Afghan National Security Forces, in preparation for the complete withdrawal of international troops in 2014.13

The share of peacekeeping costs from other bodies fluctuates since, when new conflicts break out, regional bodies are often among the first to respond. For example, the International Support Mission to Mali, organised by the Economic Community of West African States was re-hatted as the UN-led MINUSMA.

Each multilateral body has a different financing system for peacekeeping. For UN missions, expenses are distributed among UN member states according to a scale of assessment that apportions a specific percentage share of the costs to each state based on their relative wealth and ability to contribute (resulting in the United States (US) contributing by far the largest share, followed by Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and China). States can also make voluntary contributions to particular peace operations, but these account for a very small proportion of peacekeeping funds – 0.08% for 2013–2014.14

While the majority of funding for peacekeeping comes from developed countries, the majority of peacekeeping troops come from developing countries. The largest troop-contributing countries to UN missions are Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Rwanda. They also contribute other personnel: for example, at end of June 2014, in addition to just over 7,000 peacekeeping soldiers, Bangladesh was contributing 65 military experts and just under 1,700 police.15

In 2012, global military and security expenditure was an estimated US$1.8 trillion. Spending on multilateral peacekeeping was US$9.1 billion.
In focus: Public and private support in risk financing

For crisis-prone communities, financial preparedness against risks is preferable to a reliance on post-crisis assistance – allowing people greater resilience and control in the face of disaster. It can reduce the impacts of a disaster as well as create incentives to further reduce risk and bring greater confidence to invest – bringing potential to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty.

Such financial preparedness requires multiple sources and instruments because ODA and humanitarian assistance are not always sufficiently resourced, nor best placed to support these initiatives. In certain contexts, complementary approaches can come from the increasing range of market-mediated financial and insurance products, for which there is growing demand and political commitment. Extending risk financing (such as savings, reserves and credit facilities) and risk transfer products (such as insurance or catastrophe bonds) to developing countries is now feasible on a scale unthinkable 10 years ago due to developments in the products and payment distribution, as well as technical innovation in measuring and modelling risk.

Financial preparedness is a core element of a comprehensive approach to risk management. It involves identifying exposure to and the financial consequences of risk, then putting in place strategies to reduce risks and manage residual risk (that which cannot be practically or cost-effectively reduced).

Managing residual risk typically involves a layered set of options to directly manage and meet the financial cost of the most frequent and low-impact risks (such as sickness) through a combination of savings or reserves and access to credit. For less frequent but potentially high-impact risks (such as droughts or floods), against which it might not be feasible to retain sufficient reserves, the cost of meeting post-disaster financing can be met through insurance, risk pooling and catastrophe bonds, effectively ‘transferring’ the cost to others – such as the private sector. Paying premiums spreads the cost of risk over time, while combining the premiums across multiple fee-payers spreads the risk itself across space.

**Risk financing** involves taking measures to ensure that adequate funds are directly available to meet financial needs should a disaster occur. Such financing can be established internally through the accumulation of funds set aside for future use or obtained externally through prearranged credit facilities. The banking sector, capital markets and international lending institutions are all sources of risk financing.

**Risk transfer** involves shifting of the cost of risks to others who, in exchange for a premium, provide compensation when a disaster occurs, ensuring any financing gap that might emerge is partially or fully bridged. Risk transfer may be obtained through insurance policies or capital market instruments such as catastrophe bonds. The insurance and reinsurance sectors are the main sources of risk transfer, although capital markets provide an alternative source. The pay-outs of risk transfer instruments may be calculated on the basis of an assessment of actual losses sustained (indemnity-based), or a pre-agreed payment based on the occurrence of a particular trigger, such as reduced rainfall over a defined period of time (parametric and index-lined insurance). The advantage of the latter is that assessments are not necessary, so expediting pay-outs and reducing administrative costs.16

For crisis-prone communities, financial preparedness against risks is preferable to a reliance on post-crisis assistance – allowing people greater resilience and control in the face of disaster. It can reduce the impacts of a disaster as well as create incentives to further reduce risk and bring greater confidence to invest – bringing potential to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty.

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Risk financing and risk transfer requires the expertise, technological and financial capacity of a broad range of actors across public and private sectors and civil society. The role of donors and other international actors is typically catalytic, providing seed-funding to test and scale up initiatives. They can also support domestic governments to develop their own sovereign risk financing strategies and invest in public goods to build understanding of risk and demand for risk financing and enable markets to function better.

The ‘enabling’ conditions for risk financing and risk transfer to function effectively and sustainably may require significant and sustained investments over many years, and in specific contexts. This means that in practice they have limitations: risk financing and transfer mechanisms have largely focused on providing financial preparedness against natural disaster risks and are not likely to be feasible in protracted, conflict-related humanitarian crises. In such instances, internationally financed humanitarian preparedness and response will remain critical to meeting the needs of people at risk of crisis.

But as outlined in Chapter 9, even where risk-financing and risk-transfer models are not possible, more ‘risk-informed’ humanitarian action, which invests in preparedness and responds to early indicators of a deteriorating situation, would confer some of the benefits of better financial preparedness for disasters. These include a more timely and cost-effective response, improved humanitarian outcomes and protection of livelihoods.
Financial risk management strategies and partnerships supporting finance at individual/community level.

Macro level: The enabling environment
Policy, legislation, market regulation, consumer protection, sovereign risk financing, national social protection schemes

Meso level: Support infrastructure
Financial services, insurance markets, information technology providers, distribution networks (social protection schemes, mobile money networks)

Micro level: Interface
• Commercial, mutual and informal insurers
• Agents
• Brokers and intermediaries
• Education
• Demand

Risk retention:
(savings, reserves, access to credit)

Risk transfer:
(insurance, risk pooling, risk bonds)

Risk reduction:
(safety standards, risk awareness, physical protection)

Source: Development Initiatives based on Forum for Agricultural Risk Management in Development and Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight and the Microinsurance Centre

CHAPTER 8: WHAT OTHER RESOURCES ARE IMPORTANT?

RISK FINANCING AND RISK TRANSFER IN ACTION: THE R4 RURAL RESILIENCE INITIATIVE, ETHIOPIA

The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) is a strategic partnership between Oxfam America and the UN World Food Programme, initiated in 2010. It provides a combination of risk management strategies including improved resource management (risk reduction), insurance (risk transfer), microcredit (prudent risk-taking) and savings (risk reserves).

