Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA)

The Global Humanitarian Assistance project is designed to assist the process of mobilising resources, measuring equity and ensuring the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. GHA reports aim to answer some basic questions on humanitarian assistance and current financing trends as part of the wider programme of research and analysis.

GHA draws on the data captured by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the financial tracking system (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the humanitarian aid departments of donor governments, UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, selected NGOs and other international organisations.

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<td>aid</td>
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<td>The effectiveness of humanitarian assistance has to be judged from</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Peter Smerdon</td>
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<td>the perspective of people affected</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Melese Awoke</td>
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<td>© ICRC 2005/B Herger</td>
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<tr>
<td>The requirements of a CAP appeal depend on the context, nature of</td>
<td>UN OCHA FTS</td>
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<td>the crisis and funding expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 figures show a sharp rise in the amount of money channelled</td>
<td>Arzu Ozsoy/International Federation, Dec 2005</td>
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<td>through UNICEF and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent</td>
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<td>Movement</td>
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<td>Remittances from family members and diaspora communities are highly</td>
<td>Chris Stowers/Panos Pictures 2005</td>
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<td>significant: they are delivered quickly and directly to the people in</td>
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<td>crisis</td>
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<td>Institutional donor response to the tsunami was significant not only</td>
<td>Dermot Tatlow/Panos Pictures 2005</td>
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<td>in terms of volume but also in terms of the number and mix of</td>
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<td>government agencies and ministries involved</td>
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<td>Many humanitarian organisations have tried to prevent a flood of</td>
<td>Sarvodaya 2005</td>
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<td>inappropriate gifts or inexperienced people without pouring cold</td>
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<td>water on a generous public response</td>
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<td>Local people, councils, businesses, faith groups and armies</td>
<td>Sarvodaya 2005</td>
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<td>contributed significant amounts of money, supplies and personnel,</td>
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<td>which are invisible in the accounts of resources mobilised</td>
<td>Sarvodaya 2005</td>
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<td>© Fredrik Naumann/Panos Pictures 2005</td>
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<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>Credits</th>
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<tr>
<td>There is widespread assumption that we will see an increasing number</td>
<td>Olav A Saltbones/International Federation, May 2006</td>
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<td>of natural hazards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current preoccupation with fragile states is likely to continue</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Julie Stewart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food insecurity continues to be a major issue in much of Africa</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Peter Smerdon</td>
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<td>Walk the World footsteps echo around the globe</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Gerald Bourke</td>
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<td>The people actually affected by crisis are highly dependent both on</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Julie Stewart</td>
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<td>the scale of voluntary response and how the crisis affecting their</td>
<td>© ICRC 2005/B Herger</td>
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<td>lives is defined</td>
<td>WFP 2006/Marcus Prior</td>
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<td>WFP 2005/Rein Skullerud</td>
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Global Humanitarian Assistance 2006: executive summary

2005 created a new environment for global humanitarian assistance. The tsunami mobilised public response on an unprecedented scale. Humanitarian issues were high on the international agenda. New donors have become involved and new ways of working are being tried. Together, these trends suggest the emergence of a new humanitarian architecture.

Features of 2005 included:

- increased diversity in the sources of funding for humanitarian work
  - a range of government agencies and ministries was involved in the tsunami response, with significant expenditure by ministries of defence
- the engagement of new donors in humanitarian response
  - 77 of the 99 government donors that responded to the tsunami were non-DAC members – 13 of these were first-time donors
  - increased involvement by non-DAC donors could be highly significant for people in need in some countries in the future
- stronger public concern
  - at least US$5.5 billion was given by the public to NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN agencies for the tsunami relief effort, exceeding the total amounts previously reported for all NGO humanitarian assistance from all sources for any single disaster
  - based on GHA guesstimates of global humanitarian assistance in 2001 and 2005, the share of private flows has risen from 14% to 35% over the period.

The ground swell of goodwill and engagement was matched in 2005 and 2006 by commitments and action within the official donor community to deliver timely and predictable flows of effective and equitable funding. These centred around:

- building global capacity for systematic response based on consistent and comparable needs assessment and improved effectiveness
  - the new needs analysis framework (NAF) was piloted in five countries in 2005 and it is thought that it will have been applied in around three-quarters of CAP appeal countries during 2006
  - a cluster approach was established to improve sectoral coordination at field and global level
- provision of up-front funding to meet urgent and strategic needs and support a coherent, coordinated response
  - an expanded grant-based central emergency response fund (CERF)
Humanitarian assistance at a glance

Public concern over the tsunami is reflected in its share of the US$18bn guesstimate of global humanitarian assistance in 2005

Bilateral humanitarian assistance from DAC donors rose by 15% in real terms to reach US$8.4bn . . .

The largest share of this assistance continued to come from the US though the EU collectively provided 42%

In 2004, Africa maintained the greatest share of total humanitarian assistance by region but Iraq was the largest recipient by country

Food attracts the largest commitments by sector, though ‘sector unspecified’ shares are increasingly significant
was set up to provide immediate finance and to help fund neglected emergencies – 54 donors had committed US$272 million by October 2006

- common ("pooled") funding mechanisms were developed – five donors had committed US$143.2 million and US$79 million to such funds in Sudan and the DRC respectively by mid-2006, providing unearmarked funds under the decision-making authority of the humanitarian coordinator

- seven emergency response funds (ERFs) are currently being deployed – a further three such funds, which offer easily and rapidly available small grants in-country, are pending decision

- recognition that the line between chronic poverty and humanitarian crisis is hard to draw
- the links between relief and development are being increasingly institutionalised

- several donors are basing their approaches to humanitarian and development activities more strongly on the perspective of the people affected by crisis

- disaster and conflict prevention, transition and preparedness require a more integrated approach and are higher on the development assistance agenda

- the wider application of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles

- new definitions of humanitarian assistance have been agreed and expenditure on refugees in the donor country will no longer be counted as humanitarian assistance

- GHD principles are now an integrated part of the DAC peer review process

- GHD indicators have been developed and implemented – these show improvements in the proportion of humanitarian assistance spent through the CAP, the timeliness of funding and the extent of needs met since 2004.

In spite of the manifest support throughout the global community for the principle of adequate and equitable humanitarian assistance, there is still a huge gulf between the funds made available for different situations. Only one-third of needs were met in the five least-funded emergencies, compared with over three-quarters in the five best-funded. Even without the tsunami, funding per head ranges from US$20 or less in countries like Niger, to more than US$300 per person in response to the very visible crises arising from the South Asia earthquake and Sudan.

The fate of the people whose lives are afflicted by crisis still hangs in the balance, dependent not only on the scale of voluntary response from governments and the public but also on how the crisis is perceived and defined by the outside world:

- people affected by high-visibility conflict are likely to receive more
donor attention and extra resources – not just from humanitarian assistance but from development cooperation and security budgets.

- People affected by natural hazards may gain public attention, additional publicity and extra funds from voluntary sources and new donors – and some disaster prevention activities are being institutionalised.

But the response to the millions of people caught in forgotten, chronic and endemic disasters is less clear. Will new political priorities and global aid targets focus enough attention and resources on their situation? Can new funding flows like the CERF tackle chronic crises? Will the international community establish some benchmarks or minimum standards below which no-one should fall as part of the commitment to global poverty eradication?
2005 was an exceptional year for humanitarian assistance. The tsunami alone mobilised public response on an unprecedented scale and humanitarian issues were high on the international agenda. While there is no definitive figure for total global humanitarian spending, the estimates compiled for this Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report suggest that around US$18 billion was raised for humanitarian assistance in 2005. Of this, around US$6 billion was driven primarily by the tsunami itself but it does not include the vast bulk of tsunami-related commitments which will be spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation in 2006 and subsequent years, or the US$2 billion allocated by development banks to tsunami reconstruction activities.

This chapter attempts to answer:
- How much humanitarian assistance is there?
- Where is it spent?
- Who are the main donors?
- What is it spent on?
- Does humanitarian assistance reach everyone in need?

2.1 How much humanitarian assistance is there?

2.1.1 How much humanitarian assistance came from DAC donors in 2005?

Preliminary figures published by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in April 2006 showed a very large increase in humanitarian assistance from DAC donors. Bilateral spending alone increased from US$7.3 billion in 2004 to US$12.4 billion in 2005. But this preliminary headline figure is likely to be adjusted downwards when the final figures for 2005 are available. This is because substantial reconstruction expenditure included in the preliminary data will be reallocated to other sectors such as roads and pipelines.

When this reconstruction assistance is excluded from the preliminary figures, bilateral humanitarian assistance increased to US$8.4 billion – a rise of US$1.1 billion (15%) in real terms over 2004. This increase can be mostly accounted for by the US$967 million disbursed in emergency response for the tsunami (the relief part of the US$1.54 billion total bilateral disbursements for the tsunami in 2005).

2.1.2 What are the long-term trends in DAC-reported humanitarian assistance?

During the 1980s total humanitarian assistance from DAC donors averaged at just under US$2 billion a year. The 1990s saw total
Basic humanitarian assistance data and definitions:
The most comparable humanitarian aid and assistance data comes from the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which has monitored the
performance of its 22 member countries and the European Commission (EC)
since 1960.

The DAC has not had an official definition of humanitarian assistance up until
now, working instead with a category called ‘emergency and distress relief’. The
Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative has been working on a common
definition of humanitarian assistance for statistical and reporting purposes. This
new official definition of humanitarian assistance was awaiting final approval by
the DAC at the time of writing.

GHA 2006 uses the following working definitions:

**Humanitarian assistance** = a generic term, broadly meaning both the aid and
action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human
dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies.

**Total humanitarian assistance** = total bilateral emergency and distress relief
from DAC donors, total multilateral contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA and a
share of multilateral contributions to WFP in proportion to the share of WFP
expenditure on relief.

**Global humanitarian assistance** = total humanitarian assistance plus donations
to NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN
agencies by members of the general public; plus certain expenditure by DAC
donor governments that falls outside the official definition of either ODA or
humanitarian assistance (security expenditure and activities such as mine
clearance, for example); plus, crucially, the activities of governments that are not
part of the DAC (‘non-DAC’ donors).

Noteworthy inclusions and exclusions:

Previous editions of GHA have explained how, to date, domestic refugee
spending could be counted as part of humanitarian assistance — and was
included in this way by most DAC donors. It has now been agreed that, while
expenditure on refugees in the donor country for their first year of residence can
still count as ODA, it should no longer be counted towards humanitarian
assistance. This change will be reflected for the first time in figures for spending in
2007. Because of this, GHA data now excludes spending on domestic refugees
from the total humanitarian assistance figures for all years, unless specifically
stated otherwise.

Despite attempts to be all encompassing, the measures of global and total
humanitarian assistance still do not include local response or the remittances
from family members and diaspora communities.
Humanitarian assistance more than double in real terms (driven by aid to Iraq) to reach an average of over US$5 billion a year to cope with crises in the Great Lakes and south-eastern Europe. In 2003 total humanitarian assistance from DAC donors topped US$8 billion in real terms and increased again in 2004. Preliminary figures suggest a further increase in 2005.

Figure 2.1 Total humanitarian assistance, 1970–2004

2.1.3 How do the trends compare with the trend for aid as a whole?

Total ODA increased by 31% between 2004 and 2005. However the bulk of this increase was due to an exceptional level of debt relief for Nigeria and Iraq. Without debt relief grants, total ODA increased by 9% in real terms over 2004. This means that humanitarian spending in 2005, including relief disbursements in response to the tsunami, increased more sharply than ODA as a whole net of debt relief.

On the basis of preliminary figures, which show only the bilateral component, humanitarian assistance reached 10% of bilateral ODA in 2005, or 14% of bilateral ODA net of debt relief. This compares with 13% in 2004.

Over the long term, an increasing share of ODA has been spent on humanitarian assistance. This trend has spanned periods of decline and expansion in total aid spending, with the steepest rise taking place during the early to mid-1990s. Overall aid started to stagnate from 1992 – but it was also a time when post-cold war instability in Europe and complex emergencies in Africa were receiving global attention. A key question now is whether humanitarian assistance will maintain its current share of ODA.

Based on stated commitments to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the fact that large amounts of debt relief will be included in the ODA totals from 2005 to 2007, ODA levels are set to rise between 2005 and 2010. The expected increase in bilateral ODA will clearly have a bearing on the future share of
humanitarian assistance within ODA. Even if the volume continues on an upward path, the share of total spending may not increase. Between 2004 and 2005 for instance, aid for debt relief quadrupled—rising from US$5.8 billion to US$23 billion—reflecting the big write-offs for Nigeria and Iraq. Humanitarian assistance increased by 15%, but its share of total bilateral ODA declined.

2.1.4 What conclusions can we draw from these trends?

First, the emergency response to the tsunami was additional to, not at the expense of, other humanitarian situations.

Second, funding for reconstruction in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan is now being met largely out of development assistance, rather than humanitarian budgets.

Third, that while the headline figures for bilateral humanitarian assistance as a share of bilateral ODA show a fall from 13% to 10%...
between 2004 and 2005, this obscures the underlying trend. When exceptional debt relief is taken out of the picture, there is an increase in the share of bilateral aid spent on humanitarian assistance from 13% in 2004 to 14% in 2005.

Fourth, that humanitarian assistance has more than doubled each decade since 1975 — regardless of the overall trend in ODA. Even if this trend continues, the volume increases may not translate into increased shares of ODA spent on humanitarian assistance because of pledged increases to 2010 and debt relief from 2005 to 2007.

Fifth, what the trends show depends, to a very large extent, on how humanitarian assistance is defined and where the lines are drawn between humanitarian and other types of activity. The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative has set itself the objective of clarifying the definition of humanitarian assistance and improving the quality and consistency of data. One achievement under this heading has been on expenditure on refugees in the donor country, which will no longer be included within DAC-reported humanitarian assistance, and which is not included within the data included in this report.

In 2004, nearly a quarter of DAC-reported humanitarian assistance was in the form of spending on refugees in the donor country (see Figure 2.4).

The new DAC definition of humanitarian aid, which is expected to be confirmed in late 2006, includes both emergency response and reconstruction relief and rehabilitation. To qualify as humanitarian assistance, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation will have to take place during and in the aftermath of an emergency. Longer term activity should not be included. In practice this is a difficult line to draw — something that the differences between the preliminary and finalised aid figures for 2005 are likely to illustrate.

The DAC has been careful not to include anything in figures for humanitarian assistance that relates to the use of force or which could
potentially divert resources from poverty priorities to global security concerns. This too is a difficult line to draw because some spending to improve security is an essential condition for relief and poverty eradication – for example, training military personnel in human rights. Activities to protect the security of people and property through the use or even the display of force cannot be counted as humanitarian assistance.

For many donors who take an integrated approach to conflict, governance and poverty reduction, it is hard to disaggregate these expenditures and therefore there can be substantial differences between what is reported to the DAC and what appears in figures used nationally.

2.1.5 How much humanitarian assistance is there in addition to that reported by the DAC?

While the DAC data allows comparisons over time and between donors, it captures only a part of global humanitarian assistance. Donations to NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN agencies by members of the general public are not included. Certain expenditure by DAC donor governments themselves that may be part of the humanitarian effort may fall outside the definition of either ODA or humanitarian assistance (security expenditure and activities such as mine clearance, for example). And, crucially, the activities of all governments apart from the 22 DAC members, are not accounted for.

The following table provides a guesstimate of the total global expenditure on humanitarian assistance by the international community for 2005. It excludes two fundamental flows – the resources provided by the people living in or close to crisis-affected areas and the remittances from family members and diaspora communities.

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) found that local response was the most important for life-saving. But in the accounts of resources mobilised for the tsunami, as for all other disasters, the local response is invisible in the figures. Remittances by their nature are private and informal and therefore do not tend to be captured in reports on financial flows. The fact that a figure cannot be put on the value of these resources should not obscure the very real humanitarian response capacity they represent.

In 2005, the GHA guesstimate is that around US$18 billion has been mobilised for humanitarian assistance from the international community (see Figure 2.5). The guesstimate for 2001 (compiled for GHA 2003) was US$10 billion. The major increase has been in private flows, both to NGOs and to international and UN organisations. In 2001, private flows accounted for around 14% of the total; in 2005, they accounted for more than one-third (around 35%). While contributions from DAC and non-DAC governments almost doubled, their share of the total remained the same. The only category to show a fall in spending between 2001 and 2005 is post-conflict peace activity, though this is more likely to reflect reporting categories than actual expenditure.
**Figure 2.5**  GHA guesstimate of total combined international resources for humanitarian assistance in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>US$</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local response</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC-reported bilateral humanitarian aid net of estimated expenditure on</td>
<td>US$6,478m</td>
<td>This excludes major elements of reconstruction expenditure originally included in the 2005 figures. US$1,942m has been deducted to allow for domestic refugee costs, based on actual expenditure in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic refugees</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>US$1,759m</td>
<td>Estimate, assuming the same volume of disbursements as in 2004. Note that this is the DAC-defined humanitarian assistance; funds that are given completely unearmarked (even by region) to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict peace activities included in ODA</td>
<td>US$414m</td>
<td>Many donors see their post-conflict peace activities as intimately linked with their overall humanitarian assistance work. The source is 2004 DAC data (DAC Statistics Table 1 Memo Items 1.A.1 and V2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict peace activities that cannot count as ODA</td>
<td>US$1,518m</td>
<td>The rules on what can be counted as ODA are very strict and a range of security-related activities that are linked to humanitarian assistance are not eligible. The source is 2004 data and is likely to be seriously under-reported (DAC Statistics Table 1 Memo Items 1.A.1 and V2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmine clearance</td>
<td>US$214m</td>
<td>These activities are not reported within the DAC emergency and distress relief category. The source for these figures is the total commitments reported for 2004 (CRS Table 1, all donors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution</td>
<td>US$500m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration and small arms and light weapons control</td>
<td>US$380m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors</td>
<td>US$4,688m–US$900m</td>
<td>Contributions to consolidated appeals process (CAP) appeals recorded by the financial tracking system (FTS) in 2005 for non-DAC governments totalled US$308m; at least US$160m has been recorded by the FTS for contributions for projects outside the CAP appeals. On top of this, the FTS recorded US$400m in uncommitted pledges from non-DAC donors. Contributions from non-DAC donors reported via the FTS are likely to capture only part of total humanitarian assistance from these governments, which may have totalled as much as US$900m in 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary contributions to NGOs from members of the public and support groups</td>
<td>US$4,000m</td>
<td>2005 saw US$3.2bn in traceable non-official contributions to NGOs in response to the tsunami alone. GHA estimates in 2001 found at least US$700bn in voluntary income for humanitarian assistance, based on figures from 18 NGOs. This suggests that US$4bn flowed into NGOs from the public in 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary contributions from the public and national societies to the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement</td>
<td>US$1,800m</td>
<td>In 2005, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement recorded US$1.8bn in voluntary contributions from the public through branches, societies and appeals for the tsunami. Some government funding may be included in this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary contributions from the public and national societies to UN agencies</td>
<td>US$500m</td>
<td>In 2005, US$500m was recorded in contributions for the tsunami through national committees of UN agencies, particularly UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHA guesstimate of total combined international resources for humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>US$18bn</td>
<td>This guesstimate includes ONLY funding actually spent for humanitarian purposes – no reconstruction costs or future commitments – and only income actually received by NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (not pledges or commitments). While public giving to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and to some NGOs was wholly exceptional, other funding flows could be expected to be sustained. Around US$6bn of this could be treated as tsunami-driven.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives
2.2 Where is DAC-reported humanitarian assistance being spent?

2.2.1 Which regions receive the most?

Africa receives the largest share of DAC humanitarian assistance by region. At 39% in 2004, its share showed a very slight drop following four years of increase (see Figure 2.7). In volume terms, humanitarian assistance to Africa has been increasing each year since 1998:

- nine African countries feature in the ‘top 15’ list of highest recipients of total DAC humanitarian assistance for 2004
- there has been a significant growth in share of spending in sub-Saharan countries since 2000.

The Middle East has received around a fifth of the available DAC humanitarian assistance since 2003, making it the second largest recipient. The region also traditionally receives a high proportion of humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors. Expenditure in the Middle East increased by over US$1 billion (170%) between 2000 and 2004:

- three countries from the region feature in the top 15 list of DAC beneficiaries for 2004
- in spite of donor preoccupation with Iraq, the concentration of assistance in the Middle East is still less than it was in Europe in 1999 during the focus on the Balkans – in 1999, 29% of humanitarian assistance went to Europe and 16% to countries in sub-Saharan Africa; in 2004, 20% of humanitarian assistance went to the Middle East and 37% to sub-Saharan Africa.

Asia’s share of humanitarian assistance has remained at around 12% since 2003. The large shares attributed to the region in 2001 and 2002 – when Asia received over one-fifth of the available assistance – are
due to humanitarian spending in Afghanistan. Non-DAC donors are also major providers of aid to the DPRK and Afghanistan:

- only Afghanistan and the DPRK feature for Asia in the DAC’s top 15 list of beneficiaries for 2004, though Bangladesh also appears in the list when bilateral DAC humanitarian assistance is considered alone.

Europe, which in 1999 received 29% of DAC humanitarian assistance, and the Americas seem to have all but disappeared from the picture – these regions received only 3% and 5% shares respectively in 2004:

- Serbia and Montenegro ranks thirteenth in the list of top 15 recipients of DAC humanitarian assistance for 2004 but disappears from the listing when looking purely at bilateral assistance from DAC donors
- no country from the Americas features in the top 15 list of recipients.

There is a tendency for humanitarian assistance to follow donor ‘neighbourhoods’ – either places close at hand, or places where the donor has strong historical, cultural or other ties.

The US and the European Union (EU) between them typically provide over three quarters of humanitarian assistance and combine a focus on complex political emergencies with prioritisation of Africa and the Middle East.

Japan and Australia have a relatively stronger focus on natural disasters and their humanitarian assistance responds to needs within Asia and the Pacific. Data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) reveals the higher incidence of natural disasters in Asia, where over 1.3 billion people have been killed, made homeless or otherwise affected by natural disasters over the past five years, compared with 330 000 in Africa over the same period.

### Figure 2.7 Percentage shares of DAC humanitarian assistance by region, 1998–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (total)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC

While Asia’s share of humanitarian assistance has remained at around 12% since 2003 . . .

. . . Europe and the Americas have all but disappeared from the picture
2.2.2 Which countries receive the most?

In 2004, six countries received half of the humanitarian assistance from the DAC allocable by country: Iraq (16%), Sudan (11%), Palestine (8%), Ethiopia (6%) Afghanistan (6%) and the DRC (4%).

Figure 2.8 Total humanitarian assistance allocable by country, 2004

Humanitarian assistance tends to be much more heavily concentrated than development assistance. In 2004, the top five recipients shared 47% of the DAC humanitarian assistance allocable by country. The remaining 53% was shared between 148 countries. Of this group, 33 countries had very small local crises and received less than US$1 million.

As humanitarian assistance has grown in volume, it has become even more concentrated. Much of the increase is due to spending in individual high-priority countries such as Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and complex political emergencies in Africa. In 2003 and 2004 Iraq
received a larger share of DAC humanitarian assistance than any other single country over the past ten years.

Looking over the longer term, ten countries have dominated the provision of humanitarian assistance over the past ten years. While some emergencies have a clear beginning, middle and end, others do not – as can be seen from their frequent and regular appearance in the top ten recipient countries and among CAP appeals.

**Figure 2.10** Major recipients of total DAC humanitarian assistance, 1995–2004

![Graph showing major recipients of total DAC humanitarian assistance, 1995–2004.]

**Figure 2.11** Top 10 recipients of bilateral humanitarian assistance from DAC donor countries, 1995–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Timor</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sis Ex Yugo</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC, Table 2a and OCHA FTS
2.2.3 How does the allocation of humanitarian assistance by DAC donors reflect the humanitarian priorities defined in the CAP process?

The CAP process is designed to identify all of those countries in crisis that require a consolidated response. Not all countries in crisis will be subject of a CAP appeal – in some cases the country in question may not wish to be the subject of an appeal; in others, sufficient funds may be mobilised outside a CAP and other coordination mechanisms will enable a consolidated response. However, comparing country priorities in the CAP with DAC donor allocations of bilateral humanitarian assistance does reveal some key issues about humanitarian assistance.