The initiative complements the existing government-led productive safety net programme (PSNP) and uses the PSNP’s local infrastructure and targeting mechanisms to identify and access clients. Client farmers receive automatic pay-outs in the event of seasonal droughts, triggered when certain climate thresholds are breached. The pay-outs should enable farmers to purchase seeds and inputs to replant the following season and avoid selling assets. Access to credit is also provided through partnership with a microfinance institution, which uses the insurance as collateral, providing farmers with capital to make productive investments.

In 2013, over 20,000 farmers purchased insurance in Tigray and Amhara. Around 80% of Tigray’s newly enrolled farmers purchased their insurance premiums with a combination of cash (10% of the premium) and labour. Farmers who paid for insurance premiums with their labour contributed to risk reduction activities in their communities, including improved irrigation capabilities and soil management practice.
Climate financing and disaster risk reduction

The fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report concluded in 2013 that human-induced climate change was a near certainty. Climatic unpredictability, a key driver of crisis and entrenched poverty, is projected to become exacerbated through climate change, with both more intense and more frequent events.

Extreme events alone do not cause disasters: the greatest effects of climate change are felt where people and populations are most vulnerable and least resilient to these hazards. More intense events are set to have an impact on greater numbers of people in the future, while shorter intervals between disasters will leave even less time for people to recover and build up assets, exacerbating vulnerability to the next wave.

As described in Chapter 7, long-term humanitarian crisis, chronic poverty and limited domestic capacity to respond occur in the same places, challenging humanitarian and development communities to invest in building resilience and in addressing the chronic poverty, risks and vulnerabilities that cause crises to recur and become entrenched.

Many countries regularly receiving humanitarian assistance are also highly vulnerable to current and anticipated climate risks. For example, 9 of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance between 2003 and 2012 (Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Chad, Sudan, DRC, Ethiopia, Myanmar and Haiti), are in the bottom 20 countries ranked in the University of Notre Dame’s Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), which ranks 177 countries according to both vulnerability to, and ability to cope with, climate change. Most of these countries have been affected by conflict in recent years, highlighting the fact that many ‘natural disasters’ are in fact complex emergencies.

FIGURE 8.12

Top 20 recipients of approved climate adaptation funds, 2003–2013

Source: Climate Funds Update
Note: The countries highlighted in yellow are top 20 humanitarian recipients, 2003–2012.
To address the challenges faced by developing countries, the 16th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2010 saw developed countries committing to jointly mobilising US$100 billion a year by 2020. Climate change finance constitutes a range of public and private flows directed at initiatives to either mitigate the exacerbation of climate change or to minimise the impacts of climate change through adaptation. The majority of climate change flows come from the private sector, which contributed 62% of the estimated US$359 billion total in 2012.21

Investments in climate mitigation account for the vast majority of climate change finance flows, with much of this going to China and other emerging economies. By contrast, funding for adaptation in developing countries accounts for just an estimated 6% of all climate change financing to date, of which the majority has been channelled towards capacity-building.

An aggregate US$537 million of adaptation finance was approved between 2003 and 2013 for the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance, accounting for 19% of all such country-specific funding. However, only US$63 million has so far been disbursed in this period.

Only one of the top twenty humanitarian recipients, Pakistan, is among the top 10 recipients of approved climate adaptation funding in this period. A further six (Ethiopia, DRC, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan) are between 11th and 20th largest recipients of climate adaptation funding. Afghanistan, Iraq and Zimbabwe are all among the bottom five countries on the ND-GAIN and receive very small amounts of approved climate adaptation financing – US$14 million, US$ 0.1 million and US$7 million respectively.

Nine of out the top 20 recipient countries of humanitarian assistance are in the bottom 20 of the GAIN climate change vulnerability index. Most of these nine were also conflict-affected.
Multiple actors – including individuals, governments, UN agencies, NGOs and the private sector – rallied to support the millions of people affected by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in late 2013. Canada, shown here, was one of at least 20 countries that provided military assets, such as air transport for delivery of relief goods, debris clearance, and mobile medical teams.

In the aftermath of the Typhoon the Philippines government launched the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAITH) – an online platform designed to record financial and in-kind pledges and donations from international governments and institutions – to ensure accountability and improve coordination of resources.
People affected by, or at risk of, crises have dynamic and interlinked needs that often go beyond even the widest interpretation of humanitarian response (see Chapters 7 and 8). To best address these, donors as well as operational agencies and domestic governments require an accurate and current picture of people’s needs as well as of the landscape of available resources. Timely, accessible, high-quality and openly available information about needs and financing flows does not guarantee better decision-making on resourcing – but is essential to informing it.

The High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda recognised this need in the development context and called for a “data revolution for sustainable development, with a new international initiative to improve the quality of statistics and information available to citizens”. In response, governments and development organisations are looking at ways to improve the collection, transparency and use of data, particularly at national and sub-national level.

At the same time as the post-2015 data revolution takes shape, there is an ongoing need for improvements in the quality, coordination and accessibility of information on both humanitarian needs and humanitarian financing. As this chapter details, there has been innovation and progress in these areas over recent years, with many new needs assessments and aid transparency initiatives. The challenges remain to continue to adapt, implement and invest in these – as well as to see that this evidence is well-used in decision-making.
Better information about risks and needs

Humanitarian assistance is driven by the imperative to respond according to need. This imperative is at the heart of the humanitarian principles and reiterated in the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which state that funding should be allocated in proportion to needs and on the basis of strong needs assessments.

Yet it is not a simple task to assess the multi-dimensional needs of the most vulnerable people in dynamic, complex and sometimes inaccessible crisis situations. The logistical and methodological challenges can be vast. Defining and prioritising needs is further complicated by the potentially wide scope of humanitarian action – from early action and risk reduction through to recovery and reconstruction. Assessments can also risk being biased towards the needs of those who are most visible, or towards the needs that fit agencies’ repertoires of response.

Recent needs assessment initiatives

Over the past five years, there have been renewed efforts to improve the quality, timeliness and coordination of needs assessments. These come both from established humanitarian actors and from newer ones including ‘digital humanitarians’. This area of technological innovation has seen rapid growth in recent years and includes the volunteer mobilisation of the Digital Humanitarian Network and Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response platform from the Qatar Computing Institute.

From established actors, the change in the UN-coordinated appeals process in 2013 was in part an attempt to give more primacy and independence to setting out needs. The previous consolidated appeals process (CAP) integrated needs assessment and project requirements in a single document, thus risking skewing the picture of needs. The new process separates out humanitarian needs overviews, from subsequent strategic response plans (SRPs, see Chapter 2).