Of the top 15 recipients of bilateral DAC humanitarian aid in 2004, 12 were the subject of a CAP appeal:

- the three countries that were not the subject of a CAP appeal in 2004 – Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Iraq – together received US$1.5 billion in bilateral humanitarian assistance from the DAC
- of the top 15 largest consolidated appeals, just one country – Angola – received more in DAC bilateral humanitarian assistance than requested in the appeal
  - 14 countries received less in bilateral humanitarian assistance than was requested in the CAP appeal
- much of this funding flows ‘outside’ the CAP – in other words, much of the funding was for activities that were not listed among the CAP priorities or through organisations that were outside the CAP process including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs.

Only two or three Asian countries are the subject of consolidated or flash appeals each year, compared with around 15 African countries. The CAP has tended to focus more on complex political emergencies, which are more prevalent in Africa than Asia and which have received more sustained political attention over the decade to 2004 – and consequently received more funding. Increasingly however the CAP includes flash appeals for natural disasters.

A number of countries in protracted emergencies are regularly the subject of CAP appeals. Countries in the Great Lakes region, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have all been the subject of a CAP appeal for seven of the eight years between 1999 and 2006. Four of these countries (Sudan, Angola, the DRC, and the DPRK) have featured in the top ten list of recipients of humanitarian assistance every year for the past decade. Some other countries, such as Somalia and Uganda, also feature regularly in the list.

But for some of the smaller countries in chronic crises, funding has been hard to mobilise. The CAR received a total of US$3.85 million between 1995 and 2003 – yet it had funding requirements of
Iraq was one of three countries on the bilateral humanitarian assistance priority list that was not the subject of a CAP appeal. The others were Afghanistan and Ethiopia.

Angola was the only country to receive more in bilateral humanitarian assistance than was requested in the CAP appeal.

All but one of the top 15 CAP countries received less in bilateral humanitarian assistance than requested in the CAP appeal.

Only two or three countries in Asia are the subject of a CAP appeal in any one year.

Indicates country that was not subject of a CAP appeal
Indicates funding surplus to CAP-stated requirements

Top 15 CAP appeal requirements in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US$ m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>726.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>300.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>209.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>208.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>165.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>162.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>142.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>138.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>136.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>125.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>120.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>119.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>97.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>90.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes</td>
<td>85.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top 15 bilateral DAC-reported spend in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US$ m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>875.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>592.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>363.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>249.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>322</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC (Zaire)</td>
<td>157.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>138.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>130.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>92.33</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>81.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>74.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicates one of the top 15 recipients of bilateral DAC humanitarian assistance, 2004

This map is for illustrative purposes only. It is not to be taken as necessarily representing Development Initiatives’ views on boundaries or political status.

Figure 2.12  Top 15 CAP and bilateral DAC priorities side-by-side in 2004

Source: OECD DAC statistics, Table 2a and OCHA FTS
US$9 million in 2003 alone. EC and DAC donor bilateral flows improved in 2004 for a number of traditionally hard-to-fund countries. The CAR received over US$5 million – nearly three times its allocation in 2003; funding for Chad went up to US$71 million (well in excess of funding requirements under the CAP); funding for Guinea continued its upward path to reach US$35 million and even funding for the Republic of Congo showed a modest increase – from US$11 million in 2003 to US$14 million in 2004.

### 2.3 Who are the main donors of humanitarian assistance?

Over one-third of DAC humanitarian assistance is provided by just one country – the US. In 2004, the US reported US$2483 million in humanitarian assistance. The next largest bilateral donors were Japan, UK, Germany and the Netherlands. Between them, these five donors accounted for 70% of humanitarian assistance spending that year.

Figure 2.13 *Total humanitarian assistance by donor, 2004*

Collectively, the EU member states are the largest providers of humanitarian assistance, contributing 42% of the total in 2004. This includes the finance managed directly by the EC. However, EU humanitarian assistance remains very diverse. Some donors have programmes that are almost entirely focused on bilateral channels and their own national NGOs. Others are among the strongest and most consistent supporters of UN agencies and international organisations. DG ECHO itself manages a large aid programme and the EU also provides humanitarian assistance through other channels. In spite of this diversity, the EU does provide a mechanism for coordination and collaboration between EU member states and for the development of policy and potential joint actions.
2.3.1 Which donors have increased their humanitarian assistance?

Although the preliminary data released by the DAC in April 2006 is likely to be revised, it can be used to provide an indication of trends.

In all, 20 donors increased their bilateral humanitarian assistance in 2005 – two by more than US$0.5 billion and 14 by more than 20%. While some of the more extreme increases may be due to the changing use of humanitarian definitions, the almost universal growth trend suggests that DAC humanitarian assistance will reach record levels in 2005.

Source: OECD DAC statistics, Table 1
The pattern for 2005 contributions is very similar to 2004. The EC and EU member states provided around 44% of humanitarian assistance and the US – while increasing its humanitarian assistance (net of reconstruction relief) by US$613 million (20%) – continued to provide around one-third of bilateral humanitarian assistance.

2.3.2 What priority do different donors give to humanitarian assistance?

For development cooperation as a whole it is accepted that two measures should be used to assess performance – overall volume and the share of gross national income (GNI). While overall volume is clearly crucial to the capacity to deliver, the share of GNI reveals the priority that governments give to humanitarian assistance. Two other perspectives on priority are the amount that is spent per citizen and the share of total ODA that goes to humanitarian assistance.

When DAC donor contributions are compared according to how much they give per citizen or in relation to their GNI, the rankings are very different to those for total volume.

Bearing in mind the average DAC donor contribution per capita in 2005 (US$8):
- some of the largest donors give relatively small amounts per capita
  - the US gave US$8
  - Japan gave US$7
  - Germany gave US$5
  - France gave US$4

Note that the figure from Japan represents the preliminary ODA figure plus the DAC-reported disbursements for the tsunami. The data for Italy and Spain relates to 2004 as there is no reported data for 2005.

Source: OECD DAC, Tables 1 and 2

Reminder . . . this report excludes humanitarian assistance spent on refugees in the donor country and therefore the figures are not comparable with previous GHA reports!
six countries (Norway, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) give more than US$20 per citizen in humanitarian assistance.

Sweden, Norway and Luxembourg give between US$32 and US$62 per capita.

Per capita contributions to humanitarian assistance show a clear decade-on-decade increase. In 1985, the year of Live Aid, they were just US$3.64 (in constant 2003 prices). In 2005, the year of Live 8, contributions per capita were US$9.63.

The same six countries providing more than US$20 per capita are also the ‘top six’ in terms of their contributions as a share of GNI. Of these, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark have already reached the 0.7% UN target for aid as a share of GNI.

In 1985, the year of Live Aid, contributions per citizen were US$3.64. In 2005, the year of Live 8, this had risen to US$9.63.
The share of ODA allocated to humanitarian assistance is also significant. A government that gives a lot of money but only a small share of total aid, may award a lower political and institutional priority to humanitarian issues – and vice versa. The US, the largest donor by volume, also gave the highest proportion of ODA (13%) in 2004. Japan and the UK – also among the largest donors by volume – gave 10%. France, which ranks eighth in terms of volume, allocated only 3% of ODA, the lowest in the DAC. This may partly reflect the composition of ODA from France, which includes very substantial amounts of debt relief.

Among those donors with large aid programmes relative to GNI there is considerable variation in the proportion of ODA spent on humanitarian matters. Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway all allocated 10% or more of their ODA to humanitarian assistance in 2004. But Denmark and the Netherlands gave 6% and 8% respectively. And Ireland and Italy, two donors with relatively small programmes in terms of volume, allocated a significant share to humanitarian assistance.

2.4 What is humanitarian assistance spent on?

OCHA’s FTS currently provides the best analysis of humanitarian assistance by sector. Combined with the WFP’s International Food Aid Information Service (INTERFAIS), this is the main source of information for this section of GHA 2006.

DAC-reported humanitarian assistance can only be broken down into food aid and aid for refugees. As work by the GHD group and the DAC on a new definition and classification of humanitarian aid is implemented over the next year, it should be possible to show how much has been spent on: material relief and assistance; food; relief coordination and support; reconstruction and rehabilitation; and disaster prevention and preparedness. In the meantime, the FTS data reveals some pretty clear trends.

2.4.1 What sectors receive the most humanitarian assistance funding?

Food easily comprises the largest share of commitments to humanitarian appeals – 55% of the US$15.5 billion in commitments made by donors to CAP appeals between 2000 and 2005.

The volume of commitments to food (US$8.6 billion) is greater than that for all other sectors combined over the five-year period. Priorities such as health (US$781 million), education (US$432 million), shelter and non-food items (US$318 million) and water and sanitation (US$269 million) are tiny in comparison.

Analysis of the past four years shows that food, multi-sectoral, health and sector unspecified together have absorbed more than 75% of funding in the CAP appeals. The increasing significance of sector
The increasing significance of sector unspecified humanitarian assistance is a new trend. While the US$400 million in this category in 2005 might reflect the exceptional nature of the response to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami appeal, the US$220 million given as sector-unspecified in the first nine months of 2006 suggests that this was not a blip.

Figure 2.19 Volume of donor commitments to all sectors inside CAP appeals, 2000–2005

Figure 2.20 Humanitarian assistance by sector, 2003–2006

Figure 2.21 shows consistent underfunding for economic recovery, health, protection and water and sanitation – all of which had shortfalls of more than 50% each year between 2000 and 2005. Food is not only by far the largest sector – it is also the sector which is best funded in relation to requests.

Some sectors show an increase between 2000 and 2005 – economic recovery (up 33 times), water and sanitation (up 17 times) and shelter (up 153 times). But all of these increases are from a very low base. Given the scale of food aid, a small shift from food to other sectors can leave room for greatly increased spending on other priorities.
The gap between funding for food and funding for other sectors may not be quite as large as the headline figures suggest for reporting reasons. Food aid reporting to the FTS tends to be very complete compared with other sectors. For instance, if an NGO or a Red Cross agency has a particular focus on a sector – Oxfam on water for instance – actions in that sector may not be properly reported within the FTS data. This is because, up to now, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have not been consistently involved in the either the needs assessment or the CAP. Both the new cluster approach and needs assessments are more inclusive (see Chapter 4). For instance both UN agencies and NGOs can now lead clusters of activities. This should result in more complete data and better understanding of humanitarian aid resources for different sectors.

2.4.2 Food aid trends

INTERFAIS currently provides the best data on food aid trends. The best measures are carried out in tonnages.

Global emergency food aid in 2005 reached a total of 5.2 million tons. This was a 23% increase on 2004 deliveries.

Two-thirds of emergency food aid went to sub-Saharan Africa and just over one-quarter to Asia. Both regions received big increases in the volumes of food aid in 2005 – 22% in sub-Saharan Africa and 14% in Asia.

This increase in the volume of emergency food aid may be even more significant because around 39% of emergency food aid is procured through local purchases or triangular operations. The DAC estimates that local purchase increases the value of food aid by around 30%.

Emergency food aid is delivered overwhelmingly by WFP which, despite the increased volume, also increased the share of deliveries that it managed to 75% in 2005. Around 13% is delivered by NGOs.
In all, 80 countries received some emergency food aid in 2005. Just three of these — Ethiopia, Sudan and the DPRK — accounted for half of the deliveries. These countries are long-term recipients of large volumes of food aid. In the last two years, Eritrea, Uganda, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Kenya and Sri Lanka have also been major recipients.

In 2005, the US provided 45% of emergency food aid. A further 20% came from the EC and EU member states and 10% from China.

Donors take distinctly different approaches in their food aid distribution:
- only 58% of US food aid is for emergencies compared with 66% for the EC and 92% for China
- only Canada and Korea provide more than half of their food aid as either project or programme assistance (63% and 77% respectively)
- some distributions are strongly skewed towards neighbouring countries

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**Figure 2.22** Food aid volumes by region, 2004 and 2005

![Graph showing food aid volumes by region, 2004 and 2005.](source: The Food Aid Monitor, June 2006, INTERFAIS)

**Figure 2.23** Shares of emergency food aid by region, 2005

![Pie chart showing shares of emergency food aid by region, 2005.](source: The Food Aid Monitor, June 2006, WFP)
- Food aid from China and Australia goes overwhelmingly to Asia
- 27% of EC food aid goes to Eastern Europe
- Although two-thirds of US food aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa, 14% goes to Latin America, making the US by far the largest provider of food aid to that region
- Although half of Japan’s food aid goes to Asia, the other half goes to sub-Saharan Africa
- Mode of delivery is dictated by the type of food aid – data for emergency food aid alone is not available but
  - 98% of total US food aid is delivered by direct transfer compared with 2% of food aid from the EC
  - 51% of EC food aid is delivered through local purchase and 47% through triangular transactions
  - Food aid from the Republic of Korea, China and Canada has a large direct transfer component (100%, 98% and 83% respectively)

**Figure 2.24** Major recipients of emergency food aid, 2005

**Figure 2.25** Donors of emergency food aid, 2005
the Netherlands delivers 100% of its food aid through either local or triangular transactions – it is followed in this regard by Australia and Japan, who deliver 56% and 44% of their food aid in this way respectively.

The valuation of food aid

In 2002 INTERFAIS took on the role of estimating the value of global food aid in monetary terms. The project aims to combine valuation of the commodities (taking into account different components, such as non-cereal commodities and nutritional value) and estimates of sea and overland freight costs. While the emergency food aid component is not at present disaggregated, the overall figures give a sense of the scale and trends. Food aid to Iraq in 2003 helped boost spending on the sector that year. Spending has fallen back since that time.

Figure 2.26 Total food aid values, 1997–2004 (emergency, project and programme combined) from all donors

Source: The Food Aid Monitor, June 2006, INTERFAIS
2.5 Does humanitarian assistance reach everyone in need?

The CAP appeals alone targeted not far short of 46 million people in need in 2005.¹ Some of those affected live in countries that are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, while others are suffering the consequences of longer-term, complex emergencies. The basic analysis of CAP data in this section shows that while some quick onset disasters (such as the tsunami and South Asia earthquake) attract very high levels of humanitarian assistance, slow onset and chronic disasters (such as in Niger and Malawi) attract much lower levels. As shown in Section 2.4, funding per sector also suggests that programming to address more chronic issues such as health, water and sanitation and economic recovery, is neglected compared, for instance, to quick, emergency food aid.

Although many humanitarian crises last for years, and some manifestations of urgent need are really symptoms of underlying chronic poverty, the management, administrative and accounting lines drawn between ‘humanitarian need’ and ‘developmental need’ tend to be pretty rigid. This can lead to poor people in the same country receiving quite different levels of attention and resources according to a somewhat artificial distinction between humanitarian and development need.

But from the perspective of affected people, what matters is an effective short-term response designed to meet immediate need, coupled with measures to address the factors that precipitate crisis and trap people in poverty.

For donors and aid agencies, this means adopting an integrated and flexible policy approach which brings together understanding of both chronic and extreme poverty and humanitarian need. The starting point for effective interventions needs to be the needs of affected people, rather than the departmental management structure of the donor or agency.

¹. We have excluded the Angola flash appeal from this analysis as it is difficult to ascertain the number of affected people. Data on people affected by crises covers a very wide range of need and is measured in different ways. This figure is therefore approximate.
Without a consistent common denominator of need which can be applied across all emergency situations, it is very difficult to say whether needs are being met, or whether humanitarian assistance is either equitable or adequate.

The CAP is the closest approach to a comprehensive, consistent, comparable measure of needs, but it was not designed for this purpose and, as a result it has limitations. Firstly, the CAP has not been able to give a comprehensive statement of priority needs because the process has not included a number of key international organisations and NGOs. Secondly, not all countries in crisis are the subject of a CAP and large numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance are out of reach of aid agencies – for security and other reasons – and so may not feature in a CAP appeal at all. Thirdly, although there has been considerable progress in the NAF the criteria for assessing need are not yet consistently applied.

In the absence of a standard benchmark of need, the funds requested are likely to be influenced both by what can be delivered relatively easily by each agency involved or by judgements about what the market will bear. Because part of the function of the CAP is to mobilise resources, the amounts requested reflect, to some extent at least, expectations about how much money is likely to be available for each situation.

With these caveats, the fact is that measuring the response to CAP appeals remains the only way of assessing whether needs have been met on a comparable basis between emergencies.

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Some donors have been giving very serious attention to the links between relief and development for the very poor and to the demands of looking at their work from the perspective of the affected person – rather than through donor-defined categories.

Others have developed measures for severity or neglect to help them to assess which situations should get priority. These may offer additional ways to assess whether funding is flowing to the real priorities.

In 2006, DG ECHO revised the methodology for its global needs assessments (GNAs), adding a vulnerability indicator and a crisis indicator to help it to distinguish better between natural or man-made crises on the one hand and needs due to structural poverty on the other (see Chapter 7, section 7.24).
2.5.1 Are needs more likely to be met in natural disasters or complex emergencies?

Since 1997 a total of US$29.6 billion has been requested within CAP appeals. Of this, by far the larger amount (almost US$27 billion) has been for complex emergencies.

The number of flash appeals is rising. And, even without the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami appeal, total requirements under flash appeals increased from US$451 million in 2004 to US$762 million in 2005.

For complex emergencies, the totals requested rose from less than US$2 billion to more than US$5 billion between 2000 and 2003 before falling back to US$3 billion in 2004. In 2005, funds requested for complex emergencies rose to US$3.8 billion.

Figure 2.28 shows the percentage of needs met as a share of required funds within each of the appeals launched in 2005.
2.5.2 How much money is received per person in different situations?

Funding per person varies hugely between emergencies. Figure 2.29 and Figure 2.30 show how much was requested per affected person inside the CAPs and how much was received per person in total (both inside and outside the CAP) for each CAP country in 2005.

In 2005, appeal requests ranged from US$588 per person in Sudan to around one-tenth or less of that amount requested in cases from Somalia to West Africa. Crises in West Africa, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Malawi and Guyana received less than US$50 per person compared with over US$200 per person in the DRC, Benin, Guatemala and Chechnya – and over US$300 in response to the South Asia earthquake and more than US$400 in Sudan.
There is no correlation between the percentage of needs met and funding per person. For example, although Sudan was only 53% covered (see Figure 2.28), the appeal raised US$431 per beneficiary, whereas Malawi, which was 76% covered, raised just US$28 per beneficiary under the appeal.

2.5.3 Which CAP appeals have been most fully funded since 2000?

On average since 2000, the five best-funded appeals in each year have had well over four-fifths of their needs met inside the appeals. By contrast the five most poorly funded have received around a quarter to one-third of their requirements (see Figure 2.31):

- in 2005, 77% of needs were covered in the five best-funded emergencies
  - this falls below the 84% average for the period
• in 2005, only 36% of needs in the five least-funded emergencies were covered
  – this is the highest figure relating to uncovered needs for the five least-funded emergencies in the period – 6% above the 30% average for the period
• the highest reported coverage of the five best-funded emergencies was in 2003, where 96% of needs were covered – this was driven by the Iraq appeal, which received 91% of the US$2.2 billion requested.

Figure 2.31 Five best-funded and five least-funded appeals by percentage covered, 2000–2005

Ironically the most poorly funded appeals have had only modest requirements – the complex political emergencies in the CAR and the Republic of Congo for instance, needed around US$25 million each but only received US$9 million. This reinforces the view that lack of capacity to deliver and low political priority – rather than resources per se – are behind many neglected emergencies. If this is the case, then improvements in the needs assessment process and the CAP to ensure adequate or equitable funding will not, on their own be enough. They are essential building blocks, but without a disciplined approach which ensures that money follows need and therefore flows to priorities first, they cannot deliver funding that is either equitable or adequate.
Humanitarian assistance flows through many different agencies and organisations on its path from bilateral donors through to people affected by crises. UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the European Commission (EC) and NGOs all receive humanitarian assistance from bilateral donors and many of them receive voluntary contributions from the public as well. These organisations in turn become donors. Some funding will be spent directly by each organisation, but much of it will pass through to another agency – sometimes another official organisation, sometimes an NGO.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plays the key role in the coordination of these humanitarian assistance flows and many other international organisations – including the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), plus a range of corporations and civil society organisations – provide humanitarian assistance of various kinds.

The number of layers and players makes for difficult monitoring. This chapter attempts to identify the main trends in income and spending by UN agencies, international organisations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the EC and NGOs.

Monitoring humanitarian assistance implemented through UN agencies, international organisations and NGOs

Funding must be totally unearmarked in order to count as multilateral ODA in the official DAC figures. Anything falling outside this category, for example, money earmarked by region or broad theme, is classified as bilateral aid.

In 2004, 9% of total humanitarian assistance was contributed to three UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR and UNRWA) and a further 11% to the EC in unearmarked (DAC ‘multilateral’) form.

However, as donor reports clearly show, the bilateral emergency and distress relief category includes very large sums spent through multilateral organisations. In 2004, over one-third of humanitarian assistance reported by the DAC was given as contributions to the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP) which will be spent mostly by UN agencies.

The primary source for this chapter is the financial reports of agencies themselves, supported by data from the financial tracking system (FTS) and the DAC.
3.1 UN agencies and international organisations

Between 2002 and 2004 the total income received collectively by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) plus humanitarian income received by UNICEF, rose from US$4.2 billion to US$4.9 billion – an increase of around 17%. Although final figures were not available at the time of writing, it is anticipated that humanitarian income through these five agencies will show a very substantial increase in 2005.

The response to the tsunami from both bilateral governments and the general public resulted in large increases in funds to UNICEF, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and WFP. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for instance received US$2.1 billion and the UN agencies US$1.26 billion in response to the disaster. Contributions to UNICEF for the tsunami from private sources alone exceeded the agency’s total 2004 humanitarian income.1

3.1.1 How much is channelled through WFP?

At US$2.8 billion, WFP had the highest humanitarian income of all agencies profiled here, exceeding the total for UNHCR, the ICRC, the IFRC and UNICEF combined in 2004. However, its income includes in-kind contributions while the data for the other agencies shows cash income only. Income figures in WFP’s consolidated financial report

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for 2004 show that in-kind commodities as a share of WFP’s total income fell from 19% in the 2002–2003 biennium to 13% in 2004. In 2005, paid-up contributions to WFP in response to the tsunami amounted to more than US$240 million.

![Figure 3.2 WFP emergency expenditure, 2002–2004](image)

Emergency expenditure comprises expenditure that WFP classifies as relief, special operations, bilateral (services provided by WFP to a bilateral donor) and ‘other’. Development expenditure is that which is classified as such by WFP. WFP emergency expenditure includes in-kind disbursements. 2004 witnessed a significant reduction in the proportion of in-kind commodities to total commodities – 30% of expenditure was in kind, compared with 63% in the 2002–2003 biennium.

3.1.2 How much is channelled through UNHCR?

UNHCR had an income of US$962 billion in 2004 – a bigger humanitarian budget than all but two bilateral donors in the same year. Its operational expenditure by country has been on a steady and significant upward path – from US$771 million in 2002 to US$804 million in 2003 and US$854 million in 2004 (see Figure 3.3).

Expenditure includes work with refugees in developed countries as well as UNHCR’s life-saving activities in developing countries. UNHCR’s reporting on expenditure by country does not separate operational support costs from direct assistance to aid recipients, so these are also included.

3.1.3 How much is channelled through UNICEF?

Figure 3.4 shows UNICEF’s emergency expenditure as a share of total expenditure from 2002 to 2004.

While UNICEF’s emergency expenditure increased steadily from
US$253 million in 2002 to US$359 million in 2004, it has stayed within the range of 20–24% as a share of total expenditure.

3.1.4 How much is channelled through the IFRC and ICRC?

Both the IFRC and the ICRC saw sharp increases in humanitarian expenditure between 2002 and 2003. In 2004, humanitarian expenditure by both agencies fell back.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement was collectively the largest single funding channel for the tsunami response, with over US$2.18 billion collected worldwide. This represents a tenfold increase on 2004.²

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With both agencies, humanitarian expenditure covers relief supplies (including transportation and storage) and other assistance to beneficiaries as well as contributions to other organisations such as national societies to undertake humanitarian work. Expenditure on administration, staff and other support costs is not included.

3.1.5 Does UN agency and Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement income stem mainly from official or private sources?

Income stems from a variety of sources but is usually categorised as either ‘official’ or ‘private’. Official sources include government departments, inter-governmental organisations and UN and other international agencies. Private sources comprise fundraising from the public as well as the Red Cross/Crescent national societies or UNICEF national committees.

It is not always possible to draw a hard and fast line between official and private funding – in some countries, such as Greece, the government runs special appeals and is given money voluntarily by the public, but it is held accountable for the funds in the same way as for other public expenditure. In many countries, governments channel contributions to the ICRC and IFRC through their national societies. This may then be merged with voluntarily given money and contributed to international appeals.

Most international humanitarian organisations get almost all their funding from official sources. Up until 2005, the balance between official and private sources of income was relatively stable (see Figure 3.6). However, the volume of funding from the public in response to the tsunami shifted the balance between public and private sources.

UNICEF obtains the highest proportion of its emergency income from private sources. It has also seen the greatest increase in private

![Figure 3.5 Humanitarian expenditure through the ICRC and IFRC, 2002–2004](source: ICRC and IFRC annual reports)
income as a share of emergency income – from just under 14% in 2002 and 2003 to 20% in 2004. Another big increase is expected in 2005.

Figure 3.6  Official and private income, UN agencies and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, US$m

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IFRC, ICRC and WFP annual reports; other UNHCR and UNICEF

UNICEF obtains a substantial portion of its private income from its national committees. These national committees raised US$413 million in response to the tsunami.

The IFRC saw an increase in income from official sources in 2003, so the share of private income shows a fall of 3% from the previous year. However, in 2004, private income increased its share of total income to 7%. In 2005, the balance will be completely reversed; 7% of the response to the IFRC appeal for the tsunami came from governments and state donors – the rest from private sources.

In the case of the ICRC, income sources for the tsunami were also markedly different to the normal pattern – 15% came from private sources, 49% from national societies (compared with 5–6% in the past) and 36% from governments.

3.2 NGOs

Just as funding that originates with taxpayers in donor countries goes through many different agencies and organisations before it reaches people affected by crisis, so money and other resources given voluntarily by the public flows through different paths. The most direct source of funding for humanitarian relief is remittances – money given directly, person to person, often transferred through informal mechanisms. By its nature this source of funding is hard to count. But it is also likely to be highly significant, not just in terms of volume but also because it is often money that is very quickly delivered, does not rely on intermediaries and has the capacity to go directly to the people affected themselves.

NGOs receive funding from a whole series of channels – direct funding from bilateral governments, funding from the UN and international organisations, subcontracts or grants from other NGOs or foundations, money or gifts from corporations and, not least, voluntary
contributions from the public. Like other agencies, NGOs can be both donors and recipients.

The funding that NGOs receive from governments or international organisations should all be reflected in the internationally reported flows of humanitarian assistance. But it is likely that these flows are underreported. What will be additional is the money given voluntarily by the public or donated in response to fundraising initiatives and appeals.

Because NGOs do not report to a standard format and there is, as yet, no official international monitoring of all NGO humanitarian flows, it is necessary to rely on samples of information and data gathered from selected donors and NGO groups.

3.2.1 How dependent are NGOs on governments or official organisations for their humanitarian income?

Figure 3.7 shows the amounts of official and voluntary income that a selected group of NGOs received in 2004 for both humanitarian and development activities (excluding in-kind contributions).

![Figure 3.7 Voluntary and official income of selected NGOs, 2004](image)

Source: NGO annual reports

Official income comprises grants from governments and UN agencies while voluntary income covers all other sources, including trading. Together, these agencies received just under US$2.2 billion in 2004 – an increase of US$354 million on their income in 2003. At just over US$560 million, and with 12 member organisations, CARE International shows the highest income. As an individual agency, World Vision US had the highest income, at almost US$435 million.

Although in total the agencies received almost US$1.1 billion (50% of total income) in 2004 from voluntary sources, Figure 3.8 demonstrates significant differences in shares of voluntary income between the organisations.
Only 11% of International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) income stemmed from voluntary sources. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE International also got approximately 20% of their income from voluntary sources. On the other hand, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France received about 85% of its income from voluntary sources while Oxfam and World Vision US were not far behind with approximately 70% (although in the case of World Vision, its substantial food aid income from the US government is not included since the figures are based on cash income only).

3.2.2 How much humanitarian income do NGOs get from governments?

Detailed data on humanitarian spending through NGOs has been obtained from nine DAC donor countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and the US) and ECHO in order to build a picture of humanitarian assistance flows from governments to NGOs. In 2004, these ten donors channelled a total of about US$1.1 billion of their humanitarian funding directly through NGOs. The inclusion of some major donors such as Germany, Japan and the Netherlands would see this figure rise to between US$1.5 billion and US$2 billion.

In 2004, ten donors channelled a total of about US$1.1 billion of their humanitarian funding directly through NGOs.

This government funding to NGOs is in addition to the funding channelled through NGOs by UN agencies like UNHCR and WFP, which can be substantial. In 2004, UNHCR spent US$250 million through NGOs.

The largest official donor to NGOs is ECHO, with US$403 million in 2004. The US was the second largest contributor to the NGO sector, with US$259 million – and this excludes food aid.

Links between governments and national NGOs within their own countries are clearly important with 323 of the NGOs receiving official...
funding from just one donor – the government of the donor country in which they are based. Despite their presence in several donor countries, not one NGO family reported funding from all ten donors. CARE, Save the Children (SCF) and MSF were funded by the largest number of donors, followed by World Vision, Caritas, Tearfund, Oxfam GB, Norwegian People’s Aid and GOAL.

Funding is shared across a large number of NGOs – between them the ten donors profiled in this section supported over 375 NGOs. A tiny percentage of these fall outside the normal definitions of humanitarian NGOs, including political parties and state rescue services.

The number of NGOs supported by each donor varies widely, as shown in the table in Figure 3.10.

Funding is shared across a large number of NGOs – between them the ten donors profiled in this section supported over 375 NGOs. A tiny percentage of these fall outside the normal definitions of humanitarian NGOs, including political parties and state rescue services.

The number of NGOs supported by each donor varies widely, as shown in the table in Figure 3.10.

Norway and ECHO funded more than 100 NGOs each; Ireland, Portugal and Finland, ten or fewer. The average contribution overall is
US$3 million — but the range is from US$82,000 to US$5 million. The highest is Denmark with US$4.9 million, followed by ECHO with US$3.4 million, USA with US$3.1 million and the UK with US$2.6 million. Canada, Ireland, Norway, Sweden all gave between US$1 million and US$2 million per NGO.

In all, 21 NGO groupings received more than US$10 million each from the ten donors profiled here. MSF collectively received US$81 million, IRC (US and UK) received US$57 million and the collective groups of CAREs, SCFs, Oxfams and the Norwegian Refugee Council between US$40 million and US$50 million each. Collectively, the top 21 NGO groupings received US$606 million.

In addition, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement received US$201 million. This funding includes support to national societies — which are NGOs — as well as money which is official multilateral support to the ICRC but channelled through the national society.

The 21 NGO groupings, together with the Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies, received US$808 million or 60% of all humanitarian assistance channelled through NGOs. If the Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies are excluded, the 21 NGO groupings received half of the funding channelled through NGOs.

This relatively low level of concentration is diluted even further by the considerable diversity within the NGO groups themselves. These 21 multinational NGOs comprise 75 major organisations with distinctive characteristics, well known and with widespread support within their national contexts. Many of these international NGO groups are investing significant time and resources into internal harmonisation and coordination processes, which gives some indication of the diversity among them.

The remaining third of official humanitarian assistance from the ten profiled donors is spent through 302 NGOs that received between

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**Figure 3.11** Official funding for humanitarian work from ten DAC donors in 2004

Source: Donor agencies
US$3000 and US$10 million each. 220 of these received less than US$1 million – and of these, 120 received less than US$250 000.

### 3.2.3 How much do UN agencies spend through NGOs?

Between 2002 and 2004, 28%–29% of UNHCR’s operational expenditure was spent through NGOs (both international and national). UNHCR had partnerships with between 570 and 600 NGOs in each of these years.

**Figure 3.12** UNHCR income, operational expenditure and expenditure through NGOs, 2004

![Diagram showing UNHCR income, operational expenditure and expenditure through NGOs, 2004](image)

Although UNICEF has partnerships with a large number of NGOs to deliver assistance, it was not possible to obtain figures for how much of its emergency expenditure is channelled through NGOs.

WFP estimates that approximately 2% of its operational expenditure is spent through international NGOs. However, this is likely to be a substantial underestimate since to date WFP has only collected data on funding to international NGOs that had handled over 600 metric tonnes of food for the agency. In 2005 alone, WFP lists 2010 national NGO partners, though there is currently no data on how much is spent through these partners.

In addition to direct funding from these agencies, a number of NGOs receive funds from OCHA – often on behalf of a small number of donors – via the emergency response funds (ERFs). Over US$53.4 million has been channelled through ERFs in the last six years, financing 430 projects in just four countries – Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia and Somalia. In 2005, the DRC fund alone received US$11 million.

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Over US$53.4 million has been channelled through ERFs in the last six years, financing 430 projects in four countries.

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A review of ERFs commissioned by UN OCHA will be published in late 2006/2007. Further details on this funding mechanism can be found in Chapter 4.
3.2.4 How much humanitarian income do NGOs get from voluntary sources?

Estimating the total voluntary income received by NGOs

There are a number of difficulties involved even in estimating the total voluntary humanitarian income received by NGOs. One is that many NGOs have a mixed mandate, covering both humanitarian and development work, and do not tend to classify all their expenditure into one category or another. A second is that expenditure is not likely to be reported against a source of income. A programme of activity will be funded from several sources — government grants, public appeals, reserves, trading or legacy income for instance — and the expenditure is more likely to be reported as an integrated programme in a region, country or situation.

For the purposes of this report, the percentage of expenditure on humanitarian activities by mixed mandate NGOs has been applied to voluntary income. So, for example, since Save the Children UK spent 42% of its total expenditure on humanitarian assistance in 2003, 42% of its voluntary income in 2003 is shown as humanitarian voluntary income. This rough and ready method may result in an underestimate of humanitarian income because historically, there is a stronger voluntary response to humanitarian crises than to long-term structural poverty.

Figure 3.13 Estimated voluntary contributions to NGOs for humanitarian assistance, 2002–2004

The voluntary income for humanitarian activities of nine NGOs was analysed for the purposes of this report. What do the figures from these nine NGOs tell us about overall voluntary funding for humanitarian assistance?

As shown in Figure 3.13, collective voluntary income for humanitarian work for nine selected NGOs rose from US$391 million in 2003 to US$492 million in 2004 — an increase of 25%.

Together, these nine NGOs accounted for a quarter of official funding grants to NGOs other than the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. If they accounted for the same share of voluntary income,
then total voluntary income to NGOs in 2004 would have been in the order of US$2 billion. By way of reference, this compares with an estimate for 2001 of between US$700 million and US$1.5 million.

In 2005, the response to the tsunami resulted in a quantum change in voluntary funding for humanitarian assistance. Public giving in response to the tsunami was more rigorously monitored than any previous disaster with both the UN Office of the Special Envoy and the TEC undertaking comprehensive international surveys. These reveal between US$3.2 billion and US$5.5 billion in private voluntary flows through NGOs, excluding contributions via the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

The voluntary response to the tsunami was certainly unprecedented. It is not yet clear whether this marks the start of a new trend towards much more private funding for humanitarian work.

### 3.2.5 How much global humanitarian assistance is actually channelled through NGOs?

#### Figure 3.14 Estimate of global humanitarian assistance channelled through NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>US$</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary giving</td>
<td>US$2bn–US$5bn</td>
<td>At least US$2bn is raised from the public for humanitarian work. Well documented evidence exists for US$3.2bn in response to the tsunami, with a likely figure of over US$5bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official grants</td>
<td>US$1.2bn–US$2bn</td>
<td>US$1.2bn is given in documented grants from the ten donors analysed in this chapter of the report. The ten donors account for about 60% of global official humanitarian assistance. If the same pattern of funding was observed in the remaining 40%, total official funding from DAC governments to NGOs for humanitarian assistance would be around US$2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding from</td>
<td>US$500m–US$800m</td>
<td>Secure data from UNHCR, spending through ERFs and estimates of spending from WFP and UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of total</td>
<td>US$3.7bn–US$7.8bn</td>
<td>The top estimate is a possible figure for 2005, given the response to the tsunami. But it is extremely likely that well over US$4bn in global humanitarian assistance flows through NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding channelled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through NGOs</td>
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</table>

Source: Development Initiatives estimates based on the income/expenditure analysis of ten DAC donors and nine NGOs, 2006
2005 was a distinctive and influential year, creating a new environment for global humanitarian assistance. This new environment is being shaped by the scale of the response to the tsunami of December 2004, the development of new financing instruments to make funding more equitable and more effective, the progressive implementation of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) agenda, the increased attention to fragile states, security and vulnerability and, more formally, by the reform agenda set out by the UN Secretary General in his report, In Larger Freedom (March 2005).

This chapter attempts to identify some of the emerging trends and features that are shaping responses to humanitarian disasters.

4.1 The response to the tsunami disaster

The response to the tsunami that struck countries in the Indian Ocean has had reverberations for all humanitarian assistance – not only in terms of volume but also in terms of the number of actors involved and the extent of public and political engagement. The scale of funding also acted as, to quote the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), “a giant lens, illuminating the humanitarian system”.¹

The tsunami prompted the biggest international response to a natural disaster on record - and the scale of unofficial, voluntary public giving is unprecedented. By December 2005, US$14 billion had been pledged and US$11.6 billion had been either committed or actually received.

The US$5.5 billion or more given by the public to NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN agencies exceeded the total amounts previously reported for all NGO humanitarian assistance from all sources for any single disaster. NGOs (excluding the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) received US$3.2 billion from the public in verified contributions and some reports suggest that a further US$2 billion was contributed via voluntary giving.

For the UN agencies too, funding from the public was very important. Nearly US$500 million (40% of funds disbursed through the UN family) came to UN agencies from their own resources or the public – more than US$400 million of it through UNICEF national committees.

Private contributions to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

were also on an unprecedented scale, amounting to US$1.8 billion, compared with around US$300 million from governments.

The ‘normal’ balance between official funding and voluntary public contributions was turned on its head by the public response.

4.1.1 How significant were governmental contributions to the tsunami?

Institutional donor response to the tsunami was significant not only in terms of volume but also in terms of the sheer number and mix of government agencies and ministries involved.

At US$8.5 billion, institutional donor pledges to the tsunami amounted to less than the US$9.4 billion committed to Iraq in 2004 or the US$9 billion pledged to Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Funding from governments accounted for 45% of total pledges with a further 15% coming from the multilateral development banks (MDBs). Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor disbursements to the tsunami in 2005 were just under 50% of the disbursements to Iraq in the same year.

An unprecedented 99 governments (plus two intergovernmental donors) were reported internationally as contributing assistance:

- 77 governments were non-DAC members
  - in addition to cash, some of these donors (including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, China and the Republic of Korea) gave gifts in kind and deployed military assets in the relief effort
- 13 governments had never made a recorded disaster contribution before
  - this is significant as many donors, having given once, engage in further disaster response
- five donors (Australia, the EC, Germany, Japan and the US) were responsible for providing over 50% of the funds

![Donor pledges to the tsunami amounted to less than the US$9.4 billion committed to Iraq in 2004](image)

Figure 4.1 International funding for the tsunami as at December 2005

Source: OECD DAC and national donor reports
94% of the government pledges came from 20 donors.

Expenditure by ministries of defence was significant (US$251 million of the US$907 million allocated by the US, for instance) and many military assets were used, particularly transport.

### 4.1.2 What does governmental spend on the tsunami tell us about future funding patterns?

In the months following the tsunami, some donors specifically stated that their commitments to the tsunami-affected countries would be additional to current aid flows. Denmark, for example, made it clear that its contributions were additional to normal aid flows. Australia stated that its AU$1 billion for Indonesia would be additional to existing development cooperation (whereas the allocations to Sri Lanka would come from current resources).

For most governmental donors, funding was a combination of allocations from the humanitarian budget and additional funding from contingency reserves, either within the relevant government departments or from ministries of finance.

One-fifth of funding from MDBs represented transfers from existing loans. But one-third was grants and a further 36% was new loans for tsunami-affected countries.

This question of additionality is important because it has implications for:
- future contributions to the tsunami-affected countries themselves
- current and immediate future giving to other countries
- progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions or make assumptions about future patterns of spending on the basis of past experience of exceptional responses to emergencies. For example, until 2001, aid to Afghanistan had averaged around US$165 million per year. Then, in the three years that followed, aid disbursements to the country reached a total of US$2.7 billion. On the other hand, in the whole six years following Hurricane Mitch, the affected countries received only US$937 million more than they might have expected in ‘normal’ years. Relative lack of additional money to the countries affected by Hurricane Mitch suggests that the funds disbursed in response to the disaster simply replaced the normal aid flows.

However, if the tsunami commitments do indeed prove to be additional, the figures for total official development assistance (ODA) to affected countries in 2005 will show major changes. Bilateral ODA disbursements to Indonesia should be more than US$1.4 billion, those to Sri Lanka should quadruple, and disbursements to the Maldives should be nearly 15 times the 2004 level (see Figure 4.2).
4.1.3 Was public engagement in the tsunami disaster exceptional?

As we have seen, the tsunami recorded the biggest public response to a natural disaster on record, with US$5.5 billion going to NGOs and the UN – an amount greater than NGOs had ever before collected in a year from all sources for humanitarian assistance. Public contributions to NGOs represented 23% of the total amount, with a further 13% (some US$1.8 billion) being channelled through one of 76 Red Cross or Red Crescent societies and 4% through UN agencies. These figures underline the scale of public concern, not least because the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is often the first organisation that governments and individuals turn to when they want to get immediate funding to a crisis.

The timing of the disaster, while many people were enjoying seasonal holidays, was seen as one factor underpinning the public response. Other factors which gave the tsunami such a high profile were the realisation over days and weeks of the huge number of lives lost, the immediacy of the disaster resulting from extensive media coverage especially amateur video of the disaster shot by Western tourists, the fact that the disaster was an act of nature and therefore nobody’s fault, and finally, strong sense of identification with the people who were affected. Some – but not all – of these factors are unique. Part of the response may be a product of longer term concern.

Public awareness of – and involvement in – global development and humanitarian issues has also gathered pace over the last 20 years. The Millennium Review Summit, public mobilisation around Make Poverty History, the Global Call to Action Against Poverty, Live 8 and the twentieth anniversary of famine in Ethiopia, the poverty and
development orientation of the UK-chaired G8 Summit in Gleneagles as well as a read-across between the global security agenda all helped keep humanitarian affairs in the spotlight as never before during 2005. This level of support represents a fund of political capital and a bigger constituency which may underpin support for humanitarian and development assistance in the years to come. Many humanitarian organisations had to struggle with the difficulties of turning away proffered help without discouraging the givers and with coordinating huge public response and engagement. Maintaining this public involvement while encouraging a response that is effective and appropriate will remain a real challenge for the humanitarian community.

4.1.4 What light did the tsunami shed on tracing pledges and contributions through to the recipient?

The nature and scale of the tsunami response prompted several new initiatives to improve the tracking of pledges through to commitments and disbursements. The work of the UN Office of the Special Envoy, the TEC and the DAC counted among these. But what public accountability really demands is not just to know what proportion of pledges are turned into firm commitments but what has actually arrived on the ground in the disaster site. This information is difficult to obtain on any consistent, reliable basis.

The humanitarian dollar goes through many layers. While different agencies and organisations involved in humanitarian assistance have their own tracking and monitoring systems, there is no single end-to-end tracking system. Official tracking (through the OECD DAC and the financial tracking system (FTS)) stops with disbursement to implementing agencies or second-level donors. This makes it hard to determine whether a pledge has been delivered to the person in need and what proportion of the original commitment has resulted in the delivery of a benefit.

Funds may pass through many hands before reaching their final destinations, possibly incurring transaction costs at each stage along the way (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3  Tracking the humanitarian dollar

At present, we have little notion of what these various transaction costs are, how they compare between agencies, whether they would be regarded as legitimate or not by the donor, or how the costs (in whole
or in part) are deducted from the donation as it moves along the chain.

A very positive development with regard to tracking pledges, commitments and disbursements though was the publication in November 2005 – i.e. between the annual statistical reports – of the DAC survey on the response to the tsunami. The survey saw the cooperation of all DAC members in order to produce figures in advance of reporting deadlines, allowing for improved coordination and tracking of the conversion of government tsunami pledges to commitments and then to disbursements. By March 2006 it was possible to report that:

- 32% of government pledges had been disbursed
- 29% of government pledges had been committed to a specific activity or agency
- 38% had yet to be committed, though the majority of this funding was earmarked for 2006–2010 reconstruction.

Analysis of the tsunami response also shed light on the costing of gifts in kind and military assets – both of which were offered in abundance. While there are rules for what can be included as ODA, the actual charging of military activity is unclear. For instance, if foreign militaries are doing jobs – clearing rubble for instance – that could be done by local people, are their costs charged to the humanitarian budget, or is it a free gift?

Similarly, gifts in kind are not valued on a consistent basis. Nevertheless, they are often monetised and appear in the total volumes of international assistance, regardless of whether they are useful or appropriate.

These complications make a case for counting cash and commodity humanitarian assistance separately. But if commodity aid or military support is going to be monetised, then the process needs to be transparent, consistent and related to quality, with a standard system for DAC or GHD donors.

**4.1.5 What did the tsunami reveal about the use of appeals to finance humanitarian response?**

At US$1.28 billion, the UN’s consolidated appeal for the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami was the third largest ever in terms of funds requested. It was only exceeded by the appeal for Sudan in 2005 (US$1.9 billion) and the appeal for Iraq in 2003 (US$2.2 billion). In terms of funds received in direct response to the appeal itself (in other words funds for the projects listed inside the appeal), the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami was the second largest (US$1.08 billion), following Iraq with US$2.2 billion in 2003.

The Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami appeal was not fully funded. The 18% shortfall between the money requested and the money received in direct response would seem to indicate that needs were
unmet. This is a confusing concept given the huge volumes of assistance committed and disbursed in response to the disaster itself. For instance, DAC donor contributions to the value of US$1.6 billion had already been disbursed by October 2005 (outstripping the total UN appeal amount by US$300 million) and the FTS recorded total government contributions of US$4.7 billion. So what are these apparent contradictions telling us? How can there be a situation where such huge financial commitments seemingly fail to meet needs?

The answer is that 82% of funding for the tsunami recorded by the FTS was given outside the appeal. That is, although the money coming in for humanitarian assistance was raised for those affected by the tsunami, it was not for activities and organisations that the appeal had identified as being essential in order to meet the strategic humanitarian priorities. While the scale of the funding for the tsunami was exceptional, it was another example of a situation where more money flows outside than inside a CAP.

Why does this happen? Why do governments not fund the strategic priorities first? In sudden onset disasters, resource commitments have to be made before a needs assessment is even commissioned, let alone completed. Without these commitments, funding cannot flow. At the same time, there is a lot of pressure for donors to keep to their funding commitments, which was particularly evident in the first quarter of 2005 when significant media attention was devoted to assessing the reliability of the pledges that had been made. This means that pledges are made in advance of the needs assessment. This re-enforces the need for a global mechanism – such as the newly expanded central emergency response fund (CERF) – to enable funds to flow from the outset, so that subsequent donor commitments can be made in response to the prioritised needs.

A further apparent paradox lies in the fact that more than half of the money raised by the CAP appeal for the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami was unearmarked, allowing for much more flexibility in terms of responding to the needs on the ground. More than 30 donors made all or part of their contributions in this way, compared with only two or three to appeals for other countries in previous years. Nonetheless, despite the availability of unspecified funds, the majority of sectors still had shortfalls at April 2005.

These sectoral shortfalls could be partly due to the fact that the needs assessment was overtaken by events and was no longer up to date. The problem of a static needs assessment used as benchmark of funding needs for a year is self evident. One solution, proposed in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2005, was the development of a rolling needs assessment and workplan process designed to adapt with changing circumstances.

**Invisible local response**

As in all disasters, local individuals, communities and agencies carried out most of the tsunami’s immediate rescue and relief operations. Local people, councils, businesses, faith groups and armies also contributed significant amounts of money, supplies and personnel.