Another recent initiative, which feeds into some humanitarian needs overviews, is the multi-cluster/sector initial rapid assessment (MIRA).

Developed in 2012 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, MIRA is a multi-stakeholder assessment, usually conducted in the first two weeks of a sudden onset disaster. Over 40 agencies participated in the first two phases of the MIRA in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan in late 2013, the results of which informed the UN-coordinated SRP. While this multi-sectoral, coordinated approach is being widely used and adapted in many sudden onset crises, it has not yet been rolled out or adapted for the protracted crises that account for most humanitarian needs.

The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), set up by a consortium of NGOs in 2009, works across all kinds of humanitarian crises. It seeks to improve the system-wide assessment of humanitarian needs in crises. It does so through global and country-specific needs briefings, tools, training and deployment of assessment specialists. As well as providing independent support for coordinated assessments in the event of an emergency, ACAPS works with humanitarian actors to strengthen assessment preparedness in high disaster-risk countries.
NEEDS-BASED BUDGETING

In 2014, a number of UN-coordinated SRPs, including those in Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo, are piloting different methodologies for needs-based budgeting. Previously the consolidated appeal process budgets simply represented the sum of individual project requirements in each cluster. While methodologies differ across countries, generally the new approach begins with each cluster budgeting its activities by assigning an approximate average unit or beneficiary cost to each planned activity, then multiplying that amount by the number of people to be reached to meet the needs of the target population.

A mid-term review of SNAP in October 2013 concluded that the project has added significant value to the humanitarian community by improving the targeting of assistance and building a shared situational awareness of the needs of the Syrian population.

Recent risk assessment initiatives

Better information is also required on risks and early warning signs, before these become manifest or acute humanitarian needs. This information should enable preparedness and trigger appropriate resourcing (development or humanitarian, national and international) to protect lives and livelihoods and build resilience. Early warning signs of violence and conflict need to be monitored as well as those of resource scarcity and natural hazards. There are a number of country-specific early warning systems that seek to do this. One example is the Drought Early Warning System in Karamoja, Uganda. This initiative allows the analysis of community vulnerability indicators and weather forecasts, and issues warnings and advice to at-risk communities.

Focusing on global and national levels, Information for Risk Management is a new risk index to be launched in November 2014. A collaborative project of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, it aims to identify where crises may occur based on a series of indicators measuring hazards, vulnerability and capacity across 191 countries.

A number of recommendations have been proposed in this regard. At global and country levels, donors should work together better to share their analysis of funding needs and gaps and decide collectively on an explicitly agreed division of labour (see Chapter 4). At the global level, this could be managed and coordinated through an operational wing of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative; and at country level through various country-specific donor coordination groups. Not only would this encourage donors to agree and act on a collective analysis of priority needs but it would also support a more transparent and accountable approach to global resource allocation.

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Better information about financing flows

Without sufficient funds to meet all needs, there are real opportunity costs for the choices that donors make. Donors must target their finite humanitarian funds according to information about needs; but they also need to know what other humanitarian funds are being channelled, and where, in order to best direct their own.

Improving access to this real-time data is critical to improving the effectiveness, coordination and efficiency of the collective humanitarian response – and so to avoid neglect or duplication. It is also critical for full accountability to people on the receiving end of humanitarian assistance. Yet as highlighted throughout this report, there are many areas of data poverty – timely, standardised and accessible data on financial flows is still largely lacking.

Calls for greater transparency in humanitarian assistance are increasing, including through the Open Humanitarian Initiative, which promotes the sharing of information in the humanitarian space through the principles of open data.

International Aid Transparency Initiative

The multi-stakeholder International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is one way in which better data and information on humanitarian assistance could be made publicly available. Launched at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008, there are currently over 260 organisations publishing information to the IATI standard. Originally designed for development aid, initiatives are now underway to modify IATI for the particular time-bound demands and definitions of humanitarian assistance.

The ultimate vision is that IATI will provide a single standardised format to which all actors (governments, private donors and aid agencies) can publish their data. Once published to IATI standard the data can be reused and redirected to any number of reporting platforms, including the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), and to fulfil donor reporting requirements. This would reduce the multiple reporting burden currently placed on donors and delivery agencies. It would also allow project-level data to be geocoded so that resources can be traced all the way from donor to final recipient (see Figure 9.1).

Following the first IATI humanitarian stakeholders’ workshop in 2013, proposed modifications range from adding a specific humanitarian marker so that humanitarian data can be easily identified, to creating a completely new element specifically for additional humanitarian-related information. Some governments are already using IATI data in their own tracking and transparency initiatives.

DFID’s Development Tracker

The UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) uses IATI data to drive its portal, Development Tracker. By using this we can see, for example, that £98m of DFID’s £355 million Girls’ Education Challenge fund has so far been spent, £19.1 million of which is currently showing as having been allocated by fund manager Price Waterhouse Cooper to projects for implementation. Funds can then be traced to the organisations tasked with delivering the work. Once work is being delivered using Girls’ Education Challenge funds, projects should be fully geocoded, enabling access to a detailed mapping of project delivery. While this example relates to development financing, it demonstrates the potential for geocoded data on humanitarian funding to improve traceability and thus effectiveness and accountability.

Netherlands’ budget tracker

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched an interactive budget webpage that uses IATI data to track national budget items, with the potential to allow users to trace funds all the way through to local project delivery on the ground. Data is presented in four blocks:

1) an overview of the overall budget for international trade and development cooperation
2) an overview of the budget by priority areas
3) a map showing countries receiving expenditure of over 1 million euros
4) a listing of individual activities. Users can filter the data presented by budget area (including humanitarian assistance), or by country.

Philippines’ FAiTH

Following Typhoon Haiyan, in order to ensure accountability and improve coordination of resources, the government of the Philippines turned to IATI to track resources coming into the country. However, the data was not readily available because not enough donors are yet publishing their contributions to the IATI standard.

The government responded by creating the online Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH) an online platform designed to record financial and in-kind pledges and donations from international governments and institutions channelled through the government, as well as donations provided through the Commission on Filipinos ‘Overseas’ Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino Program. It does not record donations made directly to private groups and organisations such as NGOs, UN agencies or private organisations and foundations.

While FAiTH’s goals are commendable, functionality is poor. While it was originally intended to enable users to track the status of donations to the point of delivery, this is not possible with the data that is currently available. If funding information was already published to the IATI standard by all donors and all actors, the government would have been able to pull the relevant data directly from the IATI registry, rather than setting up its own system. Full IATI data would allow all funds to be traced, not just resources channelled through line ministries of the national government. It would also allow funds to be tracked all the way through the system – from the original source, through the various channels of delivery and, ultimately, to see where, how and by whom the aid was eventually delivered on the ground.

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FIGURE 9.1

Tracing financing flows using d-portal and IATI data: CAR project examples

d-portal.org is a country-based information platform that tracks development resource flows using data published through IATI and by the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS). It was set up to enable users to view all resource flows from a recipient country perspective, helping to expose gaps in development provision and highlighting unequal distribution at a national level. d-portal also assists with the planning and monitoring of development activities by enabling ministries, parliamentarians and civil society to track where resources come from and who they go to on a project-by-project basis. As the scope and quality of IATI data increases, platforms such as d-portal will provide a means of tracing the funds all the way through from donors to end recipients.

This example shows the data available for two projects in CAR, demonstrating how d-portal and similar aid-tracking devices can allow funding to be traced through the system using IATI data.

Project information

- **Title**: Prison Project in Central African Republic on behalf of the Peacebuilding Fund
- **Funder**: Other UNDP JP
- **Implementing organisation**: United Nations Office for Project Services
- **Sector**: Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (100%)
- **2010 budget**: US$376,998
- **2011 budget**: US$1,157,870
- **2012 budget**: US$1,494,624
- **2013 budget**: US$279,745
- **2011 transactions**: US$202,243
- **2012 transactions**: US$1,117,790
- **2013 transactions**: US$24,331
- **2013 budget**: €2 million
- **2014 budget**: €1 million
- **2013 transactions**: €2 million

Project information

- **Title**: DSH/HO Common Humanitarian Fund Central African Republic 2013
- **Funder**: The Netherlands
- **Implementing organisation**: United Nations Development Programme
- **Sector**: Material relief and assistance services (100%)
THE STORY

Remittances are an essential source of income for many households. The total global value of remittances – sent both through formal and informal channels – is unknown, but estimates suggest that formal flows alone account for nearly one fifth of total international resources (US$43.9 billion) to the top recipient countries of humanitarian assistance. For some of these countries they represent the largest single international inflow – in Pakistan they account for 66% and in Haiti, 39%. This woman survived the 2010 Haitian earthquake which destroyed her family home. She is the primary carer for her eight grandchildren and relies on money sent from her son, who lives abroad, to pay their school fees.
DATA & GUIDES
What is humanitarian assistance?

Humanitarian action is designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. This definition is set out in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and Good Practice Guidelines. In this report, when used in the context of data, humanitarian assistance refers to the financial resources for this action.

As well as being focused on emergencies, humanitarian assistance differs from other forms of foreign and development assistance because it is intended to be governed by the key humanitarian principles of:

- humanity – saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found
- impartiality – acting solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations
- neutrality – acting without favouring any side in an armed conflict or other dispute
- independence – ensuring autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives.

These principles are set out in the fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, reaffirmed in UN General Assembly resolutions and enshrined in numerous humanitarian standards and guidelines such as the Sphere Humanitarian Charter.

There is no universal obligation or system for reporting expenditure on humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 9), so what is counted in humanitarian assistance reporting can vary by donor. However, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) does set out clear definitions of humanitarian assistance for those donors (both member and non-member) that report to its databases.

We include what donors themselves report as ‘humanitarian’ in our analysis, but aim to consistently label and source the data we have used. OECD DAC donors report their humanitarian assistance as a sub-sector of official development assistance (ODA) against strict criteria. Yet other providers of development cooperation outside the OECD DAC who voluntarily report their humanitarian assistance to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) are not bound by the same criteria as donors reporting to the OECD DAC.
Methodology and definitions

Cash

Our analysis of cash transfers is based on UN OCHA FTS data. There is currently no specific identifier or flag within the source data, so we carry out a keyword search on the project title, description and cluster. Our keywords include: cash, cash transfer, unconditional cash, conditional cash transfer, cash grant, voucher, cash for work, CfW, cash for assets, CfA, tokens, coupons, e-money, e-cash, food for work, voucher for work, public works programme, and cash transfer programme. Our coding also distinguishes between full and partial cash programmes. Projects that are labelled ‘full’ are designed primarily for cash transfer interventions; those labelled ‘partial’ combine cash transfer interventions with other activities.

Channels of delivery

We use this term to describe the agencies and organisations receiving funding for the delivery of humanitarian assistance – UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the public sector, pooled funds and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – whether they deliver the assistance themselves or pass it on to partner organisations. For example, a donor may fund a UN agency, which may in turn fund an international NGO, which may in turn partner with a local NGO to deliver the assistance. Currently, we are only able to track humanitarian assistance expenditure to the first transaction level. However, in this year’s report we have carried out further analysis of funding to NGOs as the channel of delivery, based on our own categorisation of NGOs (see ‘NGO classifications’ and Chapter 5).

Our channels of delivery data comes from both the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the UN OCHA FTS.

Conflict, peace and security ODA

Funding to conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security appears as its own category within sector-specific ODA. In this category, activities include support of security system management and reform, removal of land mines and other explosives, demobilisation of child soldiers, reintegration of demobilised military personnel, small arms and light weapons control, peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution and participation in international peacekeeping operations.

Domestic governments

Data on what domestic governments spend in response to disasters and crises within their own borders is not systematically collated and reported to a single body. In this year’s report we include the results of our own research into the domestic disaster relief and disaster risk reduction contributions of three governments – Kenya, India and the Philippines – using publicly available national budget documents (see pages 41–44). We use the following sources of data for our analysis:


Exchange rates

We predominately use OECD DAC exchange rates for OECD DAC members and exchange rates from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database (April 2014 edition) for countries outside of the OECD DAC group.

Financing mechanisms

All of our humanitarian assistance categories include money spent through pooled funds and financing mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-level humanitarian pooled funds.

Forgotten crises

Our analysis of forgotten crises is based on the European Commission Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)’s forgotten crisis assessment (FCA) index, which is compiled annually using a series of weighted indicators to come up with an overall ranking of emergency situations.

Governments (and European Union) institutions

Our data and definition of international government funding for humanitarian crises comprises:

- the total ‘official’ humanitarian assistance expenditure of the 29 members of the OECD DAC – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European institutions – a subset of ODA, which is reported to the OECD DAC each year
- expenditure by ‘other governments’, sometimes referred to as ‘non-DAC donors’ or ‘South-South development partners’, as captured by UN OCHA FTS.