It is a major gap in reporting that local actions, from community self-help to rescue missions by domestic military forces, are rarely if ever given a financial value or included in disaster response reports. At least US$190 million — almost certainly far more — was given by the public in affected countries, while their governments contributed at least US$2.6 billion of their own resources.

The Local Response Study — one of the seven parts to the TEC study of the tsunami and emergency relief — notes: “One of the lessons from the tsunami is that most relief is local and that local capacity and preparedness are key to effective relief.” Despite this, it is all but invisible in accounts of resources available.

Invisibility reinforces the lack of attention to preparedness and working at local level. If the inputs and impact of local response were clearer, better decisions could be made on investing resources in preparedness and local capacity, potentially leading to more sustainable and cost effective response.

Ways to document local response should be developed and included in standard reporting to enable like-with-like comparisons with assistance received from overseas.

Similarly, data on remittances from family members abroad following the tsunami was not monitored. Anecdotal evidence from other disasters suggests that this type of financial flow — on a global basis in normal years worth far more than all aid flows — may provide fast and flexible sources of vital cash income.

The role of remittances in supporting local humanitarian response needs to be better understood.

The tsunami provides a rare example of an emergency where immediately pledged funds exceeded the subsequently assessed needs. However, it also revealed that neither the systems nor the culture were in place to enable NGOs and agencies to approach their donors and invite them to allow urgent unmet needs to be funded elsewhere in the world with the surplus funds from the tsunami. Instead, what most agencies appeared to do, was to keep faith with their donors by ensuring that the funding was spent in the affected places, but over a far longer timescale. As a result, in mid-2005, one UN agency had
over US$400 million of tsunami money waiting to be spent in the long term and US$360 million of unfunded projects to meet urgent humanitarian need elsewhere in the world.

Overall, the tsunami demonstrated that a process of event, followed by needs assessment, followed by appeal, followed by relief based on how much money has come in, is not a coherent way to respond to humanitarian disasters – whether they are over- or underfunded.

The tsunami raised the question of whether different norms and systems need to be in place to allow flexibility which does not undermine confidence in the integrity of the funding system. These norms might include a recognised minimum standard or benchmark (a denominator of need) that could apply to all emergencies to enable an objective, comparable assessment of the point when funding was adequate to meet basic needs and where any surpluses could be transferred to needier situations.

### 4.2 Drivers of change and developments within humanitarian financing instruments

Initiatives and reforms of international funding mechanisms have been near the top of the humanitarian community’s agenda for the last few years. The principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship agreed in Stockholm in June 2003, for example, focused on the ways in which humanitarian funding mechanisms could be improved, including by:
- providing flexible and timely funding
- allocating funding in proportion to needs
- reducing earmarking.

In 2005, spurred on by the lack of adequate or timely resources going to the crisis in Darfur, a number of ideas were put into action including the development of pooled humanitarian funding allocated under the decision-making authority of the humanitarian coordinator and the ten-fold expansion of the CERF, which is now able to give grant funding, enabling UN agencies to respond more quickly to humanitarian crises and to address needs in underfunded crises. At the same time, country-based mechanisms, such as the emergency response funds
ERFs run by OCHA, have been introduced in an increasing number of situations.

All these financing reforms have required action by donors working together. They also rely on parallel reforms within the humanitarian system such as the development of a consistent needs analysis (formerly assessment) framework (NAF), which will be applied in around three-quarters of countries that are the subject of a UN consolidated appeal in 2006, and the establishment of the cluster approach in 2005 to improve sectoral coordination.

4.2.1 The GHD initiative

The GHD initiative has driven change in humanitarian response through focusing on improvements within the direct control of donors themselves: things like respect for international standards, clear policies, financing methods, systems of allocation, accountability and coordination.

Set up at a Stockholm conference in 2003, it was formally endorsed by the DAC in 2006. It does not have an institution or secretariat but operates by collaboration between participating donors and an agreed programme of work.

GHD has established a series of mechanisms that can help to sustain improved humanitarian response. Humanitarian issues are now a standard part of the DAC peer review process, which will encourage countries to examine their strategy and operations with a critical eye. GHD has also decided on indicators of its own performance, to be publicly reported each year (See Chapter 6).

While only six donors have domestic implementation plans, a number have reported changes that can be attributed to the GHD process. Australia for instance reported that the reduction in earmarking was a direct result of the GHD framework. Belgium, the US and Portugal all noted the impact of the peer review on progress in humanitarian work. Finland, the Czech Republic and Switzerland are using GHD principles in legislation. GHD principles are commonly used in humanitarian policy statements. Examples include Ireland’s white paper and the new humanitarian strategies from Finland and the UK.

GHD has also provided a forum for taking forward new approaches such as pooled funding and improving donor coordination at field level.

GHD will be chaired by Denmark and the UK in 2006/7. Its workplan will address:

- best practice in needs-based resource allocation
- strengthening donor coordination at country level
- sharing best practice in the promotion and implementation of disaster risk reduction.

It will continue its work on GHD indicators, harmonisation and simplification of reporting and engagement with agencies and good
practice in the creation of national policies and domestic implementation plans.

4.2.2 Funding models for a coherent and equitable response

Attempts to provide funding according to need have resulted in funding models that fall into two categories:

- mechanisms that try to provide more coherent funding within crises – ensuring a coordinated response and that priority needs are met first
- mechanisms that try to decrease the inequity that is manifest across crises – providing adequate global response to all humanitarian need wherever it occurs.

These mechanisms are summarised in Figure 4.5 (below).

The CERF, common humanitarian (pooled) funds and ERFs are detailed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Further details of DG ECHO funding for forgotten emergencies can be found in Chapter 7.

4.2.3 The CERF

A central emergency revolving fund was first established in 1991 as a fund of US$50 million given as a one-off contribution by donors. The aim was to expedite the response of operational UN agencies to sudden crises (not just new emergencies but also situations in ongoing crisis that required a scaling-up of operations) before they received funds from donors. This original version of the CERF could have been a mechanism to improve response to underfunded crises but because agencies were required to reimburse the money they were given from the CERF once funding from donors came in, it was mainly used in situations that were sure to attract donor funding in the medium term.

By 2004, due to the accumulation of interest, the CERF had US$50 million in the bank and US$15 million on loan. An expanded grant-based CERF was seen as a potential mechanism to ensure readily available funding for all crises thus contributing to a more equitable response. The necessary amendment was approved by the General Assembly on 15 December 2005 and the new CERF (this time the central emergency response fund) was officially launched on 9 March 2006. The General Assembly called for the CERF to reach a level of US$500 million by 2008.

The new CERF has a grant element of US$450 million in addition to the US$50 million loan element. Up to two-thirds of the grant facility can be allocated to rapid response to emergencies while the remaining third will be devoted to addressing underfunded emergencies. In principle, when an agency has donor funds in the pipeline, it will be expected to use the loan element of the CERF so that the grant element is used only when donor funding is not available. By October
### Figure 4.5 Summary of humanitarian assistance funding models and mechanisms trialled by donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding mechanism</th>
<th>Managed by</th>
<th>Distinguishing features</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coherent funding within crises – ensuring a coordinated response and that priority needs are met first</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Common humanitarian (pooled) funds</td>
<td>Funds controlled by the humanitarian coordinator</td>
<td>Decentralised – decision-making devolved to humanitarian coordinator. Priority activities that are not funded by other sources</td>
<td>DRC and Sudan (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ERPs</td>
<td>Funds held by OCHA for NGOs/UN agencies</td>
<td>Small-scale, gap-filling, quick response activities for unforeseen needs. Allows donors to fund broader range of organisations without the direct funding relationship</td>
<td>DRC, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Somalia and others (since 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allocation of funding by UN humanitarian coordinator</td>
<td>Funds held by donor but at the service of the humanitarian coordinator</td>
<td>Maintains funding relationship between donor and recipient agency. Allows humanitarian coordinator to identify priority needs. Decentralised – decision-making devolved to humanitarian coordinator</td>
<td>DFID, Kosovo and Sudan; Netherlands, Sri Lanka and Indonesia (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. NGO fund</td>
<td>Funds managed by third party to allow more coherent engagement with NGOs</td>
<td>Allows donor to fund broader range of NGOs without having the direct funding relationship. Decentralised – decision-making devolved to agency managing funds</td>
<td>Netherlands, Afghanistan (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adequate and equitable funding globally across crises</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CERF</td>
<td>Administered by OCHA for use by operational UN agencies</td>
<td>UN agencies receive grants for underfunded emergencies and loans to enable quick response for all emergencies</td>
<td>First established in 1991. Expanded and re-launched March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Forgotten crisis assessment (FCA)</td>
<td>DG ECHO funding for any DG ECHO recipient agency</td>
<td>Financing emergencies that are not prioritised by other donors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives
2006, the CERF had recorded commitments of US$272 million from 54 donors. Of this, US$267 million had been contributed and US$5 million had been pledged. US$157 million had been disbursed, of which US$77 million was for underfunded emergencies.

The CERF is now managed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, under the guidance of an advisory group of 12 independent experts – eight from the grant facility contributors and four from a range of partners and stakeholders (such as NGOs, academics and the private sector). The ERC is to disburse funds within three or four days of a request from a humanitarian or resident coordinator, so lack of funding should no longer constrain UN agencies from responding quickly. The specific allocation of one-third of the grant element to underfunded crises should also help address current inequities in funding.

Figure 4.6 Total commitments to the CERF, October 2006


### 4.2.4 Common (pooled) humanitarian funds

As part of the humanitarian reform agenda and their commitment to GHD, a number of donors advocated the establishment of country-level funds to be disbursed under the authority of the in-country humanitarian coordinator. This mechanism, designed to meet priority needs and finance critical projects in the CAP, is being piloted in Sudan and the DRC in 2006. Although common humanitarian funds were mainly intended as a funding mechanism for UN agencies, humanitarian coordinators in the pilot countries have indicated that if NGOs are best placed to meet the priority needs within the emergency, then they should have the flexibility to fund NGOs as well.

Common humanitarian funds support the reform agenda because they empower the position of the humanitarian coordinator – and they also fit well with the principles of GHD. This is because these funds involve giving unearmarked money, which is allocated at country level on the basis of overall need, rather than individual donors and
agencies agreeing individual projects or activities. This is a crucial development in terms of coordination – enabling funds to be allocated to priority sectors and gaps to be filled. This type of funding is more flexible because the coordinator can make decisions based on advice and knowledge of changing needs on the ground. Finally, pooled funding encourages timely funding, since donors are expected to provide money (or at least commitments) at the beginning of the year.

Figure 4.7 The common humanitarian fund mechanism

Though the core of the common humanitarian fund is a pooled fund mechanism, donors who are unable or unwilling to channel money through it are encouraged to support coordination and the funding of strategic priorities by participating in one of three possible ways:

- allowing the humanitarian coordinator to allocate funding while disbursing money directly to recipient agencies (the allocation model)
- consulting the humanitarian coordinator on funding decisions but retaining the right to make the final funding decision (the consultation model)
- providing information directly to the humanitarian coordinator about funding decisions so that they can take account of all flows of resources in allocating funds.

Common humanitarian funds should improve humanitarian response by:

- creating incentives for participation in the needs assessments and common humanitarian action plans (CHAPs)
- ensuring that a higher proportion of funds flow to strategic priorities
- reinforcing quick, flexible, country-level decision-making in response to changing priorities
- enabling the humanitarian coordinator to fund a better mix of inputs, resulting in a more coordinated response
highlighting responsibility for funding shortfalls and increasing the incentives to ensure that all humanitarian priorities are met.

• increasing incentives for donors to keep the humanitarian coordinator well informed about funding decisions.

Donors have requested an independent evaluation of the pilot common humanitarian funds in Sudan and the DRC to see whether the funds are fulfilling their potential and how constraints in the administrative procedures and management processes can be overcome.

4.2.5 ERFs

The significance of country-level funding mechanisms such as ERFs has been noted in several studies and widely discussed within the context of humanitarian reform.²

At least US$53 million has been allocated through ERFs over the past six years. ERFs offer easily and rapidly available small grants (up to US$130,000) to in-country aid actors (NGOs and occasionally, as in the case of the DRC and Somalia, UN agencies). They are usually set up at the suggestion of donors and can enable:

• quick response to sudden emergencies/improved response preparedness
• gap-filling in humanitarian response, such as enabling organisations to start emergency work while waiting for funding from other donors or enabling agencies to provide service continuity when there are gaps in funding from other sources
• the supplementing of other funding to reach more beneficiaries
• increased humanitarian access by funding local NGOs
• flexible responses to changing local priorities.

ERFs also free donors from the administrative burden of managing a large number of small grants. For donors with a limited presence in the field, it is particularly useful to be able to rely on OCHA to identify the most critical needs and gaps.

For OCHA, the ability to fund NGOs can be an important support for coordination because the money acts as an incentive for NGOs to participate in coordination meetings.

From a recipient perspective, it is valuable to have a source of funding that can be quick, fill funding gaps and cover activities that other donors are unwilling to finance. Some ERFs can also fund local NGOs, who usually find it hard to get funding directly from donor governments, so it can be an important capacity-building tool.

Finally, recipient agencies tend to appreciate that the ERFs are

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managed by an organisation that understands the situation on the ground, with relatively light administration and application processes.

The ERF mechanism has come into increasing use since its first appearance in Angola in 1993. ERFs are currently in use in Liberia, Somalia, the DRC, Iraq, Ethiopia, Indonesia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Efforts are underway to establish new ERFs in Burundi, the Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire. This suggests that aid actors have found the mechanism useful in ensuring more predictable funding and improving the delivery of effective humanitarian action.

### 4.2.6 Needs analysis framework (NAF)

Almost all of the improvements in the coherence and equity of humanitarian financing rely on consistent and comparable needs assessments. Without some benchmark based on need it is impossible to say whether funding is either adequate within emergencies or equitable between emergencies.

The NAF is designed to support the CHAP and the CAP by strengthening the analysis and presentation of humanitarian needs, especially for the most vulnerable people. The document is a tool to help humanitarian coordinators and country teams organise and present existing information on humanitarian needs in a coherent and consistent way.

The NAF itself does not prioritise sector needs or provide costings for delivery of needs. Sector prioritisation occurs during the CHAP and CAP development but the NAF should provide a consistent set of information on which the prioritisation can be based.

Following pilots in five countries during 2005 (Palestine, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda and Burundi), the NAF process should be integrated into three-quarters of CAP appeals during 2006. The sudden onset of many emergencies means that not all agencies will have the time and resources to invest in creating a NAF.

### 4.2.7 Cluster approach

2005 also saw a significant new development in the management of humanitarian response with the agreement on the cluster approach. The cluster approach deals with the problems of gaps in particular sectors like water and sanitation, camp management and protection and also with the need to ensure global capacity for a systematic humanitarian response.

The approach is designed to improve collaboration and also to ensure that there are clear and accountable lead agencies responsible for ensuring that work by other agencies (UN, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs) is complementary and addresses priority needs. The cluster lead also acts as provider of last resort. This should in turn support coherent humanitarian financing: needs and capacity to respond will be better defined, accountability for delivery
will be clearer and the assessment of resources required in each sector should be more complete.

There are nine clusters, each with a designated lead. The lead is accountable to the ERC and is responsible for ensuring predictable and effective inter-agency preparedness and response within its area of activity.

Figure 4.8 The nine clusters of the cluster approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First clusters: Service provision</th>
<th>Second clusters: Relief and assistance to beneficiaries</th>
<th>Third clusters: Cross-cutting issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Emergency shelter</td>
<td>Early recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP (chair)</td>
<td>UNHCR (chair for conflict-generated IDPs)</td>
<td>UNDP (chair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency telecommunications</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Camp co-ordination and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA (owner), UNICEF (data service provider), WFP (telecoms provider)</td>
<td>WHO (chair)</td>
<td>UNHCR (chair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF (chair)</td>
<td>UNHCR (chair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF (chair)</td>
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</table>

The cluster approach is designed for work both at field level and at global level – dealing with overall capacity and preparedness as well as coordination and delivery on the ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster leadership functions at global level</th>
<th>Cluster leadership functions at field level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up-to-date assessments of the overall needs for human, financial, and institutional capacity</td>
<td>Predictable action in the cluster for analysis of needs, addressing priorities, and identifying gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviews of currently available capacities and means for their use</td>
<td>Securing and following up on commitments from the cluster to respond to needs and fill gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links with other clusters, including preparedness and long-term planning, standards, best practice, advocacy, and resource mobilisation</td>
<td>Acting as provider of last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking action to ensure that required capacities and mechanisms exist, including rosters for surge capacity and stockpiles</td>
<td>Sustaining mechanisms for assessing the performance of the cluster and individual participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and system development at the local, national, regional, and international levels</td>
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</table>
2005 witnessed: increased diversity in the sources of funding for humanitarian work; the emergence of new governmental and non-governmental donors; and, in some countries, a stronger public engagement in both global poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance.

At the same time, a number of trends have been converging to create a demand for predictable flows of humanitarian assistance. All point to the need for financing that is not based purely on crisis-by-crisis appeals. These include:

• building global capacity for a systematic response
• recognition of the links between relief and development
• providing up-front funding to meet urgent and strategic needs.

5.1 Will there be more demand for humanitarian assistance?

The need for humanitarian assistance is likely to remain as high as ever:

• there is a widespread assumption that there will be more natural hazards as a result of weather extremes from global warming and a perception that the world will see more impact from natural hazards due to the growing concentration of populations in locations and conditions that help make them vulnerable
• although the number of conflicts has been falling in Africa, many people are still living in situations of extreme volatility there and in other parts of the world1
  – in recent years a number of donors have massively increased their spending on conflict prevention, often using funds outside official development assistance (ODA), including military expenditure and integrating security and humanitarian work
  – current preoccupations with stability and fragile states are likely to continue
• food insecurity continues to be a major issue in much of Africa.

Each new major disaster appears to be having a ratchet effect, not only in terms of raising funding to new levels but also in terms of attracting donors – governments, corporations and individuals – some of whom, judging by past experience, are likely to continue to give humanitarian assistance. The scale of giving to the tsunami and the South Asia earthquake may have long-term significance because of the quantum leap in the number of donors involved.

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at www.sipri.org
The media and public attention to disasters – implicitly recognising the links citizens have to their global neighbours – is also significant for the flow of humanitarian assistance. Not just in terms of scale and volume but also in terms of speed. Public response tends to be very quick and to result in immediate transfers, which has benefits for timeliness, if not so much for predictability. Remittances offer a similarly quick response but the scale of the funding will clearly be determined by the size and wealth of the diaspora – something that has also been shown to influence donor government responses.

### 5.2 Will more aid mean more humanitarian assistance?

In 2005, the collective commitments of DAC donors to increase aid amounted to an additional US$50 billion a year by 2010. For more than a decade, humanitarian assistance has maintained a percentage share of total DAC aid of between 7% and 10%. If that share stays the same and total aid rises as has been pledged as part of efforts to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), humanitarian assistance will clearly grow as well.

Extrapolating a decade of actual ODA figures for DAC donors alongside the DAC’s own estimates of commitments to additional spending between 2006 and 2010 produces two very different lines on a graph (see Figure 5.1). If DAC donor spending continues its own trend, they will be spending just over US$7.6 billion on humanitarian assistance by 2010. If they increase ODA as they say they plan to, it will reach almost US$11.3 billion by 2010 – a difference of US$3.7 billion.
5.3 What impact will new and non-DAC donors have?

The Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami appeal prompted pledges of assistance from 77 non-DAC donors – over three times the average number involved in any other emergency between 2000 and 2004. On average, non-DAC donors contributed 6% of overall governmental humanitarian assistance between 2000 and 2005 (see Figure 5.2). The top ten non-DAC donors in 2005 according to FTS data were Saudi Arabia (US$117 million), UAE (US$98 million), China (US$66 million), Qatar (US$46 million), Kyrgyzstan (US$27 million), India (US$25 million), the Russian Federation (US$21 million), Algeria (US$15 million), Kuwait (US$13 million) and Malta (US$12 million).

As the graph shows, the varied level in giving – or perhaps more accurately, reported giving – by non-DAC donors makes it difficult to make any definitive statements about emerging trends:

- at US$650 million, reported non-DAC contributions in 2005 reached above average levels
  - however, 91% of this (US$593 million) was allocated to the tsunami
- in 2001, another above average year, the financial tracking system (FTS) recorded US$732 million in contributions from non-DAC donors (13% of the total reported humanitarian assistance that year)
  - a contribution to Palestine from Saudi Arabia accounted for 88% (US$645 million) of this
  - a further 9% (US$68.5 million) was allocated to the DPRK
- it is not clear whether the lower-than-average years indicate lack of contributions or lack of formally recorded contributions.

There are several reasons why increasingly significant levels of reported contributions from some non-DAC donors could be seen in the future:

- for countries without long established patterns of giving,
humanitarian crises are likely to provide obvious opportunities to channel resources to pressing need

- 13 first-time donors gave to the tsunami – past experience suggests that humanitarian assistance outside the national borders starts with large or local crises but then expands to other parts of the world

- several non-DAC countries – including the Republic of Korea, Turkey and all the EU accession countries – are committed to significantly increasing their aid

- emerging donors are likely to want to spend money in a way that reinforces domestic public and political support for a growing aid programme – in most countries the public strongly supports humanitarian assistance.

The amounts given by non-DAC donors are relatively small when set against total humanitarian assistance spending reported to the FTS but at recipient country level, the involvement of non-DAC donors is highly significant. As is the case with DAC donor governments, the amount of aid directed to a particular country or region is often strongly affected by cultural, social, political and economic ties:

- just four countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, the DPRK and Palestine) received an average of more than 80% of non-DAC humanitarian assistance between 2000 and 2004
  - while Afghanistan and Iraq have received very substantial funding from DAC donors, the DPRK received only 65% of its humanitarian funding from DAC donors between 2002 and 2004 and Palestine just 20%

- between 2000 and 2005, Saudi Arabia provided over US$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to 47 countries but nearly all of it went to four countries
  - the main recipients were Palestine (US$671 million), Pakistan (US$144 million), Iraq (US$44 million) and Afghanistan (US$23 million).

Overall, reported humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors to the five largest recipients between 2000 and 2004 varied from US$720 million to less than US$70 million:

- Afghanistan was reported to have received US$49 million in 2002 from non-DAC donors but less than US$1.3 million from the same source in other years over the period

- Palestine was reported to have received US$645 million in 2001, US$91 million in 2004 but less than US$2.5 million in other years

- Iraq was reported to have received US$113 million in 2003 but less than US$4 million in other years.

These very large year-on-year differences highlight the importance of improving the consistency of voluntary reporting to the FTS.
5.4 Will humanitarian reform result in more efficient resourcing?

There are two ways in which humanitarian reform could result in more resources:

- by getting better value for money from each humanitarian dollar available
- by increasing the size of overall resources available for humanitarian assistance.

The whole purpose of the financing reforms is to improve the quality of humanitarian response for people affected by crises. Common humanitarian funds can do this by allowing decision-making on the ground to determine priorities – getting urgent needs funded first, filling critical gaps and improving the speed of disbursement. Similarly the new central emergency response fund (CERF) will enable funds to flow to previously underfunded crises, ensuring that the most urgent needs are met as quickly as possible.

But there is also evidence that the new mechanisms in themselves can generate more funding. The CERF was just under 60% funded at the time of writing and about a quarter of this has come from one donor. Nonetheless, it includes contributions from over 30 non-DAC countries and some private organisations. Most of these donor countries would not have the capacity to assess a neglected emergency and find an appropriate channel for their funds. The CERF and the country-level common humanitarian funds provide mechanisms for donors to support a much wider range of humanitarian work as part of a collective response where this would be extremely difficult on a bilateral basis.

By mid-2006, the common humanitarian funds in Sudan and the DRC had both found support from five donors with commitments of US$143.2 million and US$79 million respectively.
Emergency response funds (ERFs) are also proving to be an attractive way for donors to channel money to immediate relief activities via NGOs without huge administrative burdens.

Recent trends in earmarking could also mean that better value from the humanitarian dollar should be achieved in 2006 and beyond. The tsunami set a new standard in the number of donors providing this type of funding and US$80 million of unearmarked funds were provided in response to the South Asia earthquake. Unearmarked funding is widely assumed to offer the best value for money as it allows priorities to be funded first and because it enables critical gaps (not always requiring large amounts of money) to be financed.