Note that:

- domestic government expenditure is treated separately (see Domestic governments methodology, page 117)
- although it is not an OECD DAC donor, Turkey’s reporting to the OECD DAC is more comprehensive than its reporting through UN OCHA FTS. We therefore use OECD DAC data when reporting on Turkey’s humanitarian assistance contributions.
- when we report on the individual contributions of OECD DAC donors who are members of the European Union (EU), we also include an imputed calculation of their humanitarian assistance channelled through the EU institutions.
Humanitarian needs

Our analysis in Chapter 1 of who was affected by crises is based on:

- the number of people affected by crises – data is sourced from UN-coordinated appeals, the CRED EM-DAT disaster database (data downloaded 8 May 2014) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and reflects the highest number of people affected within each country at any given point during the year.

- the proportion of the total population affected in crisis countries (based on World Bank 2012 population data).

International humanitarian response

This comprises the combined contributions of:

- international governments (data taken from both OECD DAC and UN OCHA FTS)
- individuals, trusts and foundations, and private companies and corporations (either using our own research or as reported in UN OCHA FTS).

Long-term humanitarian assistance countries

In this report, long-term humanitarian assistance countries are defined as those receiving a greater than average proportion of ODA (excluding debt relief) in the form of humanitarian assistance for more than eight years between 1998 and 2012. ‘Medium term’ refers to those receiving a lower than average proportion for between three and seven years inclusive, and ‘short term’ means under three years.

NGO classifications

Analysis of funding to NGOs is based on our own categorisation of five types of NGO, which was established following consultation with a range of recognised sources and stakeholders. Categories include:

- international NGOs – defined as those based in an OECD DAC member country and carrying out operations in one or more developing countries (e.g. Save the Children UK, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam GB, Norwegian Refugee Council)
- southern international NGOs (SINGOs) – those not based in an OECD DAC member country and carrying out operations in one or more developing countries (e.g. BRAC, Mercy Malaysia)
- affiliated national NGOs – nationally-operating NGOs that are affiliated to an international NGO (e.g. World Vision South Sudan and Food for the Hungry)
- national NGOs – those operating in the developing country where they are headquartered, working in multiple sub-national regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO (e.g. Almanar Voluntary Organization, Somali Humanitarian Aid and Development Organization (SHADO))
- local NGOs – those operating in a specific, geographically defined, sub-national area, without affiliation to either a national or international NGO; this grouping can also include community-based organisations (CBOs, e.g. Abyei Community Action for Development, Nuba Mountain Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization).
Official development assistance (ODA)

ODA is a grant or loan from an OECD member country to a developing country (as defined by the OECD) or multilateral agency for the promotion of economic development and welfare. It is reported by members of the OECD DAC, along with several other government donors and institutions, according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty-reducing development assistance (for sectors such as governance and security, social services, education, health, and water and sanitation) as well as humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC members and other donors reporting to the OECD DAC.

In this report we express our total ODA figures as net of debt relief, apart from in Chapter 8, where development assistance is based on gross ODA.

Other official flows (OOFs)

Other official flows are official sector transactions reported by governments to the OECD DAC that do not meet the ODA criteria, because their primary purpose is not development-motivated, or because their grant element is below the 25% threshold that would make them eligible to be recorded as ODA. Transactions classified as OOFs include export- and investment-related transactions, rescheduling of OOF loans, and other bilateral securities and claims.

Poverty

We refer to three international poverty lines in this report and use World Bank data in our analyses:

- $1.25 a day (‘extreme’ or ‘absolute’ poverty)
- $2 a day
- $4 a day

These measures are expressed in ‘international dollars’, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates from 2005.

Private funding

This comprises contributions from individuals, private foundations, trusts, private companies and corporations. We have developed a unique methodology to attempt to quantify and analyse this under-reported resource flow (see opposite).

Rounding

There may be minor discrepancies in some of the totals in our graphs and charts, and between those and the text; this is because of rounding.

Total ‘official’ humanitarian assistance

Total ‘official’ humanitarian assistance forms a core part of our international government and humanitarian response calculations and is used when making comparisons with other development assistance and other resource flows to developing countries.

Total ‘official’ humanitarian assistance includes:

- bilateral humanitarian expenditure of OECD DAC members, as reported through the OECD DAC
- multilateral (core and totally unearmarked) ODA contributions to UNHCR, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP).
GHA’s unique calculations

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM GOVERNMENTS

Our calculation of international humanitarian assistance from government donors is the sum of:

- total ’official’ humanitarian assistance (OECD DAC)
- humanitarian assistance from providers of development cooperation outside the OECD DAC (see Government donors page 26)

Our total ’official’ humanitarian assistance calculation comprises:

- bilateral humanitarian assistance of the 29 OECD DAC donors, as reported in the OECD DAC database under table ‘DAC1 Official and Private Flows’, item ’Hist: Humanitarian aid grants’ (net disbursements)
- total multilateral ODA disbursements to UNHCR, UNRWA, UNICEF and WFP, as recipients, reported in the OECD DAC database under table ‘DAC2a ODA Disbursements’. We do not include all ODA to WFP and UNICEF but apply a percentage in order to take into account the fact that these two agencies also have a ‘development’ mandate. These shares (applied to all years retrospectively) have been calculated using 2010–2012 data from www.unsceb.org.
- When reporting on the total official humanitarian assistance of individual donors, we include imputed calculations of humanitarian assistance contributed through the EU institutions. When reporting on the total official humanitarian assistance of individual donors to specific countries (e.g. the United Kingdom to Afghanistan), we impute contributions made via the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Until 2009 CERF contributions were reported in table DAC2a as ‘bilateral unspecified’, from 2010 data is not reported in sufficient detail in the DAC tables, so we take this data directly from the CERF.

To calculate the funding from government donors outside the OECD DAC we use UN OCHA FTS data. However, while Turkey is not an OECD DAC donor, its reporting to this database is more comprehensive than through UN OCHA FTS. We therefore use OECD DAC data to report Turkey’s humanitarian contributions.

PRIVATE FUNDING

Our definition of private funding includes contributions from individuals, trusts and foundations, and private companies and corporations. We approach humanitarian delivery agencies (including NGOs, UN agencies with a humanitarian mandate and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) directly and request financial information on their income and expenditure by means of a standardised dataset. Where direct data collection is not possible, we use publicly available annual reports and audited accounts to extract key data and complete the dataset ourselves.