5.5 What effect will new development cooperation trends have on humanitarian assistance?

In the late 1990s one of the strongest influences on the allocation of development assistance was the idea that aid should be focused on ‘good policy’ countries, where it could be most effective. More recently, the limitations of this approach have become clearer: not only did it ignore the imperative to address the extreme and chronic poverty suffered by many people living in ‘bad policy’ countries, it also ignored the destabilising effect of fragile states.

At the same time, some donors have been more explicit about adopting a rights-based approach. This requires a stronger focus on the rights of the most vulnerable and poorest people. This in turn has led to increased interest in social protection, cash transfers and safety nets (in emergencies and long-term poverty) and insurance-based approaches.

A corollary of this increased concern with the poorest is increased awareness of the devastating impact of even small shocks for people who are living below the poverty line – and that the line between chronic poverty and humanitarian crisis is a fine and blurred one. For those who are affected, it may be an impossible line to draw.

Attention to these themes brings humanitarian and development assistance closer together. Famine is often the inevitable extension of endemic poverty and starvation that has affected the same people for years.

The potential implication of this for the future of humanitarian assistance is that attention to people in crisis may become more institutionalised into development assistance – just as in some countries disaster preparedness is becoming institutionalised into the budget process. At the high point of the ‘good policy’ paradigm, more or less the only way that a donor could support work in unstable countries with poor human rights records was to define it as ‘humanitarian assistance’. Now the nature of involvement in fragile and unstable countries involves a set of long-term activities as well as shorter term relief.
5.6 Humanitarian assistance and political capital

Anecdotal evidence and public opinion polls have long suggested robust political and public support for humanitarian assistance and that this underpins support for development cooperation more generally.

This long-term support, allied with the scale of public response to disasters in 2005 and growing confidence in the reformed international humanitarian system, all combine to create a fund of ‘political capital’ made up of strongly committed individuals ranging from ministers and officials in government departments that have not previously been engaged in international disaster response, through to civil society organisations and members of the public.

Using this fund of good will is not without its challenges – the large number of people and organisations makes coordination extremely difficult and the goods and services on offer are not always appropriate or useful. The challenge for humanitarian agencies is to engage with a strongly motivated constituency and provide the most effective response. Agencies have to strike a difficult balance: not pouring cold water on offers of help but not promoting activities that flood already devastated communities with unwanted goods or inexperienced people.

In development cooperation, years of development education and public awareness raising have resulted in a well informed, articulate constituency that demonstrated its political clout in 2005 with the call to Make Poverty History. Humanitarian awareness raising and education now needs to match the huge fund of good will and political capital that has been mobilised so powerfully.

The future of humanitarian assistance

The scale, importance and impact of future trends in international humanitarian assistance may depend on whose point of view is being observed.

People affected by conflict are likely to receive more donor attention and extra resources from security and development cooperation budgets. There is nothing to suggest that there will be major changes in humanitarian assistance budgets for people affected by conflict-related crises.

Those affected by natural hazards may gain political attention, additional publicity, extra funds from voluntary sources and new donors, and some disaster prevention activities are being institutionalised.

The fate of millions of people caught in forgotten, chronic and endemic disasters is less clear. Will new political priorities focus attention on their situation? Can new funding flows like the CERF tackle chronic crises? Will attention to insurance and social protection offer some security to people who are living in situations of extreme vulnerability? Will the international community establish some benchmarks or minimum standards below which no-one should fall as part of the commitment to global poverty eradication?

And from the perspective of those who provide aid funding, there is real political capital in humanitarian assistance, especially in the wake of an event like the tsunami. Harnessing this public engagement can underpin not only humanitarian financing but the overall aid and development cooperation programme.
The GHD initiative agreed that it would produce a set of indicators to monitor collective progress against the seven objectives set out in its workplan. These objectives are to:

- identify five priorities for good donor practice at field level
- increase the availability of adequate, flexible and predictable financing for humanitarian response
- strengthen the monitoring of official aid flows
- promote the harmonisation of reporting to donors, and the management requirements they impose
- monitor the effect of the GHD initiative on humanitarian policy and practice
- achieve greater coherence between donors in protracted crises
- raise awareness and increase support for GHD among donors and NGOs.

Development Initiatives tested the collective indicators on the 2004 data and recommended some adjustments. This chapter provides figures on performance against the collective indicators in 2005, the comparative figures for 2004 and a summary of the definitions and methodology used for each indicator.

It should be noted that 2005 was in many ways an exceptional year with very large funding flows to Sudan and tsunami-affected countries, which may skew some of the outcomes, particularly on the share of funding to the least-funded countries.

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1. See: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/workplan.asp
2. Please contact Development Initiatives for a copy of this paper.
## 6.1 Summary of GHD indicators and results

### Figure 6.1 Summary of 2004/05 performance against the original GHD indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original indicator as defined by GHD</th>
<th>Summary of results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flexibility and timeliness</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a Total donor funds committed to ongoing crises between 1 January and 31 March as a share of total funds committed to those crises during the calendar year</td>
<td>34% of annual funds for ongoing crises were committed in the first quarter of 2005 compared with 19% in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b Amounts committed to individual onset disasters within the first month as a share of the total funds committed to individual disasters up to six months after the disaster declaration</td>
<td>76% of the funds committed in the six months following sudden onset disasters were committed in the first month in 2005, compared with 47% in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c Proportion of funds earmarked at the country level or above. Amount of donor funding committed at or above the country level as a share of total donors’ humanitarian commitments</td>
<td>Data is inconclusive and it is recommended that the indicator be adjusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor and agency funding for common humanitarian action plans (CHAPs) and the consolidated appeal process (CAP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a Number of CHAPs based on IASC needs analysis framework (NAF)</td>
<td>In 2006, 75% of CAP countries are expected to conduct a NAF. Five countries piloted the NAF in 2005 and one of these produced a stand-alone NAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b Proportion of funds committed to the priorities identified in the CHAPs</td>
<td>37% of total DAC-reported humanitarian assistance was spent through the CAP in 2005 compared with 20% in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c Funds committed to the countries with the largest percentage shortfalls as a percentage of the total funds to CAP countries in 2004</td>
<td>0.4% of GHD donor funding inside the CAP went to the five least-funded emergencies in 2005 compared with 4.6% in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of funding to the five least-funded CAPs compared with the average percentage of funding for all CAPs</td>
<td>36% of needs in the five least-funded emergencies were met in 2005 compared with 26% in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor advocacy and support for coordination mechanisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a The number of donors subscribing to joint statements in support of coordination mechanisms and common services delivered at each of the UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP governing body meetings</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b Amount of total funding to UN coordination mechanisms and common services</td>
<td>65% of needs for coordination mechanisms were met in 2005 compared with 76% in 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives
6.2 Indicators of flexibility and timeliness

6.2.1 Indicator 1a

**What is it intended to measure?** Whether funding for ongoing crises is committed in the first quarter of the calendar year.

**What is the result?** In 2005, 34% of funding for ongoing crises reported to the financial tracking system (FTS) was committed in the first quarter (see Figure 6.2). This compares to a figure of 19% for 2004 (Figure 6.3).

![Figure 6.2](image-url)

**Figure 6.2** Total donor funds committed to ongoing crises between January and March 2005 as a share of total funds committed to those crises during the calendar year

![Figure 6.3](image-url)

**Figure 6.3** Total donor funds committed to ongoing crises during the first quarters of 2004 and 2005 as a share of total funds committed to those crises during the calendar year

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*Source: OCHA FTS*
The analysis for ongoing crises is based on the countries/regions that were the subject of a CAP appeal in both 2004 and 2005. These 14 countries/regions (Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Chechnya, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Great Lakes Region, Guinea, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and West Africa) accounted for 64% of the total number of CAP appeals in 2004 and 93% in 2005.

Definitions and methodology
Ongoing crises are defined as those countries that are the subject of a CAP appeal for two or more years. The timing of the contribution is measured by the FTS reported “decision date”, which is defined as “[the date] on which the donor is reported to have made the funding commitment for that item”.

Donor funds include contributions to CAP appeals and funding reported to FTS outside the appeal.

6.2.2 Indicator 1b

What is it intended to measure? How much funding for rapid onset disasters is committed in the first month. Whether there is equity between different disasters in the timeliness of funding.

What is the result? In 2005, 76% of funding received for onset disasters during the first six months was committed in the first month after the
disaster declaration. By comparison, in 2004, 47% of commitments were made within the first month of an onset disaster (Figure 6.4).

In 2005, the amount committed to onset disasters in the first month was 74% of the total committed in the first 12 months. This compares to a figure of 45% for 2004 (Figure 6.6).

Figure 6.5  Funding committed to all onset disasters in 2005 within the first month, six months and year after disaster declaration

The proportion of funding committed to the ten flash appeals within the first month varied from 0% to 100%.

Figure 6.6  Proportion of 12-monthly total for onset disasters in 2004 and 2005 committed in the first month

Source: OCHA FTS
Definitions and methodology

Data is based on the ten flash appeals in 2005 and nine in 2004. Only onset disasters that have been the subject of a flash appeal are included. This is because reporting is very patchy for disasters that are not the subject of flash appeals and a decision date data is not consistently available for situations that did not have an appeal.

6.2.3 Indicator 1c

What is it intended to measure? Whether donor funds are flexible and allow agencies to allocate money within countries and between countries.

What is the result? Suggested change in definitions and methodology for reasons explained below.

Is this indicator a good measure? Definitions of earmarking vary between donors and agencies. Appeal-based funding is, by definition, earmarked at the level of the appeal which may be a country, a region, or a group of people in different places affected by the disaster.
Earmarking itself ranges from funding given to a specific organisation for a specific project or task to funding that can be used for any agency or sector within an appeal. Money can also be received as ‘earmarked’ when the allocation has in fact been decided by mutual agreement between the agency and the donor. Consequently the categories ‘earmarked’ and ‘unearedmarked’ do not, on their own, tell the whole story about flexible funding.

The other problem with this indicator is the level at which it is set. Measuring earmarking at and above the country does not reveal any information about the ability of agencies to transfer funding between recipient countries because it aggregates both the flexible money that can be allocated to any country AND the money which is only for one specified country. Secondly, the share of funding that is earmarked to the country level does not make any distinction between flexible funding — for instance committed to pooled funding or a country appeal — and funding that is tied to particular agencies.

**Recommendation:** that this indicator is reviewed. Two possible measures of earmarking would be:

- how much funding is unearedmarked above the country level — in other words given to specific agency or fund but free for allocation to any country either globally or within a region
  - this shows whether agencies have the flexibility to move funds between countries
- how much funding is earmarked below the country level
  - this shows whether agencies are being constrained to particular activities, channels or sectors within a country.

The combination of these two indicators should reveal how much funding is earmarked at the country level only. There may however still be difficulty in measuring this owing to the different procedures and definitions used by both agencies and donors.

**What would the result be using current data sources?** In 2005, UNICEF reported that 23% of humanitarian funding was country-specific, 1% was region specific and 76% was global thematic, which included the response to the tsunami.

In 2004, UNHCR data showed 20% of funding as unrestricted contributions to the annual programme budget, 32% as earmarked at the country level, 26% as earmarked at the sub regional level, 12% as earmarked at the regional level and 10% as earmarked at the sectoral or thematic level.
6.3 Donor agency funding for CAPs and CHAPs is allocated on the basis of needs assessments

6.3.1 Indicator 2a

The NAF was piloted in five countries (Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Palestine and Uganda) and integrated into appeal documents for 2006. Only Palestine produced a stand-alone NAF. The target was for all CAP countries to complete a NAF in 2006, forming a basis for the 2007 appeal documents. OCHA estimates that around 75% of the countries concerned will actually achieve this.

6.3.2 Indicator 2b

What is it intended to measure? Whether donor funding is allocated on the basis of needs assessments.

What is the result: Preliminary figures suggest that 37% of bilateral humanitarian assistance from DAC donors as reported to the DAC was spent through the CAP in 2005 (Figure 6.8).

At the time of writing a fair like-with-like comparison between 2004 and 2005 was not possible because preliminary figures from the DAC for 2005 did not show spending on domestic refugees or multilateral humanitarian assistance. The preliminary figures give an indication of the trend, which is to increase the proportion of funds committed to the CAP.
Definitions and methodology
There is currently no consistent method of assessing whether donor funding is going to CHAP priorities. However, reforms within the CAP should mean that its statements of priority are based firmly on the NAF and a CHAP. So the shared total humanitarian assistance that goes inside the CAP should be a reasonable proxy to measure the extent to which funding is based on needs assessment.

Calculations are based on total humanitarian assistance (as defined in GHA = bilateral emergency and distress relief plus total multilateral reported by the EC, UNHCR and UNRWA and the relief share of WFP multilateral) less expenditure on domestic refugees in 2004. At the time of writing, 2005 data was only available for bilateral emergency and distress relief – and this provided no breakdown of domestic refugee spending.

6.3.3 Indicator 2c

What is it intended to measure? The extent to which funding is equitable within the CAP.

What is the result? In 2005, of all contributions made inside the CAP, 0.6% went to the five least-funded CAPs. This compares to a figure of 4.3% for 2004.

Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 present the data for GHD/DAC donors. The inset charts provide the same measure but for all donors. As shown, of contributions by GHD countries inside the CAP, only 0.4% goes to the five least-funded CAPs.
Definitions and methodology

The five least-funded emergencies are defined as those appeals with the largest percentage shortfalls of funding committed. Total funding to these countries inside the CAP is shown as a share of total funds committed inside the CAP to all appeals.

What is it intended to measure? Whether funding is equitable within the CAP.
What is the result? In 2005 the five least-funded CAP countries had 36% of needs covered. The average for all CAPs was 65% of needs covered. By comparison, in 2004, the five least-funded CAP countries had 26% of needs covered, with an average for all CAPs of 69%.  

Definitions and methodology
The CAPs with the largest percentage shortfalls were selected. The volume of funding inside the CAPs as a share of total requested funds is shown for the five least-funded CAPs and remaining CAP countries.

3. The five least-funded appeals were also extremely small. They accounted for just 1.1% of requirements for all CAPs. The concentration on a small number of appeals was very heavy in 2005 with 55% of requirements being for Sudan and the tsunami.
6.4 Donor advocacy and support for coordination mechanisms

6.4.1 Indicators 3a and 3b

What is it intended to measure? Donor support for coordination mechanisms.

What is the result? In 2005, 65% of requirements for coordination and support services were met. This compares with 76% in 2004.

Definitions and methodology

The share of needs met under the coordination sector, as reported by the FTS, compared with the average for all sectors.
Humanitarian donor profiles

7.1 Introduction

In this section we look at the donor profiles of each of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries and the European Commission (EC). We also look at the donor profiles of four non-DAC donors – the Czech Republic, Poland, the Republic of Korea and South Africa.

The reporting requirements of the OECD DAC countries and the reporting to UN OCHA’s financial tracking system (FTS) enable us to present their profiles along consistent lines – how much official development assistance (ODA) did the donor give in 2005? How much humanitarian assistance does the donor give? What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by the donor over the past ten years? Where does the donor spend its humanitarian assistance? How much humanitarian assistance does the donor contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions? Does the donor have a domestic Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) implementation plan? Has the donor’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

The international reporting procedures mean that humanitarian assistance can be compared over time and between different donors on a fair and consistent basis. However, there will be differences between what is reported nationally and internationally. The definition of ODA is very strict and some activities which fall within the humanitarian budget at national level may not be included in the DAC figures. Similarly, activities which are undertaken outside the humanitarian budget may qualify as ODA and therefore be included in these international statistics.

The data reported by the four non-DAC countries is largely based on their own data, but increasingly non-DAC donors are being included in the international reporting systems, though it is not yet possible to analyse and present the data on the same lines as for DAC countries.

The graphs and accompanying data in this chapter are available in Excel format from www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org or from Development Initiatives upon request.
How much ODA did the donor give in 2005?
Here we report the donor’s ODA contribution for 2005 and where the donor sits amongst its peers in terms of ODA contribution by volume. The 2005 figures are preliminary.

**Figure 7.1.1** Total ODA per DAC donor, 2005 (preliminary and in current prices)

We also report on ODA contributions as a percentage of GNI, with reference to the following graph. Five donor countries – Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – exceed the UN 0.7% target.

**Figure 7.1.2** ODA as a percentage of GNI, 2005 (preliminary)

How much humanitarian assistance does the donor give?
Here we provide two graphs based on data for 2004. One graph shows the total humanitarian assistance from each DAC donor country (excluding domestic refugee costs) and the other shows the share of the donor’s humanitarian assistance in ODA.
The DAC itself does not produce a figure for total humanitarian aid (the “emergency and relief” component of ODA), so the figures used in this report are derived from DAC data using the following formula:

\[
\text{Total bilateral emergency and distress relief from DAC donors} + \text{Total emergency and distress relief from the EC} + \text{Total multilateral contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA} + \text{A share of multilateral contributions to WFP} = \text{Total humanitarian assistance}
\]

**What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by the donor over the past ten years?**

In this section we provide a graph showing total humanitarian assistance from the donor (excluding spending on domestic refugees), 1995–2004. Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending in constant 2003 prices, to compare the trend over ten years.

Spending on refugees in the donor country has been excluded because of likely changes in DAC rules. While expenditure on refugees in the donor country for the first year of their residence will continue to qualify as ODA, it will no longer be treated as subset of emergency and distress relief. Donors do not usually include domestic refugee expenditure in their national reporting, so a better read-across between the international and national data can be achieved if it is excluded from the international figures.

For the first time in 2006, the DAC reported preliminary data on spending on bilateral humanitarian assistance for 2005 in April when the overall aid figures were released. We also provide a graph that shows bilateral humanitarian assistance in 2004 and 2005 (current prices – hence the difference between the 2004 figure in this graph and in the one showing the trends since 1995). The 2004 bar on this graph shows the volume of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

**Where does the donor spend its humanitarian assistance?**

The pie chart and analysis in this section is based on data from 2004. We report back on the top 15 recipients of the donor’s bilateral humanitarian assistance in that year.

**How much humanitarian assistance does the donor contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?**

In this section, a pie chart presents information on the following:
- the proportion of humanitarian assistance reported by the donor through the UN OCHA financial tracking system (FTS) inside and outside the consolidated appeal (CAP) process. This is significant because the CAP should represent the priority needs for each crisis.
These are the needs that should be funded first. Even if a donor finances activities that are not part of the CAP, reporting their funding can help to ensure a better humanitarian response. If OCHA, responsible for coordination, knows where all funding is going it can ensure that resources are targeted most effectively on the gaps.

- the proportion of unearmarked multilateral contributions. The DAC defines multilateral contributions are those which are completely unearmarked. Any funds which are earmarked even loosely (for instance to a region or a theme) will be included in bilateral ODA. This means that contributions to a CAP appeal or earmarked for a CAP country will be part of bilateral ODA. These unearmarked multilateral contributions will not normally be included in the funding reported to the FTS.

- The multilateral contributions are to three UN agencies with an overwhelmingly humanitarian mandate: UNHCR, WFP and UNRWA, and to the EC. EC humanitarian assistance is financed by the EU budget and the European Development Funds. The amount contributed by each donor is calculated by applying the share of overall EC ODA provided by each donor, to the reported spending on humanitarian assistance. These contributions to EC humanitarian assistance derive from the assessed contribution of each member state to the EU. Consequently, they do not usually affect the donor’s overall budget appropriation for humanitarian assistance.

The information is based on 2004 data and is sourced from the OECD DAC and OCHA FTS. It assumes that all of a donor’s humanitarian assistance is reported to the DAC and shows the shares of this total that are reported to the FTS and allocated through multilateral channels. In practice, for some donors, more funding is reported to the FTS than to the DAC. This may be because it is funding which does not qualify as ODA or funding which has not been classified as Emergency and Distress relief under the DAC system. There are reporting anomalies, some of which are currently being addressed, which can result in the under-reporting of humanitarian assistance in DAC data.

A further pie chart shows the donor’s contributions to the CAP appeals in 2005 by country.

**Does the donor have a domestic Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) implementation plan?**

GHD implementation plans are intended to map out how the donor intends to put the principles of the GHD initiative into action. At the time of writing, six of the 22 donor countries have developed such plans – Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.
In response to the GHD initiative, Australia, Sweden and Switzerland have developed or updated humanitarian policy statements and made these accessible via the GHD website: 

www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

These statements intend to clarify the country’s humanitarian objectives and thereby encourage accountability.

**Has the donor’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**

The OECD DAC does regular peer reviews. The development programme of each DAC donor is evaluated by two other members of the DAC. Five or six DAC members are peer-reviewed annually. These peer reviews monitor individual members’ policies and efforts in the area of development cooperation.

In 2004, the DAC developed an assessment framework based on the GHD principles, to provide a systematic coverage of humanitarian action.

To date, the GHD assessment framework has been applied in reviews of Australia, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Peer reviews of Greece, the Netherlands and the US are all due by the end of 2006.
7.2 Australia

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Australia give in 2005?

Australia contributed US$1665 million (AU$2187 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.25% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Australia give?

Australia gave US$118 million (AU$160.5 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 13 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Australia that year.

Australia gave US$6 (AU$8) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$73 (AU$99) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 8% of Australia’s total ODA in 2004. Australia’s humanitarian assistance in 2004 included US$55 million spent on refugees in Australia.

Figure 7.2.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Australia gave US$118 million (AU$160.5 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 13 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Australia that year.

Australia gave US$6 (AU$8) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$73 (AU$99) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 8% of Australia’s total ODA in 2004. Australia’s humanitarian assistance in 2004 included US$55 million spent on refugees in Australia.

Figure 7.2.2 Shares of Australia’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Australia over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Australia has increased by US$30 million (42%) in real terms since 1995.

![Figure 7.2.3](image)

**Figure 7.2.3** Total humanitarian assistance from Australia excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Australia increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$68 million or 41%.

The total humanitarian assistance figure for 2004 in the ten-year trend graph is smaller than the bilateral figure shown for the same year in the bilateral humanitarian assistance graph. This is because

![Figure 7.2.4](image)

**Figure 7.2.4** Australia’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Australia channels very little multilateral humanitarian assistance (as defined by the DAC). Also, the bilateral graph is shown in current (rather than constant 2003) prices.

**Where does Australia spend its humanitarian assistance?**

Over half (54%) of Australia’s humanitarian assistance in 2004 went to Afghanistan, Sudan and Indonesia. The other 12 countries in the top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Australia received 42% between them. Overall, Australia reported humanitarian assistance to 28 countries in 2004.

**Figure 7.2.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Australia, 2004**

![Pie chart showing the top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Australia in 2004.](chart)

**Source**: OECD DAC

**How much humanitarian assistance does Australia contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?**


In 2004, Australia reported 58% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 27% inside the CAP and 31% outside the CAP.

5% of Australia’s humanitarian assistance is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

Australia supported 11 CAP appeals in 2005.
Does Australia have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

No, Australia does not have a domestic implementation plan. However, a copy of its humanitarian action policy for 2005 is available from the GHD website: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

Has Australia’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Yes, Australia’s humanitarian assistance was included in the DAC peer review process in 2004. See the OECD website: www.oecd.org/dac
7.3 Austria

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Austria give in 2005?
Austria contributed US$1552 million (€1249 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.52% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Austria give?

Austria gave US$29 million (€24 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 19 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Austria that year.
Austria gave US$4 (€3) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$83 (€67) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 4% of Austria’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.3.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Austria gave US$29 million (€24 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 19 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Austria that year.
Austria gave US$4 (€3) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$83 (€67) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 4% of Austria’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.3.2 Shares of Austria’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Humanitarian assistance as a share of total ODA (4%)
Development assistance as share of total ODA (96%)
Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Austria over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Austria has increased by US$4 million (17%) in real terms since 1995.

Figure 7.3.3 Total humanitarian assistance from Austria excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Austria increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$17 million or 29%.

Figure 7.3.4 Austria’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Austria spend its humanitarian assistance?

Russia and Nigeria received 39% of Austria’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 13 countries in the top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Austria received 43% between them.

How much humanitarian assistance does Austria contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?


In 2004, Austria reported 20% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 11% inside the CAP and 9% outside the CAP.

70% of Austria’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC and 7% is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.
Austria supported three CAP appeals in 2005.