Our dataset includes the following:

- 75 NGOs that form part of nine representative and well-known NGO alliances and umbrella organisations, such as Oxfam International [see table]
- six key UN agencies engaged in humanitarian response: UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO)
- the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Our private funding calculation comprises an estimate of total private humanitarian income for all NGOs, plus the private humanitarian income reported by the six UN agencies, the IFRC and ICRC. To estimate the total private humanitarian income of NGOs globally, we calculate the annual proportion that the 75 NGOs in our dataset represent of all NGOs reporting to the UN OCHA FTS. The total private humanitarian income reported to us by the NGOs in our dataset is then scaled up according to this proportion.

Due to limited data, we provide an estimate for 2013 private funding by calculating the share of overall private humanitarian assistance represented by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for the previous five years. Using data for 2013 provided to us by MSF, we then scale their private humanitarian income figure up according to the average share, to reach a global estimate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEMBER ORGANISATIONS IN THE DATASET</th>
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<tr>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
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<td>Caritas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
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<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>EMERGENCY</td>
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<td>GOAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>HelpAge</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>International Medical Corps</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>Islamic Relief</td>
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<td>Medair</td>
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<tr>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>Mercy Corps</td>
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<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>Oxfam</td>
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<td>ZOA</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
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For further details, please visit our website: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/tools.
## Data sources

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Accessed Date</th>
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<td>Climate Funds Update</td>
<td><a href="http://www.climatefundsupdate.org">www.climatefundsupdate.org</a></td>
<td>10 July 2014</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance, Union Budget, Government of India, New Delhi</td>
<td><a href="http://indiabudget.nic.in">http://indiabudget.nic.in</a></td>
<td>30 April 2014</td>
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<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Multilateral</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko">www.sipri.org/databases/pko</a></td>
<td>12 May 2014</td>
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<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central</td>
<td><a href="http://www.unocha.org/kehnef">www.unocha.org/kehnef</a></td>
<td>8 May 2014</td>
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<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial</td>
<td><a href="http://fts.unocha.org">http://fts.unocha.org</a></td>
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<td>UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, UN System</td>
<td><a href="http://www.unsceb.org/content/stats-fb">www.unsceb.org/content/stats-fb</a></td>
<td>24 April 2014</td>
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Our analysis of money raised by national fundraising platforms uses the following data sources:

- **Humanitarian Coalition**, Canada
  [http://humanitariancoalition.ca](http://humanitariancoalition.ca)

- **Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC)**, UK
  [www.dec.org.uk](http://www.dec.org.uk)

- **Belgian Consortium for Emergency Situations**, Belgium
  [www.1212.be/nl](http://www.1212.be/nl)

- **Aktion Deutschland hilft**, AGIRE, Italy
  [www.agire.it/it/agire_onlus/english.html](http://www.agire.it/it/agire_onlus/english.html)

- **Japan Platform**, Japan
  [www.japanplatform.org/E](http://www.japanplatform.org/E)

- **Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO)**, the Netherlands
  [http://samenwerkendehulporganisaties.nl](http://samenwerkendehulporganisaties.nl)

- **Radiohjälp**, Sweden
  [www.svt.se/radiohjalpen](http://www.svt.se/radiohjalpen)

- **Chaîne du Bonheur**, Switzerland
### Acronyms and abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>ACAPS</td>
<td>Assessment Capacities Project</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated appeal process (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organisation</td>
</tr>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (between Sudan and southern Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Disasters Emergency Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Disaster prevention and preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster risk management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (EC)</td>
</tr>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERF</td>
<td>Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAITH</td>
<td>Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Forgotten crisis assessment (ECHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GHA</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Assistance (the programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
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<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian needs overview</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IATI</td>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person(s)/people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>‘Level 3’ emergency (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**MINUSMA**  Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (UN)
**MIRA**  Multi-cluster initial rapid assessment
**MSF**  Médecins Sans Frontières
**NATO**  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
**ND-GAIN**  Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
**NGO**  Non-governmental organisation
**NNSC**  Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
**OCHA**  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
**ODA**  Official development assistance
**OECD**  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
**OOFs**  Other official flows
**oPt**  Occupied Palestinian territory (UN)
**OSCE**  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
**PPP**  Purchasing power parity
**R4**  The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative
**RCRC**  Red Cross Red Crescent
**RRF**  Rapid response facility (RRF)
**RRP**  Regional refugee response plan (South Sudan and Syria)
**SGBV**  Sexual and gender-based violence
**SHARP**  Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan
**Sida**  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
**SINGO**  Southern international non-governmental organisation
**SIPRI**  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
**SNAP**  Syria Needs Analysis Project
**SomReP**  Somalia Resilience Program
**SRP**  Strategic response plan
**UAE**  United Arab Emirates
**UN**  United Nations
**UNCTAD**  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
**UNDG**  United Nations Development Group
**UNDP**  United Nations Development Programme
**UNFPA**  United Nations Population Fund
**UNHCR**  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
**UNICEF**  United Nations Children’s Fund
**UNISDR**  United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
**UNRWA**  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
**UK**  United Kingdom
**US**  United States
**USAID**  US Agency for International Development
**WEO**  World Economic Outlook (IMF)
**WFP**  World Food Programme
**WHO**  World Health Organization
### TABLE 10.1

**UN-coordinated appeals, 2004–2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALL UN-COORDINATED APPEALS</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
<td>Revised requirements [US$ billions]</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding [US$ billions]</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unmet need [US$ billions]</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>64%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>72%</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<td>73%</td>
<td>72%</td>
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<td>71%</td>
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<td>391</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>854</td>
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<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>60%</td>
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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and CERF data.