Figure 7.3.7  Austria’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

South Asia earthquake, US$0.48m (18%)
Eritrea, US$0.91m (34%)
Palestine, US$1.28m (48%)

Source: OCHA FTS

Does Austria have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?
No.

Has Austria’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
Austria has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.
7.4 Belgium

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Belgium give in 2005?
Belgium contributed US$1975 million (€1589 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.53% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Belgium give?
Belgium gave US$97.2 million (€78.2 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 14 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Belgium that year.

Figure 7.4.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Belgium gave US$9 (€7.50) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$141 (€113) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 7% of Belgium’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.4.2 Shares of Belgium’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Belgium over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Belgium has increased by US$45 million (108%) in real terms since 1995.

Figure 7.4.3  Total humanitarian assistance from Belgium excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Belgium increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$20 million or 20%.

Figure 7.4.4  Belgium’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
**Where does Belgium spend its humanitarian assistance?**

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi received 45% of Belgium’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The other 13 countries in the top 15 recipients of Belgium’s humanitarian assistance received 48% between them.

**Figure 7.4.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Belgium, 2004**

How much humanitarian assistance does Belgium contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?


In 2004, Belgium reported 51% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 30% inside the CAP and 21% outside the CAP.

38% of Belgium’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC and 2% is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

**Figure 7.4.6 Humanitarian assistance reported by Belgium to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004**

Source: OCHA FTS 2004 and OECD DAC Table 1
Belgium’s support to the CAP in 2005 was divided between 13 appeals.

**Does Belgium have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**

No.

**Has Belgium’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**

Yes. Belgium’s humanitarian assistance was peer reviewed in 2005. See the OECD website for details. [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)
7.5 Canada

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Canada give in 2005?
Canada contributed US$3730 million (CA$4521 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.34% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Canada give?
Canada gave US$162 million (CA$211 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that ten other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Canada that year.
Canada gave US$5 (CA$6.50) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$81 (CA$106) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 6% of Canada’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.5.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.5.2 Shares of Canada’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Canada over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Canada has declined very marginally (2%) in real terms since 1995.

**Figure 7.5.3**  Total humanitarian assistance from Canada excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

![Bar chart showing total humanitarian assistance from Canada from 1995 to 2004.](chart)

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Canada increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$240 million or 81%. This included US$141 million in reconstruction relief. The definition and allocation of reconstruction relief was under review within the DAC at the time of writing, which may result in some revision in the finalised 2005 figures.

**Figure 7.5.4**  Canada’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

![Bar chart showing bilateral humanitarian assistance for 2004 and 2005.](chart)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Canada spend its humanitarian assistance?
Ethiopia and Sudan received 46% of Canada’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 13 countries in the top 15 recipients of Canada’s humanitarian assistance received 43% between them. A significant portion of Canada’s humanitarian assistance is allocated regionally, reflecting the nature of some crises and the Canadian priority of providing flexible funding.

Figure 7.5.5  Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Canada, 2004

How much humanitarian assistance does Canada contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

27% of Canada’s humanitarian assistance reported to the DAC is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies. Canada also provides unearmarked funding to the ICRC and the IFRC.

Figure 7.5.6  Canada’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Source: OECD DAC

Source: OCHA FTS
In 2004, Canada reported 88% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS. Of the amounts it reported to the FTS, 49% was spent within CAP appeals and 51% outside appeals.

Canada supported 23 CAP appeals in 2005. Canada is reducing earmarking as a matter of principle, to enable operational agencies to respond wherever the needs are greatest.

**Does Canada have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**
Canada chaired the GHD initiative from 2003 to 2005 and led the Implementation Group. It takes a very active part in promoting and applying the GHD principles. Canada introduced a GHD domestic implementation plan in June 2005. A revised version of the plan was issued in April 2006. This is available from the GHD website: [www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp](http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp)

Canada is also planning to produce a humanitarian policy statement in the near future.

**Has Canada’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**
Canada’s humanitarian assistance will be peer reviewed in 2007.
7.6 Denmark

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Denmark give in 2005?

Denmark contributed US$2109 million (DKr12 645 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.81% of the country's gross national income (GNI). Denmark is one of four donors to have exceeded the UN 0.7% target for 25 years.

How much humanitarian assistance does Denmark give?

Figure 7.6.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.6.2 Shares of Denmark's ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

1. This is the only DAC donor profile where data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been used in addition to/instead of DAC data. This is because Denmark is changing its reporting procedures. Comparative graphs on donors in the rest of this report are based on DAC data only, unless stated otherwise, and may therefore not be consistent with the data in this profile. From 2005 Denmark's profile will be based on DAC data.
The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reported that Denmark gave US$152 million (DKr913 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 12 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Denmark that year.

Denmark gave US$28 (DKr169) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$377 (DKr2255) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 7% of Denmark’s total ODA in 2004.

**What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Denmark over the past ten years?**

Humanitarian assistance from Denmark has increased by US$93 million (213%) in real terms since 1995.

**Figure 7.6.3** Total humanitarian assistance from Denmark excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark)

**Figure 7.6.4** Denmark’s total humanitarian assistance, 2004 and 2005 excluding spending on domestic refugees (current prices)

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark)
In 2005, Denmark increased its total humanitarian assistance (excluding spending on domestic refugees) by US$17 million or 11%.

**Where does Denmark spend its humanitarian assistance?**

Around 54% (US$82 million) of Danish humanitarian assistance in 2004 was allocated to its top 15 recipients. Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq received the largest shares – collectively receiving approximately 20% of total Danish humanitarian assistance that year. In addition to support for Tanzania, Liberia, Somalia, Zambia, Uganda, the DRC and Burundi, a further US$15 million was allocated to Africa.

**Figure 7.6.5 Top 15 recipients of total humanitarian assistance from Denmark, 2004**

How much humanitarian assistance does Denmark contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

Figures from Denmark show that 55% of Danish humanitarian assistance is spent in unearmarked support to UN agencies. The extent to which this assistance is spent within CAP appeals is determined by UN agencies who receive the funds.


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that 5% of Danish humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC.

In 2004, of the US$152 million reported to the FTS, 20% was spent within CAP appeals and 80% outside the appeals.

Denmark supported 14 CAP appeals in 2005.
Does Denmark have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

Denmark has been a strong supporter of the GHD initiative and became joint chair with the UK in 2006. Denmark has led work on harmonisation and reporting requirements for multilateral agencies. Denmark introduced a GHD domestic implementation plan in March 2005. This is available from the GHD website: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

Has Denmark’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Denmark has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.
7.7 Finland

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Finland give in 2005?

Finland contributed US$897 million (€722 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.47% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Finland give?

Figure 7.7.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Finland gave US$69 million (€56 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 15 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Finland that year.

Finland gave US$13 (€11) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$130 (€101) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 10% of Finland’s total ODA in 2004.
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Finland over the past 10 years?

Humanitarian assistance from Finland has increased by US$26 million (74%) in real terms since 1995.

**Figure 7.7.3** Total humanitarian assistance from Finland excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over 10 years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Finland increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$6 million or 10%.

**Figure 7.7.4** Finland’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Finland spend its humanitarian assistance?

**Figure 7.7.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Finland, 2004**

Afghanistan and Iraq received 28% of Finland’s total humanitarian assistance reported to the DAC in 2004. Other funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Unit for Humanitarian Assistance was principally allocated to African countries, notably Sudan and Angola.

How much humanitarian assistance does Finland contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

33% (US$23 million) of Finland’s humanitarian assistance is estimated to be spent through the EC, of which up to US$10 million is estimated by the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance to be Finland’s share of the ECHO budget.

28% (US$19 million) of Finnish humanitarian assistance reported to the DAC is spent in unearmarked support to UN agencies. An

**Figure 7.7.6 Finland’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005**

Source: OCHA FTS
additional US$1.7 million was given as unearmarked aid to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.


In 2004, Finland reported 88% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS. Of the amounts reported to the FTS, 25% was spent within CAP appeals and 75% outside.

Finland supported 16 CAP appeals in 2005.

**Does Finland have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**

No. However, Finland is currently drafting a policy for humanitarian assistance.

Finland does not have an operational humanitarian assistance capacity, so it channels its support through UN funds and programmes, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and/or a small number of Finnish NGOs. Finland does not carry out its own needs assessments.

**Has Finland's humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**

Finland has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.
7.8 France

How much official development assistance (ODA) did France give in 2005?
France contributed US$10 059 million (€8093 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.47% of the country's gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does France give?
France gave US$220 million (€177 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that seven other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than France that year.
France gave US$3.50 (€3) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$137 (€110) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 3% of total French ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.8.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.8.2 Shares of France’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by France over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from France has declined by US$26 million (12%) in real terms since 1995.

**Figure 7.8.3** Total humanitarian assistance from France excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, France increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$86 million or 15%.

The bilateral humanitarian assistance graph for 2004 and 2005 highlights high volumes of spending on domestic refugees (whereas this

**Figure 7.8.4** France’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
expenditure is excluded from the figures in the total humanitarian assistance ten-year trend graph).

The humanitarian assistance reported to the DAC by France is spent mainly through multilateral agencies, particularly the EC. This is why there is such a big difference between the US$196 million total humanitarian assistance reported in the ten-year trend graph and the US$19 million bilateral spending net of refugees in the 2004/5 graph.

Where does France spend its humanitarian assistance?

Palestine, Sudan and Haiti together received 38% of France’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 12 countries in the top fifteen recipients of humanitarian assistance from France received 48% between them.

Figure 7.8.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from France, 2004

How much humanitarian assistance does France contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

Just under 11% of French humanitarian assistance reported to the DAC is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies. 80% is reported as being spent through the EC.


In 2004, France reported 41% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS. Of the amounts it reported to the FTS, 33% was spent within CAP appeals and 67% outside appeals.

France supported 15 CAP appeals in 2005.
Does France have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?
No.

Has France’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
France has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.

Figure 7.8.6  France’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Source: OCHA FTS
7.9 Germany

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Germany give in 2005?

Germany contributed US$9915m (€6064 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.35% of Germany’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Germany give?

Germany gave US$435 million (€350 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that three other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Germany that year.

Germany gave US$5 (€4) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$91 (€73.50) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 6% of Germany’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.9.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.9.2 Shares of Germany’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Germany over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Germany has increased by US$143 million (58%) in real terms since 1995.

Figure 7.9.3  **Total humanitarian assistance from Germany excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US$ million (constant 2003)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Germany increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$32 million or 15%.

Figure 7.9.4  **Germany’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US$ million (current)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Germany spend its humanitarian assistance?

Two countries, Sudan and Afghanistan, received 29% of Germany’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The other 13 countries in the top 15 received 42% between them. The remaining assistance was split between 34 countries.

**Figure 7.9.5** Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Germany, 2004

How much humanitarian assistance does Germany contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

A little under half of Germany’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC. Around 9% is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.


Germany reported around 44% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 13% inside the CAP and 31% outside the CAP.

**Figure 7.9.6** Humanitarian assistance reported by Germany to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
Germany supported 18 CAP appeals in 2004.

**Figure 7.9.7  Germany’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005**

![Pie chart showing contributions to CAP appeals in 2005](image)

**Does Germany have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**

Germany’s GHD strategy is incorporated into the humanitarian aid strategy. Germany reports that GHD has been fully implemented in Germany, within its national legal framework, which means that in general, Germany does not give unearmarked funding but supports projects according to humanitarian need and prioritises flexibility and speed. The Federal Government’s “Humanitarian Aid – Detailed Summary” is available at [www.auswaertiges-amt.de](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de)

**Has Germany’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**

Yes. Germany’s humanitarian assistance was peer reviewed in 2004. See the OECD website: [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)
7.10 Greece

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Greece give in 2005?

Greece contributed US$535m (€430 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.24% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Greece give?

Greece gave US$30 million (€24 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 18 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Greece that year.

Greece gave US$3 (€2) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$42 (€34) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 6% of Greece’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.10.1  Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.10.2  Shares of Greece’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Greece over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Greece has increased by US$4 million (18%) in real terms since 1996.

**Figure 7.10.3** Total humanitarian assistance from Greece excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Greece increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$74 million or 562%. However, these figures include large amounts of money given by the public in response to the government’s tsunami appeal – which are unlikely to qualify as ODA in the finalised figures for 2005.

**Figure 7.10.4** Greek bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Greece spend its humanitarian assistance?

Romania, the Former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Ukraine together received over half of Greek humanitarian assistance in 2004. Iraq received 13%. The remaining ten countries making up the top 15 recipients of Greek humanitarian assistance shared 25%.

**Figure 7.10.5** Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Greece, 2004

How much humanitarian assistance does Greece contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

60% of Greek humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC. A further 5% is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

**Figure 7.10.6** Humanitarian assistance reported by Greece to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004

In 2004, Greece reported 5.8% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 0.5% inside the CAP and 5.5% outside the CAP. Greece supported five CAP appeals in 2005.

Figure 7.10.7  Greece’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Does Greece have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?
No.

Has Greece’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
Greek humanitarian assistance was being examined as part of the DAC peer review process at time of writing this report. The peer review is due to be completed by the end of 2006. See: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/dac-peer-reviews.asp
7.11 Ireland

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Ireland give in 2005?
Ireland contributed US$692 million (€557 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.41% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Ireland give?
Ireland gave US$61 million (€49 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 16 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Ireland that year.
Ireland gave US$15 (€12) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$152 (€122) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 10% of Ireland’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.11.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.11.2 Shares of Ireland’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Ireland over the past ten years?

Figure 7.11.3  **Total humanitarian assistance from Ireland excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

Humanitarian assistance from Ireland has increased by US$34 million (180%) in real terms since 1995. Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Ireland increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$27 million or 70%.

Figure 7.11.4  **Ireland’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)**

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Ireland spend its humanitarian assistance?
Ireland’s humanitarian aid is strongly focused on Africa. Sudan and Ethiopia together received 38% of Irish humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 13 countries in the top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Ireland received 52% between them.

Figure 7.11.5  Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Ireland, 2004

How much humanitarian assistance does Ireland contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?
20% of Ireland’s humanitarian assistance reported to the DAC is spent through the EC. A further 20% is channelled in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

In 2004 Ireland reported 91% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS. Of spending reported to the FTS 54% was spent inside CAP appeals and 35% outside.

Ireland supported 19 CAP appeals in 2005.

Figure 7.11.6  Ireland’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005
Does Ireland have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

Yes. Ireland introduced its GHD domestic implementation plan in July 2005. This can be downloaded from the GHD website: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

Ireland commissioned a study on needs-based resource allocation, which was discussed at the GHD meeting in July 2006.

Ireland’s white paper, published in 2006, announced a rapid response initiative for sudden onset emergencies, a dedicated unit for conflict analysis and resolution and a Hunger Task Force to tackle the root causes of food insecurity, particularly in Africa.

Has Ireland’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Ireland has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.


7.12 Italy

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Italy give in 2005?
Italy contributed US$5053 million (€4066 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.29% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Italy give?
Italy gave US$249 million (€201 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that six other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Italy that year.

Italy gave US$4 (€3.50) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$43 (€34.50) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 10% of Italy’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.12.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.12.2 Shares of Italy’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Italy over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Italy has increased by US$16 million (8%) in real terms since 1995.

Figure 7.12.3  Total humanitarian assistance from Italy excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Where does Italy spend its humanitarian assistance?

Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and Palestine together received 68% of Italy’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The other 11 countries in the top 15 received 26% between them. The remaining 6% of Italian humanitarian assistance was shared between a further 13 countries.

Figure 7.12.4  Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Italy, 2004
How much humanitarian assistance does Italy contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

Over half of Italy’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC. A further 15% is given in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

Italy gave US$38.4 million to the CAP appeals in 2004 and US$52.96 million in 2005.

In 2004, Italy reported 20% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 15% inside the CAP and 5% outside the CAP.

Italy supported 20 CAP appeals in 2005.

Source: OCHA FTS 2004 and OECD DAC Table 1
Does Italy have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

Italy does not have an implementation plan published on the GHD site but since endorsement of GHD by the DAC, Italy has reported that it follows the GHD strategy.

Has Italy’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Italy’s 2004 DAC peer review included an analysis of Italy’s humanitarian programme. See www.oecd.org/dac
7.13 Japan

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Japan give in 2005?
Japan contributed US$13 100 million (JP¥1 442 365 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.28% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Japan give?
Japan gave US$859 million (JP¥92 837 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that just one other DAC donor gave more humanitarian assistance than Japan that year.

Japan gave US$7 (JP¥726) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$70 (JP¥7537) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 10% of Japan’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.13.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.13.2 Shares of Japan’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Japan over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Japan has increased by US$591 million (259%) in real terms since 1995.

Figure 7.13.3 Total humanitarian assistance from Japan excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Japan reduced its bilateral humanitarian assistance by US$364 million or 55%. Given the scale of Japan’s contributions to the tsunami in 2005 it seems likely that these figures will be revised.

Figure 7.13.4 Japan’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

Japan does not include domestic refugee expenditure in its ODA/humanitarian assistance figures.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Japan spend its humanitarian assistance?

2004 was an exceptional year for DAC-reported bilateral humanitarian assistance from Japan. Between 2001 and 2003 this expenditure averaged at US$31 million; in 2004 it was US$657 million. This increase resulted from spending in Iraq, which received 97% of Japan’s bilateral humanitarian assistance in 2004. Iran received the largest share of the remaining 3%, which was divided between four countries.

How much humanitarian assistance does Japan contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

Almost a quarter (24%) of Japan’s humanitarian assistance is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

Japan contributed US$140.7 million to the CAP appeals in 2004 and US$412.5 million in 2005.

Figure 7.13.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Japan, 2004

Dominica, US$0.15m (0.02%)
Philippines, US$0.36m (0.06%)
Afghanistan, US$1.04m (0.16%)
Iran, US$15.22m (2.37%)

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.13.6 Humanitarian assistance reported by Japan to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004

Remaining humanitarian assistance reported through the DAC, US$452.44m (53%)
Humanitarian assistance reported inside CAP appeals, US$140.66m (16%)
Humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS outside CAP appeals, US$63.52m (7%)
Completely unearmarked multilateral contributions to WFP, UNHCR and UNRWA, US$202.19m (24%)

Source: OCHA FTS 2004 and OECD DAC Table 1
In 2004, Japan reported 23% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 16% inside the CAP and 7% outside the CAP. Japan supported 18 CAP appeals in 2005.

**Figure 7.13.7  Japan’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005**

Source: OCHA FTS

**Does Japan have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**


**Has Japan’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**

Japan has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.
7.14 Luxembourg

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Luxembourg give in 2005?

Luxembourg contributed US$264 million (€212 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.87% of Luxembourg’s gross national income (GNI). Luxembourg is now one of five countries to exceed the UN 0.7% aid target.

How much humanitarian assistance does Luxembourg give?

Luxembourg gave US$28 million (€22 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 20 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Luxembourg that year.

Luxembourg gave US$62 (€50) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$524 (€421) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 12% of Luxembourg’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.14.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.14.2 Shares of Luxembourg’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Luxembourg over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Luxembourg has increased by US$16 million (185%) in real terms since 1995.

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Luxembourg increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance by US$5 million or 21%.

Luxembourg does not include domestic refugee expenditure in its ODA/humanitarian assistance figures.
Where does Luxembourg spend its humanitarian assistance?
Sudan, Palestine and Côte d’Ivoire together received 35% of Luxembourg’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The other 12 countries in the top 15 recipients of Luxembourg’s humanitarian assistance received 44% between them. A further 18 countries shared the remaining 21%.

How much humanitarian assistance does Luxembourg contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?
8% of Luxembourg’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC. A further 11% is spent through completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.


In 2004, Luxembourg reported 38% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS in 2004 — 15% inside the CAP and 23% outside the CAP.
Luxembourg supported nine CAP appeals in 2005.

Figure 7.14.7  **Luxembourg’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005**

- Guatemala flash appeal, $0.24m (2%)
- Chad, $0.32m (3%)
- Côte d’Ivoire, $0.41m (3%)
- Malawi flash appeal, $0.87m (7%)
- South Asia earthquake, $1.17m (10%)
- Niger emergency appeal, $1.23m (10%)
- West Africa, $1.51m (13%)
- Tsunami flash appeal, $4.03m (34%)
- Sudan, $1.95m (17%)

Source: OCHA FTS

Does Luxembourg have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

No.

Has Luxembourg’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Luxembourg has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.
7.15 The Netherlands

How much official development assistance (ODA) did the Netherlands give in 2005?
The Netherlands contributed US$5131 million (€4129 million) in ODA in 2005. ODA from the Netherlands represents 0.82% of the country’s gross national income (GNI), the fourth highest level in the DAC. The Netherlands is one of four countries to have consistently exceeded the UN 0.7% target for more than 25 years.

How much humanitarian assistance does the Netherlands give?

Figure 7.15.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.15.2 Shares of Netherlands’ ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

The Netherlands gave US$356 million (€287 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that in 2004 the Netherlands was the
fifth largest DAC provider of humanitarian assistance, with each citizen giving US$22 (€18) out of US$258 (€208) per citizen in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 8% of total ODA from the Netherlands in 2004.

What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by the Netherlands over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from the Netherlands has ranged from under US$250 million to almost US$450 million in real terms over the last decade. It rose to US$449 million in 1999, dropped back to almost half that amount in 2003 but has now risen again to US$323 million. This figure is US$104 million or 24% lower than a decade ago.

![Figure 7.15.3](image)

**Figure 7.15.3 Total humanitarian assistance from the Netherlands excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, the Netherlands increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$164 million or 48%. The Netherlands is the only country to have reported how much it spent on domestic refugees in 2005. Excluding domestic refugees, preliminary figures show that bilateral humanitarian assistance increased by US$189 million or 86% between 2004 and 2005.
Where does the Netherlands spend its humanitarian assistance?

Sudan received a quarter of the total humanitarian assistance from the Netherlands in 2004, making it the top recipient. Afghanistan and Iraq each received 10%. This means that not far short of 50% of the available humanitarian support was shared by the top three recipients. The remaining 12 countries in the top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from the Netherlands received 37% of funding. A further 60 countries received the remaining 18%.

Figure 7.15.4 Bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The shaded part of the bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs. Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.15.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from the Netherlands, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
How much humanitarian assistance does the Netherlands contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?


In 2004, the Netherlands reported 59% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 30% inside the CAP and 29% outside the CAP. 27% of Dutch humanitarian assistance was given as completely unearmarked support to three UN agencies: WFP, UNHCR and UNWRA. 11% was spent through the EC.

The Netherlands supported 12 CAP appeals in 2005.

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**Figure 7.15.6** Humanitarian assistance reported by the Netherlands to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004

- Completely unearmarked multilateral contributions to WFP, UNHCR and UNWRA, US$96.47m (27%)
- Completely unearmarked multilateral contributions to the EC, US$39.54m (11%)
- Humanitarian assistance reported to the FTS outside CAP appeals, US$102.35m (29%)
- Remaining humanitarian assistance reported through the DAC, US$9.67m (3%)
- Humanitarian assistance reported inside CAP Appeals, US$108.15m (30%)
- 9 others, US$12.48m (8%)
- Guatemala flash appeal, US$2.89m (2%)
- Somalia, US$3.13m (2%)
- Burundi, US$4.91m (3%)
- West Africa, US$4.98m (3%)
- Great Lakes region, US$5.14m (3%)
- Malawi flash appeal, US$5.98m (4%)
- Chad, US$6.00m (4%)
- DRC, US$8.16m (5%)
- Uganda, US$11.40m (7%)
- South Asia earthquake, US$19.88m (12%)
- Tsunami flash appeal, US$26.78m (16%)

Source: OECD DAC and OCHA FTS

**Figure 7.15.7** The Netherlands’ contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

- Sudan, US$52.68m (32%)
- 9 others, US$12.48m (8%)
- Guatemala flash appeal, US$2.89m (2%)
- Somalia, US$3.13m (2%)
- Burundi, US$4.91m (3%)
- West Africa, US$4.98m (3%)
- Great Lakes region, US$5.14m (3%)
- Malawi flash appeal, US$5.98m (4%)
- Chad, US$6.00m (4%)
- DRC, US$8.16m (5%)
- Uganda, US$11.40m (7%)
- South Asia earthquake, US$19.88m (12%)
- Tsunami flash appeal, US$26.78m (16%)

Source: OCHA FTS
Does the Netherlands have a domestic Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) implementation plan?
Yes. The Netherlands introduced a domestic implementation plan in July 2005. A copy of this plan is available from the GHD website: [www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp](http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp)

The Netherlands has been a strong supporter of GHD including action on pooled funding, the CERF and flexible financing.