Notes: Data for members of the OECD DAC 2000–2012, includes their core ODA to UNHCR, UNRWA, as well as calculated proportions of WFP and UNICEF ODA contributions. EU contributions are also imputed for OECD DAC EU members and Turkey. All figures include contributions through the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). All funding is in constant 2012 prices. Data for 2013 is partial and preliminary for OECD DAC data. EU institutions are highlighted with white as part of this funding has already been imputed into EU members’ total figures. The EU is in this table to show where it ranks alongside government donors.
### Table 10.3

Top 20 recipients of international humanitarian response from government donors and private contributions, 2003–2012

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Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data
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<td>BIGGEST DONORS 2013 (US$ MILLIONS)</td>
<td>MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2013 (% GNI)</td>
<td>MOST GENEROUS COUNTRIES IN 2013 (PER CITIZEN)</td>
<td>MOST PRIORITY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WITHIN OVERALL AID PROGRAMMES IN 2013 (% ODA)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Norway 120</td>
<td>Turkey 50%</td>
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<td>UK 1,825</td>
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<td>Luxembourg 110</td>
<td>Ireland 18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey 1,638</td>
<td>Luxembourg 0.15%</td>
<td>Kuwait 95</td>
<td>Russian Federation 18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan 1,112</td>
<td>Sweden 0.14%</td>
<td>Sweden 81</td>
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<td>Germany 949</td>
<td>Denmark 0.12%</td>
<td>Denmark 73</td>
<td>US 15%</td>
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<td>Sweden 785</td>
<td>Norway 0.12%</td>
<td>Switzerland 49</td>
<td>Luxembourg 15%</td>
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<td>Canada 691</td>
<td>Ireland 0.08%</td>
<td>Ireland 32</td>
<td>Denmark 15%</td>
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<td>Norway 613</td>
<td>UK 0.07%</td>
<td>Finland 30</td>
<td>Sweden 14%</td>
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<td>France 427</td>
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<td>Qatar 29</td>
<td>Canada 14%</td>
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<td>Netherlands 410</td>
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<td>Spain 13%</td>
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<td>Denmark 409</td>
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<td>Netherlands 24</td>
<td>Switzerland 13%</td>
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<td>Switzerland 399</td>
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<td>Latvia 13%</td>
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<td>Australia 357</td>
<td>Canada 0.04%</td>
<td>Turkey 22</td>
<td>Belgium 12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait 327</td>
<td>Qatar 0.03%</td>
<td>Canada 20</td>
<td>Norway 11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy 276</td>
<td>US 0.03%</td>
<td>Australia 15</td>
<td>Poland 11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain 253</td>
<td>Bahrain 0.03%</td>
<td>US 15</td>
<td>Slovak Republic 11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium 250</td>
<td>Germany 0.03%</td>
<td>Liechtenstein 13</td>
<td>Czech Republic 10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland 162</td>
<td>UAE 0.02%</td>
<td>Monaco 13</td>
<td>UK 10%</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland 147</td>
<td>Australia 0.02%</td>
<td>Germany 12</td>
<td>Greece 10%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia 109</td>
<td>New Zealand 0.02%</td>
<td>UAE 9</td>
<td>Japan 9%</td>
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</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and World Bank data
Notes: ODA for all donors is based on OECD DAC data inclusive of debt relief, except for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) which is ODA-like concessional flows collected by the OECD DAC.
Table 10.7

International humanitarian assistance to top 20 recipients, in the context of other official, domestic and private flows, 2012

**US$ millions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOMESTIC FLOWS</th>
<th>OTHER INTERNATIONAL FLOWS</th>
<th>PRIVATE FLOWS</th>
<th>OTHER FLOWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS (GROSS)</td>
<td>DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5,079</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6,253</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>239</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>5,376</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,417</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7,181</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2,863</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2,224</td>
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<td>1,068</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>173,120</td>
<td>4,121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>93,517</td>
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<td>1,220</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>9,678</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1,441</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>12,183</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>2,789</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>13,306</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>489</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>15,140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>403</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>48,572</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>2,383</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>491</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>725</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>11,697</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>931</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>8,544</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>640</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,153</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4,058</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1,628</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza Strip</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>654</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3,569</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>873</td>
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</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on IMF World Economic Outlook, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, World Bank, UNCTAD and SIPRI data

Note: Top 20 recipients reflect 2003–2012 period. Funding flows based on 2012 data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>VOLUME CHANGE 2011–2012 (US$m)</th>
<th>% CHANGE 2011–2012 (%)</th>
<th>INTERREGIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 2012 (US$m)</th>
<th>% UNCOORDINATED APPEAL FUNDED 2013</th>
<th>% UNCOORDINATED APPEAL UNDERFUNDED 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (conflict in Rakhine and Kachin States, and Myanmar refugees in Thailand)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (Sahrawi crisis)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Naxalite-affected regions, Jammu and Kashmir, North East India conflicts)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (Bhutanese Refugees)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (Internal armed conflict)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (Myanmar border)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts, Rohingya)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR (internal armed conflict and the humanitarian crisis caused by the LRA)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (conflict in the north and refugees from the Horn of Africa)</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No appeal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10.8**

Most frequently appearing countries on ECHO’s forgotten crisis assessment (FCA) index, 2004–2014

Source: Development Initiatives based on ECHO FCA index, OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN appeals data
Notes

Chapter 1


Chapter 2


Chapter 3


8 La Lotería Nacional de la Cruz Roja Colombiana, Colombian Red Cross Society, Bogotá www.lotecruz.org.co.

9 Data presented in this section includes only analysis of funds channelled through the ICRC and the IFRC’s international headquarters, as financial statements from individual national societies are not always comparable.


Chapter 5

1 Throughout this report we use GHA’s unique dataset on private funding for our analysis of private flows. However, for purposes of comparability and data availability, we use FTS data in this section, to compare channels of delivery by donor type.

2 Funding channelled through the public sector in the donor country may include use by the central aid authorities of other public sector agencies in the donor country for implementation of specific activities. See www.oecd.org/development/stats/45917818.pdf for OECD definitions of funding channels.


5 Our analysis of allocations from the Pakistan ERF using OCHA FTS data differs to that of OCHA as outlined in its annual report (referenced above). OCHA’s own breakdown is as follows: 48% to national NGOs, 44% to international NGOs and 8% to UN agencies. We have used our own analysis primarily in order to distinguish between funding to national and local NGOs.

Chapter 6


Chapter 7

1 As set out in the 23 Principles and Good Practice for Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003, and in OECD DAC definition of humanitarian assistance.


5 Calculations are based on shares of country-allocable humanitarian assistance.

6 SRPs covering the period 2014 to 2015 are in place for Djibouti and Yemen. SRPs covering 2014 to 2016 include: Burkino Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, Mali, Sahel, Senegal and South Sudan. ‘Magazine’, Issue 61, Humanitarian Practice Network, 2014.


10 Using OECD DAC 2013 exchange rates


13 DFID is providing up to UK£70 million between 2013 and 2015 for multi-year programmes in Yemen. To qualify for DFID funding, projects must run for a minimum period of 24 months in the areas of food security, shelter, clean water and conflict recovery.