Has the Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
The Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance programme was peer reviewed on 12 September 2006. The review is available from the OECD website: [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)
7.16 New Zealand

How much official development assistance (ODA) did New Zealand give in 2005?

New Zealand contributed US$274 million (NZ$389 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.27% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does New Zealand give?

New Zealand gave US$19.1 million (NZ$29 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that all other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than New Zealand that year.

New Zealand gave US$5 (NZ$7) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$52 (NZ$79) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 9% of New Zealand’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.16.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.16.2 Shares of New Zealand’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by New Zealand over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from New Zealand has increased since 1995 by US$13 million (515%) in real terms from a low figure of just US$3 million. The increase has been steady and sustained since 2001.

Figure 7.16.3  **Total humanitarian assistance from New Zealand excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, New Zealand increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$38 million or 141%.

Figure 7.16.4  **New Zealand’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)**

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does New Zealand spend its humanitarian assistance?

40% of New Zealand’s humanitarian assistance in 2004 went to Afghanistan alone. Niue received a further 20%. The next largest recipients were Sudan and Iraq, with 13% and 7% shares respectively. These four countries received just over 80% of the available humanitarian support.

Ethiopia, Somalia, Iran, Myanmar and Bangladesh received between 1% and 3% shares each.

21 countries received shares of between 0.05% and 0.9% each. Collectively, they shared 9% of the available assistance.

Figure 7.16.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from New Zealand, 2004

How much humanitarian assistance does New Zealand contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

Around 13% of New Zealand’s humanitarian assistance is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.


In 2004, New Zealand reported 28% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 20% inside CAP appeals and 8% outside appeals.

New Zealand supported nine CAP appeals in 2005.
Does New Zealand have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?
New Zealand does not have a domestic implementation plan published on the GHD site, but it is developing a humanitarian action policy and details on its humanitarian assistance programme can be found at [www.nzaid.govt.nz](http://www.nzaid.govt.nz)

Has New Zealand’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
New Zealand has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.
7.17 Norway

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Norway give in 2005?

Norway contributed US$2,774 million (NKr17,875 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.93% of Norway’s gross national income (GNI). Norway is one of four donors to have exceeded the UN 0.7% target for 25 years.

How much humanitarian assistance does Norway give?

Norway reported US$218 million (NKr1,467 million) to the DAC in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that eight other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Norway that year. According to figures from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the total amount for humanitarian assistance, as presented to parliament in 2004 was NKr3,140 (US$466 million) of which NKr468 (US$70 million) was spent on refugees in Norway.

Figure 7.17.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.17.2 Shares of Norway’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
According to DAC figures, Norway gave US$47 (Nkr318) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$477 (Nkr3214) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 10% of Norway’s total ODA in 2004.

**What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Norway over the past ten years?**

Humanitarian assistance from Norway has increased by US$4 million (1%) in real terms since 1995. Over the period it has fluctuated from just under US$300 million to just over US$400 million, the drop between 2003 and 2004 being the sharpest decline in the period.

**Figure 7.17.3 Total humanitarian assistance from Norway excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

Figs show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Norway increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$138 million or 53%.
Where does Norway spend its humanitarian assistance?

Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan together received one third of Norwegian humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 12 countries in the top 15 recipients of Norwegian humanitarian assistance received 41%. The remaining 26% share was split between a further 74 countries.

How much humanitarian assistance does Norway contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

Just over a fifth (21%) of Norway’s humanitarian assistance is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.
Norway gave US$63.7 million to the CAP appeals in 2004 and US$204 million in 2005.

In 2004, Norway reported 74% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS in 2004. Of the amounts it reported to the FTS – 39% was spent inside CAP appeals and 61% outside appeals.

Figure 7.17.6  Norway’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Norway supported 23 CAP appeals in 2005.

Does Norway have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

Norway does not have an implementation plan published on the GHD site, but reports that it adheres to GHD principles and puts a high value on turning principles into practical, needs-based assistance, with constant attention to global funding for humanitarian purposes. Norway supports the CERF and country-level humanitarian funds. Norway accepts the annual reports of the UN, the ICRC and the IFRC as the sole reporting mechanism and participates actively in donor groups and UN boards.

Has Norway’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Yes. Norway’s humanitarian assistance programme was peer reviewed in 2004. This can be viewed on the OECD website: [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)
7.18 Portugal

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Portugal give in 2005?
Portugal contributed US$367 million (€296 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.21% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Portugal give?
Portugal gave US$32 million (€25 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 17 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Portugal that year.
Portugal gave US$3 (€2.5) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$100 (€80) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 3% of Portugal’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.18.1  Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.18.2  Shares of Portugal’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Portugal over the past ten years?


Figure 7.18.3  Total humanitarian assistance from Portugal excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

![Graph showing total humanitarian assistance from Portugal excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995-2004](image)

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Portugal reduced its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$8 million or 43%.

Figure 7.18.4  Portugal’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

![Graph showing Portugal's bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005](image)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does Portugal spend its humanitarian assistance?

Iraq alone received 80% of Portugal’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 20% was shared between ten other countries. The countries receiving less than 1% shares included: Sri Lanka, Cuba, Morocco, Thailand and Cape Verde.

![Figure 7.18.5 Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Portugal, 2004](source: OECD DAC)

How much humanitarian assistance does Portugal contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

42% of Portugal’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC. 2% is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.


In 2004, Portugal reported 9% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 4% inside the CAP and 5% outside the CAP.

![Figure 7.18.6 Humanitarian assistance reported by Portugal to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004](source: OCHA FTS 2004 and OECD DAC Table 1)
Portugal supported two CAP appeals in 2005 – 99% of its support went to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami appeal.

**Figure 7.18.7  Portugal’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005**

![Tsunami Tsunami appeal, US$2.85m (99%) Sudan, US$0.02m (1%)](source: OCHA FTS)

**Does Portugal have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**
No.

**Has Portugal’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**
Yes. Portugal’s humanitarian assistance was peer reviewed in 2006. This can be viewed at the OECD website: [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)
7.19 Spain

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Spain give in 2005?
Spain contributed US$3122 million (€2513 million) in ODA in 2005. This is 0.29% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Spain give?
Spain gave US$162 million (€130 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that 11 other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Spain that year.
Spain gave US$3.75 (€3) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$56 (€45) in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 7% of Spain’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.19.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.19.2 Shares of Spain’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Spain over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Spain has increased by US$63 million (78%) in real terms since 1995. Apart from a ‘blip’ in 2002, humanitarian assistance spending has been following a fairly steady upward trend since 1998.

Figure 7.19.3  **Total humanitarian assistance from Spain excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Where does Spain spend its humanitarian assistance?

Iraq and Afghanistan together received 26% of Spain’s humanitarian assistance in 2004. The remaining 13 countries in the top 15 recipients received well over half (57%) of the humanitarian assistance available. The remaining 17 was split between a further 25 countries. The Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) reports that the Palestine, Algeria and Indonesia received 30% of its humanitarian assistance in 2005.
How much humanitarian assistance does Spain contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?

47% of Spanish humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC. 5% is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.


Spain reported 33% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS in 2004 – 7% inside the CAP and 26% outside the CAP.

Spain supported 11 CAP appeals in 2005.

AECI reports that 16% of humanitarian assistance is spent through Spanish NGOs and 9% through international NGOs. 60% goes through UN agencies (classified as bilateral by the DAC because it is earmarked) and 15% in direct interventions.
Does Spain have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

At the time of writing AECI was developing the first Spanish Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance. Spain plans to follow the principles of GHD.

AECI reports that an increase in the annual budget of around €50 million (US$62 million) will lead to a bigger and better Spanish relief response.

Among Spain’s activities for 2006 are strengthened evaluation, increased logistical capacity, increased multilateralism, agreements with companies and NGOs and a sectoral strategy on humanitarian action.

Has Spain's humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Spain has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian assistance.

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Figure 7.19.7 Spain’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Source: OCHA FTS
7.20 Sweden

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Sweden give in 2005?

Sweden contributed US$3280 million (SKr24 510 million) in ODA in 2005. This represents 0.92% of the country’s gross national income (GNI). Sweden is one of four countries to have consistently exceeded the UN 0.7% aid target for over 25 years.

How much humanitarian assistance does Sweden give?

Sweden gave US$290 million (SKr2133 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that five other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Sweden that year.

Sweden gave US$32 (SKr237) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$302 (SKr2219) in total ODA.

Figure 7.20.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.20.2 Shares of Sweden’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
Humanitarian assistance was 11% of Sweden’s total ODA in 2004 according to DAC figures. Sweden’s own internal figures put the share at 13.5%.

What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Sweden over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from Sweden has increased by US$30 million (13%) in real terms since 1995. Support each year has ranged from just under US$200 million to just under US$350 million, with spending since 1999 tending to be higher than earlier levels.

**Figure 7.20.3** Total humanitarian assistance from Sweden excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

**Figure 7.20.4** Sweden’s bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Sweden increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$23 million or 6%.

**Where does Sweden spend its humanitarian assistance?**

Sudan, Angola, the DRC and Afghanistan together received just over 34% of Swedish humanitarian assistance in 2004. The 11 other top 15 recipients shared almost 39% of the available support. The remaining amount was split between a further 54 recipients.

**Figure 7.20.5** Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Sweden, 2004

8% of Sweden’s humanitarian assistance is spent through the EC and 22% is channelled in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies. Sweden’s own estimate is that 40% of its humanitarian aid is multilateral.


Sweden reported 64% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS in 2004 – 28% inside CAP appeals and 36% outside appeals.

Does Sweden have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?

Sweden chaired the process and hosted the conference that established GHD in 2003. It has institutionalised GHD principles and been a strong supporter of pooled and flexible funding. Sweden introduced a GHD domestic implementation plan in January 2005. It has also produced a humanitarian policy statement. Both documents can be found on the GHD website: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

Has Sweden’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?

Yes. Sweden’s humanitarian assistance programme was peer reviewed in 2004. This can be viewed on the OECD website: www.oecd.org/dac

Figure 7.20.6 Humanitarian assistance reported by Sweden to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004

Figure 7.20.7 Sweden’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005
7.21 Switzerland

How much official development assistance (ODA) did Switzerland give in 2005?

Switzerland contributed US$1771 million (SFr2206 million) in ODA in 2005. This represents 0.44% of the country’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does Switzerland give?

Switzerland gave US$173 million (SFr215 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that seven other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than Switzerland that year.

Switzerland gave US$23 (SFr29) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$210 (SFr260) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 11% of Switzerland’s total ODA in 2004.
Switzerland’s humanitarian assistance in 2004 included US$194 million spent on refugees in Switzerland.

What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by Switzerland over the past ten years?

Figure 7.21.3  **Total humanitarian assistance from Switzerland excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004**

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, Switzerland increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$5 million or 1%.

Figure 7.21.4  **Bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)**

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.
Where does Switzerland spend its humanitarian assistance?

25% of Swiss humanitarian assistance went to three countries in 2004 – Afghanistan, Sudan and Serbia and Montenegro. A further 35% was shared by the remaining 12 of the top 15 recipients. 74 other countries received the balance of humanitarian spending.

Figure 7.21.5  Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from Switzerland

How much humanitarian assistance does Switzerland contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?


In 2004, Switzerland reported 87% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 21% inside the CAP and 66% outside the CAP.

13% of Swiss humanitarian assistance is spent in completely unearmarked support to UN agencies.

Figure 7.21.6  Humanitarian assistance reported by Switzerland to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004

Source: OECD DAC and OCHA FTS
Switzerland supported 17 CAP appeals in 2005.

Figure 7.21.7  Switzerland’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Does Switzerland have a domestic Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) implementation plan?
No. Switzerland does not have a domestic implementation plan. However, it does have a humanitarian policy statement, which is available from the GHD website:
www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

Has Switzerland’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
Yes. Switzerland’s humanitarian assistance programme was peer reviewed in 2005. Details are available on the OECD website:
www.oecd.org/dac
7.22 The UK

How much official development assistance (ODA) did the UK give in 2005?

The UK contributed US$10 753 million (UK£5916 million) in ODA in 2005. This represents 0.48% of the country’s gross national income (GNI) and continues the UK’s progress towards its commitment that aid should be 0.7% of GNI in 2013.

How much humanitarian assistance does the UK give?

The UK gave US$750 million (UK£409 million) in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that two other DAC donors gave more humanitarian assistance than the UK in that year.

The UK gave US$12.50 (UK£7) per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$131 (UK£72) in total ODA.

Humanitarian assistance was 10% of the UK’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.22.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7.22.2 Shares of the UK’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004

Source: OECD DAC
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by the UK over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from the UK has increased by US$272 million (69%) in real terms since 1995, with a clear and upward overall trend in spending.

Figure 7.22.3  Total humanitarian assistance from the UK excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Preliminary data shows that in 2005, the UK increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance by US$96 million or 18%.

Figure 7.22.4  UK bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The UK does not include domestic refugee expenditure in its ODA/humanitarian assistance figures.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does the UK spend its humanitarian assistance?

In 2004, Sudan received 25% of the UK’s humanitarian assistance, Iraq received 11% and Bangladesh 10%. The remaining 12 of the top 15 recipients of UK assistance received 43% between them. The remaining humanitarian assistance was divided between a further 38 countries.

**Figure 7.22.5** Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from the UK, 2004

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Other contributions:

- Remaining humanitarian assistance reported through the DAC, US$214.22 million (29%)
- Completely unearmarked multilateral contributions to WFP, UNHCR and UNRWA, US$71.37 million (10%)
- Completely unearmarked multilateral contributions to the EC, US$155.82 million (21%)

Source: OCHA FTS 2004 and OECD DAC Table 1
The UK supported 19 CAP appeals in 2005.

Figure 7.22.7  The UK’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005

Does the UK have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?
Yes. The UK introduced a GHD domestic implementation plan in July 2005. This is available from the GHD website: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/domestic-implementation.asp

The UK policy statement on humanitarian assistance, released in June 2006, set out plans to translate GHD commitments into practice.

The UK chaired GHD in 2005/6 and continues as joint chair with Denmark for 2006/7. It is by far the largest contributor to the CERF and has been a strong advocate of pooled funding and strengthening GHD at country level.

Has the UK’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?
Yes. The UK’s humanitarian assistance programme was peer reviewed in the first quarter of 2006. See: www.oecd.org/dac
7.23 The US

How much official development assistance (ODA) did the US give in 2005?
The US contributed US$27,457 million in ODA in 2005. This is 0.22% of the US’s gross national income (GNI).

How much humanitarian assistance does the US give?
The US gave US$2,483 million in humanitarian assistance in 2004. This means that the US was the largest DAC donor of humanitarian assistance in 2004.
The US gave US$8.50 per citizen in humanitarian assistance compared with US$67 in total ODA.
Humanitarian assistance was 13% of the US’s total ODA in 2004.

Figure 7.23.1 Total humanitarian assistance by DAC donor country, excluding domestic refugees, 2004

Figure 7.23.2 Shares of the US’s ODA to humanitarian and development assistance, 2004
What have the trends been in the volume of humanitarian assistance given by the US over the past ten years?

Humanitarian assistance from the US has increased by US$1021 million (71%) in real terms since 1995. Whilst amounts each year have varied from under US$840 million to nor far short of US$3 billion, the overall trend has been a rise in humanitarian spending over the decade.

**Figure 7.23.3** Total humanitarian assistance from the US excluding spending on domestic refugees, 1995–2004

Figures show both bilateral and multilateral spending. Please note that volumes shown are in constant 2003 prices to compare the trend over ten years. All other figures in the profile are in current prices.

Source: OECD DAC

Adjusted preliminary data shows that in 2005, the US increased its bilateral humanitarian assistance (including spending on domestic refugees) by US$613 million or 20%.

**Figure 7.23.4** US bilateral humanitarian assistance 2004 and preliminary figures for 2005 (current prices)

The 2004 bar shows the share of that year’s spending allocated to domestic refugee costs (shaded). The preliminary data for 2005 did not separate out this refugee spending.

Source: OECD DAC
Where does the US spend its humanitarian assistance?

Sudan received 20% of US humanitarian assistance in 2004. Ethiopia received 17% and Iraq and Palestine just over 6% each. The remaining 11 countries in the top 15 recipients of US humanitarian spending shared 37% of the support. A further 70 countries shared the remaining 13%.

![Figure 7.23.5: Top 15 recipients of humanitarian assistance from the US, 2004](source: OECD DAC)

How much humanitarian assistance does the US contribute through the consolidated appeal process (CAP) and as multilateral contributions?


In 2004, the US reported 43% of its humanitarian assistance to the FTS – 29% inside the CAP and 13% outside the CAP.

In 2004 all US humanitarian assistance contributions to multilateral agencies are included in the reported bilateral spending. This is

![Figure 7.23.6: Humanitarian assistance reported by the US to the FTS and amounts given as multilateral contributions, 2004](source: OCHA FTS 2004 and OECD DAC Table 1)
because contributions to multilateral agencies that are earmarked in any form are counted as bilateral ODA.


**Figure 7.23.7  The US’s contributions to CAP appeals, 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>US$553.41m</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 others</td>
<td>US$44.23m</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>US$21.44m</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>US$24.72m</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>US$29.38m</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>US$30.84m</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia earthquake</td>
<td>US$31.49m</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>US$41.25m</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami flash appeal</td>
<td>US$48.29m</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>US$49.98m</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>US$55.14m</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>US$59.34m</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>US$61.30m</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, US$21.44m (2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia, US$24.72m (2%)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Region, US$29.38m  (3%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea, US$61.30m (6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA FTS

**Does the US have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan?**

No.

**Has US humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC peer review process?**

No. The US humanitarian assistance programme is due to be included in the DAC peer review during 2006 but had not been completed at the time of writing this report. See: [www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/dac-peer-reviews.asp](http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/dac-peer-reviews.asp)
The EC is one of the most significant humanitarian donors. Its humanitarian assistance is provided primarily through the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) but additional funds flow through other EC mechanisms. Funding for the EC’s humanitarian assistance comes mainly from the EU budget but also from the European Development Fund (EDF).

**How much official development assistance (ODA) did the EC give in 2005?**

In 2005, ODA from the EC reached US$9.6 billion (£7.8 billion).

**How much humanitarian assistance do the EC and DG ECHO give?**

The EC remains one of the largest humanitarian aid donors – in 2004 it ranked fourth, smaller only than Japan, the UK and the US.

US$960 million was reported to the DAC as humanitarian assistance by the EC in 2004 – a 24% increase on 2003.

Humanitarian assistance represented 11% of the EC’s ODA in 2004, the highest level since 2000. In the late nineties humanitarian assistance was as much as 15% of EC ODA. This was mainly due to the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans.

DG ECHO’s budget has remained between US$500 million and US$600 million since 2000 and it is anticipated that the budget will remain unchanged in real terms. However, the addition of food aid to DG ECHO’s overall responsibilities will increase the volume of humanitarian resources under its management. Previous peaks in spending show the response to the Great Lakes crisis in 1994 and the Kosovo crisis in 1999.
How does DG ECHO channel its humanitarian assistance?

About 60% of DG ECHO’s budget is spent through European NGOs. It has not been deliberate DG ECHO policy to channel substantially more funding through NGOs than UN agencies or the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Where does DG ECHO spend its humanitarian assistance?

The Former Yugoslavia was a major recipient of DG ECHO assistance during the 1990s. Funding to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries has been increasing since 2002 but rose most sharply between 2003 and 2004, due to a contribution of €91 million to Sudan. Asia received more funding between 2001 and 2004 but humanitarian assistance to Latin America has declined from its peak in the year of Hurricane Mitch (1998).
Since 2001, DG ECHO has had a policy of focusing on ‘forgotten emergencies’ – crises that receive low levels of donor and media attention – and it has developed a methodology for identifying these.

The share of DG ECHO’s budget allocated to forgotten emergencies in 2004 was substantially higher than in previous years due to support for Sudan, which accounted for nearly half of spending on forgotten emergencies in 2004 (see table in Figure 7.24.6).
Does the EC have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)
domestic implementation plan?
DG ECHO has stated its commitment to the effective application of
GHD principles. Its humanitarian strategy is available at:

Has EC’s humanitarian assistance been included in the DAC
peer review process?
The EC has not yet had a peer review that includes humanitarian
assistance.

Key points about the EC’s humanitarian assistance
The EC attaches great importance to forgotten crises and to the allocation
of humanitarian assistance based on assessment of need. These
assessments combine field-level analyses by DG ECHO’s geographical
units and experts and a classification of developing countries according
to their degree of vulnerability as reflected by the global needs assess-
ment (GNA) and the forgotten crisis assessment (FCA).

In 2006, DG ECHO revised its methodology for central GNAs, adding
a vulnerability indicator and a crisis indicator to help it to distin-
guish better between natural or man-made crises on the one hand and
needs due to structural poverty on the other. Field assessment remains
critical because the national-level indicators cannot highlight different
conditions in different parts of a country and sometimes rely on na-
tional data that is a few years old.

The FCA is based on a combination of major humanitarian needs
as reflected by the GNA index, levels of media coverage, levels of
bilateral humanitarian assistance and a field assessment. Generally
forgotten crises are long-standing, protracted emergencies.

### Figure 7.24.6 Forgotten emergencies, expenditure 2001–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Forgotten emergency</th>
<th>Expenditure (€ million)</th>
<th>Share of budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Angola, Western Sahara and Chechnya</td>
<td>64.92</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Angola, Chechnya, Tanzania, Uganda, Western Sahara and Yemen</td>
<td>85.05</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Western Sahara, DRC, Myanmar, Angola, Burundi, DPRK, Philippines, Chechnya, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen</td>
<td>119.00</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Haiti, Western Sahara, Myanmar, Nepal, Russia (Chechnya), Sudan, Somalia, Thailand (Burmesorder) and Uganda</td>
<td>190.00</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECHO aid strategy documents and annual reports
DG ECHO is further developing its support for disaster preparedness to help local communities react rapidly and effectively. Regional and country level work will include attention to prevention of nutritional crises in West Africa and a drought preparedness programme in collaboration with DG Development and DG EuropeAid. DG ECHO also works on the reform of the humanitarian system and supports the coordination role of the UN.
7.25 Czech Republic

How much humanitarian aid does the Czech Republic give?

Humanitarian aid from the Czech Republic varied from just under US$0.5 million in 1997 to about US$2 million in 2004.

Where does the Czech Republic spend its humanitarian aid?

In both 2003 and 2004, the largest share of the Czech Republic’s humanitarian aid was given to Asian countries (76% in 2003 and 54% in 2004). The proportion of assistance given to African countries increased substantially between 2003 and 2004 – from 8% to 26%.

Almost all of the Czech Republic’s humanitarian aid goes to developing countries. However, in 2004 it also provided a rescue team to...
France in response to floods (valued at US$66 000) and just over US$45 000 to Japan in cash in the aftermath of an earthquake.

**General information the Czech Republic’s humanitarian assistance**

The Czech Republic does not have an official definition of humanitarian assistance or any legislation governing the provision of humanitarian aid. Since 1990, humanitarian aid has been determined by:

- the needs of the affected country – there has to be an official appeal for assistance by the affected country government
- the effectiveness of the assistance (to guide decisions about the type of assistance to be provided and what is possible for the Czech Republic).
7.26 Poland

How much official development assistance (ODA) does Poland give?

The Polish government reports its ODA spending to the DAC but as yet the DAC data does not provide a breakdown showing how much is for humanitarian assistance.

Where does Poland spend its humanitarian assistance?

In 2004, Poland reported its total humanitarian cash assistance as just under US$450 000, while in-kind aid totalled US$100 000. This amounts to 2.2% of Polish bilateral ODA. The largest amount (US$300 000) was given to South-East Asia in response to the tsunami. This was channelled through three Polish NGOs and the Polish Red Cross. Iran and the DPRK both received contributions of US$10 000. The assistance to Iran was in cash while the aid to DPRK was in kind (channelled through the Polish embassy). Aid to Darfur was provided both in cash (approximately US$135 000 to UNHCR) and in kind (valued at US$90 000 and provided through a Polish NGO).

In addition to the contribution of US$300 000 in 2004, the Polish government contributed a further US$650 000 in response to the tsunami in 2005. This comprised cash contributions of US$100 000 each to UNICEF, IOM and WHO; US$300 000 to Polish NGOs and US$50 000 to the Indonesian Red Crescent.

General information Poland’s humanitarian assistance

For many years, Poland provided technical, investment-oriented and financial aid to developing countries such as Vietnam and Yemen as well as some African countries. Its economic difficulties in the 1980s and the late 1990s imposed constraints on its ability to engage in...
international development cooperation. But, in the late 1990s Poland restarted its foreign aid programme.

The government of Poland does not have an official definition of humanitarian assistance. However, the “Strategy for Poland’s Development Cooperation” adopted in 2003 states that:

“In the name of international solidarity, Poland will extend humanitarian aid to countries struck by natural disasters, calamities, armed conflicts and refugee migrations. Food aid will be activated in situations of a sudden deterioration of the food security in a given region of the world, and will be conveyed through domestic or foreign non-governmental organisations and intergovernmental institutions, such as the World Food Program. In granting food aid, Poland will be guided by the needs of the recipient states.”

To ensure that Poland’s development policy is in line with the European Constitution and UN and OECD standards, the government prepared new legislation in 2005. This referred to humanitarian aid as follows:

“Humanitarian measures are to provide emergency assistance, relief and civil protection to the victims of natural disasters or catastrophes caused by a human being. Humanitarian measures should be guided by the principles of international humanitarian law and by the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence.”

However, a new government was appointed in 2005 following parliamentary and presidential elections. Therefore, the proposed legislation was withdrawn. There is currently no indication as to when – or whether – humanitarian aid legislation will be on the new government’s agenda.
7.27 Republic of Korea

How much official development assistance (ODA) does the Republic of Korea give?
The Republic of Korea reports on its ODA to the DAC.

Figure 7.27.1 Republic of Korea, ODA, 1993–2003

How much humanitarian assistance does the Republic of Korea give?
In its contributions to UN agencies and NGOs, the Republic of Korea does not distinguish between humanitarian and development assistance. Therefore, only assistance provided bilaterally by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) can be unequivocally defined as ‘humanitarian’.

Figure 7.27.2 Bilateral humanitarian assistance from KOICA, 2000–2004

The amounts of bilateral humanitarian assistance are quite modest when compared with the Republic of Korea’s ODA, ranging from just under US$3 million in 2002 (with a contribution of US$2 million to Afghanistan) to just over US$1 million in 2003 and 2004. At US$8.2 million, the volume of humanitarian assistance was substantially higher in 2001 than in other years. This was largely made up of contributions of US$4 million to Pakistan and US$1.5 million to Uzbekistan.

How does the Republic of Korea spend its humanitarian assistance?

In addition to KOICA’s bilateral humanitarian assistance, KOICA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) provide significant funding to UN agencies that undertake humanitarian activities (see Figure 7.27.3).

A conservative estimate of how much of the aid channelled through UN agencies is for humanitarian activities can be gained by adding total contributions to the agencies that engage almost exclusively in humanitarian activities – the ICRC, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP – as well as a 20% share of the contribution to UNICEF (since approximately 20% of UNICEF’s expenditure is on humanitarian aid). This calculation shows that the amount of humanitarian aid channelled through UN agencies varies from US$2.5 million in 2000 to a high of US$5.9 million in 2001 (due to higher than normal contributions to UNHCR and WFP). This then fell to around US$2 million in 2002 and 2003 before rising to US$3 million in 2004 (see Figure 7.27.4).

KOICA’s funding to NGOs for humanitarian and development activities grew steadily between 2000 and 2002. 2003 then saw a very sharp
increase to US$6.6 million, largely due to funding for assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2004, funding levels fell back again to just under US$1 million.

A breakdown of spending by activity is available for 2002–2004. This breakdown shows that a small share of the aid funding to NGOs is specifically allocated to humanitarian activities. In 2002, KOICA provided US$325 000 for humanitarian activities and in 2004 it gave US$102 000 for humanitarian assistance. This represented 23% and 11% respectively of its total funding. 2003, though, was an exception since KOICA provided US$3.6 million (54%) of its total funding to NGOs for humanitarian aid to Iraq and Afghanistan.

For 2002–2004 descriptions of the types of activities funded were available, allowing a breakdown of humanitarian and development spending.

Where does the Republic of Korea spend its humanitarian assistance?

The distribution of the Republic of Korea’s humanitarian assistance spending varies from year to year. Due to the substantial contributions to Pakistan and Uzbekistan in 2001, 80% of the bilateral humanitarian aid from KOICA went to Asia, with African countries receiving just 1% and other areas (such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Russia and Eastern European countries) getting 18%. In 2004 though, Asian countries received about 44% of KOICA’s bilateral humanitarian aid, while African countries got 25% and other countries got 30%.

The Republic of Korea provides substantial amounts of assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The channels used for providing this aid vary from year to year but NGOs have been used increasingly since 2000, while bilateral aid has also been significant since 1999.

General information on the Republic of Korea’s humanitarian assistance

A number of different government departments in the Republic of Korea can provide humanitarian assistance. Within MOFAT there is a Development Cooperation Division and a UN Division. 85% of the government’s grant aid (which includes humanitarian aid) is managed by KOICA.
7.28 South Africa

How much humanitarian assistance does South Africa give?
South African humanitarian aid has generally been over US$1 million since 1997/8 (only falling to US$789 000 in 2001/2). However, 2002/3 was an exceptional year because the South African treasury approved a special allocation of US$16.3 million to the WFP to provide assistance to Mali. (Note that the rand fell steadily in value against the US dollar from US$0.28 in 1995 to US$0.096 in 2002 before recovering again to US$0.16 in 2004.)

![Figure 7.28.1](source: South African Department of Foreign Affairs)

How does South Africa spend its humanitarian aid?
The bulk of South Africa’s humanitarian assistance is provided through the UN. In 2002/3, due to the grant of US$16.3 million to WFP, almost 99% of humanitarian assistance is shown as going through UN agencies.

The South African government makes a statutory contribution to the ICRC each year. The share of its humanitarian aid spent through the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has varied from a high of over 40% in 1995/6 and 1996/7 to between 15% and 25% in other years. Although contributions to Movement amounted to US$165 000 in 2002/3, this represents less than 1% of South Africa’s total humanitarian assistance that year due to the size of the government’s contribution to WFP.

Bilateral assistance usually accounts for a very small share of South Africa’s humanitarian aid. 2001/2, when almost 30% was given bilaterally, was a notable exception. This comprised a contribution of ZAR1 million (US$235 000) to Cuba in response to a hurricane. In 2003/4, the South African government gave ZAR1 million
(US$133,000), which represented just over 14% of its total humanitarian assistance that year, to Palestine.

**Figure 7.28.2 Humanitarian aid spending by channel, 1995/6–2004/5**

![Graph showing humanitarian aid spending by channel, 1995/6–2004/5.](source: South African Department of Foreign Affairs)

The share of humanitarian aid shown as being spent through the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) represents contributions to the OAU special refugee contingency fund. As a share of the government’s total humanitarian aid, this has ranged from over 10% in 1998/9 to about 1% since 2001/2.

**Where does South Africa spend its humanitarian assistance?**

Given that much of South Africa’s humanitarian assistance takes the form of contributions to the general programmes of agencies like UNHCR and the ICRC, it is difficult to get a full breakdown of where this humanitarian assistance is spent. The limited data available shows that between 30%–50% of South Africa’s humanitarian assistance goes to African countries. Again, 2002/3 is an exception because of the US$16.3 million in assistance to Mali.

**General information on South Africa’s humanitarian assistance**

South Africa’s humanitarian assistance department is a small department located within the Social Development Directorate in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The South African government first developed a policy to provide humanitarian aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 1994, though it had provided humanitarian assistance before then (such as facilitating the transportation of a mobile hospital donated by a Muslim NGO, Gift of the Givers Foundation, to Mostar in 1992).

The original geographical focus of South Africa’s humanitarian aid
was gradually extended as the government came to respond to natural disasters such as an earthquake in Turkey in 1999 and earthquakes in Iran and India.

**Figure 7.28.3** Shares of South Africa’s assistance to African countries, 1995/6–2004/5

The government has not articulated specific criteria for interventions but it aims to provide aid on purely humanitarian grounds (rather than strategic interest) in emergencies which are too significant to ignore or when there is an opportunity to provide assistance. However, it did provide aid to Darfur in 2004 since the South African government was involved in peace negotiations in Sudan.
8 Basic concepts, definitions and methodology

8.1 Methodology

8.1.1 What are the main sources of data?

OECD DAC online databases
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database provides disbursement data for DAC donor members:
- Table 1 for all disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) and bilateral emergency distress relief from 1960–2004
- Table 2a for all disbursements of ODA and bilateral emergency and distress relief by recipient country and region and ODA to multilateral agencies.
- Table 5 for all commitments by sector
- Table 7b for tying status of ODA.
- reference section – indicators for population, GNI, GNI per capita for all developing countries and regions.

The creditor reporting system (CRS) database provides data on commitments made by all DAC members, broken down by detailed sub-sector and countries/regions:
- Table 1 for all commitments and all details, 1973–2004.

The OECD DAC will release official aid data for 2005 in December 2006. The 2005 figures in this report are therefore based on the preliminary data, which was released in April 2006. See: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dac/reftables

The preliminary data for 2005 was adjusted for the purposes of GHA 2006 in order to take account of forthcoming revisions arising from the reallocation of some reconstruction expenditure to other sectors.

Additional analysis is taken from the statistical reference tables of the OECD DAC Annual Development Cooperation Report. See: www.oecd.org/dac

UN OCHA financial tracking system (FTS)
The financial tracking system (FTS) of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) captures voluntary statements of contributions to humanitarian assistance from over 100 countries, validated by the agencies receiving the contributions.

FTS data primarily covers contributions for countries that are a
subject of a CAP appeal or in response to a natural disaster and which have been reported to the FTS either by the donor or by the recipient agency. www.ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx and www.reliefweb.int/FTS/

Humanitarian aid departments of donor governments, UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, selected NGOs and other international organisations

Additional data has been compiled from the humanitarian aid departments of donor governments, UN agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, selected NGOs and other international organisations.

8.1.2 How do you deal with inflation and exchange rates?
Where data has been shown at constant prices, the figures have been deflated using the DAC deflators. DAC deflators, along with annualised exchange rates, are available at www.oecd.org/dac

8.2 Basic concepts and definitions

0.7% 
0.7% refers to the repeated commitment of donor governments to commit 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) to ODA.
The DAC has been measuring this indicator since the UN adopted the standard following the Pearson Commission recommendations in 1970. This is a fair comparison between countries because it measures the share of national wealth that is given as aid. The volume can fluctuate year by year as the economy grows or shrinks, but aid as a share of GNI remains a clear, fair way to compare the effort of different donors.

By June 2005, 16 of the 22 DAC countries had agreed to meet the 0.7% target by 2015. In addition, the original EU15 member states agreed to set timetables to meet the target by 2015. The “new” EU countries (the accession countries that joined the EU after 2002) have committed to achieve 0.33% by 2015. Five countries surpassed the 0.7% target in 2005 – Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

Aid tying/untying
Tied aid is only measured for bilateral ODA commitments and can be classified as either tied, partially tied or untied. The technical cooperation and food aid components of bilateral aid are not included.
The DAC produces an annual report on progress on aid untying to least developed countries (LDCs). See www.oecd.org/dac and go to ‘untied aid’.

Bilateral aid/assistance
The term ‘bilateral’ is used to describe aid that is controlled and spent by donor countries at their own discretion. This may include staff, supplies, equipment, funding to recipient governments and funding to NGOs. It also includes assistance channelled as earmarked funding through international and UN organisations.
| Central emergency response fund (CERF) | The central emergency revolving fund (CERF) was established in 1991 as a fund of US$50 million given as a one-off contribution by donors. By 2004, due to the accumulation of interest, the CERF had US$50 million in the bank and US$15 million on loan. In December 2005 a new expanded CERF (this time the central emergency response fund) was approved by the General Assembly officially launched on 9 March 2006. The new CERF has a grant element of US$450 million in addition to the US$50 million loan element. Up to two-thirds of the grant facility can be allocated to rapid response to emergencies while the remaining third will be devoted to addressing underfunded emergencies. In principle, when an agency has donor funds in the pipeline, it will be expected to use the loan element of the CERF so that the grant element is used only when donor funding is not available. The CERF is now managed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) on behalf of the Secretary-General, under the guidance of an advisory group of 12 independent experts – eight from the grant facility contributors and four from a range of partners and stakeholders (such as NGOs, academics and the private sector). The ERC is to disburse funds within three or four days of a request from a humanitarian or resident coordinator, so lack of funding should no longer constrain UN agencies from responding quickly. The specific allocation of one-third of the grant element to underfunded crises should also help address current inequities in funding. See: http://ochaonline.un.org/cap/ |
| Cluster approach | The cluster approach refers to a mechanism for sector coordination introduced by the UN in December 2005 to “enhance the ability of the ERC (globally) and the humanitarian coordinators (on the ground) to manage humanitarian response effectively”. See: http://ochaonline.un.org/cap/ |
| Commitment | A commitment refers to the firm – but not legally binding – pledges of assistance made by donors. |
| Common humanitarian action plan (CHAP) | The common humanitarian action plan (CHAP) is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region. It provides: a common analysis of the context in which humanitarian takes place an assessment of needs best, worst, and most likely scenarios identification of roles and responsibilities, i.e. who does what and where a clear statement of longer-term objectives and goals a framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary. The CHAP is the foundation for developing a consolidated appeal. Under the leadership of the humanitarian coordinator, the CHAP is developed at the field level by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) country team. This includes UN agencies, and standing invitees, i.e. the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs that belong to International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Interaction, or Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). Non-IASC members, such as national NGOs, can be included and other key stakeholders in humanitarian action, in particular host governments and donors, are consulted. |
| Concessionality level | A measure of the ‘softness’ of a credit reflecting the benefit to the borrower compared to a loan at market rate (c.f. grant element). Technically, it is calculated as the difference between the nominal value of a tied aid credit and the present value of the debt service as of the date of disbursement, calculated at a discount rate applicable to the currency of the transaction and expressed as a percentage of the nominal value. |
### Consolidated appeal

A consolidated appeal is a tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response to complex and/or major emergencies within the consolidated appeals process (CAP). Consolidated appeals are triggered by the UN’s ERC and IASC in consultation with the humanitarian coordinator, and IASC country team. The government of the affected country is also consulted. See also “flash appeal”.

### Consolidated appeals process (CAP)

The objective of the CAP is to set a common strategy and to implement a coordinated response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. The ability to fulfil this objective depends on the extent to which the programmes within the CAP are funded. The CAP aims to coordinate:
- strategic planning leading to a common humanitarian action plan (CHAP)
- resource mobilisation (via a consolidated or flash appeal)
- programme implementation
- joint monitoring, evaluation and reporting.


### Constant prices

Constant (real terms) figures show how expenditure has changed over time after removing the effects of exchange rates and inflation. DAC deflators along with annualised exchange rates, are available at: [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac).

### Debt relief

Debt relief may take the form of cancellation, rescheduling, refinancing or reorganisation:
- debt cancellation is relief from the burden of repaying both the principal and interest on past loans — most of the poorest countries have had outstanding debt arising from past aid loans cancelled
- debt rescheduling is a form of relief where principal or interest payments are delayed or rearranged
- debt refinancing is where a new loan or grant is arranged to enable the debtor country to meet the service payments on an earlier loan.

Official bilateral debts are reorganised in the Paris Club of official bilateral creditors.

### Developing countries

Developing countries are all countries and territories in Africa; in America (except the US, Canada, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Falkland Islands); in Asia (except Japan, Brunei, Hong Kong, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan and United Arab Emirates); in the Pacific (except Australia and New Zealand) and Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey and the states of ex-Yugoslavia in Europe.

### Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

The DAC is the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Its members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK, the US and the European Commission (EC). These members have “agreed to secure an expansion of aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to improve their effectiveness”. The DAC, which was set up in 1960, sets the rules for what can and cannot be counted as ODA.

Reporting to the DAC is mandatory for all DAC members. What is reported as ODA is governed by strict rules that all members must comply with. This means that there are objective, internationally comparable figures for ODA going back to 1960, which are produced and validated by the OECD DAC each year. These provide an accepted benchmark for measuring performance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disbursement</th>
<th>The release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. In the case of activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded gross (the total amount disbursed over a given accounting period) or net (less any repayments of loan principal during the same period).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>The Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) heads the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The ERC post was created by UN resolution on December 1991 to coordinate the efforts of the special representatives of the UN Secretary-General to complex, man-made emergencies and the tasks of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), who handles natural disasters. Shortly thereafter the Secretary-General named the Emergency Relief Coordinator as a USG, specifically as USG for Humanitarian Affairs. Jan Egeland of Norway has been serving in this role since August 2003. He replaced Kenzo Oshima of Japan who served in that capacity from 2001–2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Emergency response funds (ERFs) | ERFs are project funds, managed by OCHA in-country, for short-term NGO (and occasionally, as in the case of DRC and Somalia, UN agency) projects of around US$100 000–US$150 000. ERFs are usually set up at the suggestion of donors and can enable:  
- quick response to sudden emergencies/improved response preparedness  
- gap-filling in humanitarian response, such as enabling organisations to start emergency work while waiting for funding from other donors or enabling agencies to provide service continuity when there are gaps in funding from other sources  
- the supplementing of other funding to reach more beneficiaries  
- flexible responses to changing local priorities.  
The ERF mechanism has come into increasing use since its first appearance in 1993. OCHA launched a review of the ERF mechanism in February 2006. |
| European Development Fund (EDF) | The EDF finances development cooperation between the EC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) under the Cotonou Agreement (and formerly, the Lomé Convention). It is an intergovernmental fund managed by the EC and financed on a voluntary basis by the member states. |
| Financial tracking system (FTS) | OCHA’s FTS captures voluntary statements of contributions to humanitarian assistance from over 100 countries. FTS data primarily covers contributions for countries that are a subject of a CAP appeal or in response to a natural disaster and that have been reported to the FTS either by the donor or by the recipient agency. See http://www.reliefweb.int/FTS/ |
| Flash appeal | A flash appeal is a tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response to sudden onset emergencies. It is triggered by the UN’s humanitarian coordinator in consultation with the IASC country team and following endorsement by the ERC and the IASC. The government of the affected country is also consulted. Flash appeals are issued within two to four weeks of an emergency. They are designed to cover urgent life-saving needs and early recovery projects that can be implemented within the first three to six months of an emergency. See also “consolidated appeal”. |
| G8 | The G8 countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US. |
| **Global humanitarian assistance** | A term used within the context of the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) project to provide a guesstimate of global expenditure on humanitarian assistance. It includes:  
- total humanitarian assistance (see separate definition)  
- donations to NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and UN agencies by members of the general public  
- certain expenditure by DAC donor governments that falls outside the official definition of either ODA or humanitarian assistance (security expenditure and activities such as mine clearance, for example)  
- the activities of governments that are not part of the DAC (‘non-DAC’ donors). In spite of efforts to be all encompassing, this calculation still excludes local response and remittances from family members and diaspora communities. Compare: “humanitarian assistance” and “total humanitarian assistance”. |
| **Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA)** | GHA is an independent project, established by Development Initiatives in 1999 to monitor funding for humanitarian action. The 2004–2007 phase of the project is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). |
| **Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)** | The GHD initiative was created by donor governments at a meeting in Stockholm in 2003 with the idea of working towards achieving efficient and principled humanitarian assistance. The initiative provides a forum for donors to discuss good practice in funding humanitarian assistance and other shared concerns. By defining principles and standards it provides both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor accountability. See: www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org |
| **Gross national income (GNI)** | The total value of goods and services produced within a country (i.e. its gross domestic product (GDP)), together with income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less similar payments made to other countries. |
| **Humanitarian assistance** | In this report, humanitarian assistance is the term used to describe the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. Humanitarian assistance includes both responses by local communities and governments of affected countries and the international response to crises. This report deals mainly with the international flows of humanitarian assistance that include the part of ODA that is allocated to emergency response, reconstruction and disaster prevention and also the resources given by the public through NGOs, the private sector, international organisations and informal channels. The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative has been working on a common definition of humanitarian assistance for statistical and reporting purposes and a new official DAC definition of humanitarian assistance was awaiting final approval at the time of writing. |
| **Inter-Agency Standing Committee** | The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It involves UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The IASC was established in June 1992 in response to the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance. |
| **Inside the CAP appeal** | Funds given by donors for needs identified within a consolidated or flash appeal. |
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the time-bound, quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty that were agreed by world leaders at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. The eight MDGs, which have a target date of 2015, are:

- Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty
- Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education
- Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women
- Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality
- Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health
- Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases
- Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability
- Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development


Multilateral agency
International institutions with governmental membership that conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of developing and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g. the World Bank and regional development banks), UN agencies, and regional groupings (e.g. certain EU and Arab agencies).

Multilateral ODA
Multilateral ODA is funding given to UN agencies, international organisations or the EC to spend entirely at their own discretion within their mandate. It cannot be earmarked in any way. Compare “bilateral assistance”.

Needs analysis framework (NAF)
The NAF aims to support the common humanitarian action plan (CHAP) and the consolidated appeal process (CAP) by strengthening the analysis and presentation of humanitarian needs, especially for the most vulnerable people. The document is a tool to help humanitarian coordinators and country teams organise and present existing information on humanitarian needs in a coherent and consistent way. Following pilots in five countries during 2005 (Palestine, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda and Burundi), it is estimated that the NAF document will be integrated into three-quarters of CAP appeals during 2006.

Official aid/assistance
Government assistance with the same terms and conditions as ODA but which goes to countries and territories in transition (i.e. including former aid recipients, Central and Eastern European countries and the newly independent states (NIS). Official aid does not count towards the 0.7% target.

Official development assistance (ODA)
Official development assistance (ODA) is money spent on development and humanitarian assistance by members of the OECD DAC. ODA is made up of grants or concessionary loans given by the official sector to a defined list of developing countries. The promotion of economic development and welfare must be the main objective. If a loan is given, the grant element must be at least 25%. Loans or grants for military purposes cannot count as ODA. Reporting to the DAC is mandatory for all DAC members. What is reported as ODA is governed by strict rules that all members must comply with. This means that there are objective, internationally comparable figures for ODA going back to 1960, which are produced and validated by the OECD DAC each year. These provide an accepted benchmark for measuring performance.

Outside the CAP appeal
Funds given by donors for a country that is the subject of a consolidated or flash appeal but not for the specific needs identified within the appeal document.

Remittances
Private transfers between individuals — often relatives or friends — in another country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft loan</td>
<td>A loan where the terms are more favourable to the borrower than those currently attached to commercial market terms. It is described as concessional and the degree of concessionality is expressed as its grant element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tied aid</td>
<td>Official or officially supported loans, credits or aid packages where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries which does not include substantially all developing countries. Tied aid credits are subject to certain disciplines concerning their concessionality levels, the countries to which they may be directed, and their development relevance so as to avoid using aid funds on projects that would be commercially viable with market finance, and to ensure that recipient countries receive good value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Total humanitarian assistance | In this report, total humanitarian assistance is calculated by adding the following:  
  - total bilateral ODA for emergency and distress relief from all DAC donors  
  - ODA from the EC for emergency and distress relief  
  - total multilateral contributions to UNHCR and UNRWA  
  - multilateral contributions to WFP in proportion to the share of WFP’s operational expenditure allocated to relief.  
  Compare “humanitarian assistance” and “global humanitarian assistance”. |
| Untied aid                | ODA for which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.                                                                                                   |
### 8.3 Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated appeals process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central emergency response fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHAP</td>
<td>Common humanitarian action plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Assistance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (formerly European Community Humanitarian Aid department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Forgotten crisis assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial tracking system (OCHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Global needs assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>High income countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily indebted poor countries debt initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMC</td>
<td>International Catholic Migration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFAIS</td>
<td>International Food Aid Information System (WFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least developed country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multidonor trust fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>Needs analysis framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA USAID</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Tsunami Evaluation Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WV US</td>
<td>World Vision US</td>
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</tbody>
</table>