16 UNDP Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme

17 Based on latest estimates for each country where data is available. Data is not available for eight of the top 30 long-term humanitarian assistance recipient countries.

Chapter 8

1 Somalia, Syria and the West Bank & Gaza Strip are excluded due to data limitations.


10 This includes UN-mandated peacekeeping, civilian and monitoring missions, NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other multi-lateral missions such as the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Figures are provided by SIPRI and include both central costs and estimates of troop-contributing countries’ costs.


13 Poole, Lydia, Afghanistan beyond 2014: financing for security and development, Development Initiatives, Bristol, forthcoming.


20 University of Notre Dame Environmental Change Initiative, ‘Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)’, University of Notre Dame, Washington DC, http://index.gain.org. Note that this index does not include Somalia or oPt.


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Chapter 9


2 Poole, Lydia, Bridging the Needs-Based Funding Gap: NGO Field Perspectives, Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva, 2014.

3 Interview, HelpAge International.


6 Poole, Lydia, op. cit.


10 Poole, Lydia, op. cit.


12 “What happened in the Philippines is absolute proof that there are recipient countries who want the information. And when the Philippines government tried to find information on what money was coming in, they found it very difficult.” David Hall-Matthews, Publish What You Fund, ibid. b2
What we do

The Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme provides objective, independent, rigorous data and analysis on humanitarian financing and related aid flows. Our aim is to enable access to a shared evidence base on resources relevant to crisis-affected people. We believe reliable information is fundamental for improved accountability and effectiveness.

Reports

We have been publishing our flagship annual Global Humanitarian Assistance report since 2000. We also produce a number of other reports on particular crises, humanitarian actors and financing mechanisms. Our most recent special focus reports include:

- Humanitarian assistance from non-state donors: What is it worth?, April 2014
- South Sudan: Donor response to the crisis, January 2014
- UN appeals 2014: Different process, greater needs, December 2013
- Central African Republic: The forgotten crisis, December 2013

www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/reports

We also contribute to reports published by other organisations. Examples include: Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria (IECAH) Annual Report, 2013, La acción humanitaria en 2012–2013: instalados en la crisis (published in Spanish); World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2012 and 2013, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; and research on the cost and impacts of forced migration for the World Disasters Report 2012, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

To find out more about the full range of our work you can visit our website at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org

Follow us on Facebook at www.facebook.com/ghaorg and keep up with us on Twitter at https://twitter.com/gha_org

Crisis briefings

We produce briefings on both high-profile and forgotten humanitarian crises. We aim to make these available to anyone working in and on a particular crisis, via our email list and our dedicated webpage.

We are also partnering with the Start Network to provide analysis to inform their funding allocation decisions. The Start Network is a consortium of British-based humanitarian international NGOs, which has recently launched its own fund to help fill funding gaps and enable rapid response to under-reported crises where need is great. Within 12 hours of a funding alert, GHA produces a rapid overview of the humanitarian funding picture – recent funding, an overview of appeals and funds, and analysis of donor trends.

Emergencies covered have included the conflict in South Kachin, Myanmar; drought and food insecurity in Somalia and Ethiopia, and the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone.

All of this analysis is available for anyone interested or engaged in these crises.

www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/crisis-briefings
Online products

In 2013, we restructured our website to allow improved and easier access to the range of GHA online products and services.

We maintain an active set of country profiles – and accompanying, unique, core datasets – to capture key information on humanitarian spending across the globe. There are currently 58 country profiles for recipients, donors and countries that are both donors and recipients of humanitarian assistance. Our profiles are updated annually, and new countries added.

www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/country-profiles

The GHA datastore contains the data that underpins our reports and country profiles. The data is drawn from a wide variety of sources, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee, UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN OCHA field offices, the World Bank and the European Commission. There are seven core datasets:

1) international humanitarian response (what countries in crisis receive)
2) official development assistance (what countries give and receive in the form of OECD-defined ‘aid’)
3) financing mechanisms
4) funding channels
5) needs, crisis, vulnerability
6) capacity (what resources governments allocate to crises within their own countries)
7) reference tables on poverty, risk and vulnerability.

www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides

We provide guidance on data sources and methodologies, and offer a range of simple visual tools that help to explain financing in humanitarian crises.

Helpdesk

We have a free, friendly helpdesk, that provides support in using and applying the data. We respond to information and data requests from anyone working on humanitarian issues including donors, NGOs, UN agencies and academics. We receive a wide variety of requests relating to data, methodologies and humanitarian information.

Please get in touch on gha@devinit.org

Engagement and partnerships

We regularly engage with governments, NGOs, civil society organisations, UN agencies and other members of the humanitarian community, often participating in discussion panels and presenting at meetings and events.

We believe in aid transparency and are committed to making information on financing in humanitarian crises easier to access, understand and use. In June 2013, GHA, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and UN OCHA FTS began working to make the IATI standard fit for humanitarian purposes and, ultimately, to improve the reporting of humanitarian assistance. The consortium hosted a multi-stakeholder workshop in November 2013 and is now working with a steering group to take the work forward in partnership with other initiatives.
The Global Humanitarian Assistance programme is funded by the governments of Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada.

Development Initiatives is an independent organisation committed to ending poverty by 2030. We make data and information on poverty and resource flows transparent, accessible and useable. We help decision-makers use information to increase their impact for the poorest people in the most sustainable way.

As part of Development Initiatives, the Global Humanitarian Assistance [GHA] programme analyses resource flows to people living in humanitarian crises, promoting data transparency and access to information through our research and publications – including the annual GHA reports. This report is produced entirely independently. The data analysis, content and presentation are solely the work of Development Initiatives and are a representation of its opinions alone. For further details on the content of this report including communication with its authors, to ask questions or provide comments, please contact us by email (gha@devinit.org) or visit our website at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org

The Global Humanitarian Assistance programme is funded by the governments of Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada.
Global Humanitarian Assistance reports use the latest data to present the most comprehensive assessment of the international financing at work in humanitarian situations. This report answers questions about the way that the world finances response to crisis and vulnerability: How much humanitarian assistance is there? Is it enough? Who provides it? Where does it go? How does it get there? It also highlights other resources that are important to people in crises, such as domestic government spending, remittances, foreign direct investment, official development assistance, and risk and climate financing. Transparent and reliable information, as provided by the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014, is essential for all those working to address humanitarian crisis and vulnerability.

Please visit our website at www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org to read previous reports and to download and share this one. To communicate with the authors, ask questions or provide comments, please contact us by email (gha@devinit.org). We welcome your feedback.